This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`



MAN:

A STORY OF LIGHT AND DARKNESS.

"THE NIGHT IS FAR SPENT,
THE DAY IS AT HAND."
ROM. XIII. 12.

BY THE

REV. HENRY GREENE,

CHAPLAIN TO THE BRITISH AT PISA, AND THE BATHS OF LUCCA.

"Dark, though not blind, like thee, Mæonides;
Or Milton, thee. Ah! could I reach your strains,
Or his who made Mæonides our own!
Man, too, he sung: immortal man I sing.
* * * * * *
Oh, had he press'd his theme, pursued the track
Which opens out of darkness into day:
Or had he mounted on the wing of fire,
Soared where I sink, and sung immortal man—
How had it bless'd mankind, and rescued me!"

LONDON:
WILLIAM MACINTOSH, 24, PATERNOSTER-ROW.
1866.

141. i. 39.

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND

W. J. TROWER, D.D.,

LORD BISHOP OF GIBRALTAR,

This Work

IS RESPECTFULLY AND GRATEFULLY DEDICATED BY

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THE apparently ambitious title of this really unpretending work may seem to require some explanation.

In tardy compliance with an often repeated request from friends on whose judgment he relied, the author undertook to prepare a selection of his sermons for the press. Subsequent consideration, however, led to the belief that their subject-matter might be more advantageously treated in the form of a connected work than in that of pulpit discourses; and a growing sense of the interest and importance of some of the topics discussed in one of them bearing upon light and darkness, has induced him to expand it, with extracts from others, and much new matter, into the present publication, of which the name, although he wishes it were more modest, could hardly, he thinks, have been more appropriate. The work was intended at first for little more than a brief and popular compilation. The author's design was to make it a sort of net-work of quotations and references woven into the form of a narrative. But his peculiar position prevented him from carrying this

intention into execution. The book has been written at intervals both of health and leisure, at a distance not only from the publisher, but from some of the best authorities, and from any literary friend from whom he could derive counsel or assistance. It is the author's first work, and his ignorance of the time allowed for the correction of a manuscript has caused him to leave a large portion of his own almost wholly unrevised. But, though deeply sensible of the many imperfections of his work, he still hopes that He whose strength is made perfect in weakness, will bless this effort, however humble, to promote His glory, and to vindicate the truth and importance of His own word.

CONTENTS.

THE CHAPTER OF LIGHT.

Page

I. The Creation of Man 1

His Story not yet fully told.
Divided into Day, Night, and Day or Night, for ever.
A Tale of deep interest, with a most instructive Moral, and a Tale of which the truest part is supposed by many to be apocryphal; that part recorded in the Bible, which may be called, in one sense, Man's Biography.
It speaks of the antiquity of the human race; its origin, its unity, its cradle, its early happiness, its fatal fall, its earlier kingdoms, its religious history, and its final destiny.
The first five of these the subjects of this Chapter.
The Birth of Man.
Date of it not positively ascertained.
Controversy respecting the Antiquity of Man.

II. The Origin of Man 10

Scriptural Account.
An Opposing Theory.
Reasons for believing, independently of Scripture, that Man might have been made in the image of God.
Meaning of the words, "God's image."

III. The Unity of the Human Race 48

IV. The Birthplace of Man 49

V. Early Happiness of Man 55

Agreeable to reason, that his first condition should be a happy one.

The ORIGIN of evil a hopeless mystery.
But our concern is only here with its appearance upon earth; and the Scriptural account of this more satisfactory than any other.
Students of nature, in search of simple truth, have our cordial good wishes.
Value of the argument from the analogy of nature.
The purity of Man's happiness in the beginning.
It was then "DAY."
A coming Change.
Sin involved Darkness.
IT WAS NIGHT.

THE CHAPTER OF DARKNESS.

Being an attempt to prove the reality, the nature, and the consequences of the Fall, and to answer modern scientific objections.

Page
THE DARKNESS OF IGNORANCE 71
THE DARKNESS OF DELUSION 128
THE DARKNESS OF SIN AND SORROW . . . 147
THE DARKNESS ACKNOWLEDGED 205
THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH PREACHERS OF THE DARKNESS 223
SCRIPTURE PREACHES THE DARKNESS . . . 249
THE STORY OF THE DARKNESS 296
ANOTHER STORY OF THE DARKNESS . . . 344
LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS 384
THE NIGHT WATCHES 428

THE CHAPTER OF LIGHT.

"Hail, holy Light! offspring of heaven first-born."
"Celestial light,
Shine inward, and the mind, through all her powers
Irradiate; there plant eyes; all mist from thence
Purge and disperse."

On the fifth day or period of this Creation, the Spirit of God had moved upon the face of the waters. The first morning had broken the primeval darkness. The heavenly bodies had begun their measured march. Earth was green with its earliest vegetation. Ocean's tenantry were sporting in its mighty waters. The air had been musical with the first song of morning birds; and every terrestrial creature, except the noblest, had found a home in sea, river, lake, valley, grove, wood, cave, or mountain. But a being was wanted who, in the "silent homage of the heart, and uttered sounds of worship," could glorify aright the common Creator.* God had created a beautiful world. It was a contrivance; but only celestial observers could appreciate its skilfulness. It was a palace; but no sovereign had occupied its

* Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ
Deerat adhuc et quod dominari in cætera posset
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

apartments. It was a temple; but no priest had ministered as yet upon its altars. And so, in pursuance of a design formed from eternity, "God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." Accordingly, the dust of the earth was vitalized with the breath of Omnipotence, "and man became a living soul."

Such, according to Scripture, is the commencement of that strange and stirring tale, the human story. Like a circle, or a line returning into itself, it begins with Paradise, and will end, as regards many of the millions whose history it records, with Paradise again. Much of it is yet untold; but when fully published, it will be found to have divided the life of man, considered collectively, into three successive periods. The first may be called Day; the second, Night; and the third, Day or Night for ever. It is a tale, as all acknowledge, of thrilling interest; and angels, we doubt not, study it with rapt and profound attention.

It has a moral whose meaning few can miss, and whose importance none can exaggerate; and is recorded partly in uninspired history and partly in the pages of Divine revelation. But it is just this latter portion of the story which, though written by God Himself, is deemed in these doubting days to be, to a great extent, apocryphal; and the portion whose truthfulness it is one of the objects of these pages to vindicate.

There are many volumes in which the rise and fall of earthly kingdoms, and all that concerns us as members of society, are registered. But whatever affects us most, as immortal and responsible creatures, is written in a book which, as the book of all books, is called

emphatically *the* book, or the Bible. This, then, in one sense—and that the highest—may be called Man's Biography. It supplies us with information respecting the antiquity of the human race—its origin—its unity—its cradle—its early happiness—its fatal fall—its first kingdoms—its religious history—and its final destiny. But of these it is only the first five that, in this chapter, are to engage our attention.

The Bible, too, has *its* story; and the singular fortunes of that wonderful volume—its authors, its antiquity, its preservation, its foes, its martyrs, its vicissitudes, its circulation, and its victories—while they helped to substantiate its high pretensions, would constitute a narrative which could hardly be read with indifference.* But as our subject at present is not the history of man's biography, but that of man himself, we begin it with his birth.

I.—The date of this memorable event is registered in heaven; but on earth is now, and is likely long to continue, the subject of much controversy. The chronology of Scripture is not sufficiently understood to enable us to fix it with precision. The traditions of eastern nations assign to it a fabulous antiquity; profane history is silent respecting the duration of the misty ages of mythology; and the data furnished as yet by archæologists and geologists, are too vague to sustain any but a very conjectural conclusion.

The question now so much agitated, whether the antiquity of the human race is not greater than that

* The Bible Society has published a well-known work, called "The Book and its Story;" but it is hardly full enough.

which the received chronology allows, is by no means new, and many Christian writers—such as Julius Africanus, Eusebius, and Syncellus, have held that the interval between the creation of the world and the birth of the Saviour was greater by many centuries than four thousand years. This opinion was also maintained by Michaelis; and Dr. Pritchard, unable to reconcile the main conclusion of his great work, namely, that all mankind are the offspring of a single pair, with the short period allowed by the received chronology of Scripture for the development of the numerous physical varieties which distinguish the human race, contends that Scripture affords no means of ascertaining how many centuries, or even how many chiliads of years may have elapsed between the creation of man and the arrival of Abraham in Palestine. (See "Physical Researches," Appendix to last volume.) He rejects, however, the vast periods of the Indian and Egyptian fabulists.*

There certainly does appear at first to be a convergence of proof from many different lines of argument to this one conclusion—the necessity for some expansion of our recognized chronology. These may be classified under the following heads—ethnological, geological, linguistic, and historical. Under the first may be included the difficulty already noticed of otherwise accounting for all the physical varieties of man, on the supposition of their origin from a single pair. Under the second, the discovery of flint implements in strata and under circumstances which would go to prove that

* See also "Hale's Chronology."

man was contemporaneous with animals which were extinct it would appear many thousands of years before the historic era. Under the third, the growth of languages; which it is supposed must have occupied a much longer period than agrees with our present chronology. And under the fourth, historical evidence in connection with ancient monuments, national traditions, and the length of time which must have been required for the population, the settled form of government, and the political institutions of Egypt in particular, which existed at the very early period at which they come before us in the clear light of history.

But not one of all these arguments can be fairly considered as quite conclusive. The two first, derived from the physical varieties of man, and from geology, assume a fact which can never, perhaps, be thoroughly established; and that is, that the causes of change, as they affect both man and the earth which he inhabits, operate always with the same, or nearly with the same intensity. The linguistic argument ignores the Scriptural account of the confusion of tongues, and is based besides on a mere theory of language—a theory, too, which some of the most distinguished philologists have pronounced untenable; while the historical argument rests upon data most of which must be regarded as obscure and unsatisfactory—fragmentary notices, hieroglyphical inscriptions, lists of kings, (many of whom might have reigned, not successively, but contemporaneously,) mythological sovereigns, and traditions of incredible antiquity originating in national vanity.

It should be remembered, too, that there is counter-

evidence to prove the comparatively recent origin of man; that M. Bunsen—perhaps the ablest of all Egyptologers who contend for a greatly enlarged chronology—has advanced arguments which we think Mr. Rawlinson and others have fully answered; and that he has been clearly convicted of dealing unfairly with the lists of Manetho, his favourite authority; (see "Aids to Faith;") that other students of Egyptian antiquities, and students of great eminence, have come to conclusions widely differing from his; and that we can hardly be expected to place implicit confidence in the inferences of learned antiquarians, who, while they agree in rejecting the received chronology, are yet, on other points, irreconcileably opposed to one another, since one of them allows only eighty or ninety years for the stay of the Israelites in Egypt, while another assigns no less a period than 1434! and since the estimates made of the Hyksos period vary from three or four centuries to fourteen or fifteen.*

* Answers to Sir Charles Lyell's work on the Antiquity of Man have appeared in the "Witness" newspaper. See also a reply to his arguments in an "Examination of Sir Charles Lyell's recent work," by S. R. Patteson, F.G.S., who, having examined all Sir Charles's witnesses, claims the verdict of '*not proven*' on the issue joined; and "Scientific Theories on the Origin of Man reprinted from the 'Record.'" Doctor Wilson, in his work on "Prehistoric Man," thus concludes,—"Here it is obvious we are dealing with no incomprehensible cycles of time. There are, indeed, difficult questions still requiring the illumination which further observation and discovery may be expected to supply, nor have such been evaded in these researches; but the present tendency is greatly to exaggerate such difficulties. The first steps in

Even if these and similar arguments were unanswerable, they would only demonstrate that, on a point which in no way concerns the salvation of our souls, or any of the main objects of Divine revelation, the text of Scripture has been tampered with; and so far from regretting the discovery of any such trifling errors, whatever their cause, we rejoice at any criticism that may bring them to light, and help us to eliminate from the pure Word of God these human additions. For in this way we may hope to obtain at last, in its original state, that divinely inspired record which, in its pristine purity, "has God for its Author, salvation for its end, and truth, without any mixture of error, for its subject-matter." The truest friend to light is the truest friend to Christianity; and we shall acknowledge that Scripture has been in some places misinterpreted, mistranslated, or even interpolated, whenever such passages are not to be reconciled with *demonstrated facts;* firmly convinced that the necessary emendations will only restore the text to the state in which it first appeared. But we deny that any such facts have as yet been established, and agree with Mr.

the process thus indicated cannot be reduced to a precise chronology. The needful compass of their duration may be subject of dispute, and the precise number of centuries that shall be allowed for their evolution may vary according to the estimated rate of progress of infantile human reason; but I venture to believe that to many reflecting minds it will appear that by such a process of inquiry we do in reality make so near an approach to a beginning in relation to man's intellectual progress, that we can form no uncertain guess at the duration of the race, and find in this respect a welcome evidence of harmony between the disclosures of Science and the dictates of Revelation."

Rawlinson in thinking that, "nothing has as yet been really discovered, either in the facts of history or those of language, that militates against the chronological scheme of Scripture, if we regard the Septuagint and Samaritan versions as the best exponents of the original text in respect of the genealogy of the Patriarchs, from Shem to Abraham. Whether the chronology of those versions admits of further expansion; whether, since the chronologies of the Hebrew Bible, the Samaritan Pentateuch, and the Septuagint, differ, we can depend upon any one of them; or whether we must not consider that this portion of revelation has been lost to us by the mistakes of copyists, or the intentional alterations of systematizers, it is not necessary at present to determine. 'Our treasure is in *earthen* vessels.' The revealed Word of God has been continued in the world in the same way as other written compositions, by the multiplication of copies. No miraculous aid is vouchsafed to the transcribers, who are liable to make mistakes, and may not always have been free from the design of bending Scripture to their own views. That we have a wonderfully pure and perfect text of the Pentateuch, considering its antiquity, is admitted; but doubts must ever attach to the chronology, not only because in all ancient MSS. numbers are especially liable to accidental corruption, but also, and more especially, from the fact that there is so wide a difference in this respect between the Hebrew, the Samaritan, and the Greek copies. Still, at present, we have no need to suppose that the numbers have in every case suffered." ("Aids to Faith," pages 263-4.)

It ought never to be forgotten, that even the strictest believer in the inspiration of the Bible has never contended for the inspiration of its translators or its transcribers: nothing but a continued, a stupendous, and, we argue, a useless miracle, could preserve the Sacred Volume from *all possible* corruption. And are we to suppose that the Deity must miraculously interfere to prevent every error that the omission or insertion of a figure, a letter, or even a dot, might occasion in a matter, not of doctrine or of practice, but of mere chronology? If the Bible be the oldest book in existence—if it be intended for translation into every language under heaven, and if, to give it the requisite currency, it must have been rendered into different tongues, dead as well as living, imperfectly known as well as well-known, and therefore have passed through the hands of many translators and many copyists, from century to century—how endless must have been the miracles, which alone could secure it from trifling interpolation. The real wonder is, not that Divine Providence has not interposed, specially and repeatedly, to prevent every possible error that might have otherwise crept into the text, but that errors of this kind have not been far more numerous than they are; and in arguing for the uncorrupted preservation of the Scriptures, all that we contend for is, that they have come down to us without any such change as would materially affect a single precept of duty, or a single article of belief. It is right that all this should be clearly understood by Christians in general, for otherwise their faith may be disturbed by discoveries, for which well-instructed believers have all

along been prepared, and which can cause them no perplexity.

II.—Another of those disputed points, upon which the results of modern research are supposed to be at variance with the Scriptural story of man, regards his origin. The Bible informs us, that he was created by an express act of the Deity; that he was made from the dust of the earth; that God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, thus making him a living soul; and that he was made in the image and likeness of the Creator. But certain physiologists and comparative anatomists have argued, on the contrary, that he is only the latest development of some inferior animal!! Fortunately, the highest authorities in these departments of science have come to a totally different conclusion. Yet the grounds on which, independently of Scripture, we believe that the first of our race *might have* been made in the image of God, are worth considering, since they show that the conclusions of modern science, as explained by its ablest professors, harmonize completely with the simple and sublime account which Scripture has given us of the Genesis of man; and because they are the groundwork of a striking argument from analogy, in favour of Divine revelation.

It appears, then, from some of the latest discoveries of geology, that though our race may be older than is generally imagined, we must yet be either almost or altogether the youngest of all the teeming tenantry of the globe that we inhabit. (See Sir Henry Holland's Lectures on scientific and other subjects: Note to the last essay.) Nor can it be doubted, that if the youngest,

we are also the noblest. It is equally clear, that if geology be true, and the fact of a personal Creator be once admitted, He has made provision in all the earlier changes which earth has undergone, not only for the wants, but even for the enjoyments, of that immortal creature who was one day to be His worshipper. Feelings of the liveliest wonder and gratitude ought to be elicited from the devout believer, as, guided by the light which geology throws, not only on pre-historic, but pre-human ages, he contemplates the prospective and far-reaching benevolence of the mighty God who, during all that distant past, had been providing for his happiness. "The comfort of man is dependent on the condition of the earth, the place of his temporary abode and probation; and this is the result of methodical operations going on for long successive ages. Man's life, too, is inseparably linked with the plants and animals which co-exist with him; and these are also the issue of long anticipations and preparations." ("Typical Forms and Special Ends," p. 345.) It seems that gigantic operations in Nature's husbandry have been gradually preparing the earth for the richness of its present vegetation. "Subsoil ploughing, mixing and re-mixing of soils, have been going on in all ages. Man is but the unwitting copyist, on a small scale, of actions which have been conducted on a far greater scale, and apparently with his benefit in view." (Ibid, p. 346.) What a wonderful provision for yet future man was made out of the luxuriant flora of the carboniferous period—the dense forests of giant pines—furrowed and jointed reeds, club mosses, and graceful ferns,—those copious sources of

that mineral fuel which has been deposited for ages upon ages in the storehouses of earth; which contributes so essentially to the comfort of our homes, and which, in connection with its associated lime-stone and iron-stone, has given, in a great degree, at least to the present age, its "form and pressure"! Intended, it would seem, for human use, it would seem also to have been purposely made accessible to mankind by the subterranean forces which have placed it within our reach. But the nearer we approach to the human period, the more striking those preparations appear; and it is only when the "coming one" was near at hand, that we discover these peculiar trees and fragrant flowers, which show that God had provided for our *enjoyments* as well as for our actual *wants*—flowers, which, had they appeared before man, must have been "born to blush unseen, and waste their sweetness on the desert air."* The connection of all this with the creation of man in the image of God will appear in the sequel, and we go on to observe, that according to Professor Owen, Professor Agassiz, Hugh Miller, and many other distinguished writers of the present generation, there are certain types or model forms in nature; and that one of these, in its final and full significance, is presented in the outward structure of man, "fearfully and wonderfully made;" that all the animals which preceded him presented in their frames, types, anticipations, and, as it were, prophecies of the coming monarch—man, the great "*antitypal existence*" —the final and foreseen product of one stupendous plan

* See "Testimony of the Rocks," by Mr. Hugh Miller, pp. 48, 51.

—"the last in time, but the first in the contemplation of Him who called them all into being." The physical structure, then, of man, is considered by these writers as the consummation of a "type," presented more or less distinctly, in his predecessors from the very beginning, and with increasing distinctness as the human period was approaching. So that man comes forth at last as the final fulfilment of a typical prophecy, from which angelic students of nature (if such there were) might have learned of the coming advent of a creature whose form would exemplify a grand idea, existing from eternity in the mind of the Supreme Creator. This is, by no means, a fanciful speculation. "Types," we are told, "are really found in nature, and are not the mere creation of human reason or human fancy." "Type," we are told again, "means a prophecy embodied in a *symbol*, and also one of the *general* forms of nature—a *pattern form*." But in the geologic series both meanings converge, and become one; the *general* form becomes also a prophecy, and "was exemplified in the deputed lord of the creation." The greatest, perhaps, of all living comparative anatomists is Professor Owen, and he considers man as the perfection of a type in which nature had been working from the beginning, with a view to his formation; so that man's existence must have been preordained. "The recognition," he says, "of an ideal exemplar for the vertebrated animals, proves that the knowledge of such a being as man must have existed before man appeared; for the Divine Mind that planned the archetype also foreknew all its modifications. The archetypal idea was manifested in the flesh, under divers

modifications, upon this planet, long prior to the existence of those animal species that actually exemplify it." Again, we are told by Professor Agassiz, that "there is a manifest progress in the succession of beings on the surface of the earth. This progress consists in an increasing similarity to the living fauna, and among the vertebrates especially, in their increasing resemblance to man. But this connection is not the consequence of a direct lineage between the faunas of different ages. There is nothing like a parental descent connecting them. The fishes of the Palœozoic age are in no respect the ancestors of the reptiles of the secondary age, nor does man descend from the mammals which preceded him in the tertiary age. The link by which they are connected is of a higher and immaterial nature, and their connection is to be sought in the view of the Creator Himself, whose aim in forming the earth—in allowing it to undergo the successive changes which geology has pointed out, and in creating successively all the different types of animals which have passed away, *was to introduce man upon the surface of our globe. Man is the end towards which all the animal creation has tended, from the first appearance of the first palœozoic fishes.*" These are, as Hugh Miller justly observes, "surely extraordinary deductions." "In thy book," says the Psalmist, "all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them;" "and here," he says, "is natural science, by the voice of two of its most distinguished Professors, saying exactly the same thing!"

Now, before explaining the connection of all this with

the argument in favour of man's creation in the image of God, it may be useful just to glance at the proof which it furnishes from analogy of the truth of Divine revelation. There are sceptics who object to the whole system of typical and allegorical instruction, as we find it in the Bible, and regard it as incredible. But here we are told, on the very highest authority, that the Creator has been employing types—model, pattern, and prophetical forms in nature—from the very beginning; and that all these have been foreshadowings of the completion of an idea existing in His mind from eternity. Not that He needed tentative efforts or preparatory experiments, prior to the accomplishment of his own predetermined plan—far otherwise; but that of that plan there has been a *gradual development;* that it was a plan, every portion of which was known to Himself from the beginning, and must, in due time, have been consummated; and that though omniscient, immutable, and almighty, He has chosen to act *progressively*, and to act progressively through types and symbols. If, then, it be true that these are written even in the first page of the book of His *works*, how is it incredible that something exactly similar should be written in the book of His *words?* If, again, all the types of the pre-human period pointed onwards to the coming "*first* man," and with greater and greater distinctness as the time for his appearance was approaching, have we not the sanction, at all events of analogy for supposing that that first man might be himself just what Scripture describes him to have been, and that is, the "figure"—literally, the "TYPE"—of a being to be called "the *second* man;" and

that symbolic intimations of the coming of this second man, resembling those of the coming of the first, should be more and more significant, as the era of His manifestation was drawing near? If the great event predicted in what have justly been called the "geologic prophecies," were the advent of One who was *merely* man, why should we regard it as incredible that the great event predicted in the human period should be the advent of One who, though also *man*, should be more than man? And may not this latter event have been only a further manifestation of the same eternal idea in the mind of the Supreme, which acquiring a clear significance in man, was yet dimly shadowed forth in the earliest of all created organisms? If the mere man were *their* appointed antitype, is it incredible that the God-man should be *his?* The only difference in the two cases is this, that the same God who inscribed the geologic prophecies on the silent rocks, has delivered subsequent predictions through the living form and articulate speech of human beings—through Adam, the type of the Redeemer—through "holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost"—and through prophets, "whose hallowed lips were touched with fire;"—all, to carry out the one sublime idea which was perfected in the mind of its Author from everlasting. Both advents —that is, the *merely* human, and the human yet divine—must be regarded as parts of one glorious system, that reaches from eternity to eternity, and comprises, first of all, the successive dynasties of those inferior animals which were lords of the creation, till man appeared, and who mutely, but, as it now appears, intelligibly foretold

that another monarch was approaching, who should be greater than all; then, the rule of him of whom they prophesied—that is, of one to whom God should give dominion "over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth on the earth;" and who, in *his* turn, should prefigure a Sovereign greater again, and greater far than himself—one of whose dominion there should be no end—the empire of the *Divine* man; then, the glorious coronation of this King of the whole earth—this "King of kings, and Lord of lords"—"the faithful witness, the first begotten of the dead, the Prince of the kings of the earth"—He to whom "every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, and every tongue confess that He is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." And then—oh, what tongue of man or of angels can adequately describe it!—the glorious regeneration—the ultimate fulfilment of the great Creator's grand intention!—a scene of joy and glory, from which the last of all the geologic changes shall have obliterated every trace of defilement, and every vestige of a curse!—"a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness"—a glad creation, where glorified, immortal man, arrived at the full dignity of his being, is to dwell and reign with the same Divine man, who has been his deliverer, and in whose image he shall be shining as the brightness of the firmament, and the stars for ever and for ever—a creation, in short, where God shall be universally glorified, and His people shall be unspeakably happy! Verily, there is a grandeur

in the very conception of this wondrous system, that of itself would show that it is *Godlike*—a grandeur which the prophet has but dimly seen in the most exalted of his visions, the philosopher has never realized in the loftiest of his musings, and the poet has never reached in the sublimest of his creations! Away, then, for ever with the thought that it is a human forgery! No mind but that of the Infinite could ever have devised it; and it remains in unapproachable magnificence, to show that God's ways are higher than our ways, and His thoughts than our thoughts, as well as to confound the presumption of man in his littleness, with the majesty of God in His almightiness! *

* We cannot help thinking that it would be possible to draw such a parallel between the systems of Nature and Revelation as would present us at one view with the points of correspondency, and thus supply every unbeliever who is a Theist with materials from analogy for a complete answer to many objections against Christianity, and even with presumptions if not proofs of its truth. Such a parallel might embrace, along with copious references to "Butler's Analogy," whatever since his time science has contributed to fortify his arguments; and the following very imperfect sketch, notwithstanding its extreme brevity, and even though some of the resemblances which it specifies may be deemed doubtful, fanciful, or false, will yet, it is hoped, be found suggestive:—

NATURE.	REVELATION.
I. *Miraculous.*	I. *Miraculous.*
It has been argued that the successive appearances of new species of plants and animals in the different geological eras demonstrate a miraculous agency,	Every attempt to rid Scripture of the "*supernatural element*" has been a total failure, and had any succeeded it would have destroyed all the *moral*

But it is time to turn to the argument which this digression has interrupted, and of which the object was

NATURE.	REVELATION.
I. *Miraculous.*	I. *Miraculous.*

and until a more satisfactory reply than any yet given to the arguments of Professor Hitchcock, Hugh Miller, and other eminent writers shall appear, geology will seem to prove a succession of what in our opinion may truly be called *miracles* in nature. We venture accordingly, despite of the modern theories which appear to militate against this conclusion, to endorse the prophecy of Mr. Rogers, that "a time is coming when geology will have familiarized the world with the idea of successive interventions, and, in fact, distinct creative acts, which have all the nature of miracles." "Reason and faith their claims and conflicts." The doctrine that men and animals have existed from eternity in an endless succession is completely and conclusively negatived by geology as now understood. See "Religion of Geology." See also "Butler's Analogy," part ii., chap. ii., of the supposed presumption against a revelation considered as miraculous.

evidences of Christianity, for it would show that our Saviour and His Apostles made false pretensions; for it is written, "That ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins, I say unto thee, Arise, and take up thy couch."

"If I with the finger of God cast out devils, no doubt the kingdom of God is come upon you." (Luke xi. 20.) "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." (John x. 25.) "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin." (John xv. 24.) "Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind." (John ix. 32.) "Jesus Christ a man approved of God among you by miracles and wonders and signs, &c." (Acts ii. 22.) "By the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth whom ye crucified, whom God raised from the dead, even by Him doth this man stand before you whole."

to show, independently of Scripture, the credibility of the doctrine that man was made in the image of God.

NATURE.	REVELATION.
I. *Miraculous.*	I. *Miraculous.*
	"If Christ *be not risen*, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." "Here at least is an instance in which the entire Christian faith must stand or fall with our belief in the supernatural."—*Aids to Faith*, p. 4.
II. *Uniform with Special Adaptations.*	II. *Uniform with Special Adaptations.*
"In taking an enlarged view of the material universe . . . it may be discovered that attention is paid to two great principles or methods of procedure. The one is the *principle of order*, or a general plan or pattern or type to which every given object is made to conform with more or less precision. The other is the *principle of special adaptation*, or particular end by which each object, while constructed after a general model, is at the same time accommodated to the situation it has to occupy and a purpose which it is intended to serve." — *Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation*, p. 1.	Scripture has one main object, "The Revelation of Jesus Christ," but it was specially adapted to different ages before and after "the fulness of the time," and to different minds, Jewish and Gentile.

Bearing in mind, then, that our postulate is a personal Creator; that there is evidence from geology for sup-

NATURE.	REVELATION.
III. *Progressive.*	III. *Progressive.*
The doctrine of progress is not to be confounded with that of progressive development. We believe that there has been a progress in creation from lower forms of life (but not by transmutation or development) to higher. On the exact order or nature of this progress it may be premature to generalize, but a real progress of some kind seems to be universally admitted.	Christianity has been progressively revealed. See chap. xix. on "Redemption, a Progressive Scheme," in "Bible and Modern Thought," by the Rev. T. R. Birks. See also the admirable "Letters on Romanism," by the Rev. William Archer Butler, in which the *perversions* of this correspondency are guarded against. And a very able review of Professor B. Powell's "Order of Nature" in the "North British Review" for Nov., 1859, p. 374.
IV. *Prophetical.*	IV. *Prophetical.*
"Geology has a further, and that a most important, principle to reveal. It shows not only an uniform but an advancing plan. It does more. It unrolls a prophetic scroll, in which the earlier animated creation points on to the later, and in which the later comes in as a fulfilment of the anticipation of the earlier."—*Typical Forms and Special Ends.*	"Whom the heavens must receive until the time of the revelation of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." (Acts iii. 21.) "The more sure word of prophecy whereto ye do well that ye take heed." Much of Scripture is typical, but a type necessarily possesses something of a prophetical character. (See Fairbairn's "Typology of Scripture," chap. iv.,

posing that man was the last, as he is certainly the noblest of all the dwellers upon earth; that a series

NATURE.	REVELATION.
IV. *Prophetical.*	IV. *Prophetical.*
	p. 100, vol. i.) See also "Typical Forms and Special Ends on Scriptural Types:" "A type is a prophecy embodied in a symbol." See supra, p. 15-18. "A *new* school of prophecy" (Miller), the first, or geological, pointing to the first Adam—the second, or the Scriptural, to the second. "*In* this view of the matter what a striking analogy does the history of God's operations in nature furnish to His plan in providence, as brought out in the history of redemption. Here in like manner there is a grand archetypal idea in the person and kingdom of Christ, towards which for ages the Divine plan was continually working. Partial exhibitions of it from time to time appear in certain personages, events, and institutions, that rise prominently into view as the course of providence proceeds, but all marred with obvious faults and imperfections in respect to the great object contemplated, until at length in its entire length and breadth it is seen embodied in Him to whom

of prospective changes prepared the globe for his habitation; that his outward structure was the visible

NATURE.	REVELATION.
IV. *Prophetical.*	IV. *Prophetical.*
	all the prophets gave witness—*the God-man foreordained before the foundation of the world.*"—("Typology of Scripture," vol. i., Appendix A.)
V. *Vicarious.*	V. *Vicarious.*
We understand by vicarious something done or suffered by one person for the benefit of another. In nature we find the vicarious principle exhibited on a large scale, and through all its living departments. We trace it in the vicarious action of different organs in the animal economy, organs which would almost seem to be "conscious of one another's wants and minister to one another's necessities." (Religion of Geology," p. 191). Physiologists tell us of vicarious secretions, and vicarious functions. Zoology tells us of whole classes of animals who live upon others. History tells us of some noble acts of self-sacrifice in man for the benefit of man. It is an appointment of natural providence that one man shall suffer for another whether he will or	See Isaiah liii. throughout; Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10; John xi. 51, 52; 1 Pet. iii. 18; 1 Tim. 2—6, and a multitude of other passages. The double vicarious appointment in *nature* by which evil is both vicariously incurred and vicariously remedied, has its exact counterpart in redemption. "For as by *one* man's disobedience many were *made sinners*, so by the obedience of *one* shall many be *made righteous*." (Rom. v. 19.) See especially "Butler's Analogy," part ii., chap. v., of the particular system of Christianity, the appointment of a Mediator, and the redemption of the world by Him. Also "Aids to Faith," Essay viii., Section iii.

embodiment of an everlasting idea in the mind of the Creator; that the aim of the Creator, in all the different

NATURE.	REVELATION.
V. *Vicarious.*	V. *Vicarious.*
not, and often that the *innocent shall suffer for the guilty.* In the same natural providence evil is often both vicariously suffered and vicariously remedied, for disease inherited through another's guilt is often cured by another's intervention.	
VI. *Imperfectly Comprehended.*	VI. *Imperfectly Comprehended.*
Under the head "nature" we include not only the whole material universe, but also what Bishop Butler calls God's "natural government of the world." He argues that the natural world and the natural government of it is an incomprehensible scheme, "so incomprehensible that a man must really in the literal sense know nothing at all who is not sensible of his ignorance in it." See the masterly chapter of the government of God considered as a scheme imperfectly comprehended. "Analogy," Part i., Chap. vii.	So under the head of Revelation we include natural religion (for Christianity is, in fact, a republication of natural religion with additions) and God's *moral* government of the world. That all this is "incomprehensible" in the strict sense of that word, not to be fully grasped, that is, by any finite intelligence, though it may be partially understood, is on all sides admitted. Thus "the analogy of God's natural government suggests and makes it credible that His moral government should be a scheme beyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to all objections against the wisdom and justice of it."—*Analogy,*

types of animals which have passed away, was "to introduce man upon the earth," and that man is "the end to

NATURE.	REVELATION.
VI. *Imperfectly Comprehended.*	VI. *Imperfectly Comprehended.* Part i., Chap. vii. "While some particular things contained in God's scheme of natural government further show how little weight is to be laid on those objections."—*Ibid.*
VII. *A scheme in which no ends are accomplished without means, and "means very undesirable often conduce to ends so far desirable as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means."*—Ibid.	VII. *A scheme exactly analogous.* "It is a system of means which involve far less evil than the evil they prevent or remedy."
VIII. *Carried on by General Laws.*—Idem.	VIII. *Carried on by General Laws.* All irregularities are not prevented or remedied by present interpositions; miracles not the rule but the rare exceptions.
IX. *Man, "the sum total of all animals,—the animal equivalent to the whole animal kingdom."*—Professor Oken. *"The great end towards which all the animal creation has tended from the first appearance of the first palæozoic fishes."*—Prof. Owen.	IX. *Christ, the second Man;* by whom "all things consist [literally, *stand together*]; and he is the head of the body, the church: who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead; that in all things he might have the pre-eminence. For it pleased

which all the animal creation has tended" from the first: is it asking much to demand, that we should proceed a step farther, and admit that he was created in the image

NATURE.

The human brain is supposed to assume in succession the form of the brain of a fish, of a reptile, of a bird, of a mammiferous quadruped; and "finally it takes upon it its unique character as a human brain."—*Miller.* Man, the "great antitypal existence." —*Idem.* Man is lord of all the animal creation. The "human dynasty" succeeded that of fishes, reptiles, and quadrupeda. Then came successive dominant races of men:—Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Grecian, Roman, Mohammedan, Gothic.

REVELATION.

the Father that in him should all fulness dwell; and, having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven." (Col. i. 17—20.) "That in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth; even in him." (Eph. i. 10.) The first man, "the image of God;" the second, "the express image of his person." The second Adam, "Prince of the kings of the earth" (Rev. i. 7), "King of kings and Lord of lords." (Rev. xix.)

"Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet." (1 Cor. xv. 24, 25.) "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name

or likeness, in some sense or other, of his Maker and his God? Is

"Ocean into tempest wrought
To waft a feather or to drown a fly?"

NATURE.	REVELATION.
	which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." (Phil. ii. 9—11.) "To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne." (Rev. iii. 21.)

It would not be difficult, we think, greatly to extend this parallel. The two systems are vast—beyond all human conception; and there is reason to suppose, from the deductions of modern science, that the whole plan of nature was pre-arranged from everlasting,—just as Christ was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and His goings forth have been of old from everlasting. (See "Testimony of the Rocks.") In both systems there is much that, prior to experience, might have been thought incredible. Supposing a Revelation to be actually given, it is highly probable beforehand that it must appear to us liable to objections. The acknowledged constitution and course of Nature are very different, in many respects, from what we should have expected; and, reasoning from analogy, it is natural to suppose that Revelation would also be different. All this, and much more, has been shown in Butler's "Analogy," which, in fact, supplies an

Is any end less dignified than this, worthy of all this long anticipation, and all this continuous preparation? Rejecting the development hypothesis, as pronounced by some of the best authorities to be untenable, how, but by supposing that man was intended to be a creature of such dignity and importance as would at least warrant a claim to the high title of God's image, can we well account for this extraordinary system of type adaptation and pre-arrangement from the very beginning?

answer to all the principal objections both against Christianity and the proofs of it. But, though the chief value of analogy consists in answering objections, it is not without weight in supplying proofs; for, if it can be shown that the resemblances between Nature and Revelation are very numerous, and extend not only to general features but to particular details, these various correspondences between the two systems will argue for both a common Authorship. It is probable, too, that, as our knowledge increases, these correspondences will be found to be more and more remarkable; and an instance of the aid furnished, in this way, to the Christian argument, in addition to what has been here stated already, is presented in one further resemblance, which, as it carries on the parallel to the very end from the very beginning, may deserve attention. We read in Scripture of a final and glorious regeneration—a new heaven and a new earth; an extensive purification (not, we think, total destruction) of the world as it now is, by fire. (2 Peter iii. 7.) Now, geology proves that the present earth and atmosphere are vastly different from what they once have been, having undergone great and improving changes (some of which have been caused in part by the agency of fire), and favours the supposition of a future state of this earth as much superior to its present as its present is to any that preceded it; while there is every reason to believe that the central heat of the earth is intense: so that the earth would seem to be "*stored with fire*," with a view to its ultimate renovation.

But the truth of these remarks, respecting the origin of mankind, will be more apparent after considering, next, in what it was that this image consisted. Christians in general suppose, on the authority of St. Paul, that the image of God is "righteousness and true holiness;" and of all the features of that resemblance, this, no doubt, is by far the most important: it constitutes, in fact, its very spirit and essence, and in comparison with this, every other mark of likeness sinks into utter insignificance. But we can hardly confine an image to a solitary feature of resemblance; and it is the more necessary to consider what this likeness must have been in all its original integrity, in order to conceive what it shall be, when finally restored and rendered everlasting.

Man, says a modern unbeliever, is "God manifest in the flesh"—language which, in one sense, is presumptuous blasphemy, while in another it may be simply and sublimely true; for if we apply it, not to fallen man, but to man as he was in the beginning, and understand by "manifest" merely *represented*, or imaged, then, as without the consciousness of a sin or the experience of a sorrow, he walked the wide inheritance of which God had made him lord; his foot upon the earth—his eye to heaven; with a form which God Himself had moulded into symmetry; with a brow betokening "thoughts that wandered through eternity;" with an eye that kindled with conscious immortality, and with a soul that was the very breathing of divinity;—what was he, but the image of that Creator who was also his Redeemer—the image, that is, or the anticipated likeness outwardly in the human form, as well as

inwardly in the living spirit, of that second Man, who verily *was* "God manifest in the flesh"—God in human form subsisting, but God over all, blessed for ever? *

> "This heaven-assumed majestic robe of earth
> He deigned to wear, who hung the vast expanse
> With azure bright, and clothed the sun in gold."

Nor has this feature of the glorious likeness, as once exhibited, been wholly obliterated since; for though degraded and distorted in those lower types of humanity, whose countenances are more expressive, perhaps, of the brute than of the man, it lingers in those noble lineaments of "the human face divine" which characterize the highest races of mankind. But in the morning of the glorious resurrection, when this corruption shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality—when we that have worn the image of the earthy shall also wear the image of the heavenly, and Christ shall change our vile bodies, that they may be fashioned like unto His glorious body—then shall this resemblance be more complete than it has ever been, even in Paradise, since then we shall, in every sense, be "*like* Him, for we shall see Him as He is;" and the body, redeemed from all the degradation of the Fall, and all the defilement of the sepulchre, shall be a glorious mirror, in the day of the *manifestation* of the sons of God, to reflect the living likeness of Him who is our brother, the firstborn among

* It is mere quibbling to say, that since the form in which our Lord became incarnate was *verily* human, this is not *likeness*, but identity. For if the material of an image be partly the same as that of the original, this only makes that image more perfect.

many brethren, and yet in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.

We go on to observe that another feature of this resemblance must have been *intellectual.* But here we may be met at once with this objection—that Satan is in the highest degree intellectual, and that no one supposes that Satan was made in the image of God. Now it is true that the happiest description ever given of the great enemy of souls is *Intellect*—but then, "Intellect *without God.*" The addition of the two last words makes all the difference; and if intellect without God be the character of the devil, intellect *with* God must be the character of the highest archangel. Whatever the image of God in man may have been, it must surely have enabled its possessor to glorify God with *all* his being, and not merely with a *part* of it. If even *fallen* man (and such of course was David) could say, "Bless the Lord, O my soul, and *all that is within me* bless his holy name," can we suppose that *un*fallen man could have desired a more reserved or a more qualified consecration of what he had and was to the same Benefactor? But if the image in question did not extend to the intellect of our first progenitor, how could he have devoted, as effectually as otherwise he might have devoted, its various powers to the glory of the giver of them all? It is demanded of the Christian now to love God with all his *mind,* as well as with all his *heart,* and the requirement in Adam's case could hardly have been less comprehensive. It does not follow that because Scripture speaks disparagingly of earthly wisdom when opposed to that of God, it condemns wisdom altogether;

or that, because it alludes to science *falsely* so called, it depreciates the human understanding. If there is the *pride*, there may also be the deep humility of intellect; and if there is one sight more sublime than another, it is that of the profound philosopher, sitting with all the simplicity and all the docility of a little child at the feet of the great Master and Teacher of mankind, to join with babes and sucklings in perfecting His praise.

It is supposed, moreover, by many divines, that a part of this Divine likeness consisted in the fact that to man was given *dominion*. But intellect is *power;* and we can hardly help supposing that one source of this supremacy over all other animals arose from intellect.

The image of God is, therefore, we think, justly supposed by many theologians to have been partly intellectual; and many of them argue that traces of this feature of man's original resemblance to his Maker can still be discovered in the various operations of the human faculties. A certain similarity between the intellectual nature of man and that of God is tacitly assumed in the usual argument from design to prove a designer. We discover in the works of creation such marks of contrivance—such an adaptation of means to an end—as argues, it is said, a contriving and adapting Intelligence. But we arrive at this conclusion by assuming that the mind of God must bear an intellectual resemblance to our own—differing immensely from ours in degree, but, to a certain extent, similar in kind. "The class of phenomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity, is exclusively given in the phenomena

of mind." (Sir Wm. Hamilton, quoted in "Aids to Faith," Essay 1, sec. 20.)

"It is from this little world of our own consciousness, with its many objects marshalled in their array under the rule of the one conscious Mind, that we are led to the thought of the great universe beyond; that we conceive this also as a world of order, and as being such by virtue of its relation to an ordering and presiding Mind. Design—purpose—relation of parts to a whole, of means to an end—these conceptions, borrowed from the world of mind, can alone give order and unity to the world of matter, by representing it as moulded and governed by a ruling and purposing Mind, the centre and the source of that relation which mind does not take from matter, but confers upon it." ("Aids to Faith," Essay 1, p. 26.) "Man's conception of God as *mind*, is derived from the personal consciousness alone; and our primary religious consciousness is that of man's relation to God as a person to a person." (*Ibid.*)

Now, the opponents of the argument from design object to this as *anthropomorphism;* but, as the same writer observes, quoting the words of Jacobi, it is an anthropomorphism "identical with theism, and without which there remains nothing but atheism or fetechism." We can see no weight whatever, then, in this objection to the argument from design, as used by Paley and others; and therefore we have no hesitation in pointing out the similarity between the contrivances of man and those of God, as evidence that the former was the *image* of the latter, and has not lost all the traces of this kind of intellectual resemblance.

It is the doctrine of the best divines that man was created in the image of *Christ;* but it is certain from Scripture, both that Christ was, in a special sense, the world's Creator, and that the form which He assumed was the *human.* This, then, may account, in some measure, for the resemblance in question; since it shows that what the Divine Man has wrought in *His* works, the *mere* man, His *image,* just because he *was* that image, has been working in *his.* We can agree accordingly with the sentiments of the geologist who tells us that all the past of our planet may be divided into two periods—that of the Creator-worker (God), and that of the creature-worker (man); and that a correspondence in nature and intellect between these two workers may be traced in the similarity or identity of their contrivances.* This he explains by the following illustration:—The Chinese originated printing, gunpowder, and the mariner's compass, without any concert with the European centre of civilization, because in China, as in Europe, the same human faculties, prompted by the same tastes and necessities, have led to the same inventions. "The identity," he says, "of Chinese and Egyptian arts and mechanical contrivances with our own, would have convinced me of the identity of mind in the individuals by whom they were respectively originated, as conclusively as though I had seen these individuals at work. They thought and contrived 'after the manner of men.'"

Applying this to the geologic periods, he speaks of the *human* cast and character of the contrivances which,

* See "Testimony of the Rocks."

before man as yet appeared, they exemplified. What the Creator-worker had originated in the palæozoic and secondary periods, has been, in after times, originated by man, the little creature-worker; wholly ignorant that his contrivance had been anticipated, and was but a repetition of a previously executed design. The structure of the ammonites contained an element of strength like that lately introduced into iron roofs and metallic boats. The belemnite united the principle of the float to that of the sinker, as in our modern lifeboats. The trilobites were covered with an exquisitely-constructed plate-armour. In the ancient crinoids, we find the principle of the arch in almost every possible form and modification. We are presented in a single fossil scale (that of the Holoptychius) with three distinct strengthening principles afterwards adopted by man:—the principle of the "fluted pot," such as Cromwell required for a helmet; the principle of a rampart lined with plank, and filled with sand-bags in the centre; and the principle of the double-woven fabrics of the "moleskin" manufacturer.

These are a few illustrations of the designing principle in creation, as exhibited of old, and since adopted by man. But there are other illustrations which are more modern, and far more familiar. Every mechanical power that man employs is at work in nature; every mechanical instrument that man uses is used in nature; and almost every mechanical contrivance that man invents has been anticipated in nature. Man, like God, works upon a pre-determined plan; and the means employed are often identically the same in human as in

Divine productions. If man spreads sails upon the waters, so did the nautilus before him. If the mariner guides his vessel with a helm, it was by a similar provision that the fish could wind and wander through his ocean home. If he feathers his oar, a similar operation is performed by the web-footed birds. If the fisherman spreads a net, so did the spider before him; if he uses a float, the seaweed is buoyed up upon the waters by a far more ingenious contrivance. Every human artist has had his predecessor among the tribes of the animal creation. If man weaves, there are insects that fashion a web far finer than his own. One great engineer took *his* happiest idea from a tree; another *his* from a lily. When the human mechanician would economize his materials, and combine lightness with strength, he makes a hollow tube; but the principle was acted upon before he was created to observe it, in the bones of animals. Is man a chemist? All the material universe is Nature's laboratory. Is man a geometer? The bee constructs his cell on principles that are strictly geometrical.*

* These observations are taken, with hardly any alteration, from the writings of Hugh Miller and Drs. Dickie and M'Cosh. See also "Pope's Essay on Man":—

"Who taught the nations of the field and wood
To shun their poison and to choose their food?
Prescient the tides or tempest to withstand,
Build on the wave or arch beneath the sand.
* * * * *
See man from Nature rising slow to art,
To copy instinct then was reason's part.

But these resemblances are confined, for the most part, to mechanical contrivances; and are selected, not because they are the most satisfactory, but because they are perhaps the most intelligible. We argue that the same intellectual likeness can be traced in another set of faculties than those which these contrivances imply. Man is gifted with a desire and a power to arrange and classify; and philosophers have divided the living creation into classes, orders, genera, and species. But it would seem that the most distinguished amongst these students of nature have adopted at last the very arrangement which science is now proving that God must have adopted in the creation.* Man is gifted with a natural perception of the beautiful; hence his admiration of certain forms, colours, and harmonies. But the most perfect models of beauty are supplied in the works of Nature. We doubt not that the finest of all human forms of architecture will be acknowledged at last to be that which most resembles the Divine; while of *this* there are numberless specimens in those ornamental structures —mineral, vegetable, and animal—which adorn this,

> Thus, then, to man the voice of Nature spake—
> 'Go, from the creatures thy instruction take;
> Learn from the birds what food the thickets yield,
> Learn from the beasts the physic of the field,
> Thy arts of building from the bee receive;
> Learn of the mole to plough, the worm to weave,
> Learn of the little nautilus to sail,
> Spread the thin oar, and catch the driving gale.' "

* See "Testimony of the Rocks," lecture 1.

God's own and God's beautiful world. Then, as for colours—

> "Who can paint
> Like Nature? Can imagination boast,
> Amid its gay creation, hues like hers?"

Again: man is endowed with a sense of melody; and Nature, through her many and melodious tongues, makes creation musical with her harmonies.

The main object of all these remarks is to show that there are grounds, independently of Scripture, for believing that man might have been made in the image of God; and thus to remove, or help to remove, such antecedent reluctance as the *mere speculations* of modern science may create in the mind either of an objector to Christianity or a doubting believer in its truth, to receive the Scriptural account of the origin of man. We must not, then, beg the question by assuming that the Scriptures are a Divine composition, and then referring to the magnificent poetry of Isaiah and St. John to prove that the same feeling of the beautiful, of which we discover so many indications in the *works* of God, may be discovered also in His *words*—those burning words in which prophets, whose mouths were touched and purified with "a live coal from off the altar," uttered His messages and embodied His inspirations. But we can logically appeal to the *Christian*, and ask whether that "vision and faculty divine"—which is the very name that man has given to the source of his own loftiest poetry—is not found in a perfection which the noblest of all human bards could but humbly imitate, in the glowing language of Isaiah and the sublime visions of the Apocalypse?

Enough, however, has been said to show that, whether we consider man as a mechanician, a geometer, a chemist, a classifier, an architect, a painter, a decorative designer —or a lover of the beautiful in form, in colour, in sound, or even it may be in poetical conception—Nature, and therefore Nature's God, has furnished him on the whole with models of which his grandest achievements are but the happiest imitations; and that, intellectually, he is an humble copyist of the works of that Infinite Intelligence whom, according to Scripture, he was *created* to resemble. The results at which he arrives, though immeasurably inferior in degree, are exactly the same in kind as those of the great Original, whom we contend that, in this respect, he still, though most imperfectly, images. For we argue that this feature of the glorious likeness in which man was made at first is not, or not wholly, lost; but remains as an evidence, to some extent at least, that the origin which the Bible ascribes to his race is the true source of all the intellectual dignity that can be reached by the wisest and most gifted of his kind.

But the Scriptural doctrines once admitted—that man was created in the image of Christ—that Christ is Creator, and that this Creator was in due time to be *incarnate*—give to this argument some force and consistency; for they show that this intellectual correspondence between creature and Creator, if it does not explain, is at least in thorough harmony with the fact that (as hinted already) the merely *human* being was made in the likeness of that Divinely *human* being who was also his Redeemer.

Waiving this, however, for the present, the foregoing

remarks fortify the presumptions already suggested, independently of Scripture—that man was intended for some such place of dignity and importance among the works of the Creator as accords with the Scriptural account of his origin, and renders the statement that he was made in the image of his Maker far (to say the least of it) from incredible. For if, on the supposition of a personal Creator, it be admitted that man is the noblest of all the tenantry of the earth—that that earth has undergone a long series of preparations and changes, extending over vast cycles of time, all it would seem chiefly for his benefit—that he is the great antitypal existence which was shadowed forth in the earliest of all created organisms—that the Creator's aim in forming the earth, causing it to undergo so many revolutions, and peopling it with the tribes of beings by whom, prior to man, it has been tenanted, was to introduce man upon the globe—and that man himself is the great end to which all the animal creation has tended from the beginning,—then the fact that we can trace a resemblance in many striking particulars between the *intellectual* nature of himself and his Creator, and the fact (to be noticed hereafter) that there are even yet traces in man (fallen though he be) of a *moral* resemblance also, all this will surely be evidence that it ought to be no mere query—no simple conjecture, nor even plausible hypothesis however ingenious—that should weaken our belief in the truth of the statement contained in that Book which has so many credentials of its origin from heaven—that in the beginning God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness."

Now, the Christian may look forward to the glorification of this intellectual feature of resemblance between himself and his Maker as a source of pure and exalted happiness. He may anticipate a rich enjoyment from all the inspiring prospects of heaven's magnificent materialism. He may expect to find counterpart objects for some of his intellectual tendencies in the beautiful forms and enchanting harmonies of heaven's transporting scenery; and gratification for others in a knowledge sufficient to meet the lawful yearnings of the human mind for some profounder acquaintance with the wonderful works of God, as well as some distincter insight into those eternal laws which maintain the order and the harmony of the whole material universe, than is given to man in his present condition; while he may look for the indulgence of others still in a clearer perception than he possesses at present of the nature of his own being, intellectual, moral, and spiritual—of those sublimer truths of Divine revelation which he now sees but through a glass darkly—of those mysteries of providence which, in his present state, appear perplexing, but which he dismisses from his thoughts on the faith of the promise, "What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter"—and of those grander features of redemption which only the final consummation of all things can fully exemplify. Oh, it must be that, since we are to know even as also we shall be known, the light of heaven—the light that comes directly, and through no obscuring medium, from the Source of all light—shall irradiate the understanding of every glorified believer, and enable him, through an

intelligent apprehension of all that inspires the songs of wonder and worship and joy that constitute the choruses of heaven, to join his voice with those angelic harmonies that proclaim, Glory to God in the highest, and to magnify for ever "Him first, Him last, Him midst, and Him without end."

But the sense in which pre-eminently, and so pre-eminently that it came to be considered as exclusively, the sense in which man was made in the image of God, is, beyond all doubt, moral and spiritual. That idolatry of *mere intellect* which distinguishes so many, especially in this generation, is founded on an utter mistake of what it is that constitutes the true dignity of man in his highest condition. There are traces of mere intelligence in the very lowest orders of all the living creation, and of something approaching even to human intelligence in those animals which man admits into his companionship; but of the moral sentiments (at all events the highest), where can we find any clear illustration whatsoever on this earth but in the human species? Gratitude and fidelity are, no doubt, the attributes of a dog; but what animal except man can be supposed to have a sense of justice and a sense of religion? If we grant that there are infernal spirits of vast intelligence, are we to grant also that they stand higher in the ranks of creatureship than man, however humble his intellectual capacity? Surely, on the supposition that such spiritual beings exist at all, we must suppose that they exist in a state of *degradation?* They are destitute of the truest element of greatness; and a desire to resemble them would be not only a sinful

but a foolish and perverse ambition. We would be men, not monsters. We would be as God—not as knowing good and evil, but as the word God in our own Anglo-Saxon tongue denotes, that is, the good, the glorious Being in whom there exists no approach to evil —the holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty!

God, then, is pre-eminently goodness; not intellect—though this He is also in perfection—but goodness distinctively; and if man was verily made in His image, then it must have been in this especially that the likeness consisted. Our sublimest conception of the Supreme Being is that of One who is pure and holy to a degree that admits not of human expression; and the first lesson that we are to learn in the school of Christ and His Apostles is, that—

> "Not in mental, but in moral worth,
> God excellence hath placed; and to the good—
> To virtue—granted happiness alone."

Since, then, it is only rational to conclude that the moral sentiments occupy a far more important place in the mental economy than the intellectual faculties, it is rational also to conclude that the education of the former rather than of the latter should be the main purpose of all true religion; and the fact that, in this respect, Christianity stands almost alone among the creeds of mankind, is an evidence of its incomparable superiority to any other religious system whatsoever. With our Saviour and His Apostles, the cultivation of the *heart*, rather than that of the understanding, is the point of importance; and thus it is that St. Paul, speaking

of the image of God, makes it just what it is in its very spirit and essence, and that is, righteousness and true holiness. Unless, then, we have learned to admire and to value the humblest, most unpretending, most unintellectual, and most unlettered of all those who belong to Christ, simply because his heart is right before God, more than the profoundest philosopher who, notwithstanding the wondrous powers of his comprehensive intellect, lives without God in the world, we have yet to learn the very rudiments of Christianity.

Now, there is a certain kind of righteousness which has survived the Fall, and may be taken—along with that intellectual resemblance already noticed—as evidence, even to the unbeliever (provided he be a Theist), that man might have been the image of his Creator. There are sentiments of benevolence, justice, and mercy, which man, even in his natural state, exhibits; and these, in infinite perfection, are the attributes of Deity. But the righteousness and *true* holiness to which the apostle refers, have been wholly lost; and Christianity teaches us that they are regained only by those who are renewed in the spirit of their minds after the image of God who created them. None, then, but those who have undergone this great change which most of all assimilates them to the Deity, can be said, in the most important sense of these words, to be in His image. They only who resemble Him, more or less, in His goodness, may be said, comparatively speaking, to resemble Him at all.

The image of God, then, as it existed in the first of our race, was a voluntary assimilation of his heart and will to the mind of his Maker. It was not the resem-

blance of a lifeless picture to its original, but the conscious and intentional conformity of a free creature to his great Creator. It was a cordial desire to have a similar character to that of the great Exemplar before him, to be like whom was at once his duty and his happiness. He would glorify God, because God would be glorified by the creatures He had made, and to whose enjoyment He was ministering; and he would obey, because conformity of will in the creature to will in the Creator is evidenced by obedience. The resemblance, therefore, was not that unconscious and automatic likeness that one piece of ingenious mechanism may bear in its structure and operations to another, but the far sublimer correspondence of an intelligent and voluntary agent to a model from which he was free to differ, but which he *chose* to resemble.

The image of God was, consequently, godliness. It was to love God with all the heart, and mind, and will, and strength—His will, His works, His ways, His laws, His character; to have Him in all his thoughts, and endeavour to imitate His infinite perfections. It was an image that would work out its own similarity to its glorious original, and be like Him most in the features that were most characteristic. It was the godliness, accordingly, of exalted goodness; the moral, and therefore the highest, attributes of Divinity—especially love, for God is love. Of all the descriptions that have ever yet been given of the Supreme, this is surely the most rational; and, therefore, "he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him."

Now, it is the distinguishing characteristic of all the

moral sentiments—more especially the higher, and most of all of those which constitute godliness—that they communicate *happiness*. This has been so often proved by divines and moralists—agrees so thoroughly with our own consciousness whenever we have reason (but, alas, how seldom is this the case!) to believe that the motive of any of our actions for the good of men and the glory of God is, on the whole, pure and single, and is so thoroughly rational in itself, as not to require here any special evidence of its truth. Granting, then, that godliness is happiness, how exalted, on the Christian supposition, must be the bliss of the true believer when, having regained in grace this lost image and likeness of the living God, however dimly and imperfectly it may have been outlined on earth, he finds it perfected in glory, and with his WHOLE being—a body in resurrection grandeur, likened to the body of his Lord—an understanding irradiated in all its powers with the light of the Spirit of "God, the only wise"—and, above all, with a moral and a spiritual nature assimilated to the Divine—he enjoys the everlasting and the glorious presence of that God who shall then be all and in all, "ruling, pervading, animating, inspiring, and actuating all things."

It is no wonder, on this supposition, that "these are the things which the angels desire to look into;" and that redemption is the theme, as told in the Apocalypse, of the new song—for ever new, because exhaustless—in heaven; since that redemption has a bearing, in some way or other, on all things and beings, from the very first to the very last, in all this lost but ransomed world,

as either affecting or affected by man and man's Redeemer.

There is a solemn and sublime simplicity in the Scriptural account of man's creation which affords a remarkable contrast to the wild and fantastic legends of heathen mythology. Nothing can be more grotesque and extravagant than the origin assigned to mankind by all the nations of antiquity except the Hebrews. Gods are described as beings "who have their heads cut off, or devour their children, or undergo marvellous transformations, or marry their mothers, or are fished up out of the sea by fishermen, or are otherwise set before us in ludicrous aspects, which take away all solemnity and seriousness from the narrative. How different from this is the simple and awful grandeur of Genesis! What a deep and solemn earnestness meets us in the very first words! What sustained seriousness do we find throughout! How evident that we stand on holy ground! in the hands of a writer who does not dare to jest or sport with things divine! who is no fanciful allegorizer, weaving quaint fables to delight as he instructs, but one who speaks as in the presence of God, with a simple, reverent solemnity incompatible with any conscious departure from literal truth." ("Aids to Faith," p. 275.)

The writer here quoted gives the following example, and it is only one out of many of the legends alluded to: —"In the beginning all was darkness and water, and therein were generated monstrous animals of strange and peculiar forms. There were men with two wings, and others even with four, and with two faces; and

others with two heads, a man's and a woman's, in one body; and there were men with the heads and horns of goats, and men with hoofs like horses, and some with the upper parts of a man joined to the lower parts of a horse, like centaurs; and there were bulls with human heads, dogs with four bodies and with fishes' tails, men and horses with dogs' heads, &c., &c., &c. Belus then commanded one of the gods to cut off his head, and to mix the blood with earth to form men and beasts. How different this from the majestic simplicity of Scripture, 'And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.'"

Such are a few of the arguments to prove, independently of Scripture, the credibility of the doctrine that man was made in the Divine image; but they will derive additional weight from the proofs (to be considered hereafter) of the Fall, since it is clear that whatever proves the Fall, must prove that there was something to fall from, and therefore a previous state of virtue and happiness.

III.—The antiquity and the origin of the human species lead us naturally to consider, in the next place, *its unity*. Scripture informs us that God "hath made of one blood all nations of men" (Acts xvii. 26); and it seems to be quite clear that the conclusion which the great majority of the highest scientific authorities have come to on this point agrees with the testimony of revelation. We can quote upon the orthodox side of the question the illustrious names of Humboldt, Cuvier,

Müller (the German naturalist), Pritchard, Owen, Max Müller (the philologist), Hugh Miller (the geologist), * and a variety of writers of less note on the natural history of man, including some who have written on the subject since the publication of the ablest and most recent works on the opposite side of the controversy. †

But admitting that all the tribes of men are but forms of a single species; admitting, too, that they have descended from a single pair; what bodily configuration and character, it may be asked, constituted the primitive type of mankind? This is a question to which science, it has been said on high authority, can give no satisfactory reply; and though Scripture is wholly silent upon the subject, we may yet presume, in accordance with its own statements respecting the dignity of man's origin, that that type was the noblest, or what is generally called the "Caucasian."

IV.—The next point in connexion with the earliest condition of our race, regards its birthplace; and could that be clearly ascertained, what a profound and peculiar interest would attach to the locality! Man has been regarded as

"The glory, jest, and riddle of the world;"

but, whatever he is, no human being, we might suppose,

* We are far from being convinced that more recent authorities have shown that the foregoing are of no value.

† The reader will find a brief, popular, and, we think, a very convincing argument, to prove, not only that man is the only species of the genus "Homo," but that all races and diversities of

could look with indifference on the spot in which the first of his kind came into existence. It is not without

mankind are really derived from a single pair, in an article on the Natural History of Man, in "Essays on Scientific and other Subjects," by Sir Henry Holland. See also "Scientific Theories on the Origin of Man," No. III. The unity and specific individuality of the human race are ably advocated by Dr. Pritchard, in his great work, "Researches into the Physical History of Mankind." This remarkable work is now scarce, but by no means *out of date*. We confess that we do not ourselves think it has yet been answered; and Dr. Pritchard's opinions are still held, we believe, by many, if not most, of the more eminent anthropologists of the age. The theory of transmutation makes, we think, *too little* of the vast difference between men and apes; while the theory of more than one origin for the human race makes *too much* of the differences between men and men. The exigencies of either theory appear to militate against those of the other; and facts would seem to be equally strained, though in opposite directions, in order to meet them. The author of a recent work, edited by Reginald Stuart Poole, on "The Genesis of Earth and of Man," having come decidedly, but, we cannot help thinking, prematurely, to the conclusion, not only that the human race is vastly more ancient than is generally supposed, but also that it has descended from more than one pair, endeavours to reconcile both positions with Scripture by contending that it refers to Adamite and pre-Adamite races. His object is to reconcile Revelation with what he considers as *proved facts*. "If," he says, "we find any inconsistency between what we *certainly know* of the *works* of God, and what we conceive to be the meaning of His *Word*, we may be sure that we have not rightly understood the latter; and we have not sufficiently emancipated our minds, if we cannot accept the revelations of science, and use them to explain obscurities and ambiguities in the Bible."

But *do* we "*certainly know*" that the age of man is utterly inconsistent with such an enlargement of our received chronology

emotion that each of us, if he revisit the scene on which he first saw the light, looks upon the place which he

as some orthodox writers have long ago suggested; and is it, as yet, a "revelation of science" that he has sprung from more than a single pair? We find a competent judge, who has sifted the evidence adduced by Sir Charles Lyell in favour of the vast antiquity of man, declaring that the verdict of science must be, "not proven;" and, though the descent of mankind from more than a single pair may be a very plausible theory, it is not an established truth. What effect further research and discovery may have upon either or both of these theories, it is impossible to say; but of this we are certain, that the more they are sifted the better for Christianity. What, as Bible Christians, we most want, are—first, the *true text* of Scripture, and, next, its *right interpretation;* and past experience justifies a confident belief that true science will contribute much to the ultimate attainment of both of these desiderata. We, therefore, cordially hail all real light, from whatever quarter it may proceed. There is abundant light already for all the purposes of salvation; but our very reverence for Scripture, and our thorough conviction that it is verily the Word of God, prompt a strong desire for the effectual removal of all such remaining obscurities and ambiguities as may either supply a plausible objection to the sceptical, or prove a stumbling-block to unstable believers. Difficulties in a real revelation from God are to be expected, and subserve a very salutary purpose. (See Butler's "Analogy," Part I., chap. iii.) But whatever are not essential to that end will assuredly disappear before the light of real knowledge and discovery; and we, therefore, cordially agree with Lord Shaftesbury in imploring men of science to study profoundly. We wish for all the evidence they can possibly supply on the subjects in question. Our object is truth, and truth must be consistent with itself. But we must be thoroughly satisfied that certain supposed deductions of science are *real* truths, before we proceed to show their consistency with other truths which are equally real. We claim an amount of evidence which no honest

associates in his own mind with the memories and the hopes, the sorrows and the joys of his youth, and with

mind can resist for the truth of the Bible; but we claim no such evidence to show that we ourselves are its infallible *interpreters*, and shall, therefore, be most thankful to those who *prove* that we have mistaken the meaning of any of its announcements. But to do this they must supply us with something better than mere hypothesis, ingenious conjectures, and plausible speculations; otherwise, the balance of proof may be strongly in favour of that interpretation which these guesses would seem at first to falsify. It were a great mistake to suppose that we resist inquiry. But, before we abandon an interpretation which for strong reasons has been already adopted, we must have stronger still for rejecting it. It would be possible to alter the translation of certain passages of Scripture to meet the demands of what is *now* supposed to be scientific truth. But such a proceeding would be extremely rash; for the progress of science might lead to the discovery that such a change was uncalled for, or necessitated a return to the very reading which had been rejected. Men of science themselves urgently inculcate great caution in arriving at positive conclusions, and cannot be surprised if we act upon their advice in matters which are sacred; while the very slowness with which we embrace their opinions, and our reluctance, except upon conclusive evidence, to adopt them, may occasion a more rigid investigation of proofs, and, therefore, a more satisfactory establishment of truth, than might otherwise have been possible. Now, the modern theories already alluded to are not, as far as we can see, received *unanimously* by those who are admittedly competent to judge of their merits. Some of the arguments by which they have been defended have been fully answered, and some weakened in force by suggesting other solutions than those which they afford of the phenomena to be accounted for. If, however, the disputed points are ever clearly and conclusively established, in the judgment of all qualified and impartial judges, the result will be a blessing to mankind, and be found to harmonize with the words of eternal

the character to which, in later years, they may have given its distinguishing complexion: a still greater interest is experienced by some on beholding the spot in which some immortal poet, statesman, or philosopher

life; for all this is no more than experience warrants us to anticipate. Meantime, let us, as Christians, remember the language of Habakkuk:—"I will stand upon my *watch*, and set me upon the tower, and *will watch to see what he will say unto me*, and what I shall answer when I am reproved;" or, as the margin more correctly renders it, "when *I am argued with*." Let us watch for such answers to difficulties as God in His providence may supply, when we are "argued with" by unbelievers in *our* day, as Habakkuk was in his. "For the vision is yet for an appointed time," said the Lord to him, "but at the end it shall speak, and not lie: though it tarry, *wait* for it; because it will surely come, it will not tarry. Behold, his soul which is lifted up is not upright in him: but the *just shall live by his faith*." (Habakkuk ii. 1, 3, 4.) Three editions have been printed of a work, called "Pre-Adamite Man; or, The Story of our Old Planet and its Inhabitants." This and the work last cited are both anonymous, but both able, instructive, and interesting, while both are written in a spirit of becoming reverence for Scripture; but there is a wide difference between the authors as to who the Pre-Adamites were—one making them negroes, the other angels! fallen angels. The doctrine of *some* pre-Adamite race was held by Isaac de Peyrère, 200 years ago. Its advocates contend that it is *taught* in Scripture; and it has the advantage, not only of being consistent with the fact (if such it shall ever be proved to be) that man is descended from more than one pair, but also of not interfering materially with the Septuagint Chronology, which, in such a case, might relate only to the *Adamites*. In confirmation of the opinion held by the latter of the two last-mentioned writers, the statement of Dr. Cumming, so far back as 1853, might be quoted. "Church before the Flood," pp. 69, 70.

was born. But the cradle of the human race, could it be precisely determined, would attract, we may imagine, travellers in all ages, and from all quarters. This natural curiosity, however, is not to be gratified; and the task of endeavouring to decide upon which of the various conjectures respecting the site of the Garden of Eden is the most probable, would be equally tedious and unprofitable. All history, however, and all tradition, so far as they elucidate the subject at all, agree with whatever can be clearly gathered from the Bible regarding the centre from which the human species originated. It was situated in those temperate regions which are not far from the Caucasian mountains, and includes Nineveh, Babylon, Syria, Egypt, and Greece. Within this area, we can trace the sites of all that we have clear historical evidence for supposing to have been the earliest kingdoms of mankind; and it has been remarked, as a noticeable fact, that while we discover here that variety of the human species which all writers on the natural history of man regard as the finest, that is, the Circassian, the greater the divergence from this centre, the more striking is, in general, the departure from this type of humanity. The Georgians and Circassians are still regarded as the handsomest races of mankind. The ancient Greeks are supposed to have been remarkable for the regularity and symmetry of their features, and have embodied the sublimest idea, perhaps, of human beauty that man can entertain, in the statues which they erected to their gods. The same type of countenance, though less perfect, is traceable in the Assyrian monuments which represent the kings who reigned at Nineveh. Again

(and, as some suppose, in the truest conformity to the same model), among the ancient Hebrews, so far as it can be detected in existing paintings. Again, though with an African cast, in the colossal figures of Egypt; and once more, in the physiognomy of all the more cultivated races of modern Europe. But, with a few exceptions, the further we depart from this centre of the earliest civilization of man, and the scene of man's dwelling, as he came from the forming hand of his Creator, the greater is the degradation of this (as we naturally suppose) the *original* type of the human form and countenance. It is in these extra-Caucasian regions that, in the language of the poet, it has been said, "humanity seems to be in disgrace;" and where, in some places far removed from the centre already alluded to, we meet with man as we may suppose him to be when *most fallen*—a caricature, and not a resemblance of the structure that enshrined the living soul of God's image, ere sin had left a dishonouring mark on that breathing and beautiful temple of the Lord.

V.—But wherever exactly may have been the garden of the Lord, it is represented in Scripture as having a scenery suited to the being for whose dwelling it was designed: and granting that he was physically, intellectually, morally, and spiritually all that we suppose to have been meant by the expression "image and likeness" of God, how great must have been his happiness! All the elements of his nature must have been in perfect harmony with each other, and every member, power,

sentiment, affection, and principle of his being must have yielded its own intended co-operation with all the rest, to produce their combined effect in the good of the creature, and the glory of his Creator. Happiness is an adequate supply of suitable objects to legitimate desires; but in this case there were material objects adapted exactly to the outward organization of a creature who could appreciate all such material enjoyments as consisted with inward purity. There were wide fields of intellectual contemplation in which his understanding could gather fruits of wonder and joy; above all, a subject of inspiring meditation in the character of that God whose works and attributes were fitted to gratify his devotional tendencies. Thus endowed, and thus situated, we can easily conceive that his whole existence was one life of joy. In his case there must have been a pleasure in mere existence. Life and happiness are things which in the beginning God had put together, but which sin has put asunder; and among the unions which the Fall has dissolved, but which Religion (the very derivation of which implies a binding *again*) shall restore, this original alliance between existence and enjoyment shall be one; for Scripture associates bliss with life, as though there existed some real and primary connexion between them, and speaks of the tree of life, and the river of the water of life, in the midst of the Paradise of God, as though everlasting life (a phrase never used in reference to the lost) meant everlasting joy, and God intended in the beginning that life should involve happiness. But this connexion will

be at once perceptible, if we consider the nature of that spiritual life which arises from union with God, and involves a fruition of those spiritual blessings which such an association communicates. For just as natural life is the union of the body with the soul, and natural enjoyment the pleasure which arises from their mutual connexion; spiritual life is the union of the soul with God, and spiritual enjoyment that of the Divine influence upon the spirit on which it operates. To live, then, with God, is to live indeed. All other modes of living are only *existence*. This is life. Hence the language, "On the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die:" for as natural death is the separation of the soul from the body, spiritual death is the separation of the soul from God. Life, then—all that best deserves the name—is joy. The words now, indeed, convey ideas which are not only different, but even antagonistic. But in heaven these divorced ones shall be re-married; and to live—instead of being, as it often seems at present, to suffer—shall be again what it was before, and that is to enjoy. We can even now fancy, that in a state of perfect health—a state the existence of which, since the Fall, may be questioned—in which every organ would perform, with undeviating regularity, its appointed function, there would be a pleasure in breathing, in moving, in exercising every bodily power—in short, EXISTING. But with a mental constitution as free from moral taint as we have thus supposed the body to be from physical, there would be a gratification that was far more exalted; while with both body and mind altogether healthy, and in a world adapted exactly to the one in all that could

breathe enchantment from *without*, and to the other in the favour of Him who is Himself the fountain of bliss, to inspire a heavenly gladness *within*, how sublime must have been the resulting enjoyment! The healthy, the normal state of a being like man, composed of body and soul, must surely, then, be a state of happiness: a different one must be *ab*normal. We cannot suppose the Supreme Being to have created anything in a state of DISEASE; but physical suffering is the result of physical disease, and moral evil of moral disease. Scripture, then, accords with the conclusions of sound reason, in representing man as originally "upright, though he has since sought out many inventions;" while the traditions of antiquity harmonize with both. The Chinese speak of a first heaven—an age of innocence—when the whole creation enjoyed a state of happiness; when "every thing was beautiful, every thing was good." Similar to this are the legends of our Scandinavian ancestors, the age of perfection among the Hindoos, and the fabled golden age, so exquisitely described by the classic poets. All these, we may suppose, were traditions of the Mosaic Paradise, for they could hardly have been pure fabrications, since it is not the custom of men to trumpet forth their own dishonour. Vanity is, perhaps, the strongest and most general of all human sentiments, and it would surely forbid human beings (unless they had some good cause, either from the exercise of their own reason, or some traditions of revealed truth, for such a course) to proclaim their own degradation.*

* For an account of these traditions see the very able work of the Rev. D. Macdonald on "The Creation and Fall."

Unless, then (and this we are by no means compelled as yet to concede), it be upon that one disputed point, the antiquity of man in connexion with our present system of chronology, we do not see anything either in the conclusions of modern science, or the results of modern criticism, that need disturb our faith, even for a moment, in all this earlier portion of man's history, as recorded in that volume, for the authenticity of which, as a Divine revelation, in the exact state in which its authors left it, we have evidence so clear, copious, and convincing, as to satisfy every mind that is open to conviction; while we do see, on the contrary, confirmations from analogy, as furnished by geology, and the modern science of homology, of some striking truths of Scripture, in connexion both with man and his Redeemer.

The sources of happiness supplied by the fact that Adam was made in the image of God, and placed under the circumstances adapted to his peculiar constitution, having thus been explained, it is needful now to consider on what it was that the continuance of this happiness was suspended. This, it would appear, must have been a conscious, confessed, continual, voluntary, and cordial *dependence* upon the Supreme Dispenser of all this rich inheritance of joy. Its happy possessors were to feel that One Being, and One only, was underived and self-existent. They were to acknowledge Him alone as the great "I AM"—the Infinite, the Absolute, the Everlasting. To Him they were to yield the homage due from dependent creatures to the bounty of their beneficent Creator. They were to show that they owed

their being and all its enjoyments to their happy connexion with the mighty God, in whose image and for whose glory they were made. Man was never, for a moment, to forget that he was a subject intelligence. To remind him, therefore, of this fact, and keep him in that state of voluntary submission on which his happiness was resting, he was made amenable to a law—a positive commandment. It was by the homage of a FREE creature to Him who made him, not the inevitable conformity of a mere machine to the will of its contriver, that he was to glorify his Master and his God; and thus (as already noted), by voluntary assimilation, that he was most of all to exhibit the resemblance that likened him most to his Divine Creator. His state was, therefore, that of one

"Able to stand, yet free to fall."

But he could not have been free to fall if there were no possibility of falling; and the possibility of falling could not have existed (as far as we can see) without a commandment, in the breach of which that falling would be involved.

A commandment, then, of some kind being needful, we can easily understand that its purpose could not have been accomplished had it enjoined or forbidden "some *great thing*." It was the PRINCIPLE of obedience that was to be exercised, and it is most of all in *little things* that that principle is manifested. In a matter of great and obvious importance *in itself*, apart from the legislator who orders or forbids it, obedience is, comparatively speaking, a thing almost of course. But when the

conduct enjoined or interdicted appears to regard a *mere trifle,* the case is wholly altered, and then obedience shows the sincerity, the simplicity, and the thoroughness of the disposition which induces it. Now, in Adam's case, it was just this very disposition to obey on principle, and because God had commanded, that was to be exemplified; for its object was to keep in exercise that feeling of continual *dependence and submission* in the creature towards his Creator on which man's happiness was depending. Granting, then, that there must have been a law, and a law relating to something of little apparent consequence, how futile is the objection that it simply forbade the eating of a fruit!

The next necessity involved *temptation;* for though it is certainly conceivable that, since Adam was "free to fall," he *might* have fallen without any temptation, and through a perverse determination to disobey for the mere sake of disobeying, yet the extreme violence to a nature like his which such a course of conduct would involve, renders the supposition too extravagant to be credible. Granting, then, a commandment—a commandment, too, just of the sort supposed—and a temptation to disobey it, there are some observations of Bishop Butler, in his chapter on a state of probation as intended for moral discipline and improvement, which are worthy of all possible attention. He there observes, that active habits of virtue grow stronger and stronger by active exercise (this is matter of universal experience); and that, on the contrary, temptations *

* The word which he employs is "propensions;" but we think it may be substituted by "temptations."

grow weaker and weaker by being constantly resisted. This, too, agrees with all experience. It is as certain that active virtues grow by exercise, as it is that our bodily powers are fortified in a similar way; while it is also as certain that vicious tendencies and propensities become weaker and weaker by non-indulgence, as it is that our corporeal organs lose more and more their original vigour by want of exercise. Putting, then, these two facts together—the tendency in the power to resist to gain strength by exercise, and the tendency in the disposition resisted to yield and grow weaker through not being indulged—we see that obedience under temptation, when grown into a *habit*, affords a GRADUALLY INCREASING SECURITY against a GRADUALLY LESSENING *danger*. Had, then, our First Parents obeyed until obedience had grown into a confirmed and long-established habit, the *power* of resisting temptation would have reached a maximum, while the *strength of temptation* would have been reduced to a minimum; and, therefore, the security would have become at last so strong as to be complete proof against the danger: so that man might have been "finitely perfect," and never have lapsed at all. *

* This, however, is the very conclusion which the Bishop avoids, though without actually denying. His words are:—"And virtuous self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the inward constitution or character, and may improve it to such a degree that, though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle, and consequently (though) we should allow that such creatures as have been above supposed (creatures made

Whatever, then, be the difficulty of accounting for the Fall, it is clear that the evil was brought upon the transgressors themselves by their own act; and that, as far as we can judge from the constitution of their minds, they might, if they would, have at last prevented it for ever.

Supposing, then, a temptation of *some* kind to be necessary to their improvement and confirmation in virtue and happiness, it is natural to suppose that the peculiar temptation to which man, as *God's image*, would be most exposed, would be to imagine himself *like God*—to be *self-sufficing;* to forget that he was *only* an image, and to dream of independence. We might suppose that, being already the likeness of his Creator, he could be seduced into the persuasion that he could equal Him, and, therefore, be influenced to shake off an allegiance which implied, not equality, but subjection. In exact accordance with this natural supposition, we find that Scripture represents the Tempter as addressing himself to that point in the nature of his victim which, from its very constitution, he justly concluded would be most assailable:—"In the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as GODS, knowing

upright) would for ever remain defectible; yet the danger of actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified against the remains of it—if that may be called danger against which there is an adequate, effectual security."—*Analogy*, Part I., chap. v. But with what the Bishop actually *does* say we are quite content; for a danger, "if such it can be called," almost "infinitely lessened," is scarcely a danger at all.

good and evil." As though he had said—The simple and only distinction between you and Him is this knowledge: it shall be imparted by the fruit of that tree. Eat, therefore; and what is now a dependent image, will be the absolute equal of its Divine original. At all events, it is easy to understand how a breach of the commandment would be tantamount to a declaration of independence. It would be a virtual abandonment of God. It would be as much as to say, "I can live, and live in joy, without thus acknowledging in everything and always Thy supremacy. I have elements of happiness apart from Thee, and in myself alone, and so can venture upon disobedience."

Now, it were presumptuous to hope that these observations could elucidate, in any degree whatever, that profound and terrible mystery—the origin of evil. But the *origin* of evil is quite a different thing from its *appearance upon earth.* That evil existed, according to Scripture, before man was born is certain, and the *real* difficulty lies in accounting for its introduction into the universe, or any part of it, in the very beginning. Once existing, that it should continue and spread, is no more than what agrees with universal experience; while as regards the length of its duration, the extent of its influence, and the mischief of its operation—all this is doubtless *mystery;* but, then, it only regards the more or less of a mystery which, on the supposition of any evil, to any extent, or to any degree, must already have been *infinite;* and whether there can be more or less of that which is *infinite,* is a question of more subtlety than importance.

But, confining ourselves to the earliest manifestation of evil upon this planet, we maintain that the account of it which is given us in Scripture, is thoroughly consistent with itself—with the only circumstances under which a *free* creature could be placed, in order to his ultimate establishment in the security of tried and fortified fidelity —and with the known tendencies of this human nature wherever, as far as we can discover, in all the earth, and all the periods of its history, man has been a dweller; and we could easily prove, if necessary, here, that however incomplete may be the above explanation, any attempt upon unscriptural or anti-Scriptural principles to account for the phenomenon, would only make the darkness deeper still—

> "Chaos umpire sits,
> And, by deciding, worse embroils the fray."

On the whole, then, we can say to the modern devotees of science and of true philosophy, "As long as your object is the simple discovery of truth, and not the overthrow of that faith in which we and our fathers have been reposing, we bid you God-speed. We oppose not your researches, because we dread not your discoveries. Catechise Nature wherever you think it likely or possible that she can render you one intelligible response. Listen with that reverent attention which, in the language of your great Master, becomes man, her "servant and interpreter," to the voice with which, however indistinctly, she whispers from the solitudes of a yet unpeopled globe the secrets of a dim and hoar antiquity. Never can she tell you, either that there is no God, or

that, if there be, He is not a designing, a foreseeing, a providing, an all-wise, an all-powerful, and an all-holy Intelligence. Never can she tell you that He has not revealed Himself in words that breathe and burn with immortality, as well as in works which, with less, and yet with real eloquence, bid you to her feet for their truthful interpretation. She may speak, indeed, of a few seeming disagreements between these different productions of the same glorious Author; but of none which a sounder acquaintance than we have at present with both will not enable us to reconcile. Even as it is she tells us of many striking correspondences which furnish, if not proofs, at least presumptions, that two such closely agreeing and resembling records must have a common origin.

But it is in answering objections that this argument from analogy is most convincing; for when the enemies of our faith assert that God cannot act in a particular way, we can appeal to His works in nature or in providence, to show not only that He can, but that He *does* so act. We believe that she tells us of hieroglyphic prophecies of the first man, in the various organisms which preceded him on earth, and argue that these predictions have been supplemented by prophecies which, in a different way, foretold of the second. She tells us of a system already begun; and we contend that the same system is now in progress to completion. Revelation has sketched, as we believe, a comprehensive picture, but has left us to discover that Nature has added, at His bidding, certain touches and details, which only magnify our astonishment at the grandeur of

the great conception. She tells us of preparations begun, ere yet this lovely globe had one human inhabitant, for the accomplishment of a plan affecting all human generations. We even believe, that if her utterances, at such an immeasurable distance, could be audible, we should find, that issuing from the very depths of eternity, they echoed across the silent ages of all the then unborn, to tell us, though indirectly, of "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Her intimations of this might, indeed, be obscure, and such as only those who took them in connection with other truths could interpret; but such intimations, we are verily persuaded, there would be; and could we fully comprehend them, they would be found to accord exactly with the statements of that Volume which assures us, that out of the ruins of a world, cleansed from its pollutions with a lustration of fire, there shall arise, in all its beauty and in all its glory, that regenerated earth, to which all previous things and beings had a reference, and which its everlasting Author, in the sovereign decrees of His own unchanging will, had ordained, from eternity, to be part of the final consummation. But, be this as it may, we believe that Scripture, nature, and history, when taken together, constitute a trinity of witnesses to truths which we have learned in our infancy, and pondered over in maturer years—which have cheered us in our hours of sorrow, and gladdened us at the prospect of death itself. Of these truths, those which relate to the earlier periods of the history of man now engage our attention. We left him in a state as yet of innocence and joy: no cloud had hitherto passed over his morning happiness.

God, we are told expressly, "is light, and in Him is no darkness at all:" and man was then enjoying the light and blessing of His presence; therefore it was *day*. The Sun of Righteousness was above the human horizon; and what the natural sun is to the material world, the spiritual Sun is to the moral—a hallowed and a heavenly illumination, enlightening all the faculties of the understanding, and gladdening and fertilizing all the affections of the heart. The warmth of true devotion was glowing in the sentiment of worship within that grateful creature, whose being was happiness, and whose language was praise. He answered the end of his creation—recognised God in every thing, and every thing in God—and saw and felt, that while all things else

> "From earth's great altar sent up silent praise
> To the Creator,"

it was for him, and him alone, to make the new-born world musical with articulate speech, and sing the first hymn that ever ascended from earth to heaven. Sublime enjoyment! We pause upon its contemplation, for we feel that what once was, may be again, and believe that the renewal will be greater and grander than even the creation. It is well to ponder over all that we have lost, and take shame to a nature that could forfeit this for the visionary good that sin had promised to disobedience; while it is also well to animate our hearts with those inspiring hopes of *even better* things to come, which are based, not on the weakness of creatureship, but on the strength of almightiness. Yes, it

was day. The green world was rejoicing in the richness of a vegetation that owed its fertility to that material orb which makes the woods rejoice, and the valleys to laugh with joy. But there was a spiritual luminary, that was far more gladdening; and it was shining in cloudless glory on the lord of this wide inheritance. He had come into being, it would *now* appear, as the fulfilment of types of outward form, pointing him out to those who could understand them as the great end to which they were leading. But intelligent beings who could read them, we are taught to believe, existed in the angels who kept their first estate; and we conclude that they who celebrated the nativity of the Second Man, by singing "glory to God in the highest," had also sung glory to God, as the type of this woman-born Redeemer—that is, the first man—came forth to glorify, in his make and nature, the heavenly Architect of a new creation. "The morning stars," on that occasion, sang together, and the "sons of God shouted for joy."

Such is the first chapter of our biography. It was a chapter of light. But we all know that another phase of the story was soon to be exhibited. This shall be noticed in the chapter that is to follow. There was a melancholy change, and its cause, its consequences, and the remedy shall be alluded to hereafter. For the present, it is enough to say, that we have no means of ascertaining, or even conjecturing, how long this happy state of things continued; and only know that it was followed by a darkness which has lasted to this hour—

that the cause was sin, and that we can easily believe, that when the fatal act was over—

> "Nature, sighing through all her works,
> Gave signs of woe that all was lost."

IT WAS NIGHT.

THE CHAPTER OF DARKNESS.

"Night, sable goddess, from her ebon throne,
In rayless majesty, now stretches forth
Her leaden sceptre o'er a slumb'ring world.
Silence how dead! and darkness how profound!"

When this beautiful world came from the forming hand of its Almighty Architect, it rolled upon its axis, obedient to the law which has ever since regulated, with wonderful uniformity, its diurnal rotation. Morning, therefore, came then just as it comes now, when the far horizon gleams with golden light, dewdrops sparkle on the blades of glass, and birds begin their song—was followed, just as it is now, by the burning glory of a noontide sun; this, in its turn, by the calmness and the beauty of his dying light; and this again by night, with its darkness and its chills, its silence and its stars. The earth, in its daily rotation, withdrew, successively and periodically, every portion of its surface from the sun's enlightenment; and therefore, through all its regions, here at one time and there at another, there was night. The darkness was caused (and this is the gist of our illustration), not by any diminution of the lustre of the sun, or by any departure of the sun himself, but by the removal of the earth,

portion after portion, from his beams: and thus there was darkness then, just as there is now, in the world that is material. But no corresponding result had been produced as yet in that which is moral and spiritual, simply because no corresponding cause had there been as yet in operation. Man had not withdrawn himself from God, and that God, like the glorious luminary to which He is so often compared, never, never withdraws Himself from us. The creature, therefore, enjoyed, as we have seen, the light of the countenance of his Creator; and there was day—clear, cloudless, and continued day. But Adam, by disobedience, departed from the Lord. He turned away from his Creator—that "Sun of Righteousness," in whose beams he had ever, till then, been rejoicing; and thus began that long, long night, in which, ever since, his race has been involved.

But when our Saviour says, "I must work the works of him that sent me while it is day: the night cometh when no man can work," he attaches to the words day and night a meaning directly opposite to that in which they are used by the Apostle when he tells us that "the night is far spent, the day is at hand." The language of our Lord intimates that life is, as it were, the daytime of our being, the time not for repose but exertion, and that eternity is the night of our existence, the period when activity is succeeded by rest, and opportunities are ended. But the Apostle reverses this, the usual signification of these different figures, and teaches that the now, both of earth's history and our own, is but night, while that eternal period that must succeed it shall be day. Nor is this employment of the same words in

contrary meanings without significance. It shows that "now is the accepted time, to-day is the day of salvation," while it also shows that substantial life and essential realities are not for this life, but for that which is never to terminate. And this latter truth is the more deserving of attention from what would seem, if we were to judge from the actions of men, to be a very popular opinion. It would appear that with only too many the present is regarded as the period, and the only period, of realities. To them, all upon the life-side of the sepulchre would seem solid land—all beyond it, a region of vapour and of mist, of fancy and of dreams. How consistent, then, is Scripture with itself in saying that faith is the *substance* of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen! But it tells us that a time is coming in which faith will end in sight—the deep sleep of those infatuated dreamers be broken up, and they themselves, awake at last, be convinced that the now present is strangely unsubstantial, while the then present is intensely real—since night, with all its shadows and delusions, will then have passed away, and eternity, with all its glories or all its horrors, have begun.

Adopting, then, the metaphor of the Apostle, we contend that it is now night; and the fact that the world in general fancy it to be day only shows how happy is his illustration, for the deeper the dream, the profounder the conviction of its reality. The soundest sleeper, if he dream, is the sleeper who never imagines, even for a moment, that he is sleeping at all. It is the silent hour of solemn midnight when he fancies it is noonday; and it is only when the thought first flashes

across him, that what he hears so vividly and sees so distinctly is, after all, a mere illusion, that he awakes.

We have seen how apt is the comparison between the cause of natural night, and the cause, as explained in Scripture, of that disastrous change which is generally called the Fall. Nor is the resemblance between the effects of these different causes less striking than that between the causes themselves; for all the facts of human experience for thousands of years may be justly regarded as nocturnal phenomena. It was nightfall when Adam sinned, and his race have ever since been wanderers through the darkened scenery of an apostate world, seeking with various lights, and in different directions, the lost land of the morning. Thus the history of man is the story of a pilgrimage by night. He has moved along, with stumbling steps and deceitful guides, under a cloudy firmament, but not without stars, through regions of gloom and of danger, irradiated with a light which though feeble at first was to shine with increasing brightness, and in the "fulness of time" to render distinctly visible the right path—Christ the "*way*," as well as "the truth and the life," by whom true believers in every age have had access, though under different circumstances, "by one spirit to the Father"—to the God of light and to the land of light for ever. The events which distinguish his biography are like the occurrences which often happen at the season to which we have thus compared his momentous lifetime, and, therefore, to give them their real character, we have only to follow out the Apostle's illustration. The proofs of its propriety are the proofs of the fall of man, and without

this His whole story is a dark and terrible enigma. The tale of redemption is a fabulous episode in the gloomy narrative. The preaching of apostles is vain, and the faith of their followers is vain also. The good news which, like "songs in the night," has cheered so many sorrowing hearts, is a mere delusion. If man have not fallen Christianity cannot be a true religion, for it presupposes and provides for a fact which has never occurred. The doctrine of human apostacy is so inseparably interwoven with the whole scheme of salvation, as revealed in Scripture, that they must stand or fall together; and therefore, if that doctrine be false, we are left at this hour without a Divine revelation, for it can hardly be denied that our choice lies between Scripture and no revelation at all. Consequently, if Christ has not come to seek and to save that which was lost, and has not conveyed from heaven messages of mercy to the fallen, neither has He authoritatively brought life and immortality to *light* through the Gospel. They remain in the obscurity in which He found them, to be guessed at or guessed out by human reason, without one written sign from heaven that its conjectures are correct. Some of the best and wisest men that ever existed have been in gross and grievous error on points of the utmost conceivable importance, and after the most patient and laborious efforts in the candid search after truth. The light that has so often cheered the distressed, the desponding, and the dying, has been an *ignis fatuus;* and for anything we can *certainly* tell to the contrary, there is no hereafter, so that, possibly, the wisest philosophy after all may be just "let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we

die." Are we obliged to believe that this in fact is our melancholy condition? Assuredly not—for we defy our opponents to prove that there has not been a fall, while we can show from evidence independent of Scripture, that in all probability there *has*; a probability that becomes certainty if we once admit that that Scripture is authority—no, that fall has made our story sad and sorrowful enough—but it was foreseen and provided for; and that God, whose government brings good out of evil, has revealed a mode of recovery by which all that was lost shall be regained and increased, so that the second Paradise shall be sublimer than the first. Looking forward, then, in the midst of our bitterest afflictions to the glorious future of the true believer in his glad inheritance, we can bid it the heartier welcome, and feel it with the keener relish, as we contrast it with the present and the past—and thus hope, that "rainbow that is arched upon falling tears" seems all the brighter from the darkness of the cloud that is behind it. But this is mere assertion—what are the *proofs* that man is a fallen creature? Now, the truth of the remarks in our first chapter involves the truth in question, for it is certain that he is not *now* enjoying the innocence, peace, purity, and happiness which we have there described as distinguishing his state at the beginning. But the proofs of that state, to those who deny or doubt the authority of Scripture, must of necessity be open to cavil or objection, for certain knowledge on the subject is attainable only by Divine revelation. Enough, however, has been said, we think, to show that the Mosaic account of paradise is not in itself incredible, and even

that there is evidence amounting to a presumption that it is true. But if that evidence have any value at all, it corroborates a conclusion which we arrive at from other proofs, and must be taken for what it is worth to fortify the inference that man's existing condition is one of degradation and apostacy.* In addition, then, to the arguments (whatever their weight) which go to establish a prior state of things on earth far happier than the present, we argue that man has fallen, first of all because the supposition of his lapse, regarding it for the present as a mere hypothesis, accounts for all the phenomena which we employ it to explain, and therefore must hold its ground until superseded by another which also explains them all, and explains them more satisfactorily. But the only rival hypothesis worth noticing, or that of natural progress without a fall, shall be considered hereafter and compared with that which its advocates would employ it to supplant. At present we shall only observe that one of those phenomena is spiritual darkness, or the darkness of ignorance, delusion, wickedness, and sorrow.

And first of the darkness of ignorance. Is it then, or is it not, a *fact* that this night feature of

* We can *either* argue (as in p. 48) from a distinct class of proofs that the primitive state of man was one of great virtue and happiness, so that there was something to fall from, and then fortify such proofs with *independent* evidence that his present state is abnormal, *or* we can argue (as here) that the evidence of his early innocence and joy corroborates the *independent* evidence which goes to prove that his present cannot be his normal condition. But the statements here and in page 48 are not to be taken together.

our history, as, in accordance with the Scriptural illustration, we may term it, distinguishes the natural condition of man always and everywhere? Then if it be, is it not accounted for on the supposition of an apostacy from God which leaves us in *spiritual*, just as the daily departure of each portion of the earth from the sun leaves us in *natural*, obscurity? But can that fact be reasonably disputed? We have tried to show already, putting Scripture, for argument's sake, aside, that this state of darkness can hardly have been our original and normal condition, but that another and a widely different one possibly, and perhaps probably, was. But can any reasonable person deny that it is our actual condition at present? If the light of nature be like that which, after nightfall, supplies to a certain extent that want which the sun's absence occasions, but still leaves us in great comparative obscurity, and unable, without *additional* light, to see with anything like the requisite distinctness, it is just the sort of light which, we contend, has been actually allowed to us, and which shows the necessity for a Divine revelation to supplement such a scanty source of enlightenment. But if it be contended that this light of nature has no such nocturnal character, we deny the fact; for the spiritual ignorance, doubt, and perplexity of man always and everywhere, when without a revelation, disprove it. Some, indeed, have gone so far as to say that there is no such thing as natural religion at all—anything that deserves to be called religion wrought out by the mere operation of man's natural understanding. "Traditional religion," they say, "that is, a revelation from God handed down

from generation to generation, though often corrupted in its transit; this we can understand, but we cannot understand how a creature, naturally so blind and polluted as man, can originate for himself a creed that, with any justice, can be termed true or rational; for just as we cannot conceive that a wandering savage, as he paces the shore, can be dreaming of optics and astronomy, or the inventions and contrivances which aid us in their study, yet easily imagine that as he stumbles upon the instruments of science which a stranded bark has left upon the beach, he may conjecture the uses for which some of them were designed; so, while we can hardly suppose that man can reason out the doctrines of what is called natural religion for himself, we can yet suppose that fragments of a Divine revelation may have floated on the waters of tradition, and left him to separate all that was substantial and useful from the weeds and the foam that were drifted along with it in this perilous and precarious transport." But be this as it may, we contend that the light of nature alone is, after all, and comparatively speaking, but darkness; the dubious and uncertain illumination of a spiritual night, just such as the cause we have assigned for it would produce. The very variety of religions at all times on earth is itself an evidence of the fact, and resembles the case of men guessing about colours when the sun is down. We read of Monotheism, Dualism, and Polytheism, creeds that make the Deity a single being, two beings, and it may be ten thousand, varied with Atheism, which makes Him nothing, and Pantheism, which makes Him everything, with the higher Oriental-

ism that made Him spiritual, the Hellenism that made Him human, and the Fetichism that makes Him inanimate or else brutal—the nature worship that adores the stars, and the gross idolatry that adores a stone! We hear of religions which tell us that God can be approached by but one Mediator, by thousands of mediators, and without any mediator at all. Is all this consistent with light and with day, and if not, does not the cause to which we ascribe it—a separation from God, and therefore from light—account for it? Whether or not another hypothesis can explain it better is not *now* the question. We only ask whether the facts are true, and if so, whether the supposition is adequate to their explanation.

Let us turn, in the next place, to the statements and confessions of some of the profoundest scholars and some of the wisest philosophers that ever existed. If there be any subject upon which such men might be expected, if our natural state were not that of benighted creatures, to be clear, explicit, and unanimous, we might suppose it to be the immortality of the soul—yet Socrates concludes his long discussion about the condition of souls after death in these words, "that these things are so as I have represented them it does not become any man of understanding to affirm;" and in his apology to his judges he says upon the same subject, "if the things which are told us are true." Similar to this is the language of Tacitus, addressing the shade of his friend Agricola, "*If* (*as the wise suppose*) the souls of men are not destroyed with their bodies, may yours repose in peace;" and that of

the Emperor Julian, "I am not one of those who disbelieve in the immortality of the soul, but the gods alone can know. Men can only conjecture that *secret*," a phrase that reminds us of Gibbon, who calls the true religion "the great *secret* of the universe." Every scholar can largely multiply these instances, and it is certain that while some of the ancient philosophers believed in the immortality of the soul, others doubted it, and others still not only denied it but treated it as an actual absurdity. It is worth remarking, too, that many of them acknowledged their own natural inability to discover the proper mode of worshipping God. The saying of Cicero is well known, "No man was ever great without some divine influence (*afflatu divino*)," while Plato declares that we cannot know of ourselves what petition shall be pleasing to God, or what worship to pay Him, but that it was necessary for a lawgiver to be sent from heaven to instruct us. He says also that this man whom he greatly desired to see must *be more than* man, for since every nature is governed by another nature that is superior to it, as birds and beasts by man, he infers that this lawgiver, who was to teach man what *man could not know by his own nature*, must be of a nature superior to man, that is, a divine nature. In referring to this remarkable passage, Dr. Olinthus Gregory quotes a passage from Rousseau's letter to the Archbishop of Paris, "When Plato described his imaginary good man loaded with all the shame of guilt, yet meriting the highest rewards of virtue, he describes exactly the character of Jesus Christ, the resemblance was so striking that all the fathers perceived it." This

remarkable anticipation is, perhaps, the nearest approach to a proof that all history can afford that *some* minds have not been naturally benighted. Perhaps, however, modern unbelievers will regard it, if taken by itself, as a proof to the contrary; since they may argue that even Plato was so blind as not to see that such a teacher was wholly unnecessary. He was not of those who understood the "absolute religion." He had not been indoctrinated into the religion of "intuition," or "intuitional consciousness," nor did Cicero know that the *afflatus divinus*, or something like it, was given unequally, but still universally, to man. All those great men who felt the impotency and blindness of man by nature on the subject of religion were mistaken. They knew not that faith has nothing to do with reason, or that light from without was not required since we have all light from "*within*." It never occurred to them that he "who worships God *truly* (?) by whatever form, worships the only true God, and that He hears the prayer, whether called Bramah, Pan, or Lord, or called by no name at all." They had not studied the "religious sentiment" and its sufficiency, though acting in the darkest ignorance, the vilest idolatry, or the most flagitious crimes, and they could not entertain an opinion similar to that of him who tells us in our own times, that "many a swarthy Indian, many a grim-faced Calmuck who worshipped the great God of storms, many a Grecian peasant who did homage to Phœbus Apollo when the sun rose or went down; yes, many a savage, his hands smeared all over with the blood of sacrifice (human?), shall come from the east and west and sit down in the kingdom of God with

Moses and Zoroaster, with Socrates and Jesus." The notion of Plato that we cannot know the truths or even duties of religion of ourselves, and need a legislator from heaven to instruct us, was, it seems, a great error, since the "absolute" and "universal" religion by anticipating supersedes an external revelation. But is this "spiritual insight," admitting for the present its reality, a proof that the world in general is not in a state of moral and spiritual darkness? Is the faculty so definite and uniform as to make it a clear and universal light? Does it resemble any of those principles or instincts which belong to man universally? Mr. Rogers has put this so forcibly that we cannot forbear from quoting his language, "When we say that any principle or faculty is common to the whole species, do we not make the proof of this depend upon the uniformity of the phenomena which exhibit it? When we say, for example, that hunger and thirst are universal appetites, is it not because we find them universal? Or, if we say that the senses of sight and hearing are characteristic of the race, do we not contend that these are so because we find them uniform in such an immense variety of instances that the exceptions are not worth reckoning? If men sometimes saw black where others saw white, some objects rectilineal which others saw curved, some objects small which others saw large, nay, the very same men, at different times, seeing the same object differently coloured and of varying forms and magnitudes, and every second man *almost* stone-blind into the bargain, I rather think that instead of saying that all men were endowed with one and the same power of vision, we

should say that our nature exhibited an imperfect and rudimentary *tendency* towards so desirable a faculty, but that a clear uniform well-defined faculty of vision there certainly was not. As I gaze upon the spectacle of the infinite diversities of religion which variegate, but, alas! do not beautify the world, what is there to remind me of that uniformity of result of which I *do* see the indelible traces in every faculty really characteristic of our nature, as, for example, in our senses and our appetites? Powerfully does Hume urge this argument in his 'Natural History of Religions.'

"I have my *doubts*"—(the speaker is supposed to be a sceptic)—"admire the modesty of a sceptic—whether the entire phenomena of religion do not favour the conclusion that man in this respect exhibits only the traces of an imperfect truncated creature; that he is in the predicament of the *half-created* lion so graphically described by Milton,—

> "'Now half appeared
> The tawny lion pawing to get free
> His hinder parts.'

only unfortunately, *man's* 'hinder parts'—his lower nature—have come up first, and appear unhappily prominent, while his nobler moral and spiritual faculties still seem stuck in the dust!

"There is, indeed, another hypothesis which squares, perhaps, equally well with the phenomena—I mean that of the BIBLE—that man is *not* in his original state—that the religious constitution of his nature in some way or other has received a shock. But *either* this, *or* the

supposition that man has been insufficiently equipped for the uniform elimination of religious truth, is, I think, alone in harmony with the facts, and to those facts, patent on the page of the whole world's history, I appeal for proof that man has not on these highest subjects the certitude of any internal revelation marked by the most remote analogy to those other undoubted principles and faculties which exhibit themselves with undeniable uniformity."

After some very witty remarks on the supposition that there is an *approximate* uniformity, he adds, "Or if it be vain to attempt to abstract this absolute religion from all religions, as Mr. Parker indeed admits, though it is truly *in* them, and I take his definition from his 'direct consciousness,' which direct consciousness we can see has been *directly* affected by his abjured Bible, namely, that it is voluntary obedience to the will of God,—outward and inward—why what on earth does this vague generality do for us? What sort of God? Is *He* or *it* one or many? of infinite attributes or finite? of goodness and mercy equal to His power or not? What *is* His will—*How* is He to be worshipped? Have we offended Him? Is He placable or not? Is He to be approached only through a mediator of some kind, as nearly all mankind have believed, but which Mr. Parker denies—a queer proof, by the way, of the clearness of the internal oracle, if he be right—or is He to be approached, as Mr. Parker believes, and Mr. Newman with him, without any mediator at all? Is it true that man is immortal and knows it by immediate 'insight,' as Mr. Parker contends; or does the said insight, as

Mr. Newman believes, tell us nothing about the matter? Surely the 'absolute religion,' after having removed from it *all* in which different religions differ, is in danger of vanishing into that imperfect susceptibility of *some* religion which I have already conceded, and which is certainly *not* such a thing as to render an external religion very obviously superfluous. It may be summed up in one imperfect article. All men and each may say, 'I believe there is *some* being, superior in *some* respects to man, whom it is my duty or my interest to'—*cætera desunt*. . . . 'All the phenomena point either to an imperfect organization of his nobler faculties, or to the doctrine of the "fall." But surely, if this internal oracle exists in man, every sincere and earnest soul, on interrogating his consciousness, would hear the indubitable response, would enjoy the 'beatific vision of spiritual insight.'" The sceptic then solemnly protests that having honestly, sincerely, and with the utmost diligence interrogated his own spirit, he is not conscious, apart from those external influences and that external instruction which the revelation from *within* is supposed to anticipate and supersede, of any of the sentiments which either of the above writers makes the sum of all religion. . . . "That the response must be faint indeed in *other* men, I infer," he says, "from this, that men have, for the most part, arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions from those of these interpreters of the spiritual revelation. As to the articles, indeed, of man's immortality and a future state, it would be truly difficult for *my* 'spiritual insight' to verify *theirs*, for, according to Mr. Parker, his 'insight' affirms that man

is immortal, and Mr. Newman's insight declares nothing about the matter. Nor is my consciousness, so far as I can trace it, mine only. This painful uncertainty has been the confession of multitudes of far greater minds; they have been so far from contending that we have naturally a clear utterance on these great questions, that they have acknowledged the necessity of an external revelation, and mankind in *general,* so far from thinking or feeling such light superfluous, have been constantly *gaping* after it, and adopted almost anything *that bore the name.*

"What, then, am I to think of this all-sufficient revelation from *within?*" *

If, then, the ancient philosophers, like Æneas and the sybil on their way to the region of shades,—

"Ibant obscuri solâ sub *nocte* per umbram,"

we have yet to learn that the modern teachers of the absolute religion and spiritual insight have either proved that the "light *within* us" is not comparative "darkness," or that they themselves have thrown any real illumination upon the subjects which they profess to elucidate.

"Whatever doth make *manifest* is light." This is a definition the correctness of which can hardly be disputed, even by those who deny that it comes to us with

* "Eclipse of Faith"—the *via media* of Deism—a chapter which we cordially recommend to all who hold the opinions of which it is a masterly exposure. See also the same author's most amusing account of the sceptic's select party, in which the *disagreements* of those who reject the Scriptures are wittily described.

any other authority than that of its own truth and sufficiency. But can we say that the characteristic quality of much of the modern teaching of unbelievers is thus to make "*manifest*"? We suspect, on the contrary, that it is rather to "darken counsel with words without knowledge." The author last quoted does not exaggerate the obscurity which pervades the writings of this school when he puts the following language into the mouth of a young student from Germany, "Nor is there any God apart from the universal consciousness of man.

"Ought you not to say *it*?

"It, then, is the entire process of thought combining in itself the objective movement in nature with the logical subjective, and realizing itself in the spiritual totality of humanity. He (or it, if you will) is the eternal movement of the universal, ever raising itself to a subject, which first of all in the subject comes to objectivity and a real consistence, and accordingly absorbs the subject in its abstract individuality. God is therefore not a person but personality itself." To all this, we are told, "nobody answered, for nobody understood."

But the following extracts, taken from the "Physio-philosophy" of Professor Oken, of Zurich, are far more incomprehensible. It is needless to give them *in extenso* and in the connexion, if there be any, in which they actually occur, for it is impossible that any connexion could make them intelligible:—

"The highest mathematical idea, or the fundamental principle of all mathematics, is the zero = 0.

"Zero is in itself nothing. Mathematics is based upon nothing, and consequently arises out of nothing.

"The Eternal is the nothing of nature.

"There is no other science than that which treats of nothing.

"There exists nothing but nothing; nothing but the Eternal.

"Man is God wholly manifested. God has become man. Zero has become +.

"For God to become real He must appear under the form of the sphere.

"God is a rotating globe. The world is God rotating. Everything that is is material. Now, however, there is nothing that is not; consequently there is everywhere nothing immaterial.

"Fire is the totality of ether, is God manifested in His totality.

"God only is monocentral. The world is the bicentral God. God the monocentral world which is the same with the monas and dyas. Self-consciousness is a living ellipse."

Professor Oken himself tells us that the work in which these passages occur was written in a kind of inspiration!! If so it requires an inspiration to understand them.

We read in Scripture "to the law and the testimony; for if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is *no light* in them." And assuredly there is no light *here*.

We are far from asserting that the light which even Christians possess is more in any degree than is just sufficient, and we even allow that there is much upon

which it leaves us in great obscurity. "Great," we are told, "is the mystery of godliness." "We see through a glass darkly." "What I do," says the Saviour, "thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter." A declaration which we extend much beyond the immediate occasion of its utterance. "We know" but "in part," and even with the Scriptures in our hands we admit that there is much in the ways of the Supreme which we cannot comprehend, and some things in the Scriptures themselves which are indeed "hard to understand." But all this is in exact harmony with the supposition of the fall, and with the Scriptural doctrine of spiritual enlightenment through that "spirit of wisdom and of revelation" in the knowledge of God, who opens our eyes and removes the films of prejudice in different degrees with different persons, but still leaves the most enlightened in a state very different from that of actual day. When the children of Israel (the illustration will hold even though the fact be denied) had light in their dwellings, while even at noon the Egyptians were in darkness, that light might have proved the darkness *abnormal*, and been sufficient for the Israelites themselves, yet far inferior in brightness to the viewless sun for which it was a substitute. An irresistible blaze of light would be inconsistent with the very character of the dispensation. It may be admitted, then, that there are difficulties which even Christianity has not thoroughly removed; though we verily believe that there are few, indeed, which it has not materially lessened; nor need we be afraid of acknowledging that there may be some seeming objections to the scheme

itself to which as yet we can give no such answer as would thoroughly satisfy the captious and the prejudiced; though we think that the analogy of nature is sufficient on many points to *silence* even them, unless they be Atheists. Our very proposition is that it is now *night*, even with the regenerate. Our creed is that while they are yet to enjoy more light than Adam had in Paradise, they now in some respects enjoy less, and that a *thorough* restoration of what man in Adam lost, and which in Christ he partially regains, is reserved for the final and glorious consummation, when it will be not only fully restored but vastly augmented. In the meantime we ought not to be surprised if it should happen that, even with the best use of the light that we have, there remain some difficulties in our religion which are not, or at least do not seem to be, thoroughly soluble. Of these it is true, that increasing knowledge may diminish either the number or the perplexity or both, and the fact that objections which once appeared insuperable have since been overcome, gives encouragement to the hope that others, if any, which now appear as formidable, shall also be overcome. Take, as an example, the difficulties started by Bishop Colenso in his work on the Pentateuch. In a recent Charge by the Bishop of Ossory, that distinguished Prelate, after observing that many detailed replies to the two first parts of that work had been published,—that they do not leave an alleged fact to which any importance can be attached, or a point of criticism or an argument unexamined,—that however calculated the same work may be to perplex and stagger an

ordinary reader, we may be satisfied that the replies to it provide abundant means for reassuring and quieting their minds and re-establishing their faith, and that we have every reason to regard this last assault upon our faith as having performed, in some measure, the good office which, under God's providential guardianship of His word, all preceding attacks upon it have been made to render; that is, the office of confirming its authority by the conclusive replies which they have drawn forth in its defence—goes on to furnish a few hints which, in reading those replies, he thinks may be useful, and thus expresses himself under the second head of those hints:—"But if it should happen, as it may, that of some of the difficulties put forward by the Bishop of Natal you cannot find in any of the answers to his work which have been published what you regard as a perfectly satisfactory solution, you ought not to be discouraged or shaken in your faith in the truth and inspiration of the Pentateuch. For it requires but a very little consideration of the question to see that we have no good reason to expect that every difficulty which has been or may be raised shall be so solved as to leave no doubt of the sufficiency of the solution. We have no more reason for expecting that all difficulties connected with the inspired volume should be removed, than we should have for expecting that none should exist. One cannot think for a moment upon the subject without seeing manifold reasons why one who reads the Bible at the present day, even in a fair and humble spirit, must encounter some difficulties in it; and why a reader who looks for difficulties

there must find them in abundance. When it is said that this must be the case, I need hardly say that I mean that, in the natural course of cause and effect, it could not be otherwise. No one can doubt that God could have ordered otherwise if He pleased, and that He could have made every part of His Word as plain as some parts of it are. But when we see that this has not been His will, that He has not seen fit to interfere with the natural effects of time and change, and other causes of obscurity and difficulty, we must be sure that the difficulties which He has permitted to exist in His Word serve to promote some useful end or ends. We should be sure of this, I say, even if we could see nothing of their mode of operation. But we can see that they are fitted to exercise our industry, our patience, our faith, and our humility; and we cannot doubt that they may serve many useful ends that we are unable to discover. But the very same reasons that there are for suffering many difficulties to exist may render it right that after all is done that we can do to remove them some should be allowed to remain.

"If we see some, therefore, which resist all efforts to solve them, they ought not to form a stumbling-block to us. But, on the other hand, when we see that what seemed to be as formidable difficulties as any other are actually removed, ought it not to make us feel that it would be rash to conclude that others are well-founded because they have hitherto resisted all efforts to remove them?"

These remarks are applicable to all other difficulties as well as to those which are started by Bishop Colenso, and we call attention more particularly to the obser-

vation, "That the very same reasons that there are for suffering many difficulties to exist *may* render it right that after all is done that we can do to remove them, some should be allowed to remain." Such residual difficulties (should there be any) would be in thorough harmony with the general character of a dispensation which we have all along been endeavouring to show is one of comparative darkness. In another place we shall show that difficulties, which seemed to be as formidable as any such residual ones can well be, have in fact been solved, and therefore that it would be "rash" to conclude that even those, if any, which now appear intractable will not admit of a satisfactory explanation. But should they not, the same reasons as those for which the fall, and therefore the darkness, have been permitted, may operate to permit such difficulties to continue. We speak, of course, with reserve and caution, but it might perhaps be contended that since there must be a certain degree of light which is not consistent with creatureship and belongs only to the Creator, there may be difficulties which to every finite intelligence must remain for ever insoluble. In heaven they must cease, indeed, to perplex, but it does not follow that there they must cease to exist. Be this as it may, it is certain that on earth the most enlightened Christian must walk by faith and not by sight. Granting that man is a fallen creature, and that he is now in a state of education and of discipline for a happier condition, the fact that he has no more light than is just sufficient for his guidance in the darkness of his pilgrimage is only what beforehand might have been reasonably expected. It is the doctrine of

Scripture that Christ has redeemed or purchased back for its original possessor that inheritance of joy which man, as a fallen creature, has forfeited. But, supposing it to be recovered and restored, a certain moral and spiritual *character* is indispensable for its enjoyment. Of what use would be a paradise of melody to the deaf, a paradise of scenery to the blind, or a paradise of philosophy to fools? For the enjoyment then of moral and spiritual happiness there must be moral and spiritual capacities. But how are these to be acquired? To this question there would seem to be but one answer, and that is the judicious direction, the diligent exercise, and the harmonious combination of all the essential elements of human character. But of these, Faith, Trust, Hope, and Diligence are among the principal; while it is plain that there could be no opportunity for their exercise except under a condition of things which would leave us open in some respects to much doubt, uncertainty, and danger. Certain knowledge is not compatible with faith, since it supersedes all faith; being, not belief, but certainty. Nor always at least with trust. For if we *know* beforehand the medicine which, if we are sick, our malady requires, it need not be trust in the physician who prescribes it, that causes us to employ it, if we do employ it, but may be, and perhaps must be, our own acquaintance with its properties. Whereas, in utter ignorance of those properties, we *confide* in his skill and are cured. If a child knew beforehand all that his parents know, he could never show that simple and confiding dependence on their superior wisdom which is the charm of childhood. And what is true of faith and trust is equally

true of hope. All are opposed to sight—Faith is sight when it becomes certainty—Trust is sight when it becomes experience—and Hope is sight when it becomes fruition; but none of them is or can be such in itself and at the beginning—so that to be what they are there must be along with them a possibility of doubt and error. This is the very condition of their exercise, for it is the very condition of their existence; and if there be room for very grave doubt, and a hazard of very serious error, there will be all the greater need for another set of qualities—namely: caution, candour, patience, and diligence in the investigation of evidence. For to believe without any grounds *at all* for belief is not faith, but folly; to trust without ANY reason for confiding is blind reliance, and to hope without a promise, and *some* reason to believe that he who made it can perform it, or to expect in any other way a future good for which there is no sort of evidence, is not rationally to hope but blindly to anticipate. Hence the necessity for *some* light. There must be darkness, but then that darkness must not be total. There must be obscurity, otherwise the qualities in question could have no existence; but there must also be a certain degree of light, otherwise, working wholly in the dark, they would work at random and amiss. Thus, on the supposition that we are fallen creatures in a state of pupilage for the requisite capacity to enjoy what we have lost, supposing it recovered, the actual state of things, a state, that is, of light, but not of daylight, is precisely the state that is best adapted to our improvement. For, granting that illumination, either much greater or much less than

that which we actually enjoy, would be inconsistent with the profitable exercise of faith, trust, hope, candour, caution, humility, diligence, and patience, we can perfectly understand how these qualities, working in proper activity and proper combination, can produce a capacity for a very high degree of moral and spiritual happiness. Well directed and properly enlightened they would form a character that might almost be called sublime. Faith, trust, and hope, are pre-eminently principles of action, and in conjunction with love would produce the most cordial obedience. They would call forth all the virtuous dispositions of which a human being could be capable, and since, if anything in morals deserves to be called an axiom, it is "that virtue is happiness," they would furnish him with sources of the highest, the purest, and the most abiding enjoyment. Bring faith, trust, and hope, *to bear* upon the subjugation of our evil propensities, and how powerfully they operate! Bring them again to bear upon the cultivation of our moral principles, and how effective are the motives which they bring into operation! If, then, they act so as to lead at last to the formation of the only character that qualifies its subject for just the sort of happiness which we suppose a fallen creature to have lost and to be seeking to recover, they answer an end of the utmost conceivable importance. So far we have confined ourselves to the consideration of the *character* which they produce and the happiness which such a character would occasion; dwelt upon their connexion with the other principles of our nature, and shown how the *general combination* causes a capacity for moral and

spiritual happiness by improving and exalting the general character. But faith, trust, and hope, are elements of enjoyment *in themselves*. Is there not a real satisfaction in believing? What a multitude of cares and anxieties may be prevented or mitigated simply by trusting? And as for hope, its effect upon enjoyment is proverbial. Now we cannot agree with those who believe that there can be no place *whatever* for these sentiments in heaven. We believe, on the contrary, that the texts of Scripture which are generally quoted to prove that there cannot be, are not satisfactory; that a state which rendered them impossible in *any degree* would be inconsistent with creatureship, and that their operation, even in heaven, will be among the sources of the future enjoyment of the blessed. But this is not the general opinion of Christians, and we waive it as not essential to the argument, which is only that the character which they form, when rightly combined and exercised, is just the character that gives a capacity for the sublimest enjoyment. Conceding, then, that in heaven these dispositions are not to operate, how invaluable are they on *earth!* Are they not real blessings even in this life? Thus, upon the hypothesis that man has fallen, this phenomenon of darkness, and just the sort of darkness that surrounds us, is precisely what might have been expected. It is relieved by the light of revelation, but even this is not so overpowering as to forbid the exercise of qualities which greatly conduce to the future happiness of a creature supposed to be both fallen and immortal, but which could have no scope except in a state in

many respects of much obscurity, and which, even in this world, are corrective of many sorrows, and sources of much enjoyment. The particular quality for which, in the present day, there seems to be the greatest need, is patience. There are certain difficulties which evidently require more knowledge than we possess at present for their satisfactory removal, but this knowledge we are thoroughly convinced will yet be within our reach, provided those difficulties are not essential to the proper education and discipline of our moral and spiritual faculties. Our duty, then, as reasonable creatures, is to watch and wait. "The vision will surely come, though it tarry, wait for it." But there are other difficulties which may never be surmounted, never at least in this life, and this it is plain, so far from perplexing us, ought to strengthen our faith, since it is no more than what might have been rationally anticipated from the very nature of a dispensation such as that which the fall has involved. The most that could reasonably be looked for, even as regards the truth of revelation, is a preponderance of the proofs in its favour over the proofs, or what seem to be proofs, that it is a human invention; and that there *is* such a preponderance no one who has studied the subject and has even the remotest pretension to honesty and fairness can hesitate for one moment to acknowledge.

And it is very important to remember that since, according to the supposition, the cause of the fall was moral, and not intellectual, the mode of restoration should be one that improved the heart rather than one that only enlightened the understanding. A Revelation,

therefore, to answer its purpose need not satisfy curiosity, and need only communicate as much light as would enable us to discover the truths which were most likely to influence practice. Nothing can be more certain than the possibility of acting through a perverse state of the heart in direct opposition to the clearest and strongest convictions of the judgment. The drunkard is as satisfied as any demonstration could make him that his habit is fatal to his health, his reputation, his worldly success, and even, it may be, his very life, yet he indulges it, and if the light of Christianity were a thousand times clearer than it is, it is probable that without some strong influence on the will, the conscience, the affections, or all these together, men in general would not act upon it or act up to it at all more consistently than they do at present. If a spectator be anxious to ascertain the precise colour of a particular object but view it through stained glass it will be tinged with the hue of the medium through which he beholds it, be the light ever so intense. It is not, then, by increasing the light, but by taking the stain from the window that the true colour can be distinguished. Now, our passions, prejudices, and sins are the medium through which we naturally look upon the sort of truth which Christianity reveals, and if these be the real causes of all essential error in our judgments of that truth, it is not by increasing the evidence but by improving the heart that such error can be rectified. It is remarkable, accordingly, how often and how emphatically this is set before us in Scripture. "The *secret* of the Lord is with them *that fear him*, and He will show *them* his covenant." "He that *will do his*

will shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." "The fool hath said in his *heart* there is no God." "The meek shall he guide in the way," &c., &c., &c.

These are days in which unstable believers are likely to be staggered in their faith by the notoriety which is given to certain admitted difficulties in Scripture and the exaggerated importance assigned to them. Many an humble Christian now hears of them for the first time, and it is neither desirable nor possible in this inquiring age to conceal them. It is right, then, to prepare all such persons for their discovery, and to show that they are only what might have been expected. For this reason, as well as to answer a favourite objection of unbelievers, we have dealt long upon this portion of the subject, and cannot even yet dismiss it without a few additional remarks.

Never was libel more unfounded than that which charges true Christians with vilifying, depreciating, or in any way undervaluing the reasoning faculty in connexion with religion. We only give it its proper place and assign it its proper functions. That place is dignified and those functions are important. It is to this faculty, acting honestly and without bias, that we appeal for a verdict in favour of Christianity as a Divine revelation. But we contend that its judgment should be guided by the evidence that preponderates, either for it or against. We maintain that whoever demands any other ground for its decisions, demands more than can be justly expected. The question, and the only question is, whether or not there is evidence enough for *faith* and for *action*. But to this we argue that there can only be one impartial

answer, and that answer is, that for this purpose the evidence is abundant. Mystery, to a certain extent, there must be, and when the infidel speaks of religion without mystery he speaks absurdly. For a religion without mystery would be a religion without God. It is essential to the very sublimity of the Godhead. To make Him perfectly, plainly, and universally intelligible, were to degrade Him, and once convinced upon sufficient preponderating proof that a certain professed revelation is verily from Him, we are bound to believe it, even though certain profound mysteries which are not actual contradictions are inseparably mixed up with it. "We ought not," says Lord Bacon, "to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason, but on the contrary to raise and advance our reason to the Divine truth." And again, "The prerogative of God comprehends the whole man. Wherefore, as we are to obey *God's law*, though we find a reluctance *in our will*, so we are to believe His *word*, though we find a reluctance in our *reason:* for if we believe only that which is *agreeable unto our reason* we give assent to the *matter*, not to the *author*, which *is no more* than we would do to a *discredited witness*." Yet, there are some who, while professing to believe that Scripture is the testimony of God, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine it with as much irreverence as if the Court had prejudged Him to be a prevaricating or a dishonest witness, to be credited only so far as His testimony could be corroborated by that of others, or by the probabilities of the case, and not by the *character* of the witness himself as credible both from his known sincerity and his thorough

acquaintance with all the points in dispute. In the name of common sense and common honesty, is such a course fair and reasonable, not to say becoming and reverent? If the real merits of a case on which the lives and properties of many individuals were depending hung upon a very profound question in mathematics, or in some very abstruse science, of which the Court who tried that case were ignorant; and a witness whose integrity was beyond suspicion, and whose knowledge of the subject was undisputed, were summoned to give evidence, would it be just to reject his testimony if it stated facts for which that Court in its ignorance could not comprehend the reasons? Should no weight be attached to the mere statement of such a high authority? To admit, then, as some do, that the Bible is God's Word, —yet reject some parts of it, simply because they cannot understand them, is grossly inconsistent. Or, even if there were no proof, in the case of such a witness, but his own professions, of his own attainments, would it be fair to set him down as false or incompetent to give evidence merely because while stating a number of facts which judge and jury knew to be true, he stated others also which they were not intelligent or not learned enough to be *sure* were either true or false? The natural course will surely be to credit as true, or at all events possible, the part of his testimony which they could not comprehend, since all that they *could* comprehend was certainly known to be true. And we do not see that it is necessary to qualify this materially to make it a perfectly fair illustration.

There are many who object to revelation because it is

mysterious, and believe in nothing which they cannot comprehend. To be consistent, then, they must believe in very little, for there is not a solitary department of human knowledge but has its mysteries. Natural religion has many, and some of which there has never yet been an approach to a solution. As for the "absolute religion" of modern times it is, perhaps, the strangest of all mysteries. It speaks, we are told, in all men, and yet none are conscious of its utterances, or if some say that they are, others say decisively they are not. It anticipates all Revelation and makes it needless, yet men have always and everywhere felt their want of a revelation, and longed for it accordingly. It is an inward oracle to be consulted by all men, yet its response to one is "the soul is immortal," while to another it says, "I cannot tell you whether it is or not, for I know nothing on the subject." It makes a universal religion, which we are to believe is self-consistent, out of a medley of opposite and even contradictory creeds, all of which inculcate in some way or other the true worship of the true God, and it sanctifies the most abominable crimes on the supposition that they are acceptable to God if committed under the sincere conviction that they are so in fact. It is founded on a universal instinct, though its intuitions are so vague, various, scanty, and obscure, that it differs from all else that we know to be instinctive in our nature, and yet they are so clear and copious as to render a revelation superfluous!

It has been said by some opponents to Christianity that where "mystery begins religion ceases." But would they make a similar statement of any other

subject of human knowledge? or could they say in general that where mystery begins *truth* ceases? Is it certain that nothing can be true, yet incomprehensible? "The mixed mathematical science of mechanics is conversant about *force, matter, time, motion, space.* Each of these has been the cause of the most elaborate disquisitions, and of the most violent dispute. Let it be asked, What is *force?* If the answerer be candid, his reply will be, 'I cannot tell so as to satisfy every inquirer, or so as to enter into the essence of the thing.' Again, What is *matter?* 'I cannot tell.' What is *motion?* 'I cannot tell.' Here, then, is a science, the professed object of which is to determine the mutual relations, dependencies, and changes of quantities with the real nature of all of which we are unacquainted, and in which the proposed object is, notwithstanding, effected. We have certain knowledge respecting subjects of which, in themselves, we have no knowledge; demonstrated irrefragable propositions respecting the *relations* of things which in themselves elude the most acute investigations. . . . I may challenge the wisest Philosopher to demonstrate from unexceptionable principles and by just argument, what will be the effect of one particle of matter in motion meeting with another at rest, on the supposition that these two particles constituted all the *matter* in the universe. The fact of the communication of motion from one body to another is as inexplicable as the communication of Divine influences. How, then, can the former be admitted with any face, while the latter is denied, solely on account of its incomprehensibility? We know nothing of *force,* any more

than we do of *grace*, except by its effects. There are questions, doubts, perplexities, disputes, diversities of opinion about the one as well as about the other. Ought we not, therefore, by a parity of reason, to conclude that there may be several true and highly useful propositions about the latter as well as about the former? Nay, I will venture to go further, and affirm that the preponderance of argument is in favour of the propositions of the theologian. For while force, time, motion, etc., are avowedly constituent parts of a demonstrable science, and ought, therefore, to be presented in a full blaze of light, the obscure parts proposed for our assent in the Scriptures are *avowedly* mysterious. They are not exhibited to be perfectly understood, but to be believed. They *cannot* be explained without ceasing to be what they are; for the explanation of a mystery, as Dr. Young long ago remarked, is its destruction. They cannot be rendered obvious without being made mean, for a clear idea is only another name for a *little* idea. Obscurities, however, are felt as incumbrances to any system of philosophy, while mysteries are ornaments of the Christian system, and tests of the humility and faith of its votaries. So that if the rejectors of incomprehensibles acted consistently with their own principles they should rather throw aside all philosophical theories in which obscurities are found, and exist as *defects*, than the system of revealed religion in which they enter as essential parts of that *mystery* of Godliness in which the Apostles gloried.

"But, perhaps I may be told that, although things which are incomprehensible occur in our physical and

mixed inquiries, they have no place in "*pure* mathematics where all is not only demonstrable but intelligible." ("Gregory's Letters"—Letter 4th.) This author after then referring to "hyperbolas which continually approach to their asymptotes but cannot possibly meet them unless an assignable finite space can become equal to nothing,"—to conchoids "which continually approach to their directrices yet can never meet them unless a certain point can be both beyond and in contact with a given line at the same moment;" and to other "mathematical incomprehensibles," subjoins, "yet the science in which these and numerous other incomprehensibles occur is called *mathesis* the DISCIPLINE, because of its incomparable superiority to other studies in evidence and certainty, and therefore its singular adaptation to discipline the mind. . . . How does it happen, now, that when the investigation is bent towards objects which cannot be comprehended, the mind arrives at that in which it acquiesces as *certainty* and rests satisfied? It is not manifestly because we have a distinct perception of the *nature* of the objects of the inquiry (for that is precluded by the supposition, and indeed by the preceding statement), but because we have a distinct perception of the *relation* those objects bear one towards another, and can assign positively, without danger of error, the exact relation as to identity or diversity of the quantities before us at every step of the process. Mathematics is not the science which enables us to ascertain the nature of things in themselves; for that, alas! is not a science which can be learned in our present imperfect condition where we see through a glass darkly; but the science of quantity as measurable, that is, as comparable: and

it is obvious that we can compare quantities satisfactorily in some respects, while we know nothing of them in others. . . . We cannot comprehend the nature of an infinite series, so far as that nature depends upon an acquaintance with each term; but we *know* the relation which subsists between it and the radix from which it is expanded: we cannot comprehend the nature of the impossible quantities $\sqrt{-a}$ $\sqrt{-b}$, &c.;* but we *know* their relation to one another, and to other algebraic quantities. In like manner (though I should scarcely presume to state such a comparison but for the important practical inference which it furnishes) we cannot with our limited faculties comprehend the infinite perfections of the Supreme Being, or reconcile His different attributes so as to see distinctly how 'mercy and truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other,' or how the majestic governor of the universe can be everywhere present, yet not exclude other beings; but we know, or at least *may* know (if we do not despise and reject the information graciously vouchsafed to us by the God of truth) His relation to us as *our* Father, *our* guide, and *our* judge. We cannot comprehend the nature of the Messiah as revealed to us in His twofold character of the 'Son of God' and 'the Man Christ Jesus,' but we know the relation in which He stands to us as mediator of the new covenant, and as He who was wounded for *our* transgressions, who was bruised for *our* iniquities, and by whose stripes *we* are healed. Again, we cannot comprehend, perhaps, why the introduction of moral evil should be permitted by Him 'who *hateth* iniquity,' but we know in relation to ourselves that He

* Before referred to by Dr. G., in full.

hath provided a way for *our* escape from the punishment due to sin (which way, if we lose, the fault is entirely our own), and therefore, though we cannot comprehend and explain it so as to silence all cavillers, yet we have abundant reason to glory in the *mystery* of reconciliation. By pursuing this current of thought further, and running over the general principles of other branches of mathematical, chemical, and metaphysical science than I have here adverted to, you will still find, I am persuaded, that the result of the inquiry will come in aid of our religious belief by showing that the difficulties attending Christianity are of the same kind (and should probably be referred to the same cause, the weakness of our faculties) as those which envelope all the fundamental principles of knowledge." (Ibid.) "We should point out to objectors, that what is revealed is practicable and not speculative, that what the Scriptures are concerned with is, not the philosophy of the human mind, nor yet the philosophy of the Divine nature in itself, but that which is properly religion, the *relation* and connexion of the two beings, what God is *to us*, what He has done and will do for us, and what *we* are to be and to do in regard to Him."*

So far then is it from being true, that where mystery

* This passage is referred to by the able translator of M. Saissett's "Religious Philosophy," as from a living author, and as quoted with approbation by Mr. Mansell. It is objected to, however, by the translator in his own admirable Essay (see "Modern Pantheism. Essay, by the translator." Pp. 214-15.) But though we acknowledge the justice of his criticism, we contend that the passage requires but a little qualification to render it a true and valuable statement. It is not from the author quoted above.

begins religion ceases, that a religion without mystery would bear upon the face of it evidence of forgery. It would be unlike all that we know of its professed author from His works of nature and of providence. It would be, as it were, a coin which, bearing what was called the image and superscription of the "King of kings," and offered for circulation on earth, differed so widely from all the recognised mintage of Heaven as to prove it at once to be spurious.

Bishop Butler, in his great work, has dwelt largely on many points which bear upon the subject before us, that is, this darkness of ignorance. In the 7th chapter of the first part he treats of "the Government of God considered as a scheme or constitution *imperfectly comprehended*," in which he proves conclusively that our ignorance, "as it is the common, is really a satisfactory answer to all objections against the wisdom and goodness of providence," while he also proves that the "answer given to such objections cannot equally be made use of to invalidate the proofs of it." In the 3d chapter of the second part he enlarges on our "*incapacity of judging what were to be expected in a revelation*, and the credibility from analogy that it must contain things appearing liable to objections:" and in the 6th, "of the want of universality in revelation, and of the *supposed deficiency in the proof of it*. It would be impossible to extract sufficiently from these invaluable chapters without greatly enlarging the present volume. We can only very earnestly recommend their careful study to all to whom the darkness of our present state may cause perplexity or doubt. They make that darkness itself an

answer to a large class of objections against religion, both natural and revealed, and taken in connexion with his remarks in the 5th chapter of the second part, section v., in which he speaks "of this darkness, or this light of nature—call it which we please," go to prove the world to be in a state of ruin, while they are all written with a *caution* which we greatly fear that some modern advocates of Christianity have damaged its claims upon our belief by neglecting.*

The same chapters show us that in the affairs of this world we often act upon very doubtful evidence upon an even chance, and even when the chances are greatly against success, and that the supposed doubtfulness of the proofs of religion render our state *a more improving state of discipline*, and may, in fact, constitute some people's *peculiar* probation. But there is one passage which we cannot forbear from quoting: "If we were to suppose that the evidence which some have of religion to amount to little more than seeing it may be true, but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule of life; others, to have a full conviction of the truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others, severally, to have all the intermediate degrees of light and evidence which lie between these two. If we put the case, that for the present it was intended revelation should be no more than a small light in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and darkness; that certain glimmerings of this light should extend and be directed

* See Translator's note in "Modern Pantheism," vol. i., p. 70.

to remote distances in such a manner as that those who really partook of it should not discern from whence it originally came; that some in a nearer situation to it should have its light obscured and in different ways and degrees intercepted; and that others should be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet that, *even to these*, it should be no more than a light *shining in a dark place*, all this would be perfectly uniform and of a piece with the conduct of Providence in the distribution of its other blessings. . . . I say if we were to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light and evidence which were intended to be afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is their situation in their moral and religious capacity, there would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty in all these varieties and supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others respecting religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural dispensations of Providence at present, and considering ourselves merely in our temporal capacity." ("Analogy," part ii., chap. vi.) He then proceeds to prove that there is nothing shocking in all this if we would really keep in mind that everyone shall be dealt equitably with, instead of forgetting this or explaining it away after it is acknowledged in words.

Thus, even under the Christian dispensation, it is still ght, though its darkness has been greatly relieved, and think we can see on the supposition of the fall undant reason for the light not being brighter than it

is—since darkness to some, and some considerable, extent must still remain for the purposes of our improvement in those virtues which require that darkness for their exercise. But how are we to account for the darkness of mankind in general? Surely, the obvious answer is by supposing such an obscuration of our original faculties as the fall, admitting it to be a withdrawment from God, and therefore from light, would occasion. This is the simple explanation of what would otherwise appear so perplexingly anomalous. Man is an immortal creature, vastly superior in general intelligence, and psychical endowment to any of the brute creation, capable of high intellectual attainments, endowed with a religious sentiment, and susceptible of the very loftiest aspirations. Yet, as such, he finds himself unable to discover truths of the utmost importance to his welfare. He has qualities which prompt him to worship some invisible superior, but whom to worship, or how, he knows not, and can only vaguely conjecture. He is the noblest of all the creatures of God upon earth, and made, therefore, more signally than the rest to give Him glory—yet he knows Him not, and by "searching" cannot "find Him out." His nature, as it now is, would appear to require a something to make it what it seems designed to be. He is "fearfully and wonderfully made," and so made for that which he is not. He was made for light, yet he is living in darkness. He has qualities for which earth and time appear to be too little, and yet he is ignorant of the sphere in which they are ultimately to operate, and of the mode in which they must be exercised in order to fit him for its enjoyment! Man, as Pascal says,

is "divided against himself," and can we suppose that this is his normal condition? No doubt we can,—but is not the hypothesis of a disorder in his mental and moral condition a more natural explanation of these anomalies? We have no reason to suppose that the inferior animals are thus out of harmony with themselves; and if man's case be exceptional, this fact only increases the mystery; for why should the noblest of all God's creatures be the most incongruous?

We have dwelt long on this peculiar evidence of night, yet at the hazard of being tedious, we must make a few more remarks. The immense importance of the subject must be our apology. There are some who, like those who have lost themselves in the misty speculations of Pantheism, imagine that the human understanding is adequate to the discovery of truths which are wholly beyond its reach, and there is much metaphysical controversy that, in the expressive Greek phrase, may well be called "nuktomachia." Even orthodox Christians have often engaged in this night-fighting, and the very expression is used by an ecclesiastical historian * to represent the controversies at one time in the Church respecting the abstruse questions which are connected with the doctrine of the Trinity. Such persons ought to remember that man is a fallen creature, and that his state is therefore, even at best, a state of darkness. "Difficulties meet us and baffle us in the constitution of nature as well as in the pages of revelation, and when we consider the mysteries of every kind that surround

* Socrates, quoted by Millman, in his "History of Christianity," ɔk iii., chap. iv.

us, and that the very mind which thus erects itself into a standard of all things is most ignorant of that which it ought to know best itself, and finds there the most inscrutable of all mysteries. . . . When we reflect upon all this, surely we cannot but feel that the spectacle of so ignorant a thing refusing to believe a proposition merely *because* it is above its comprehension, is of all paradoxes the most paradoxical, and of all absurdities the most ludicrous." *

But if there are thus some who do not believe that our natural faculties are benighted, there are some sincere though mistaken Christians who so greatly exaggerate our ignorance and darkness as unconsciously to make them an answer, not only to some objections to Christianity, but also to the proofs of its truth; and it is against this that Bishop Butler has cautiously and effectually guarded by showing, in four different arguments, that the sort of ignorance which answers those objections does not invalidate these proofs. (See part i., chap. vii.) He also takes great pains not to "vilify" —to use his own language—Reason, "that candle of the Lord within us." It is not true that the fall has so vitiated our natural faculties that they are wholly useless in the search for religious truth. If they were it would be needless to use them for its discovery. No proofs would be available, and no objections could be answered. But though Scripture forbids us to *trust* in means *alone*,

* Essays from the "Edinburgh Review," by Mr. Rogers—"Genius and Writings of Pascal," 1 vol., pp. 297—98. We are sorry to be obliged to abbreviate the very striking passages from which the above is a meagre extract.

it requires us, notwithstanding, to use them; now our natural faculties are means to an end, namely, truth; and though the fall has certainly damaged them greatly, it has not so damaged them as to prevent them from assisting us when used aright, that is with caution, with diligence, with humility, and with prayer in ascertaining something, nay much, of all that it vitally concerns us, as immortal creatures, to be acquainted with. We are not competent judges of such questions as what exactly a revelation ought to contain, the time in which, and the persons to whom it ought to be published, or the precise degree of evidence by which it ought to be supported, but we *are* competent judges of what might have been expected on the ground of morality; and "when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue than, all circumstances considered, could have been expected from enthusiasm and political views: this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth: because we *are* competent judges of what might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views." *(Ibid.)* The doctrine that the fall has damaged our intellectual as well as our moral and spiritual nature must be taken with those limitations which Scripture itself both implies and imposes. It appeals to our reasoning faculties, on some points, while on others it gives us to understand "that such knowledge is too wonderful for us—we cannot attain unto it." It implies that our state is dark enough to need a Divine revelation, but not so dark as to make it useless; that we have eyes, herwise light would answer no purpose, but yet eyes

which are so filmy, that the Spirit of God is necessary to remove the mist, and enable us to see distinctly. There is much in Christianity that we can comprehend and admire, much of which the very beauty and excellence can be urged as a proof of its heavenly origin; and to argue that our faculties are so vitiated as to be unable to recognize any of this beauty and excellence is to weaken the cause we are anxious to advocate. But there is much that we cannot comprehend, and much we may think we understand, and to which we may imagine that we see many objections; now it is just here, as Butler has so ably proved, that our ignorance is a complete answer to our objections. We have faculties for appreciating the morality of Scripture, and for deciding on what would result from human imposture, enthusiasm, and ambition; and we have faculties for judging of the *evidences* of Christianity, as distinguished from Christianity itself, nor amongst those evidences, must that which is called *internal* be *wholly* rejected from our supposed incompetence to judge upon the subject at all. Where it fails, it *evidently* fails because of the weakness of our faculties,—but on points within their reach it does not fail, but has been employed with signal advantage by Dr. Chalmers (who at one time excluded this sort of proof), and by others to show, not only the sublime morality of the Gospel, but also its singular adaptation to the nature, which it was the chosen instrument of God to regenerate.

Nor can we agree with those who think that in consequence of the fall our ignorance is so profound that, until the understanding is supernaturally en-

lightened by the Spirit of God, "evidences," even with total unbelievers, are either useless or mischievous, —surely, unbelievers are not to be left alone in their infidelity, and thus suffered to conclude that their objections are unanswerable. The reasoning which would lead us to this strange inference would go to prove that ends are to be accomplished without means,—a doctrine decisively negatived by the whole constitution of nature as well as by all revelation and all probability.

Against such exaggerated views of the consequences of Adam's transgression we would protest. But there are many who, without holding the extreme opinions above alluded to, imagine that books on the evidences of Christianity are pernicious to those who already believe. To use the language of the late Dr. Whately, "there are persons professing to believe in Christianity, and to be anxious for its support, who deprecate altogether any appeal to evidence for it as likely to lead, not to conviction, but to doubt or disbelief; and again, there are not a few Christians who think that there is the more virtue in their faith the less rational the ground for it, and the less they inquire for any. He then quotes Scripture to prove that our Lord and his Apostles not only inculcated faith as a virtue, and denounced sin as unbelief, but did so appealing to numerous proofs of the truths for which they demanded that faith, and adds: "To maintain in the face of the whole New Testament history that the Apostles demanded faith without offering any reason for it is an instance of audacity quite astonishing, and not less wonderful is it, that any rational being should be found who can imagine that men's minds can

best be satisfied by proclaiming the inquiry as hazardous. If there were any college, hospital, or workhouse; asylum, or other institution, whose managers and patrons assured us that it was well conducted, but that *inspection* was much to be deprecated, because it would probably lead to the conviction that the institution was full of abuses, I need not say what inference would be drawn." "It is to be wished that such writers (alluding to those who disparage the study of the evidences of our faith), if they really have that regard for Christianity which they profess . . . should in the first place read attentively the New Testament, that they may see how utterly contrary to the fact are all the statements they have made; and in the next place I would wish one of those writers to consider what he would think of some professed friend coming forward as his advocate, and saying, 'my friend, here is a veracious and worthy man, and there is no foundation for any of the charges brought against him, and his integrity is fully believed in by persons who thoroughly trust him and have never thought of examining his character at all, or inquiring into his transactions: but of all things do *not make any investigation* into his character, for be assured that the more you examine and inquire, the less likely you will be to be satisfied of his integrity.' No one can doubt what would be thought of such a pretended friend. And no reasonable man can fail, on reflection, to perceive that such professed friends of religion do more to shake men's faith in it than all the attacks of all the avowed infidels in the world put together." He then refers to the "deplorable fruits which have followed from thus *depre-*

cating the use of reason, and thus hiding under a bushel the lamp which Providence has thus kindly bestowed upon man." ("The Origin of Civilization," a Lecture, pp. 30—36.)

To recapitulate. The fall has darkened our reason but it has not destroyed it, and we may use our reason even in judging of a revelation, though with the caution, the humility, the distrust in it alone, and the dependence upon God, as well as the prayerfulness which become a fallen, fallible, and erring creature. There is light enough (in the language of Pascal) for those whose sincere wish is to see, and darkness enough to confound those of an opposite disposition. We encounter objections to our faith, some of which it is difficult, if not impossible, in *consequence of our ignorance*, fully to answer, but these are outweighed by a vast *preponderance* of proofs, and proofs *drawn from our knowledge*, in the opposite scale. The evidence, too, which we actually have, is exactly of that sort which a state of moral education and discipline such as that in which (according to the supposition of a fall and the mode adopted by the Deity as taught in Scripture for our recovery) we are placed, would seem to require; for that evidence is neither strong enough to overpower all possible doubt, nor weak enough to prevent all earnest enquiry. It is enough to satisfy every dispassionate mind, and yet it is open to such doubts and difficulties as the moral improvement of fallen and sinful creatures, to be educated, among other ways, by the trust, patience, humility, diligence, faith, hope, candour, and honesty, which a sincere and prayerful search after

truth, not irresistibly convincing and even assailable with plausible arguments, must call into exercise to qualify such creatures by the formation of the character which these virtues produce for the enjoyment of the Paradise they have lost. It is evidence of which it has well been said that "if it were greater the Gospel would cease to be a faith, and if it were less the Gospel would become a superstition. If it were more there would be no probation for the heart, and if less no grappling point for the reason." * And there is one fact which we ought never to forget, and that is, that evidence alone, however convincing, is not always enough to regulate conduct. We may have the clearest possible conviction of what is right and yet systematically practise what is wrong. The heart, therefore, must be educated as well as the understanding; nor is this all, we may make a clear metaphysical distinction between the principles of our nature, but it is certain, notwithstanding, that they act upon one another reciprocally. If the understanding influences the affections, the affections in their turn influence the understanding, and it often happens that the cultivation of our moral involves an improvement of our intellectual nature. For just as there is a close connexion and mutual interaction between body and mind, so is there between our mental and our moral constitution.

"What an influence do the passions exercise upon the judgment! How is the voice of reason drowned

* For much useful and interesting information on these points the reader may consult the treatise of Mr. Rogers on "Reason and Faith, their Claims and Conflicts." See also Bampton Lecture of Mr. Mansell, "Limits of Religious Thought Examined."

in the cry of impetuous desires! To what absurdities will the understanding give assent when the will has resolved to take up their advocacy. How little way can truth make with the intellect when there is something in its character which opposes the inclination. And what do we infer from these undeniable facts? Simply that while the moral functions are disordered so must be the mental. Simply that so long as the heart is depraved and disturbed, the mind in a certain degree must itself be out of joint, and if you would give the mind fair play there must be applied straightway a corrective process to the heart . . . . We prove to you that a weak mind may be so connected with a wicked heart that to act on the wickedness would be going far to act on the weakness, —oh! fatal downfall of man's first parent, the image could not be shivered in its moral features and remain untouched in its intellectual. Well has it been said that Athens was but the rudiments of Paradise and an Aristotle only the rubbish of Adam. But if there be a moral renovation there will, from the connexion now traced, be also to a certain extent an intellectual." *

It is manifest, then, that light alone, be it ever so brilliant, is not enough to dissipate darkness and enable the benighted to see distinctly. Indeed,

> So weak is man,
> So ignorant and so blind, that did not God
> Sometimes withhold in mercy what we ask,
> We should be ruined at our own request.

And were some of those who desire light generally in the head, without caring for grace in the heart,

* Sermons by Henry Melvill, B.D. 1840. Vol. II., Sermon XII.

to put their wishes into prayers, they might be asking for that which, by increasing their powers of wickedness, might only aggravate both their guilt and their sorrows. Besides, according to our hypothesis, moral causes produced the darkness, and therefore it is moral causes that must be chiefly employed for its removal. But, as we have shown already, an intense light would prejudice their operation and defeat the very object they were intended to accomplish. All this proves that while without a revelation men were involved in much uncertainty and obscurity, there are reasons why even those who enjoy that revelation should still see "through a glass darkly." We see enough to guide us through the darkness of our pilgrimage safely to the light land of Heaven, while for that darkness we can imagine no cause so satisfactory as that which Scripture assigns. Night has closed in around us because we have wandered away from the source of all real enlightenment, yet as there might be a far deeper darkness than that which mantles the dreaming earth when the orb of natural day is below our horizon, so there might be a vastly profounder spiritual obscurity than that with which, until enlightened by a revelation and by the Spirit of God, the human understanding is benighted. Without these, no doubt, there is darkness, but then that darkness is neither so slight as to make precaution needless, nor so impenetrable as to render vision useless. There is light when the material sun is no longer visible, and there are modes of illumination additional to those which nature employs. These, it is true, are of human fabrication, and so far the illustration

fails, but they are added to the sources of light which the mariner finds already in the firmament, and with all these together he can steer in safety even in the midnight storm; so there is light in the understanding though it has strayed from God, and this light is very greatly increased by another which is amply sufficient, when properly applied, to guide us in perfect security through all the dangers of our perilous voyage to that land of which we are told emphatically that there is "no night there." It is the light of revelation, not, as is often supposed, dispensing with, but increasing that of nature. It is "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ," and a light of which every ray is luminous with the glory of the sun it reflects and the morning it anticipates. It falls, we admit, upon some peculiar objects which it does not fully illuminate, but it throws even upon them such gleams of lustre as enable us to hope that we shall one day either see them clearly, or rejoice in a knowledge of the reasons for which they are so far "hidden from our eyes;" while even in itself there are dark spots like those on the sun, but which also, like those on the sun, have doubtless some important uses, though all those uses may as yet be unknown, or known but imperfectly; still we can perceive that they have *some* in the very hope which they suggest that they shall yet be dark no longer; and here we would cite the eloquent words of the writer who has last been quoted, "We can never think that God would tell man things for the understanding of which he is to be always incapacitated. If he know them not now, the very fact

of their being told is a sufficient proof that he shall know them hereafter. And therefore in every scriptural difficulty I read the pledge of a mighty enlargement of the human faculties. In every mystery, though a darkness thick as the Egyptian may now seem to shroud it, I can find one bright and burning spot glowing with promise that there shall yet come a day when every power of the soul, being wrought into a celestial strength, shall be privileged as it were to stretch out the hand of the Lawgiver and roll back the clouds which here envelope the truth. I can muse upon one of those things which are 'hard to be understood' till it seems to put on the prophet's mantle and preach to me of futurity, telling me in accents more spirit-stirring than those of the boldest of mortal oratory that the present is but the infancy of my being, and that in a nobler and more glorious estate I shall start from moral and mental dwarfishness, and endowed with vigour of perception and keenness of vision and vastness of apprehension, walk the labyrinth, and pierce the rock, and weigh the mountain. Oh! I thank God that amongst those countless mercies which He has poured down on our pathway, He has given us a Bible which is not in every part to be explained. The difficulties of Holy Writ—let them be made by objectors the subject of marvel or cavil—they constitute one great sheet of our charter of immortality, and in place of wondering that God should have permitted them, or lamenting that they cannot be overcome, I rejoice in them as earnests given me by Him 'who cannot lie,' that man hath yet to advance to a sublime rank amongst

orders of intelligence, and to stand in the maturity of his strength in the very centre of the panorama of truth. And if it be true that every mystery in Scripture, as giving pledge of an enlargement of capacities, witnesses to the glories with which the future comes charged, and if from every intricate passage, and every dark saying, and every unfathomable statement, we draw new proof of the magnificence of our destinies, which of you will withhold his confession that the difficulties of the Bible are productive of benefit, and that consequently there result advantages from the fact that there are in Scripture 'some things hard to be understood'?" *

Dryden has briefly and beautifully expressed the substance of many of the preceding remarks in the following lines :—

"Dim as the borrowed beams of *moon and stars*
To lonely weary wandering travellers
Is reason to the soul; and as on high
These glittering lights discover but the sky,
Not light us higher, so reason's feeble ray
But guides us upwards to a better day.
And as those *nightly tapers* disappear
When day's bright lord ascends the hemisphere,
So, pale grows reason in religion's light,
So sinks and so dissolves in supernatural light
Some few whose lamps shone brighter have been led
From cause to cause to nature's secret head,
And found that one first principle must be.
But what or who that universal He,
Whether some soul encompassing this ball,

* Ibid, Vol. I, p. 374—5. There are doubtless many other benefits arising from this obscurity. See "Eight Sermons," by the Rev. G. S. Drew, of St. Pancras, London; Sermon vii.

Unmade, unmoved, yet making, moving all,
Of various atoms' interfering dance,
Leaped into form, the noble work of chance,
Or this great all was from eternity,
Not ev'n the stagirite himself could see;
And Epicurus guessed as well as he,
As blindly groped they for a future state,
As rashly judged of providence and fate.

* * * * *

Thus anxious thoughts in endless circles roll
Without a centre where to fix the soul.
In this wild maze their vain endeavours end,
How can the less the greater comprehend?
Or finite reason reach infinity?
For what could fathom God were more than He."

THE DARKNESS OF DELUSION.

The fiend they found
Assaying by his dev'lish art to reach
The organs of her fancy, and with them forge
Illusions as he list, phantasms and dreams.

We have called the phenomena for which we are accounting, nocturnal, compared the existing state of things to darkness, and treated of the darkness of ignorance as resembling night in general, without reference to the special states of body and mind with which it is associated. Of these one of the most pertinent to the subject in hand is dreaming. Though not a necessary consequence of night it is one of its frequent accompaniments, and though not identical with darkness we may be pardoned for calling it darkness, and the spiritual condition to which we would compare it, the darkness of delusion. Ignorance is negative, being simply a want of knowledge. Delusion is positive, and implies error, mistaken for truth. The one originates in a darkness of which we may be conscious, the other in a darkness of which we are not conscious, and which fancy, or folly, or madness, would dissipate with false lights and cheer or sadden with fantastic apparitions. Both are of the night, but the former involves those

who may be called the waking, the latter those who may be styled the dreaming. Now the dream state presupposes and cannot be understood but in connexion with a sleep state. Nor ought the resemblance between this also and the spiritual condition of men in general to be wholly overlooked. But we shall dismiss it with a very few observations. "Balmy sleep" "steeps the senses in forgetfulness," and while the body under its influence resembles a breathing corpse rather than a living organism, its inhabiting spirit, though often in wild activity, seems to the waking observer as torpid as that corporeal framework that appears to be its dormitory. But to this it may be said there is nothing analogous in the state of mankind as regards religion. That subject has attracted the attention of men in every era of the world, and often convulsed society with controversy, with wars, and with martyrdom. The state, then, of man cannot be one of spiritual lethargy. But after deducting from all this excitement and commotion whatever can be traced to worldly politics and party violence, to the prejudices which religion so often opposes, to the passions which it resists, and the pride that it mortifies, to the vices which assume its name, and to the merely intellectual curiosity which it awakens, as well as to that genuine and lively interest in the subject itself which we admit but deem exceptional, and account for consistently with the proposed hypothesis, what remains but apathy or torpor? Does religion, regarded simply as our duty to God, occasion that personal, practical, profound, and universal attention which its paramount importance ought always to inspire?

The truth is that notwithstanding the excitement which its connexion with other subjects may have caused, it has always in its naked simplicity been so distasteful to men in general, that something unusual or something startling, a grievous sickness, a serious disappointment, a melancholy bereavement, or a marvellous escape, is necessary to awaken them to a sense of its real importance. But however natural, in the ordinary sense of that word, may be this insensibility, is it normal? If there be verily a God, a sovereign Creator and moral governor of the universe, a being of infinite wisdom, goodness, and power, in whom we "live and move and have our being," ought He not to be, and, but for some such catastrophe as the fall, may we not presume that He would be, in all our thoughts? Would not the knowledge of Himself, His ways, His works, and His laws, of the proper manner in which to worship Him, and of the right mode of procuring His favour and promoting His glory, be the one great end and aim of our whole existence? Man is a rational, responsible, and immortal creature; whence, then, this strange indifference to the most important of all the subjects that can engage his reasoning faculties, to all that can make responsibility serious, and to all that can make immortality awakening? Surely if we were not now on the "night side of nature," and the sun were above our horizon, the day would summon us one and all to its duties, and men by their spiritual activity over all the earth would prove that they were "up and stirring." We are not ignorant of the arguments by which this reasoning may be met, and shall consider

their validity in the proper place; but at present it is enough to ask whether the phenomenon we are now alluding to is not real, and whether the fall does not afford for it at least an obvious explanation.

These remarks, however, are but preparatory; sleep is often accompanied with dreams, and the spiritual state to which we would compare that in which they originate we have called the darkness of delusion. It is at night that appearances, even to the wakeful, are most likely to be deceptive, that one object is most frequently mistaken for another, and that lifeless forms seem living creatures. But in dreams fancies appear facts, and the wildest hallucinations sober realities. The beggar believes that he is a king, and the thirsty drunkard that he quaffs a sparkling wine cup. The miser counts imaginary gold. The votary of pleasure thinks that he is listening to the festive song, that he joins in the visionary dance, or that he riots in voluptuous delight. The lame imagine that they are leaping with joy. The sick feel healthy again; and the felon in his cell forsakes, he thinks, his solitary dungeon, and walks the wide land with a step that is elastic and a spirit that is bounding with liberty. Now no one supposes that in all these cases the dreaming man is properly himself. A change of some kind has passed over him; his dream state is not his proper one, and however hard it may be to give a satisfactory explanation of the cause of these delusions, delusions they certainly are, and arise from some important alteration either in the body in general or the brain in particular. Now the religions of mankind, with the exception of Christianity, bear a closer

resemblance to what a sceptical writer has called them, that is "sick men's dreams," than to the sober conclusions of a rational, a healthy, and a waking mind. But these "sick men's dreams" imply of necessity some such disorder or disease as that which, according to Scripture, the fall has occasioned.* Is it likely that those hideous creations of human thought which have

* Whether many religions have not originated in actual and literal dreams is a curious subject of inquiry. We have all heard of the mesmeric coma and clairvoyant (so called) "revelations." Of trance artificially induced and trance that if real might be called idiopathic. Of various kinds of intoxication which have caused the sufferer to be looked upon as inspired. Of drugged priestesses at the oracles, and drugged witches, and wonder doctors, to say nothing of the supernatural phenomena which are said to be sometimes associated with dreams. The doctrines of Zoroaster (which certainly bear in some respects a resemblance to Christianity) regarding the principle of good eternally absorbed in *light*, and the principle of evil eternally buried in darkness, are well known. But whatever may have caused those doctrines themselves their *exposition* was, or was said to be, the result of a *literal* dream. They were much disputed, and Ardshir, or Artaxerxes, summoned the magi to determine them. "The Persian synod was reduced, by successive operations, to forty thousand, to four thousand, to four hundred, to forty, and at last to seven magi. One of these, Erdaviraph, received from the hands of his brethren three cups of soporiferous wine. He drank them off, and instantly fell into a long and profound sleep. As soon as he waked, he related to the king, and to the believing multitude, his journey to heaven, and his intimate conference with the Deity. Every doubt was silenced by this supernatural evidence, and the articles of the faith of Zoroaster were fixed with equal authority and precision."—Gibbon, "Decline and Fall," Chap. viii. See also "Synonyms of the New Testament," by Dr. Trench, § vi., Fourth Edition, pp. 22—27.

often been embodied in human creeds, arose from the operations of the mind in its waking, healthy, and *truly* natural condition? "As well might we say that the normal state of man in the fulness of noontide light was that in which he suffers from a nightmare. Think of the fantastic and frightful idols which savages are worshipping, of their torturing penances and their cruel superstitions; of the filthy rites and the human sacrifices of various nations of antiquity, or of the widow-burnings, and the victims crushed by the car of Juggernaut; what are these but delusions and mockeries? fantastic visions of the night, dreams of fever-stricken sleepers, not the result of the sober thought of rational creatures, awake, in health, and in the day. Whatever be the origin of man there can be no doubt of the dignity of his place in the creation. This is a point which we have glanced at already, but its importance deserves the repetition. The general organization of man, both physical and moral, goes to prove that he was intended to be just what he is, and that is at the head of all the living tribes by which the earth is tenanted. The structure, for example, of the human hand, the most perfect we believe of all known instruments of prehension, (so perfect that to this Anaxagoras ascribed man's superiority, but of which Galen said more justly, that it was given to him *because* of that superiority,) is one of the proofs of this designed preeminence. Another, we think, is the human brain, which even *though* it may share with the Simiæ the "posterior lobe," the "posterior cornu of the lateral ventricle," and the "hippocampus minor,"

differs in its depth * and *relative proportions* † from that of any other animal. Another still, is language, speaking of which, Dr. Max Müller says, "Where, then, is the difference between brute and man? What is it that man can do, and of which we find no signs, no rudiments in the whole brute world? I answer without hesitation: the one great barrier between brute and man is *language*. Man speaks—language is our rubicon, and no brute will dare to cross it. Language is the outward sign and realization of that inward faculty which is called abstraction," but this, according to Locke, is "an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to." ‡ There is yet a further evidence of this preordained superiority in that capacity for *progress* which eminently distinguishes man, but of which we can hardly discover a trace among the inferior animals. But the most conclusive proof of all is the religious sentiment—a sentiment to which *they* appear to be utter strangers, but of which no human being would seem to be wholly destitute. § All this, taken in

* See "Natural History Review," for January, 1861, on the Zoological Relations of Man to the Lower Animals; also "Note, sur L'Encéphale de L'Orang-outang," in same Review, for January, 1862.

† That is, according to the Phrenologists.

‡ "Lectures on Language," by Dr. Max Müller. Lecture ix.

§ "That man forms a separate kingdom is a proposition which can only be denied by some purblind Physiologist. Where then are the *phenomena* which do not occur in other animals? Among the *mammiferæ*, and especially among the apes, there is an absolute identity in many features of anatomical composition. The peculiarity of the '*os sublime*' belongs to the clumsy penguin and the

connexion with the *fact* of man's acknowledged supremacy—though by nature he is comparatively unarmed and undefended—over all other creatures on earth, however numerous, however cunning, and however powerful; and with his high intellectual attainments, proves beyond a doubt that he is the Creator's master-work on

waddling duck. Of intelligence the animal has some faint outlines; between the pointer and the philosopher it is a question of more or less. M. Agassiz considers that a scientific notification of the growlings of bears in various lands would lead to the derivation of one from the other as indubitable as the process by which Professor Müller at Oxford traces Sanscrit and Greek to one genealogical tree. The sentiments of love and hatred and the parental affection are roughly and rudimentally in the brute and bird. The associating faculty is developed in the castor and the bee. But the notions of morality and of a future existence—the faculties which we may call moral and religious—exist, however rudely, and with whatever grotesqueness of form, wherever man is to be found. One is not likely to forget the exceptions that have been made. The Australian languages have no words to render *justice*, *sin*, or *crime*. Be it so; neither have they words to express, generically, *tree*, *fish*, or *bird*. It would be a precarious hypothesis indeed which should maintain that the Aborigines are unacquainted with the *thing* signified by the *word fish;* and I think it equally precarious to assert that they are utterly unacquainted with the *things* signified by *right* and *wrong*. Accurate investigations have proved that the supposed atheism of the Hottentots and Caffres is an over-hasty conclusion, from the absence of images and sacrifices. And Dr. Livingstone tells us that the existence of God and a future life is 'universally acknowledged in Africa.' Hence the fact, which has indeed been generalized into a law, that 'civilization can only come to savages through religion'" (extracted from translator's note in "Modern Pantheism," p. 34). See also a series of papers by M. Quatrefages in the "Revue des Deux Mondes," in 1860-61.

earth, and was meant to be such by that God of whom he was the pre-appointed worshipper. But can we suppose that He who made him thus made him to negative and neutralize, to a great extent at least, almost all that gives him this obviously intended preeminence? for it would appear that brutes have none of these delusions. Is it likely that the same Creator who has evidently made the human hand, the human tongue, and the human brain in exact *adaptation* to the high mental endowments which require these organs for their action, expression, or manifestation, would *not* have adapted such endowments themselves to the rational worship always and everywhere of the Great Benefactor to whose bounty they are owing? We see an obvious correspondency between the hand and the mechanical works of human ingenuity—between articulate speech, at all events language properly so called, and the "general ideas" to which, according to some eminent philologists, it must have been intended to give expression, and we *think* also between the brain and the mental and moral attributes of the creature who possesses them. But we deny that there is the same *degree* of correspondency between man as he now is and without a revelation, or even with a revelation which he rejects, and the proper object of his religious worship—nor can we believe that the being who could make the rudest stone hatchet, express the simplest of general ideas, or understand the plainest argument, was not possessed of a nature which, unless perverted in some way or other, must have taught him that it was useless for him to worship a *stone*.

Here again the doctrine of natural progress may be

pressed into the service; and it may be said that the disparity as works of art between such a stone hatchet, and a Venus de Medicis, or an Apollo Belvedere, is not greater than that in religion between idol worship, and the theology of some heathen philosophers. What *that* really was we leave all those who have carefully studied their opinions to determine. The wisest of those philosophers were utterly at sea as to some of the most important truths of natural religion, and even in these enlightened days there are Theists, Pantheists, and, professedly at least, Atheists—some who believe in the immortality of the soul, some who deny it, and some who are at a loss to know what to think of it. In our humble opinion the religious notions of the grossest idolater are not much less rational than those of some modern Pantheists. As far as we can see, the great difference between the fetich worshipper (if these Pantheists are right) and themselves, is this, that the former worship the Deity in His integrity, while the latter worship (if we can say so without irreverence) only a *bit* of Him. But for thus speaking in disparagement of opinions held by men of great learning and wonderful subtlety we take shelter under the protection of very high authority. If there be one modern writer who has studied Pantheism more profoundly than another, it would seem to be M. Saissett. He does ample justice to the high-mindedness and the genius of Hegel, and some others of his class, yet shows that while Pantheists despise, they must avail themselves of experience—that with a profession of religion, not perhaps insincere, they are most inconsistent, and that

the words, liberty, responsibility, duty, right, immortality, adoration, religion, have no intelligible sense, even in the system of Hegel, of which he says,

"It matters little whether this theory is more or less original. It is enough to know that for Hegel, as for Spinoza, the evolution of man is subject, as well as that of the stone, to an absolute necessity; and certainly he must possess a rare power of self-deception who does not see that such a system strikes at the root of moral and religious life. What! the actions of my life are to be unrolled like the rings of an iron chain, and I am to think myself responsible? What is called God is nothing but the dialectic law, and I am to adore that law, even when it crushes and destroys me! I am only a necessary form of being, destined to be replaced by another, and I am to hope for a life to come. And then they tell me that God is myself, and that I should find my happiness in feeling myself to be God. What! I feel pain. I must die, and I am God—a strange sort of God! Shall I not cry out with Pascal, O ridiculosissimo eroe! But let us treat the theory seriously if possible. God, you say, takes consciousness of himself in men; so God in Himself has no consciousness of Himself, but He takes consciousness of Himself in another. This is strange, especially when the other is not one individual, but millions of individuals—some dead, some living, others to be born, who do not know each other, and are separated by spaces and ages—Where is the unity of a consciousness? What is the meaning of a consciousness which divides itself and breaks itself into a and pieces? What is the meaning of a conscious-

ness which is made in time, and which is never made—which is always seeking for itself, and never finds itself? This is, to tell me in a strange dark language, a very simple thing most easily known, namely, that man is but a necessary form of being, like that tree, or that pebble, or that stream; with this small difference, that man believes himself to be a free agent, without being so in reality; that he sees before him death, with the full certainty of dying, and that in this excess of misery he has only to persuade himself for a moment that he is God, to be consoled for all.

"The great Pantheists have intellects which are too acute not to have perceived these contradictions, so what do they do? They take away with one hand what they have given with the other. Spinoza recognises liberty, but he calls it a free necessity; and this is also the sentiment of Hegel. 'The moral man,' he says, 'has consciousness of his action as something necessary, and thereby only is he truly free.' There is the same strange agreement between Spinoza and Hegel on the distinction of good and evil. They begin by acknowledging it, and a short time after they deny it. Both of them tell us that the soul is immortal, and then they proceed to reduce this immortality to the consciousness that we have of being an eternally necessary form of the absolute being—Liberty without responsibility, morality without duties, immortality without consciousness, mad idolatry of self—these are the practical conclusions of Pantheism, this is what it makes of human personality.

"In a word, contemporary Pantheism, forced to choose

between an extravagant mysticism which is rejected by all the instincts, good and bad, of our day, and the contrary tendency, decides for the latter, and sacrifices resolutely the personality of God in hopes of making more of man. What is the result? It destroys human personality. So true is this profound saying of a contemporary spiritualist." "There are two poles of all human science, the personal I, with whom all begins, and the personal God, in whom it all ends." "Yes, man without God is an enigma. I know not what—an inexplicable monster. He has no mission upon earth and no hope of heaven. Losing his divine ideal, trying to make himself for his ideal, he falls below himself, and his punishment for *dreaming* to be God is, that he ceases to be man."*

Equally strong, and in some respects more pertinent, is the language of M. Saisset's translator.

"Pantheism is constantly falling over into Atheism, as with Hegel and Spinoza, or becoming sublimated into an immoderate Theism, as with Malebranch and Plotinus. Like Scadder, in Mr. Dickens's novel, it has a bright side and a bad side to its face, and he who looks exclusively at the one or the other will draw an imperfect representation. Pantheism is as like Atheism as sleep is to death; it resembles mysticism as closely as a drunkard's *dream* resembles delirium tremens. But sleep is not death, though there is a sleep which is soon frozen into death; and a drunkard's dream is not delirium tremens, though such dreams are often its forerunners."†

* 4th Meditation; God the Creator.

† The Translator's Essay, p. 901.

These are happy illustrations, for Spinoza was reviled in his day as the Prince of Atheists, and Spinozism was called by Bayle "a regular system of Atheism;" yet all competent judges now agree in asserting that he was certainly not an Atheist, while some of Hegel's disciples will have it that Hegel himself was essentially an orthodox Christian, yet he too has been called an Atheist. Pantheism, then, with some is "the sleep that is soon frozen into death," for Atheism is the death of all religion. But with others it is falling into "that immoderate Theism" which is called mysticism, and teaches that there is nothing but the infinite—nothing but God: but this, as the writer last quoted has well observed, is the "sublime of folly;" "nature is but one vast theatre for the movements of God, as men are only the impotent chords of an instrument with a thousand stops which God uses for His glory. The universe is effaced. The human soul is dissipated and vanishes. There is no longer anything but God." *

Surely this is more than the dream of an intoxicated theorist. It is "thought run mad."

"To assert, on the other hand, that there is nothing but the finite, is as absurd, and more degrading. Are these gleams of the infinite nothing but the flashing of the candle of the *Ego* upon the petty window-pane of my consciousness, which I mistake for the lightning shining along the heavens? Do not those mysterious sounds announce to me the infinite as surely as the voices of

* M. Saisset, "Modern Pantheism," 2d Treatise, p. 91.

the sea behind the sandhills announce to me the existence of its waters, though I cannot catch their glimmerings behind the barrier over which they murmur? Are my loftiest thoughts a delusion, and my purest sentiments a mockery?" *

There can be no doubt that some Pantheists have been men of extraordinary powers of intellect, as well as zealous and apparently disinterested searchers after truth, but this acknowledgment does not prevent us from applying to them, with a little alteration, the language of Festus to Paul: Too much *thinking* has made you mad; nor from saying that Pantheism, whether in ancient or modern times, in India or in Germany, is a delusion and a dream. Whether or not Spinoza has reconciled the seeming contradictions of his own philosophy we leave others to determine. Some of them are the following: that God is extended, yet incorporeal; that He thinks, and yet has no understanding; that He is free and active, and yet has no will. "Canst thou," said Zophar to Job, "by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" † "Oh the depth of the riches," says St. Paul, "both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known

* Essay by Translator, page 202. The whole Essay contains a clear account of M. Saisset's views of Pantheism, and some very valuable cautions in the study of them.

† Job xi. 7, 8; Rom. xi. 33, 34.

the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" "Such knowledge," says David, "is too wonderful for me, it is high; I cannot attain unto it." We may infer from these and many similar passages the teaching of *Scripture* with regard to the "deep things" of the science of God, and the profound humility that becomes us poor weak and perishing mortals when we make Him the subject of our contemplations. And surely such teaching must commend itself at once to every reasonable creature. Dryden has well expressed this truth—

> "Can finite reason reach infinity?
> For what could fathom God were more than He."

But the sentiments of Zophar, supported as they are by those of David and St. Paul, are very different from those of Spinoza, who, notwithstanding the contradictions above alluded to—contradictions which we do not believe that either he himself or any of his disciples have ever reconciled—has the audacity to conclude the first book of the "Ethica" with these bold words:—"I HAVE EXPLAINED THE NATURE OF GOD!" Now what is this but delusion?

We often hear of the beautiful mythology of the Greeks, but in their highest conceptions of the Supreme Being as embodied in their exquisite statuary, the marble that seems to "breathe and burn with divinity," they would seem to have only humanized what grosser idolaters have brutalized. Apollo was "the sun in human limbs arrayed." All their other gods were represented in human forms, and supposed to be influenced by human passions, while the same mythology,

which is so often appealed to as a proof of the intellectuality and idealism of ancient Greece, teaches us that the gods were addicted to some of the vilest propensities of men! * For all this there may be different ways of accounting, but to us the simplest and most satisfactory is that which supposes "a strong delusion to believe a lie."

* "But the more" (says Professor M. Müller) "we admire the native genius of Hellas, the more we feel surprised at the crudities and absurdities of what is handed down to us as their religion. Their earliest philosophers knew as well as we that the Deity, in order to be Deity, must be either perfect or nothing; that it must be one, not many, and without parts and passions; yet they believed in many gods, and ascribed to all of them—and more particularly to Jupiter—almost every vice and weakness that disgraces human nature. Their poets had an instinctive aversion to everything excessive or monstrous, yet they would relate of their gods what would make the most savage of the Red Indians creep and shudder:—how that Uranos was maimed by his son Kronos; how Kronos swallowed his own children, and, after years of digestion, vomited out alive his whole progeny; how Apollo, their fairest god, hung Marsyas on a tree and flayed him alive; how Demeter, the sister of Zeus, partook of the shoulder of Pelops, who had been butchered and roasted by his own father, Tantalus, as a feast for the gods." ("Lectures on Language," 2d Series, pp. 385, 6.) He tells us, however, that the philosophers from the earliest times were shocked by these fables, and materially qualifies the above language in a subsequent chapter, and tells us we can afford to be generous to Jupiter and his worshippers, and that there is much more of true religion in heathen mythology than we expected. He then shows that "Zeus, the most sacred name in Greek mythology, is the same as Dyaus in Sanscrit, Jovis or *Ju* in *Ju*piter in Latin; *Tiw* in Anglo-Saxon, preserved in *Tuvsdœg*, *Tuesday*, the day of the Eddic god *Tŷr*; *Zio* in old High German; that *Dyaus* is derived from a root which signifies to *beam*; and that in the actual and settled language of India, *dyu*,

Take a few more examples—creation without a creator, effects without a cause; this is the dream of the Atheist. Two gods in constant antagonism—the dream of the Manichean. A multitude of gods—the dream of the Polytheist; that man can put God under an obligation; that he can give Him anything that is not already His own; that God can be advantaged by a creature; that a man has powers and opportunities which it is not his *duty* to consecrate to God; so that there is an overplus to bestow on a work of supererogation; and therefore that there can be "*creature merit*,"* the dream of all Pharisees, ancient and modern, and the self-righteous always and everywhere; that it is right to burn or persecute unbelievers for the glory of

as a noun, means *sky* and *day*." Again: "But though recognizing in the name of Zeus the original conception of light, we ought not to deceive ourselves, and try to find in the primitive vocabulary of the Aryans those sublime meanings which after thousands of years their words have assumed in our languages. The light which flashed up for the first time before the inmost vision of their souls was not the pure light of which St. John speaks. We must not mix the words and thoughts of different ages. Though the message which St. John sent to his little children, "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all," may remind us of something similar to the primitive annals of human language; though we may highly value the coincidence, such as it is, between the first stammerings of religious life and the matured language of the world's manhood, yet it behoves us, while we compare, to discriminate likewise, and to remember always that words and phrases, though outwardly the same, reflect the intentions of the speaker in ever-varying angles." Pp. 448, 9.

* See a most eloquent and convincing sermon on "The Impossibility of Creature Merit," by Mr. Melvill.

God,—a dream from which even the civilized world can hardly be said to have yet awakened.

Much has been said of modern enlightenment, yet it is not long since there were followers of Johanna Southcote, and who in these days has not heard of "Mormonism?" In short, no impostor or enthusiast who professes to have a Divine mission can entertain opinions too extravagant to prevent him from securing a host of disciples. Surely, then, the Anthropologist who studies man as he is at present and on the whole, studies only his pathology, and sees him in a state, not of health, but of disease,—not, therefore, we may presume, the state in which at the beginning he was created, and the state which his general economy, intellectual and moral, even at present, and notwithstanding these perversions, would seem to prove that he was intended for.

Hail! heavenly daylight—bright and beautiful irradiation, that shall dissipate for ever all these wild delusions! Hail! celestial city! into which there shall in nowise enter anything that "defileth, or worketh abomination, or *maketh a lie*. Where there shall be no *night*, and they need no candle, neither light of the sun, for the Lord God giveth them light, and they shall reign for ever and ever."

THE DARKNESS OF SIN AND SORROW.

Oh, cursèd, cursèd sin! traitor to God
And ruiner of men! mother of woe
And death and hell; wretched, yet seeking worse,
Depth ever deepening, darkness darkening still.

THERE are unions which God has made, but which man is either permitted, or is vainly endeavouring to dissolve. In some of them the things associated exist, it may be, separately in the mind of the metaphysician, but are never actually witnessed except in conjunction. In some they are parted, but only to prove how unnatural and how disastrous is the divorce. In some again, though always found together, they are linked by laws of connexion which elude our cognizance. In others, though actually united, they appear to be separate because the points of contact are to us at present invisible, so that we must wait for a knowledge of their real association till, with vaster powers than we now enjoy, we can perceive and appreciate the harmonies of the universe. Alliances, too, are conceivable between things which are now frequently disconnected, and yet so much oftener in companionship, and so obviously suited the one to the other, that we can hardly help believing them to be, either now as it were, affianced, and to be

one day espoused, or to have once existed together and been divorced, though but partially, and by some such abnormal cause of separation as will not prevent them from being ultimately and for ever reunited. Of this latter kind are those between goodness and happiness, and between sin and sorrow. We often see, though, perhaps, if the whole truth were known, it would be right to say that we only seem to see, the goodness without the happiness, and the sin without the sorrow. But it can be clearly shown that their union is far more frequent than their severance. We take it that this could be decisively proved by an appeal to general experience. It could also be established by the evidence of consciousness. We have the witness in ourselves. Nor is it merely hope that in the case of goodness causes the happiness, nor merely fear that in the case of sin produces the sorrow. These are additional elements of pleasure and pain, and fortify the argument which would be valid without them. They are annexed respectively to virtue and vice, and go to prove that the one is a cause of enjoyment, the other of unhappiness. But though there were no hope in the case of virtue there would still be enjoyment, and though there were no fear in that of vice there would still be misery. For it has been well observed, and, we think, conclusively proved, that there is a positive pleasure in the mere emotions of gratified virtue apart from the hope of reward, and a positive pain in the mere emotions of sinful propensity apart from the fear of punishment. It will be granted, for example, that there is a real joy in the workings of pure benevolence—a happiness in making others happy,

even when there can be no possibility of requital, and a real wretchedness in hatred, even when there can be no risk of retaliation. Does not trust quiet anxiety, and suspicion on the other hand awaken alarm? Can it be questioned that, even as regards the present life alone, there is "peace and joy in believing," while there is disturbance and dissatisfaction in doubting and distrusting? A good conscience will make its possessor happy, even when he sees no prospect of reward, and an evil conscience will make its victim wretched, even when he has no fear of punishment. There are virtues such as patience and temper, which cause, in their exercise, a dignified satisfaction, while it is hardly possible to conceive how the opposite qualities can operate at all without producing pain or uneasiness. He who *really* forgives an injury, forgets, it may almost be said, that he has ever been injured at all; while an implacable enemy, brooding continually over remembered wrongs, feels them without cessation; and if there be vices that on earth are hell anticipated, they must be revenge and jealousy. Milton has finely described the misery of wickedness in his character of Satan—

"Nor with cause to boast
Begins his dire attempt, which nigh the birth
Now rolling boils in his tumultuous breast,
And like a devilish engine back recoils
Upon himself; horror and doubt distract
His troubled thoughts, and from the bottom stir
The Hell within him; for within him Hell
He brings and round about him, nor from Hell
One step; no more than from himself can fly
By change of place."

It would be easy to adduce other instances of this contrast, and quite enough to show that it expresses a general law. The consequences, too, of virtue and vice respectively, even in this world, corroborate our position. Pride incurs a thousand mortifications which humility avoids, and induces many quarrels to which humility finds no provocation. The ambition of one mind often awakens the jealousy of another, while that jealousy vents itself in the infliction of an injury on him who provokes it. But an humble spirit avoids, unless called to them by duty and Providence, the places which, because they are high, are also dangerous. The natural consequence of prudence, energy, honesty, fidelity, and perseverance, is worldly success, while it is certain that the contrary qualities "clothe a man with rags." There are virtues which obviously conduce to bodily health, and vices which as obviously occasion physical disease. If society sometimes gives countenance to guilt and disparages goodness, it after all—at least in cases of glaring wickedness and undeniable virtue—frowns upon the vicious and does homage to the upright; and if human laws do not sanction goodness with reward, they visit crime with punishment. Such, it must surely be admitted by all who are not wilfully and obstinately blind to facts of universal experience, is the constitution of nature—such the course of natural providence; and if we grant, as every Theist must, that these are from God, they amount, in the language of Butler, to an authoritative "declaration on His part in favour of virtue and against vice." But, as stated already, there are exceptions, and many. Virtue often suffers, and

vice as often prospers, still they are manifestly *but* exceptions, and whoever thinks that on the whole they are not, must at least believe that the world in its present state is strangely *out of order*. But take exceptions and rule together,* and how beautifully they harmonize with the doctrine of a future existence to some of happiness and to others of misery! What do the exceptions prove? Surely that the present state is not and cannot be the consummation of things, but that there must be an hereafter—a state in which these temporary irregularities will be set to rights. If we witness on earth prospering vice and martyred righteousness, how can we well avoid concluding that Divine justice requires another, a wider, and a more enduring sphere than that of earth for its satisfactory vindication? Then, on the other hand, what are we to infer from the rule, namely, that virtue produces happiness, and sin suffering? Why, clearly that "what is begun and established *here* shall be continued and consummated *there*." To suppose this is —only to suppose that a system already commenced shall go on and be completed; that moral shall resemble natural vegetation, and that he who sows sin shall reap sorrow, while he who sows goodness shall reap enjoyment,—just as he who sows nightshade may expect poison, and he who sows wheat may expect nutritious food as the produce of his husbandry. Thus, while the exceptions argue a future state, the rule teaches us what it is that *in* that state we may reasonably anticipate; so that both together point in perfect concord to the same

* "Butler's Analogy," from which, and from the writings of Dr. Chalmers, most of these remarks are taken.

harmonizing truth, and receive their common explanation in a life to come. But this is only incidental. Our point is, that there is some natural affinity between goodness and happiness, and between sin and sorrow; and we think that it not only argues a future existence, but also affords a presumption that it was once itself much closer and more apparent than it is at present. Is it incredible that there *was* a time in which goodness and happiness, now so generally companions, went in unbroken harmony together, and that it is owing to some disastrous change that things so obviously akin are often at present separated; or, since sin and sorrow are now so much more frequently together than apart, that it was sin which in some way or other was the beginning of all sorrow? And is not this the true "philosophy of tears"? May we not argue from the analogy of what now is, respecting what might have been; and if sin be now the prolific source of pain, and grief, and suffering, may it not have been so ever since there was sin at all? Then, if this be admitted, it is only pushing the conclusion a little farther to infer that some sin must in the beginning have caused a possibility for the existence of any sorrow. Thus, all the facts when taken together—facts which appear at first strange, anomalous and inconsistent, are reconciled and accounted for by two suppositions; the one is that of a future existence; the other that of a past apostacy. This is not the place for proving that Christianity is thoroughly self-consistent. But if the fact be admitted, then it can hardly be denied

system which, while thus at harmony with itself,
les apparently conflicting phenomena with each

other, and with *it*, bringing all into perfect agreement, has a valid claim upon our belief. Our concern at present, however, is only with sin and suffering; and there is a philological argument which is not, perhaps, without importance, to prove that a firm belief in this intimate connexion between them, pointing, possibly, to some original sin as the parent of all suffering, is among the earliest and deepest convictions of mankind. Whether these convictions arose from the exercise of the reasoning faculty, from conscience, from a vague intuition of the mind,—if there *be* such a thing,—or from traditional teaching, it is not necessary now to determine, for they are evidence in any case to prove that the connexion alluded to, and its assigned origin, are and have been felt—and strongly felt—by mankind in general to be real. The argument *ex consensu populorum* may be thought of little importance, but, whatever its value, it is here available, and the evidence of this consensus is furnished by language. If, again, such evidence be deemed vague and fanciful, we reply in the first place that etymology is now very largely employed to illustrate history, ethnology, and geography, that we see no reason why it should not also be employed to illustrate moral truths and human feelings, and that if a nation's speech is evidence of this kind, then the world's speech must also be such evidence, for it is a mirror in which the heart and conscience of universal man is reflected; and in the next place that it is a *sort* of evidence which has been employed against us by our adversaries, and pushed to the uttermost, so that they, at least, have no reason to dispute its validity.

Premising this, we would now quote two very high authorities,—the first is the present Archbishop of Dublin, who, in his deeply interesting work on "the study of words," says, "some modern false prophets, who would gladly explain away all such phenomena of the world around us, as declare man to be a sinful being and enduring the consequences of sin, tell us that pain is only a subordinate kind of pleasure, or, at worst, that it is a sort of needful hedge and guardian of pleasure. But there is a deeper feeling in the universal heart of man, bearing witness to something very different from this shallow explanation of the existence of pain in the present economy of the world—namely, that it is the correlative of sin, that it is *punishment*, and to this the word pain, which there can be no reasonable doubt is derived from 'pœna,' bears continual witness. Pain *is* punishment; so does the word itself, no less than the conscience of every one that is suffering it, declare. Just so, again, there are those who will not hear of great pestilences being God's scourges of men's sins; who fain would find out natural causes for them, and account for them by the help of these. . . . They may do so, or imagine that they do so, but, yet every time they use the word 'plague' they implicitly own the fact which they are endeavouring to deny; for plague means properly, and according to its derivation, 'blow,' or 'shake,' and was a title given to these terrible diseases, because the great universal conscience of men, which is never at fault, believed and confessed that there were strokes or blows inflicted by God on a guilty and rebellious world. With reference to such words so used we may truly say *vox*

populi vox Dei—a proverb which, shallowly interpreted, may be made to contain a most mischievous falsehood, but, interpreted in the sense wherein, no doubt, it was spoken, holds a deepest truth. We must only remember that this 'people' is not the populace, either in high place or in low, and that this 'voice of the people' is not any momentary outcry, but the consenting testimony of the good and wise, of those neither brutalized by ignorance, nor corrupted by a false cultivation, in all places and in all times.

"Every one who admits the truth which lies in this saying must, I think, acknowledge it as a remarkable fact that men should have agreed to apply the word 'miser,' or miserable, to the man eminently addicted to the vice of covetousness, to him who loves his money with his whole heart and soul. Here, too, the moral instinct lying deep in all hearts has borne testimony to the tormenting nature of this vice, to the gnawing care with which even here it punishes him that entertains it to the enmity there is between it and all joy; and the man who enslaves himself to his money is proclaimed in our very language to be a miser or a miserable man.*

"It is certainly very noticeable, and many have noticed it already, that the Greek word signifying wickedness (πονηρία), comes of another signifying labour (πόνος). How well does this agree with those passages of Scripture which describe sinners as '*wearying themselves* to commit iniquity,' as *labouring* in the very fire. 'St.

* "We here, in fact, say in a word what the Roman moralist, when he wrote 'nulla avaritia sine pœnâ est *quamvis satis sit ipsa pœnarum*,' took a sentence to say."

Chrysostom's eloquence,' as Bishop Saunderson has observed on this very matter, 'enlarges itself, and triumphs in this argument more frequently than in almost any other'; and he clears it often, and beyond all exception, both by Scripture and reason, that the life of a wicked or worldly man is a very drudgery, infinitely more toilsome, vexatious, and unpleasant than a godly life is. Take, again, the witness of our words to a central truth of our faith. A deep-lying connexion acknowledged by the mind of man between sin and expiation, a profound conviction that sin was that which needed expiation and satisfaction, and could not be forgiven without it, this confession entwining itself in the very roots of men's minds, and so incorporating itself in the very words which they employed, all this has been traced in the German word for sin with another word signifying to expiate or atone ('sünde' with 'sühnen')." He then refers to Grimm to show that the doubts expressed about the etymological relation of these words were not sufficiently well founded to show that the idea 'of that which needs expiation does not really lie in the word sin, sühnen, in sünde;' and adds, 'As the great lines in which the human mind travels are evermore the same, we must recognise as a confirmation of this conclusion, that in the Latin "piaculum" is used for an enormous sin, which, as *such*, demands *expiation*.'" ("Study of Words," Lecture iii. pp. 58, 62.)*

Our next authority is Max Müller, who says, "If the serpent is called in Sanscrit *sarpa*, it is because it was

* See also his remarks on the words *passion* (which means *suffering*), *integrity*, and *conscience*.

conceived under the general idea of creeping, an idea expressed by the word *srip*. But the serpent was also called *ahi* in Sanscrit, in Greek *echis* or *echidna*, in Latin *anguis*. This word is derived from quite a different root and idea. The root is *ah* in Sanscrit, or *anh*, which means to press together, to choke, to throttle. Here the distinguishing mark from which the serpent was named was his throttling, and *ahi* means serpent as expressing the general idea of throttler. It is a curious root this *anh*, and it still lives in several modern words. In Latin it appears in *ango*, *anxi*, *anctum*, to strangle, in *angina* quinsy, in *angor* suffocation. But *angor* meant not only quinsy or compression of the neck; it assumed a moral import, and signifies anguish or anxiety. The two adjectives, *angustus*, narrow, and *anxius*, uneasy, both come from the same source.* In Greek the root retained its natural and material meaning; in *egys*, near, and *echis*, serpent, throttler. But in Sanscrit it was chosen, with great truth, as the proper name of sin. Evil no doubt presented itself under various aspects to the human mind, and its names are many; but none so expressive as those derived from one root *anh*, to throttle. *Anhas*, in Sanscrit, means sin; but it does so only because it meant originally throttling, the consciousness of sin being like the grasp of the assassin on the throat of his victim. All who have seen and contemplated the statue of Laocoon and his sons, with the serpent coiled round them from head to foot, may realise what those ancients felt and saw when they called sin *anhas*, or the

* Possibly, perhaps, also the English word anger (?)

throttler. This *ankas* is the same word as the Greek *agos*, sin. In Gothic the same root has produced *agis* in the sense of *fear*, and from the same source we have *awe* in awful, *i.e.* fearful, and *ug* in ugly. The English *anguish* is from the French *angoisse*, the Italian *angoscia*, a corruption of the Latin *angustiæ*, a straight." ("Lectures on Language," 1st Series, pp. 387, 8.) Here, then—to say nothing of the allusion to the *serpent* in connexion with *sin*—is evidence to show that from the very earliest times men have felt that sin was fatal to happiness; and *perhaps* we may carry the argument farther by showing how the word "*religion*" affords a presumption that they associated sin itself with some early rupture of the bonds that once united creature and Creator. That word, in accordance with its derivation, signifies a *binding again*. Thus, in the language of Archbishop Trench, "words often contain a witness of great moral truths."* And we cannot help thinking

* And with reference to the same word, religion, he makes some remarks which, though not quite relevant here, are worth noticing as having an indirect reference to the general subject now under consideration. "And not less," he says, "where a perversion of the moral sense has found place, words preserve oftentimes a record of this perversion. We have a signal example of this, even as it is a notable evidence of the manner in which moral contagion, spreading from heart and manners, invades the popular language in the use, or rather misuse, of the word religion during all the ages of Papal domination in Europe. Probably many of you are aware that in those times a religious person did not mean any one who felt and allowed the bonds that bound him to God and his fellow-men, but one who had taken peculiar vows upon him,—a member of one of the monkish orders; a religious house did not mean—nor does it now mean, in the Church of Rome—a Christian house-

that this philological argument might be carried further, for it might, we think, be shown that the words for *man* in various languages signify both dignity and degradation—that the terms which express the *different kinds of sin* can be traced to roots which mean some kind of pain, of suffering, or of sorrow, and that some expressions for sin in general point perhaps to a lapse or an apostacy from a state of original uprightness.

But be this as it may, we consider sin and sorrow together partly for the reasons already mentioned, partly for the sake of brevity, and partly because they are generally associated both with each other and with night. The chill of natural night condenses earth-born vapour into drops, and, according to our hypothesis, spiritual night once distilled a sin-born exhalation into tears. Some silent hour when the sun is down is the

hold, ordered in the fear of God, but a house in which these persons were gathered together according to the rule of some man, Benedict, or Dominic, or some other. A religion meant not a service of God, but an order of monkery; and taking the monastic vows was termed going into a religion. Now what an awful light does this one word so used throw on the entire state of mind and habits of thought in those ages! That, then, was 'religion,' and nothing else was deserving of the name! And 'religious' was a title which might not be given to parents and children, husbands and wives, men and women, fulfilling faithfully and holily in the world the several duties of their stations, but only to those who had devised self-chosen service for themselves." ("Study of Words," Lect. 1.)

In answer to a criticism on this passage in "Fraser's Magazine," Dr. Trench quotes a decree of the great 4th Lateran Council, in which the word religio occurs three times in the very sense in which he contends for its use in the Church of Rome.

time which he who perpetrates a "deed of darkness" chooses for his "convenient season," and

> "Night is the time to weep,
> To wet with unseen tears
> Those graves of memory where sleep
> The joys of other years;"

while a period of much suffering is termed a "night of weeping," and our days of sorrow are called our "days of darkness."

But is man really the sinful and suffering creature which Scripture represents him to be? Does it not greatly exaggerate both his guilt and his wretchedness? Such is the language of many—though not of all—the opponents of Christianity; and, with reference to his guilt at least, our reply is this; that we can discover but three tests of moral character, words, works, and thoughts, and that all these establish the truth and accuracy of Scripture in describing and deploring his natural corruption. As for the first it has been quaintly but truly said that "by examining the tongue, physicians find out the diseases of the body, and philosophers the diseases of the mind." Now we contend that the language of man is itself an evidence that he is indeed a sinful and a suffering creature, and the following extract from the work already quoted, by Archbishop Trench, on the study of words, puts this in a light which to many may be new, while to all it must be striking:—

"But has man fallen, and deeply fallen, from the heights of his original creation? We need no more

than his language to prove it. Like everything else about him, it bears at once the stamp of his greatness and his degradation; of his glory and of his shame. What dark and sombre threads he must have woven into the tissue of his life before he could trace those threads of an equal darkness through the tissue of his language! What facts of wickedness and woe must have existed in the world, ere there could be such words to designate these as are found in the last! There have been always those who have sought to make light of the hurts which man has inflicted upon himself, of his sickness with which he is sick; who would fain persuade themselves and others that moralists and divines, if they have not quite invented, have yet enormously exaggerated these. But are these statements found only in Scripture and in sermons? Are there not mournful corroborations of their truth imprinted deeply upon every region of man's natural and spiritual life, and on none more deeply than on his language? It needs no more than to open a dictionary, and to cast our eye thoughtfully down a few columns, and we shall find abundant confirmation of this sadder and sterner estimate of man's moral and spiritual condition. How else shall we explain this long catalogue of words having all to do with sin, or with sorrow, or with both? How came they there? We may be quite sure that they were not invented without being needed; that they have each a correlative in the world of realities. I open the first letter of the alphabet; what means this ah! this alas! these deep and long-drawn sighs of humanity which at once encounter us there? And then presently

follow words such as these: 'affliction,' 'agony,' 'anguish,' 'assassin,' 'Atheist,' 'avarice,' and twenty more words, you will observe, for the most part, not laid up in the recesses of language, to be drawn forth and used at rare opportunities, but occupying, many of them, its foremost ranks. And indeed, as regards abundance, it is a melancholy thing to observe how much richer is every vocabulary in words that set forth sins, than in those that set forth graces. When St. Paul (Gal. v. 19, 23) would put these against those, the works of the flesh against those of the Spirit, those are seventeen, these only nine; and where do we find in Scripture such lists of graces as we do, at 2 Tim. iii. 2, Rom. i. 29, 31, of their contraries?"

"Nor can I help taking note in the oversight and muster from this point of view of the words which constitute a language, of the manner in which its utmost resources have been taxed that so it may express the infinite varieties, now of human suffering, now of human sin. Thus what a fearful thing is it that any language should have a word expressive of the pleasure which men feel at the calamities of others; for the existence of the word bears testimony to the existence of the thing. And yet in more than one such a word is found. Nor are there wanting, I suppose, in any language words which are the mournful record of the strange wickednesses which the genius of man—so fertile in evil—has invented. What whole processes of cruelty are sometimes wrapped up in a single word. Thus, I hardly open an Italian dictionary before I light upon the verb 'abbacinare,' meaning, to deprive of sight by holding a red-hot metal basin close to the eyes.

"And our dictionaries, while they tell us much, yet will not tell us all. How shamefully rich is the language of the vulgar anywhere in words and phrases which are seldom allowed to find their way into books, yet which live as a sinful oral tradition on the lips of men to set forth that which is unholy and impure. And of these words, as no less of those which have to do with the kindred sins of revelling and excess, how many set the evil forth with an evident sympathy and approbation, as taking part with the sin against Him who has forbidden it under pain of his extremest displeasure. How much cleverness, how much wit, yea, how much imagination must have stood in the service of sin before it could possess a nomenclature so rich, so varied, and often so Heaven-defying as it is!

"How many words men have dragged downward with themselves, and made partakers, more or less, of their own fall. Having originally an honourable significance, they have yet, with the deterioration and degeneration of those that used them, or those about whom they were used, deteriorated and degenerated too. What a multitude of words, originally harmless, have assumed an harmful as their secondary meaning; how many worthy have acquired an unworthy." He then instances the words 'knave,' 'boor,' 'varlet,' 'menial,' 'churl,' 'minion,' 'time-server,' 'conscience,' 'officious,' 'moody,' 'demure,' 'crafty,' 'cunning,' 'maudlin,' 'tinsel,' 'tawdry,' 'voluble,' 'plausible.' "A like deterioration," he adds, "through use may be traced in the words 'to resent.' It was not very long ago that Barrow could speak of the good man as a faithful 'resenter' and requiter of

benefits, of the duty of testifying an affectionate 'resentment' of our obligations to God. But, alas! the memory of benefits fades and fails from us so much more quickly than that of injuries; that which we afterwards remember and revolve in our minds, is so much more predominantly the wrongs, real or imaginary, which men have done us than the favours they have bestowed on us, that to resent, in our modern English, has come to be confined entirely to that deep reflective displeasure which men entertain against those that have done, or whom they believe to have done them a wrong. And this leads us to consider how it comes to pass that we do not speak of the 'retaliation' of benefits as often as the 'retaliation' of injuries. The word does but signify the again rendering as much as we have received; but this is so much seldomer thought of in regard of benefits than of wrongs, that the word, though not altogether unused in this its worthier sense, has yet a strange and somewhat unusual sound in our ears when so employed. Were we to speak of a man 'retaliating' kindnesses, I am not sure that every one would understand us." "Animosity," he tells us, "meant 'spiritedness,' but is now applied to only one kind of vigour and activity, that, namely, which is displayed in enmity and hate." . . . . "Does not this look too much as if these often best stirred men to a lively and vigorous activity?"

And what a mournful witness for the hard and unrighteous judgments we habitually form of one another lies in the word "prejudice." The word of itself means plainly no more than a "judgment formed beforehand,"

without affirming anything as to whether that judgment be favourable or unfavourable to the person about whom it is formed; yet so predominantly do we form harsh judgment of others before knowledge and experience, that "'prejudice,' or judgment before knowledge, and not grounded on evidence, is almost always taken to signify an unfavourable anticipation about one; and 'prejudicial' has actually acquired a secondary meaning of anything which is mischievous or injurious." . . . . He then speaks of the testimony, in the word "retract," to human *infirmity*. Retract means properly no more than "to handle over again, to reconsider. And yet so certain are we to find in a subject which we reconsider or handle a second time, that which was at the first rashly, inaccurately stated, that which needs therefore to be amended, modified, withdrawn, that to retract could not tarry long with its primary meaning of reconsidering, and has come to signify, as we commonly use it, 'to withdraw.' . . . . What a seal does this word's acquisition of such a secondary use as this set to the proverb, *Humanum est errare!*" ("Study of Words," Lecture III.)

Sin, according to Scripture, is "the transgression of the law;" but that law, if it be carefully examined, will be found to inculcate *all* that is necessary to constitute "the right moral condition of man," a condition, that is, of ethical *integrity*, or entireness; "the integrity of the body being, as Cicero explains it, the full possession and perfect soundness of *all* the members of the body . . . . and ethical integrity is this same entireness or completeness transferred to the region of the higher moral life"

(*ibid*). For this reason no obedience that is only partial can give us a claim to moral integrity; and if we drop "one link in the golden chain," the whole falls to the ground. We are sinners, for we have betrayed a want of integrity. Hence the language of St. James, "whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all;" and how wretchedly inadequate must be that man's notions of God who can fancy that this partial, and therefore this *mutilated*, obedience can satisfy that all-perfect Intelligence! We do not deny that there may be difficulties connected with a substituted obedience, but if so, they are neither insurmountable, nor so great as those which are connected with a partial obedience considered as a ground of justification, or even a partial obedience supplemented with repentance, but without an atonement or a mediator. But what we insist upon here is, that this moral integrity is very different indeed from what the conduct, the character, and the language of even the noblest specimens of human nature have ever yet exhibited. The great majority of our race resemble, more or less, dwarfs, or monstrosities; men who are defective, or wholly wanting in one or other of their bodily organs; and if the primitive man were, as some contend, the savage, then would his very language prove that he came into existence "an imperfect truncated creature," to use the words of Mr. Rogers, already quoted, like "the *half-created* lion" of Milton; for while the vocabulary of savages is rich sometimes to an extreme in words expressive of crime and wickedness, they have none, or nearly none, to denote some of the most ordinary virtues. The absence

of a word in a language is not a conclusive proof,* but it is certainly a presumption that those who speak that language are ignorant of the thing which the word signifies, while the presence of a word is the clearest evidence that they know something at least of that to which they have given a name. Now the writer last quoted tells us that he has read of a tribe which, while it has no word to signify † God, has one to designate a process by which an unborn child may be destroyed in the bosom of its mother, and that he has good authority for stating that in the native language of Van Dieman's Land there are four words to express the taking of life; one to express a father's killing of a son, another of a son's killing of a father, with other varieties of murder; and that in no one of these lies the slightest moral reprobation, or sense of the deep-lying distinction between to "kill" and to "murder;" while at the same time of that language so richly and so fearfully provided for this extreme utterance of hate, his informant reports, "that any word for love is wanting in it altogether." "Thus," he says again, "it is the ever-repeated complaint of the missionary that the very terms are well-nigh or wholly wanting in the dialect of the savage to impart to him heavenly truths, or indeed even the nobler emotions of the human heart," and tells us, on the authority of a Jesuit missionary, that two of the

* See *ante*, p. 134, Note §.

† It is generally discovered at last that the languages which appear to have no word for God are not in fact without such a word.

native tribes of Brazil possess no word at all corresponding to our "thanks," as also that Dr. Krapf has remarked in the dialects of Africa the same absence of any word expressing the idea of gratitude. We cannot conclude without one more citation from the same distinguished writer.

"But what does their language (that is of savages) on close inspection prove? In every case what they are themselves—the remnant and ruin of a nobler past. Fearful indeed is the impress of degradation stamped on the language of the savage, more fearful, perhaps, even than that which is stamped upon his form. When wholly letting go the truth, when long and greatly sinning against light and conscience, a people has thus gone the downward way, — has been scattered off by some violent revolution from that portion of the world which is the seat of advance and progress, and driven to its remote isles and further corners, then as one nobler thought, one spiritual idea after another has perished from it, the words also that expressed these have perished too. As one habit of civilization has been let go after another, the words which those habits demanded have dropped as well, first out of use and then out of memory, and thus after a while have been wholly lost. . . . . Yet ever and anon, in the midst of this wreck and ruin, there is that in the language of the savage, some subtle distinction, some curious allusion to a perished civilization now utterly unintelligible to the speaker; or some other note which proclaims his language to be the remains of a dissipated inheritance, the rags and remnants of a robe which was

a royal one once. The fragments of a broken sceptre are in his hand, a sceptre wherewith he once held dominion (he, that is his progenitors) over large kingdoms of thought which now have escaped wholly from his sway." (Lecture I., pp. 14, 18.) There seems to be no possible alternative between embracing this explanation of the language, and, so far as language reveals it, of the character of the savage; and, adopting that ouran-outang theory, as it has been called, which obliges us to suppose that man came into existence a short, stunted, deformed, and imperfect creature, little more, as it were, than the third of a man, possessing a brutal development of all the animal propensities, but wanting all the higher intellectual faculties and most of the moral sentiments, or else endowed with them only in the most rudimentary form, as latent capacities (so latent as to be unperceived), or vague potentialities which required tens of thousands of years for their development into actual powers,—a theory against which, as we hope to show hereafter, there are insuperable objections.

But there is another definition of sin which is thoroughly consistent with the two preceding, and that is either an inordinate indulgence or a misapplication, a misdirection, a perversion, an abuse or a prostitution of some natural quality. It is no sin to eat or to drink, but it *is* a sin to be gluttonous or to be intoxicated. It is no sin to value money, as a means to an end, if that end be lawful, but it *is* a sin to be avaricious. It is no sin to care for the good opinion of those whose approbation is worth obtaining, but it *is* a sin to act only or

chiefly with a view to the praise, or through fear of the censure of the world, and to barter our independence of thought and character for the sake of mere popularity. It is no sin to have affections, but it *is* a sin to make them idolatrous. It is no sin to have animal instincts and propensities, but it *is* a sin to indulge them otherwise than in the way which God has appointed, sanctioned, and consecrated. It is no sin to associate and to imitate, but it *is* a sin to "follow a multitude to do evil." It is no sin to conceal a lawful purpose when no duty demands its disclosure, but it *is* a sin to tell a falsehood, or to be deceitful. There is a legitimate ambition to be great and good, and there is a false ambition to be first among the low and mean, and even a devilish ambition, like that of Satan—

> To reign is worth ambition, though in Hell:
> Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.

There is a virtuous indignation against oppression, injustice, and injury, of which the natural expression is one of warmth and energy, and there is a wild wrath that verges upon madness. It is a great mistake to suppose that, fallen and corrupted though we are, there is within us a single element of character that ought to be extinguished. It is a sacred fire, to be burning on its proper altar, and conscience, like a ministering priest, is to give us warning when it is too intense, or when an enemy would transfer it to an idol's temple. The will of God is our sanctification, and He sanctifies, not by destruction, but by consecration. Whatever He has given us He has given us for *His* glory and for *our* good, and it is only when we employ it to a degree, or in a

way which He has forbidden, that it becomes a sin. Hence the utter mistake of the Oriental religionists, that matter and the flesh were essentially, inherently, and eternally vicious. They were right in representing God as light, and evil as darkness, but they were utterly wrong in supposing that matter in itself was evil. Hence, too, the error of all ascetics. That error was natural enough to the Manicheans, who believed in two First Principles, like the Ormuzd and Ahriman of the Zorastrians, but to those who believe in one infinitely good God, the error in question seems to involve a belief that this all-wise Being has made *a mistake* in giving us certain propensities at all, or at least in allowing them to be universally and inevitably mischievous, so that to prevent the evil of their operation they cannot be overruled for good, but must be wholly destroyed; contrary to the whole analogy of nature which tells us that God's plan is not to destroy, but to change; not to annihilate, but to blend into new combinations. The true theory, we think, of the fall, and of all subsequent sin, is this: that man was made upright, in possessing a nature in which all the elements of his being were rightly directed and harmonized, but that they afterwards became perverted—so that disproportion succeeded symmetry, discord agreement, abuse consecration, confusion order; and that where once was sweetest music, since every feeling, affection, sentiment, and faculty mixed its melody in praise to God, now

> A universal hubbub wild
> Of stunning sounds and voices all confused,
> Borne through the hollow dark, assault the ear.

Now, if this be a right definition, it would seem to follow that a sin is great in proportion to the dignity of the mental or moral principle which it prostitutes, just as the magnificence and the sacredness of a grand and a venerable cathedral enhance our regret at its profanation. And, if so, how awful is the wickedness of man! This is a point which we wish to be steadily kept in view, for it has an intimate bearing upon all the observations which we would make upon the subject which we are now considering. Applying it then to the gift of speech, may we not ask whether even an "idle word" is without its criminality? It is an abuse of one of the noblest of all human endowments—that wonderful power which gives to man one of his distinguishing titles, the "speaker"*—which philologists consider as a consequence of the reasoning faculty, and given to express "general ideas," ideas of which they tell us there is not a trace among brutes—which enables human beings everywhere to reciprocate their thoughts in social communication, the philosopher to express his wisdom, the orator to rouse us into action or to move us to tears; the teacher to impart instruction, educating all our moral as well as intellectual capacities, and the minister of religion in words that while, glowing with the warmth of his own devotion, kindle that of all attentive listeners, as in public worship they through him, or with him, express their contrition, unbosom their wants, and utter their

* Φως is frequently used by Homer for man, and *some* derive it from Φαω to speak. But the noblest name for our species is "*Man*," which, according to Professor Max Müller, means the *thinker*.

thanksgivings to the common God they are adoring! Oh! it can be no innocent thing to desecrate this marvellous gift, even by one idle word, and, if so, how can we describe the sinfulness of reviling, of loose conversation, of jesting at sacred things, of lying, of slander, of perjury, and of blasphemy? Or if, again, (though it is often a very false test) the greatness of a sin be made known by the magnitude of the social mischief it produces, how awful and how irreparable have been the evils which a few false words have occasioned! Can it be doubted as a matter of fact, and without reference to the authority which, to the Christian, gives the statements a character of sacredness, that if a "soft answer turneth away wrath, grievous words stir up anger," and that the tongue is "a world of iniquity," what bitter quarrels among families, acquaintances, and even nations, this gift, or to describe it, not as God has bestowed, but as man has perverted it, this curse of speech, has originated! Nor need we, in proof of this, refer only to those public calamities which the abuse of this endowment has caused, for we can trace to the same prolific source of evil, divided households, blasted reputations, or even broken hearts, in all the circles of domestic and private society. A confidential whisper, breathed with earnest injunctions of solemn secrecy into one listening ear, is yet repeated to another; a voice then utters it aloud, and so "the little meaning sound" passes "from ear to lip, from lip to ear," exaggerated *in transitu* till it reaches the victim of the calumny—who, if of a gentle spirit, bears it in silent sorrow, and, it may be, sinks under the unmerited reproach; or who, if of a fiery temperament,

resents it even unto blood. And how vain is the attempt to escape from the application of all this by calling it exceptional! Who can pass often through the streets of a crowded metropolis without sometimes hearing those words of imprecation or of blasphemy that, breaking from polluted lips, make the air on which they are wafted resemble for a time the atmosphere of Hell? Or who can mingle much with his fellow-creatures anywhere without entering into societies where no expression that outrages conventional propriety is permitted, and yet where the subjects of conversation are those of which a rational being ought to be ashamed,—where frivolity alternates with malice, and where it is hardly too much to say that at every word a "reputation dies"?

And if the statements of the illustrious author of the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, endorsed as they are by Professor Hitchcock, and by others of equal eminence in science, be really true, what a solemn significance they give to every word to which a speaker gives utterance! "Every atom impressed with good and with ill retains at once the motions which philosophers and sages have imparted to it, mixed and combined in ten thousand ways with all that is worthless and base. The air itself is one vast library, on whose pages are for ever written all that man has ever said or woman whispered. There, in their mutable but unerring characters, mixed with the earliest as well as the latest sighs of mortality, stand for ever recorded—vows unredeemed, promises unfulfilled, perpetuating in the united movements of each particle the testimony of man's changeful will"—so, then, every "idle word" has its immortality. It lives, yes; and,

unless it be a truth that the sins of a believer are "blotted out," lives for ever to perpetuate in the very air on which it has been registered, a testimony to the abuse of one of the noblest of all human endowments, and therefore to the damning fact that man—yea and even the best of men (for who in this way has not "offended with his mouth?") is verily a sinner before his God; and when, to the sum of all these idle words we add those graver offences of the tongue of which in some form or in some degree every human being has been guilty, what a register of human guilt must be that "vast library" to which the Philosopher refers, and on whose pages, as he tells, "are for ever written all that man has ever said or woman whispered!" Certain it is, at all events, as every believer in a personal and omniscient God must admit, that in the figurative but most expressive language of Scripture, all that we say, as well as all that we do, is recorded in "the book" of His "remembrance;" and there is a real comfort in the good news—which, we maintain, (let the unbeliever smile or sneer as he may) there is convincing evidence for regarding as also true—that it is that God who says, "I, even I, am he that *blotteth out* thy transgressions." But, not to anticipate, we would merely observe at present that if there were no other proof that man is indeed as sinful as Scripture tells us he is, there would be proof enough in his very language.

But no one doubts that *actions* are a test of character, and in judging of these let us be honest. We have here to do with facts, and they must neither be ignored nor evaded, nor glossed over. We are to meet the demands

of sacred truth and not the exigencies of a theory. But to answer the "stubborn logic of facts" those who deny the depravity of man have affected in this case to make light of them, to soften them down, and to explain them away. Scripture assures us that "the whole head is sick, the whole heart faint, from the sole of the foot even unto the head there is no soundness in it"—but the open enemies, and some of the pretended friends, of that Scripture deny that this is the case. They look only upon the surface of society, and if there be nothing there to shock their sensibilities at once and with violence they call the language which has just been quoted "gross exaggeration." To vindicate, then, the character of the great Physician who speaks thus decisively, we must unwind the bandages and expose, even though they disgust us, what He Himself calls the "wounds, the bruises, and the putrifying sores." There must be no blinking when the vindication of His veracity requires us to "come and see." Now, it must be remembered that, according to the supposition, He who through the mouth of his prophet speaks thus of the Jews, employs language which is quite as strong in speaking of human wickedness in general, and that He is Himself, the "Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God Almighty." It follows, then, from the very nature of such a being, that He must see real and even great iniquity where we, His sinful creatures, can detect but mere imperfection. The edge of the finest razor appears to the naked eye completely smooth, even, and uniform, but when we view it through a microscope we find it notched like a saw. If, then, some such instrument were applied to

our moral vision, (and such an instrument we believe to be the Bible) ought we to wonder if it enabled us to see guilt where we had before imagined there was only innocence? Now, the wickedness alluded to is wickedness in the sight of Heaven, who beholds all things exactly as they are and needs no magnifier to make them visible, as well as wickedness in the sight of men, creatures whose imperfect vision requires this instrumental aid to view what, to them, would be too minute to be otherwise perceptible. Bearing this in mind, let us look fairly and fully in the face the stern and terrible realities of actual history. We have judged already from the dictionaries of men, let us now judge from their annals and biographies. Whatever history we take up, be it ancient or modern, of existing or extinguished empires, of a barbarous or a civilized people, we meet with the same story, almost endlessly repeated, under circumstantial variations, but in substance with monotonous and mournful uniformity. It is the same sad tale; that selfishness has counteracted benevolence, treachery betrayed confidence, and falsehood imposed upon simplicity; that avarice has extorted and cunning overreached; that envy has awakened malice, and that injury has been retaliated with revenge,—that power has been oppressive, and that ambition has been unscrupulous. No one, we suppose, has studied history more attentively than Gibbon, who tells us that it is "little more than the register of the crimes, the follies, and the misfortunes of mankind." His own "Decline and Fall," which embraces a period of more than twelve centuries, and records the transactions of men in three continents,

is a melancholy verification of the preceding remark. It tells us, indeed, of one comparatively brief and exceptional period in all that long and gloomy interval, the period, that is, between the death of Domitian and the accession of Commodus, in which he says the "world was most prosperous and happy," and when "the vast extent of the Roman Empire was governed by absolute power under the guidance of virtue and wisdom." Yet how much must there have been even then that could not bear the light of day, to say nothing of the light of Heaven! Then, as to all the other periods in the same interval, he tells us of crimes of nearly every dye and variety, in recording their history; that every obligation of law, honour, and morality, has been outraged; that wars have been begun without scruple or provocation, and pursued without pity or remorse; of conquerors whose ruthless spirit resembled his who boasted that "grass never grew where his horse had trodden;" that in the battle of Chalons the number of the slain amounted to 162,000, or, according to another account, 300,000 persons; and that these incredible exaggerations suppose "a real and effective loss sufficient to justify the remark, that whole generations may be swept away by the madness of kings in the space of a single hour." We know that brother has met brother in deadly strife; that husbands have murdered their wives, and wives their husbands; that fathers have destroyed their sons, and sons their fathers; and that in private the poison has been mixed, or the dagger struck; when in public desolating wars have been converting fertile valleys into dreary deserts, and

crowded cities into gloomy solitudes. Dr. Dwight in his sermon on the degree of human depravity states but the simple truth when he says that "war has waded through human blood, trampled on human corpses, and laid waste the fields and the dwellings, the happiness and the hopes of mankind; that rational and immortal beings, instead of loving, worshipping, and adoring God, have worshipped devils; that to appease the anger of imaginary gods they have offered up countless hecatombs, and butchered, tortured, and burnt their own children. Before these gods their religion has enjoined and sanctioned the unlimited prostitution of matrons and virgins to casual lust and systematized pollution. The same religion has also sanctioned war and slaughter, plunder and devastation, fraud and perjury, seduction and violation without bounds. Its persecutions have reddened the world with blood, and changed its countries into catacombs. On the 'pale horse,' seen in the Apocalyptic vision, 'death' has gone before it, and 'hell, following after,' has exulted in its deplorable follies, its crimes without number, and the miseries which it has occasioned without end."*

But all this it may be said is true only of ancient times and barbarous countries. What, then, shall we say of the abominations of slavery, abolished, comparatively, of late, throughout the British dominions, and

* The discourse from which this is an extract, and another by the same writer, on the universality of sin, in which he proves his point by six different arguments, establish the truth for which we are now contending with a completeness that defies all rational controversy.

still existing in a country that calls itself the *freest* and one of the most civilized in the world? What shall we say of some of the terrible atrocities that have disgraced the most recent of wars? And what of the abominable vices and crimes which the public press records, or of which the public magistrate takes cognizance almost daily in every civilized metropolis on the face of the earth? And if men be not depraved, how comes it that universal experience has taught the necessity for universal caution, if not for universal suspicion? —that common prudence requires locks to our doors, and bars to our dwellings, that father trusts not to the veracity or the honour of his son, or the son to the truth and honesty of his father, but that they both find it expedient to commit to writing, with all the studied accuracy and all the formal solemnities of law, the more important of their pecuniary engagements? Some seem to think that rank is a security against wickedness, but if so how comes the atrocious wickedness of nobles, kings, and emperors to be so often recorded? Are there not vices that are no bar, even now, to an entrance into the selectest and most exclusive society; and even vices that may be called fashionable? Some appear to think that education and merely secular knowledge are fatal to all serious transgression. Alas! the most gigantic frauds have been committed by men who could boast of a respectable if not a liberal and a learned education, while knowledge and intellect often only give ingenuity to wickedness. It is true that there are certain amiable tendencies of character which are natural to their possessor, and which no enlightened Christian ever disparages,

except as a warrant for self-righteousness, and a *claim* upon God for reward; and that some of them have originated actions which do honour to their authors considered as *members of society*. But is it too much to say that in the sight of Him who is "a God of *knowledge*," by whom "actions are *weighed*," even these are often but "splendid sins?"

> "Judge not of actions by their mere effect;
> Dive to the centre and the *cause* detect."

But to do so thoroughly is the prerogative of Omniscience. With us ignorance should come in aid of charity, and cause us often at least to conclude that "lovely is what lovely seems." But could we read, as Heaven reads them, the hearts of men to the very bottom, what a mixture of motives we might discover even in the very best of their actions! And if each of us cannot truly say with David, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me;" and if there be no necessity for that spiritual change, to which a greater than David alludes in the well-known words, "Except a man be *born again* he cannot see the Kingdom of God," how comes it that of all human tasks one of the hardest to accomplish satisfactorily is the moral education of children?

But there *is* a test, which though ignored by many as a test at all, is in fact the most conclusive. What has been said of actions may be said, and with greater propriety, of thoughts; they take

> "Their hues from the complexion of the heart
> As landscapes their variety from light."

And it can hardly be denied by anyone that "out of the *heart* are the issues of life." It is this, and this alone, that determines the character. It is the secret fountain of which our words and actions are only the surface waters, and these are healthy or poisonous, according to the character of the spring out of whose depths they are bubbling. Man can judge, though but imperfectly, of the streams and outgoings, and when he sees that they are dark and turbid, often describes their pollution to some impurity in the earth over which they wander, and not to any defilement in the well from which they are issuing. He attributes his own faults and failings to inevitable contact with those who set him a bad example, and not to any inherent corruption in himself; and is willing, perhaps, that others in judging of their real character should be comforted by a similar delusion. But if he were honest with himself would not his very thoughts convince him that the true source of this liability to be influenced for evil by evil example, is a heart prone of itself to take that morbid action of which it catches the contagion. A man *is* what he *thinks*. His deeds may be sometimes deceptive, and so may be his words. These are but the dress of his thoughts, and may serve not to display but to disguise. His thoughts, on the contrary, could they be read by his fellow-creatures, or honestly even by himself, would be found to be the faithful and infallible criteria of his character. He *cannot* always act as he wishes, but this can be hardly said of what may almost be termed the omnipotence of *thought*. His words and his actions must be often interrupted, whereas thought in its very nature is con-

tinuous. It is a current that flows from the cradle to the grave, and from thence into that wider world of thought that is beyond it; and in its progress, now perhaps flooded, impetuous, and billowy; now shallow, calm, and gentle, but never dry and never still. Flow it must, and flow for ever. Its force may be weakened, but by no power that we can imagine, but that of God himself, can it ever be destroyed. We think in our walks by day and in our dreams by night; and it is supposed by many philosophers that even in the deepest depth of what seems to be a dreamless sleep,—in the most death-like swoon, and even in death itself, the mind is still thinking. The truest test, then, of moral poison is that of thought, for it is not only the simplest, the most unerring, and the most continuous, but the most accessible—since every man carries all the apparatus of analysis within himself, for it is simple consciousness. Now there are two great consolations with which every real Christian can be comforted when overpowered for a time by the oppressive consciousness of his sins. The first is, that in the scheme of salvation there is an ample provision through the work of Christ, made available by faith, for the full, free, and everlasting forgiveness of them all; and the second is, that in the same scheme a provision is also made through the work of the Spirit, for resisting them, overcoming them, and keeping them in habitual subjection. Every true Christian believes that Christ died not only to save him from their consequences, but also to cleanse him from their pollution and to deliver him from their power; and so has, or at all events ought to have, "peace and joy in believing." But he lends no ear to the perilous sophistry that would

cheat him into a persuasion that they are either few in number or trifling in character, and never eliminates from the catalogue of his transgressions a single offence for which his God has taught him to feel responsible. He reads, for example, in his Bible, "The *thought* of foolishness is sin." "Pray God if, perhaps, the *thought* of thy heart may be forgiven thee." "Let the wicked man forsake his evil way, and the unrighteous man his *thoughts*." "Out of the heart proceed *evil thoughts*, adulteries, fornications, &c., &c., *these* are the things which *defile a man;*" and while he finds that the commandments forbid him not only to *steal*, but to *covet*, he also finds that his Saviour identifies a lustful look with committed adultery. But is he, therefore, in despair? No, for he feels that the blood of Christ cleanseth from all sin, whether of act, of word, or of thought; of omission, of commission, or of ignorance, and that the evil of his thoughts may be corrected through the agency of God's Spirit, and the instrumentality of appointed means. He can endeavour always and everywhere to realize the omniscience and omnipresence of that thrice holy God from whom nothing is concealed, and thus to crush at once every rising thought of which in such a presence the consciousness would overwhelm him with confusion and with shame. He can betake himself to some lawful, useful, and more especially religious occupation, and thus by pre-engaging the chambers of the heart leave no room for unbidden and lowed visitors; or, if thought be compared to a then, though he cannot stop the current, he can ly change its direction but purify its waters. By oying himself in some legitimate, though but

temporal employment, he can turn it out of the channel that pollutes it on, as it were, to a bed of harmless and ordinary earth; and thus prevent a further impregnation; or he can medicate the stream itself by guiding it over the works, the words, and the ordinances of God, so as to imbue it with the healing and the heavenly properties of the hallowed soil through which it finds its way into that ocean of joy with whose waters it shall be mingling for ever. Above all, thoroughly convinced that one of the offices of God's Spirit is to sanctify, and that Heaven's self is pledged by an express and emphatic promise that that Spirit will be given to those who ask for His influences in real prayer, he can unbosom his wants to Him who can abundantly supply them all, and implore that God "to whom all hearts are open, and from whom no secrets are hid, to cleanse the thoughts of his heart by the inspiration of His Holy Spirit." And we maintain that such a person, in the full assurance of faith, can go on "conquering and to conquer—for though the weapons of his warfare are not carnal they are mighty through God, casting down *imaginations* and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing every *thought* into captivity to the obedience of Christ." But such a course implies a belief that man is a fallen creature, and that a plan has been devised in Heaven, perfected on the cross, and revealed in Scripture for his recovery. There are some, however, who consider, or profess to consider all this as incredible, and these have their own consolation. They deny that, properly speaking, mere thought can ever be sinful at all; and if their scepticism does not carry them to such a pitch as causes

them to disbelieve in any sort of judgment to come, they argue thus: "Nothing can properly be called sinful for which we are not responsible. Now we are not responsible for that which is not voluntary. But thought is not voluntary, therefore we are not responsible for thought, and consequently mere thought cannot in any case be properly called sinful." How strange it is that any rational being could ever be imposed upon by this transparent sophistry!—for, not to mention the other fallacies of this reasoning, it is enough to ask whether *all* evil thought is thus involuntary? No one can pretend that it is. If, then, *some* evil thoughts are the immediate consequences of our own free volition, can it be contended that we are not responsible for *these?*—or can it be denied that a large proportion of the evil thoughts of many minds is precisely of this description? And suppose we admit that we are certainly not accountable for such evil thoughts as we ourselves have *never* taken any voluntary part in producing by the previous and wilful formation of *that state of mind* in which we could hardly fail to perceive beforehand that they were likely to originate—thoughts, however, which in some mysterious manner enter unsolicited into the heart, but which we immediately and resolutely dismiss as uninvited and unwelcome strangers,—suppose we admit that though these may argue a fallen nature, they are not in themselves evils for which we can justly be responsible. What then? Can it be seriously maintained that such improper thoughts as are not of this character, but which *just at the time* of their entrance into the mind are altogether involuntary, were *always*

so? Why, it is manifest that we may encourage so frequently a certain train of thoughts to take possession of the mind that they will enter it at last without an invitation from the will, like welcome guests so often entertained by a hospitable host, that they "drop in" at last without waiting to be asked, and that every one who is capable of the least forethought and reflection must, or at all events might, have foreseen that these unbidden visitations would be the natural consequence of giving a wilful and repeated encouragement to all their predecessors. It is notorious that in the body a convulsion contracted by habit, which was at first voluntary, becomes at last habitual, insomuch that its victim is wholly unconscious of its operations; and it needs no wonderful sagacity, no such effort as man, though fallen, is not fully capable of, nay, intended for, to conclude that a similar effect may be produced by the reiterated meditations of the mind upon the same subject of thought.

But we are now arguing with those who believe in a future judgment of *some* kind, and it is scarcely too much to say that the same reasoning which would prove that we are not accountable for thoughts would prove that we are not accountable at all, for there is scarcely a known offence which it may not be pleaded to justify. Many an Infidel has educated himself into an incapacity for believing the Scriptures, by the voluntary study of infidel works, and a voluntary refusal to listen to the arguments by which these works have been refuted. How idle, then, is it for such a person to say, "I am not master of my own convictions, and am not accountable for my opinions!" An habitual drunkard may in

a fit of intoxication commit an act of violence of which he is then unconscious, but we are not aware that it is the custom of magistrates to exempt such an offender on that account from exemplary punishment. The blasphemer may have broken the third commandment so often that now he violates it unconsciously in every sentence he is uttering, and we apprehend that in these, and a multitude of similar cases, the apology only aggravates the offence it is intended to justify, for it shows that a voluntary sin has been so often repeated that it became at last an *in*voluntary practice. If, indeed, the argument we are now opposing were taken in all its extent, and followed into all its consequences, it would refute itself by its own extravagant absurdity, for it would prove not only that almost every sin was excusable, and that great sins, such as could only result from long indulged habits of iniquity, were less culpable than those which argued a more recent acquaintance with crime, and were less atrocious in character, but that the oftener *we sin*, the greater is our *chance of impunity!*

And there is another aspect of the subject which deserves consideration as well from its independent value as on account of its connexion with the point in dispute. We allude to the well-known tendency of sinful thoughts to produce sinful actions. It must have been a full conviction of this important truth that suggested to Solomon that invaluable advice which we have noticed already, "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life." Nor do we quote him here merely for the sake of his authority as one who was divinely inspired. That authority, alas! with those for

whom especially we write goes for nothing. He mentions a fact that can be verified by consciousness and experience. Thought is action in the germ, and action is thought in the flower, but both are of the same vegetation, and as is the seed so shall be the produce. He that sows the wheat may expect the wheat, and he that sows the tare may expect the tare as the harvest of his husbandry. The acorn grows into a majestic oak, and the root of the bella donna into what is vulgarly but expressively called the "deadly nightshade." Sinful action, then, is the deadly nightshade that germinates from the poisonous thought out of which it fructifies, — and under this name how truly it expresses both its own nature and the darkened scenery in which it vegetates! But admitting that sinful thoughts will ultimately generate sinful actions, and (as all who consider that we are properly responsible at all must admit), that we are justly accountable for our actions, then it is clear that we must also be accountable for our thoughts; for how is it possible to make us responsible for an effect, and not so for the cause that produces it?

The passages of Scripture already quoted leave upon those who believe it to be verily inspired no doubt whatever that, apart from the tendency of sinful meditations, there is something positively sinful in the meditations themselves. Nor is the evidence of this fact confined to Scripture alone. Can any rational being suppose that there is nothing blameable in misdirection, misapplication, abuse, perversion, and desecration? The air, as we have seen, has been compared to a library. But with equal propriety may we apply the illustration to the mind.

We commiserate the blind fanaticism of Caliph Omar in ordering the destruction of the Alexandrian library. But if he had been capable of appreciating the literary treasures it contained, and yet, like Nero, in ordering Rome to be fired, had commanded the books to burned merely for his own amusement, our feelings would have been those of wonder, indignation, and disgust at the character of a man to whom the utter destruction of such precious materials could minister enjoyment. The purpose which they actually subserved proves, that even in the hands of Omar they could not be said to have been entirely useless, but it was effected by a barbarous perversion to a very humble end of one of the noblest monuments of antiquity, and this perversion, as well as the loss that it involved, we deplore. But the human mind, especially, if we are to credit Gibbon and some of his commentators, is a nobler library than that of the Ptolemies—a repository for thoughts sublimer far than those of which the records furnished fuel for the baths of Alexandria.*

* Gibbon says:—"The tale has been frequently transcribed, and every scholar, with pious indignation, has deplored the irreparable shipwreck of the learning, the arts, and the genius of antiquity. For my own part I am strongly tempted to deny both the fact and the consequences." But the former has been accepted by subsequent writers of authority, though denied by the editor of "Gibbon's Rome" with variorum notes. As for the consequences, Gibbon sneers at those who lament the loss of the books, because he supposes that they related chiefly to *Christian* controversies. But amongst that "incredible multitude" of volumes which—according to the account—supplied fuel to 4,000 baths for six months, there must have been many which Gibbon himself would have preserved.

It cannot only contain, but create the subject-matter of volumes which shall be infinitely richer than were the tomes that met with that ignoble destiny, in every idea that genius can inspire and that reason can ponder over; that eloquence can clothe in words or music can express in song; that imagination can throw into poetry; that wisdom can impart to philosophy; and that all can convey to religion! Wonderful principle! It contains in time thoughts intended for eternity. It can soar into regions where nothing unholy and nothing unhappy can find one moment's harbourage. It can partially anticipate on earth the enjoyments of heaven. It can benefit men through the sanctification that fits it for communion with God. It can aim, not only at the intellectual but the moral improvement of our race, and multiply to a vast extent the materials of human happiness. It can forestall a portion of its own future and unutterable joy in reciprocating thought with thought in a genial companionship with "just men" on earth, to be "made perfect in heaven." It can expatiate on some of those inspiring themes of meditation and of song that enrapture the angels, and above all, upon the sublime idea of that infinitely perfect God "in whose presence there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore." And is it no sin, we ask, to prostitute this by converting it, not into light, for the conduct, but into fuel for the passions? What was the burning library of Egypt in comparison with a consumption of the thoughts that result from this amazing endowment, just to kindle or to keep on fire

"the lusts of the flesh, the lust of the eye, or the pride of life"? For who can doubt that the imaginary indulgence of a vicious propensity warms it into a flame of unusual intensity? What is this but bringing a lighted torch to that which is always inflammable, and sometimes already in a blaze? What is it but kindling a conflagration worse in every way to the loser of all that it destroys than that out of whose ashes none can now rake up a solitary fragment of the lost learning of the land of the Pharaohs? Sinful thoughts not sinful in themselves! Why it is obvious, and has often been stated before, that it is quite possible by their means to attain a "refinement in wickedness" which is utterly unattainable by sinful actions; for in the way of actual deeds of wickedness there are numerous, and in some cases insuperable obstacles arising, partly from the laws of the land, partly from the nature of things, and partly from mismanagement on the part of the person who aims at their accomplishment. But besides this, it has well been observed that the "evil propensities of our own minds are liable to counteraction from similar propensities in the minds of other individuals;" that "ambition is often counteracted by ambition, avarice by avarice, cunning by suspicion, and lust by jealousy;" whereas it is difficult to retard the rapidity or limit the excursiveness of thought. It may riot in the imaginary perpetration of unattempted sin the most aggravated and appalling. It may take a part in the darkest tragedies of wickedness that human history has ever recorded, sin with generations past, present, and to come, and breath-

ing its pollutions into Paradise itself contaminate the very scenery of heaven.

There are degrees, no doubt, in this as in every other kind of wickedness; but who can say that he is free from it altogether?

> "Who has a heart so pure
> But some uncleanly apprehensions
> Keep leets and law-days, and in session sit
> With meditations lawful?"

And since it is certain that "thought is heard in heaven," we can hardly help concluding that, with such exceptions as those already noticed, the very mildest form in which this perilous tendency of our nature can be manifested must be considered as a very grievous offence in the judgment of that God who, Himself beyond conception pure, "seeth not as man seeth . . . . but looketh on the heart," and tells us through the words of Solomon that "as a man *thinketh in his heart so is he.*" Nor need we stop to answer here the objection that to quote Scripture to those who deny its authority is begging the question; for that character of the Supreme Being which the passages just quoted imply is so obviously true, that it can hardly fail to be accepted as such by all who believe in His existence. Nor if, as already observed, the human mind be the greatest and noblest gift of God, can any mode of injuring or defiling it be less than profanation. If, again, one proof of the danger of the sin in question be the fearful aggravation of which it is capable, and another its real guilt even under its mildest aspect, we may add to both the facility and the frequency of its commission. How easily is it

indulged! Thought is the slave of the will. We have only to summon an unlawful idea, and it obeys with a lightning-like rapidity. No telegraphic message was ever conveyed with such perfect ease, and responded to with such astonishing velocity. Then, were it ever so trifling in itself, how formidable at last would be the whole sum of the iniquity which its frequent repetitions would involve! And again, how numerous and how strong are the temptations to indulge in it! It may be invited, or operate without solicitation to beguile the monotony of wearisome idleness, or to change the current of painful meditation. It may contribute to wile away the gloomy hours of a sleepless night, or be the day-dream of the solitary walk. It accommodates its working to every character, and has food for every propensity. It may freely converse with the heart in the secret chamber, or whisper its messages even in the densest crowd. Other sins may be prevented by the fear of detection and exposure; but this may be hidden from all but self and Heaven. It can operate with every degree of intensity between that which just shows that man is a thinking creature, and that which possesses him like a demon and drives him into madness. Who, then, that reflects on all this, can deny that in the sight of that all-holy Intelligence over whom there never yet has passed the faintest conceivable shadow of pollution, he must be indeed a vile and miserable sinner? Who can think upon it, remembering that every thought has a voice which Heaven—though it may be Heaven only—hears, without a secret misgiving that, since his heart is not right before God, and since he never can *demonstrate*

that there shall not be a judgment, he may have yet, if he now refuses a mediator between himself and his God, to stand in all the nakedness of guilt at the bar of his great Creator? Oh! we envy not the creed of him who believes that all this is, we will not say true, but even possible, yet who will not hear of a refuge in one who is mighty to save, and saves "unto the uttermost," whose blood cleanseth from *all* sin, and in whom whosoever believeth shall not perish but have everlasting life. But we are now concerned only with the evidence that acquits the Scripture of exaggeration in describing man by nature as "desperately wicked:" and the foregoing remarks on his words, works, and thoughts, prove, we think, conclusively, that it states upon that subject no more than can be thoroughly verified by all the possible tests with which we can analyse his character. Can the state, then, which all this argues, have been the primitive condition of man?

Now, there is a mystery which the preceding observations help to elucidate, but which to all who repudiate Scripture altogether, yet believe in a God of mercy and love, would seem to be inexplicable. It is the mystery of human suffering. The globe that we inhabit, though suited to a *fallen* being, and *therefore*, as we hope to show hereafter, not a work which taken by itself seems to argue *unmixed* benevolence on the part of its Creator, is yet a work in which we see that benevolence greatly predominates. But it may be doubted whether we can say as much of man. He has, it is true, the elements of real and even exalted happiness. Nor can it be questioned that he often experiences very great enjoyment. Many too

there are, who, judging from what they feel themselves, will thankfully acknowledge that the sum of his sorrows is considerably less than the sum of his joys; and if the opinion of these persons be correct, man is only like his dwelling-place, a proof of God's predominating, but not, to our seeming, unmixed benevolence. He is a fallen creature, and therefore a creature whom God chastens, yet a creature whom He loves, and for this reason puts under discipline. Yet judgment is His "strange work," and therefore man, even though often in the furnace, suffers on the whole much less than he enjoys. But there are many persons who think that life is little more than one sorrowful pilgrimage—a night journey through a wilderness where hardly a solitary wild flower peeps above the sand, and where all the light there is serves, it may almost be said, only to discover "sights of woe." Certain it is, at all events, that the pilgrim's earliest cry—the first sound that he utters when his journey begins, and the first conclusive proof that he is verily "a living soul," is a cry of pain—pain through the earliest inspiration of the air that he is breathing. That note of suffering is but a prelude to his future sorrows—a prophecy of the many drops he is yet to pour into an ocean "briny with the salt of human tears;" and every pain of bodily sickness, every sigh of mental anguish, and every pang of mortal agony he may afterwards endure is to corroborate its testimony to the solemn truth that he is "born to sorrow as the sparks fly upward." Yet God is love. Whence then those weeping eyes and wailing sounds!—this bitterness of grief—this eloquence of woe? In asking these questions we

tread upon the verge of that dark and terrible abyss of mystery—the origin of evil. We look down and try in vain to fathom it—all is darkness; we look again, but again the depth seems bottomless. Excited curiosity asks eagerly for light, and some there are who think they can pierce the deep obscurity, but we ask them what they see, and the answer often only seems to make "confusion worse confounded." The torch of reason, like a miner's candle in the choke-damp, is extinguished, and the baffled gazer casts his glances again upon objects which his vision is fitted for beholding. Nor does the revelation which we hail as light from heaven clear up the mystery. It tells us however of the earliest appearance of evil in our world, and assures us that it came by sin; while we can prove that the cause assigned is such as would produce the effect experienced. It does more. It shows that "our grief is our grandeur in disguise." If it be indeed true that man of all living creatures suffers the keenest sorrows, it is only a poor satisfaction to feel that he also enjoys the most exquisite pleasures—for if there be no hereafter this only puts him upon the whole on a par in point of happiness with the inferior animals, and thus makes him truly the "riddle of the world;" and if while the works in general of the Creator argue a predominating benevolence in Him who made them, yet man (as some affect to think) be in this respect exceptional, then the enigma is even more perplexing. Or if again we try to get rid of the difficulty by turning to Pantheism or to Atheism, we only pass from darkness into darkness deeper still. But here it is that Revelation

enlightens us; for it tells us that in the hands of that universal Ruler who not only brings good out of evil, but makes the evil itself an instrument for good, our very sufferings, and just in proportion to their severity, may minister to our happiness. It tells us of one who has "borne our griefs and carried our sorrows," and that through Him our sufferings are the qualifying discipline that fits a guilty creature for ultimate and everlasting enjoyment.* If then it be also true that "the husbandman prunes not the bramble but the vine, and that the stones intended for a temple require more cutting and polishing than those intended for a common wall," we can easily understand that a being who was at one time the image of his God, and whose final destiny may be sublimer than ever was his forfeited bliss, must undergo trials and afflictions of which the severity shall be commensurate with the dignity of his place in the Creation, with his wonderful capacity for progress, and with the nobleness of the purposes to which his powers should be consecrated. He is like a magnificent sanctuary which a ruthless conqueror has left in ruins; where the light that was once glowing on its golden altars has been exchanged for a soldier's watch-fire, and the burst of deep-toned music, that once thrilled with its inspiring melody enchanted listeners, for the wild song of a soldier's revelry, yet where every shattered window and every broken pillar and every fallen column not only attests

* The title to this enjoyment is distinct from the meetness *for* it. The former is God's work *for* us through Christ; the latter God's work *in* us by His Spirit, and for the most part through sanctified affliction.

the original grandeur of the desecrated architecture, but proves that it is capable of the amplest restoration. But then the master-spirit who completed the first beautiful design must himself undertake the work of renewal, and begin by expelling at any cost the fierce intruders who profane it. He must conquer the conqueror, silence the riotous host, and wash away the blood stains; chisel the marble into beauty again, cleanse the temple of its pollution, and breathe another and more hallowing consecration over all the desecrated materials. But in making the ruin thus a more imposing and a more majestic and a more enduring pile than ever was the original structure, it must be that in the process the building shall be often disturbed, re-echo with the groans of dying enemies, and bear eloquent witness to the fierceness of the battle-strife. "Hail, then," might the Christian exclaim, "all hail, ye Heaven-sent sorrows, —ye are to purify—ye are to exalt—ye are to etherialize, and ye can qualify me, through grace, for a richer rapture than ever sin with all its promises, and earth with all its allurements, and Eden with all its glories could bestow. Be it that for the present you cause the tear to fall, the heart to bleed, the soul to sicken. Be it that ye summon the deep-drawn sigh, and wring from the wounded spirit an expression of its inward anguish. Oh! ye can but obey the behest of a Father that chastens in love, and chastens to make heavenly; and ye can but last till this my pilgrimage and its woes shall be over for ever. Ye can but last till the few years of all this wearying journey are ended, and then—Hail Heaven, hail! I shall have

there a field for the exercise of all that *you* have been sent to expand, to exalt, and to ennoble. Through you and Him who has deputed you and made your mission successful I am receiving in sorrow an education for glory, and when the task is fully learned I shall rejoice in the application of the lessons of wisdom and goodness and joy which I have learned in the school of that heavenly Master at whose feet I shall be sitting for ever —for ever to be learning, and for ever to be making my knowledge my happiness. You have destroyed nothing. You have only shown me how with *all* that is within me I can benefit myself, can serve my generation, and can glorify my God. True it is that I cannot fathom the mystery of evil, but then I can do better; I can overcome the evil itself. "Be not," I am told, "overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." Should that evil be owing to the malice of my fellow-creatures I can conquer it by Christian forbearance and forgiveness,—for if my enemy hunger I can feed him, if he thirst I can give him drink, and thus put coals of fire on his head, melting his enmity into love. If it come from myself I can subdue it through the grace of God and His blessing on the use of means. If it come directly from Heaven I can overcome it by Christian fortitude and Christian resignation. Thus I reckon that the sufferings of this present time (be they what they may) are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in us, and thus in the midst of the darkness, "God my maker giveth songs in the night." All this has been eloquently described by a modern writer in language suitable exactly to our illustration.

"It may well be said that so soon as man had fallen it was night on this Creation. The creature had shut itself out from the favour of its Creator, and what was this but to shroud the globe with the worst of all darkness? . . . It was only to have been expected when the fatal act had been committed that there would have ascended from the earth one fearful cry, and that then an eternal silence would have covered the desecrated globe. But in place of this—though the gathered night was not at once dispersed—there still went up the anthem of praise from lowing herds and waving corn and stately forests; and man in his exile had an evening and a morning hymn . . . and all because God had already discovered Himself as our maker who giveth songs in the night . . . we may assert that there cannot be imagined, much less found, the darkness in passing through which there is no promise of Scripture by which you may be cheered. Let us take the case of most frequent occurrence but of which the frequency diminishes nothing of the bitterness; we mean the case of the loss of friends, the case in which death makes way into a family and carries off one of the most beloved of its members. It is night, deep night, in a household whensoever this occurs. Philosophy comes in with its well-meant but idle endeavours to console those who sit in this darkness—and pleasure approaches with its allurements and fascinations to cheat the mind into forgetfulness, and wile the heart from its sadness. Yes, philosophy may enter where all is night, but it leaves what it found even weeping and wailing, and pleasure may take the lyre whose strings have often seduced and enchanted,

but the wearied spirit has no ear in the gloom for what sounded magically when a thousand lights were blazing. But religion, faith in the promises of that God who is the husband of the widow and the father of the fatherless, this can cause the sorrowing to be glad in the midst of their sorrow . . . We might easily multiply our illustrations. We might follow the believer through all the stages of his progress from earth to Heaven; and wheresoever you could show that it was night there could we show you that God giveth songs. Is it the loss of property with which believers are visited? our Maker giveth songs in the night, and the chorus is heard. We have in Heaven a better, even an enduring substance. Is it the loss of friends? our Maker, as we have shown you, 'giveth songs in the night:' they 'sorrow not as others who have no hope,' and over the grave is heard the fine confession, 'Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord.' . . . . Let the thickest night gather. Let death be at hand, and shall it be said that our text fails of accomplishment? On the contrary, it is here emphatically true that our Maker 'giveth songs in the night.' The believer in Christ knows and feels that his Redeemer hath abolished death. . . . What upholds the dying man? What throws over his wasted countenance that air of serenity? What prompts those expressions of peace, those breathings of hope which seem so little in accordance with his circumstances of trouble and decay? It is because God is whispering to his soul such words as these: 'Fear thou not, for I am with thee; be not dismayed, for I am thy God. I will strengthen thee, yea, I will help thee.' . . . It is our nature to rejoice when all

within and without is undisturbed; the miracle is to rejoice in tribulation, and this miracle is continually wrought as the believer passes through the wilderness. The harp of the human spirit never yields such sweet music as when its framework is most shattered and its strings are most torn. Then it is that when the world pronounces the instrument useless and man would put it away as incapable of melody that the finger of God delights in touching it, and draws from it a fine swell of harmony; come night, come calamity, come affliction. God still says to His people, as He said to the Jews when expecting the irruption of the Assyrian, 'Ye shall have a song as in the night.'" *

It appears, then, that our hypothesis accounts for all the phenomena of human experience and consciousness so far as they are immediately connected with man himself—that it supposes a darkness exactly analogous to that of the particular season to which we compare it, and caused in a similar way—that the darkness is one of ignorance, delusion, sin, and sorrow—the darkness of degradation. Now, degradation is no such unusual thing in nature as to render it in this case incredible, for it is certain that there are many instances of degeneracy, not only in the animal and vegetable kingdoms generally, but in individuals, families, and whole races of men in particular, while in the three last cases this degradation can be traced almost always to sin. It would also appear that this darkness is not in the least degree exaggerated in

* Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge, by Henry Melville, B.D. Sermon II.

Scripture—that it tells us of a sufficient remedy—that the darkness of ignorance is just of that sort that is necessary to enable a fallen creature to acquire in another world the desired illumination—that a provision has been made for the final dissipation of all human delusions—that the consequences as well as the pollution and the power of the sin can be removed—that the sorrow can be turned into joy, and joy, partly at least, through the very instrumentality of that sorrow—that though we cannot account for evil, we can do better, and that is overcome it—and that in the very darkest hour of the night as it gathers round ourselves, our Maker has given us songs wherewith we can be comforted and made glad.

Abide with me, past is the even-tide,
The darkness deepens, Lord, with me abide ;
When other helpers fail, and comforts flee,
Help of the helpless, O abide with me.

Hold thou thy cross before my closing eyes ;
Shine through the gloom, and point me to the skies,
Heaven's morning breaks, and earth's vain shadows flee,
In life, in death, O Lord, abide with me.

THE DARKNESS ACKNOWLEDGED.

Knowledge and wisdom, far from being one,
Have ofttimes no connexion. Knowledge dwells
In heads replete with thoughts of other men,
Wisdom in minds attentive to their own.
Knowledge a mere unprofitable mass,
The rude materials with which wisdom builds;
Knowledge is proud that it has learned so much—
Wisdom is humble that it knows no more.

MR. THEODORE PARKER is, we believe, almost the only writer who has flatly denied that man is really sinful and sorrowful at all; and Cowper's distinction between wisdom and knowledge should be carefully attended to in judging of the authority due to his opinions. The stubborn fact that we are all guilty and suffering creatures is so variously attested, so extensively experienced, and so deeply felt, that the vast majority of our race have considered it beyond dispute. The great conscience of universal man bears an unequivocal and unhesitating testimony to the solemn truth that his "heart is not right before God;" and as for the suffering, the tendency of men in general is not to deny but to exaggerate its intensity. Hence the various explanations of moral and physical evil, and hence the readiness with

which, even from the earliest times, credence has been given to theories which would ascribe it to our degeneracy from a purer and a happier than our present condition. Plato's well-known definition of man—"a biped without feathers"—was ridiculed by Diogenes, who, plucking the feathers from a cock, called it "Plato's man;" but of the real meaning of this definition the cynic was ignorant. The Platonists held that men had sinned, and had therefore been condemned to appear in their present bodies, and with souls reft of the wings wherewith they could once have ascended into the regions of light and happiness. Nor need we complain of Plato's statement if we regard it as a mere illustration. For man is verily like a featherless eagle which, had its pinions never been plucked, might be able with an "eye that never winks and a wing that never tires" to soar into the heavens and to gaze upon the sun. It was the opinion of Marcus Antonius that men were born slaves to their appetites and passions, while traces of a widely prevailing belief that our state at present is one of degradation through sin can be detected, not only, as we have seen, in the most primitive of all the known languages, but also in the oldest of all the surviving traditions of mankind. The best men have always been the most willing to acknowledge their own natural corruption, while of the few who have dared to deny *theirs* some have been among the very persons in whom the truth which they reject with their lips but attest by their lives has been most signally exemplified. There are many, too, who, while considering themselves as exceptional, readily admit the fact upon which we are insisting and

make it an excuse for their misanthropy. Nor have any class of men on the whole been more cordial in acknowledging, or more eloquent in describing it, than unbelievers of a past generation. The language of Voltaire on the subject is particularly striking, and painful: "In man there is more wretchedness than in all the other animals put together. He loves life, and yet he knows that he must die. If he enjoys a transient good he suffers various evils and is at last devoured by worms. This knowledge is his fatal prerogative: other animals have it not. He spends the transient moments of his existence in diffusing the miseries which he suffers; in cutting the throats of his fellow-creatures for pay; in cheating and being cheated; in robbing and being robbed; in serving that he may command, and in repenting of all he does. The bulk of mankind are nothing more than a crowd of wretches equally criminal and unfortunate; and the globe contains carcases rather than men. I tremble at the review of this dreadful picture, to find that it contains a complaint against Providence itself, and I wish I HAD NEVER BEEN BORN."* According, then, to this unhappy unbeliever's own showing, it is verily true that man by nature is "dead in trespasses and sins," that he is "born to sorrow," and that his heart is "desperately wicked." And on the strength of the same showing may we not ask whether it is likely that this state of anomaly and disease (for

* Mr. Jay draws a very striking contrast between this passage and the language of the excellent Hallyburton, "I shall shortly get a very different sight of God from what I have ever had, and shall be made meet to praise Him for ever and ever . . . What a

what can it be but disease?) was man's primitive condition? Has God *inflicted* upon him endowments superior to those of any other living creature, in order that in *him* there should be more wretchedness than in all the other animals put together? If to him exclusively were given the "fatal prerogative" of knowing that he must die, was it, despite of his vast intellectual pre-eminence over the rest of the animal creation, a prerogative to be *specially miserable?* But the question immediately before us is this, has the moral and spiritual darkness here so often alluded to been generally admitted? To this we again give an affirmative answer, founded on the general consent, so far as we can find it out, of mankind; on the confessions of the very men in whom that darkness was least, and on the statements of unbelievers themselves. Nor is all this the only evidence, for it is corroborated by the testimony of some of the deepest thinkers that ever existed, who, after carefully examining the subject, have come to a conclusion essentially similar to that of Coleridge, whose words express the very truth which all the preceding remarks are intended to establish. He tells us that "a fall of some sort or other—the creation of the non-absolute—

wonder that I enjoy such composure under all my bodily pains and in the view of death itself! What a mercy that, having the use of my reason, I can declare His goodness to my soul! I bless His name I have found Him, and die rejoicing in Him. . . . I have a father and mother and ten brothers and sisters in heaven, and I shall be the eleventh. Oh! there is a telling in this providence, and I shall be telling it for ever; If there be such a glory in his conduct to me now, what will it be to see the Lamb in the midst of the throne! Blessed be God THAT EVER I WAS BORN.

is the *fundamental postulate of the moral history of man.* Without this," he adds, "man is unintelligible, with it *every phenomenon is explicable,*" and this language is the more valuable from expressing the mature judgment of one who had previously entertained very different opinions.

But against all this we have to weigh the all but solitary authority (as we believe) of the late Mr. Theodore Parker; and is it sufficient to turn the scale? "Knowledge," says Cowper, "is the mere material with which wisdom builds," and there can be no doubt that this was eagerly sought, rapidly acquired, extensively possessed, and eloquently imparted by that remarkable man. Yet this praise must be qualified by the following criticism of an able and in this case a most impartial writer. "With all his enormous reading and the varied knowledge he acquired, Mr. Parker can hardly be called a scholar. His Latin, when we have made the most liberal allowance for misprints, is such as might make the very compositor shudder. His Greek was probably worse. Nor was his intellect that of a philosopher. In disposition and manners Mr. Parker was what we on this side of the Atlantic call 'very pushing.' . . . . Similarly his intellect was what we might call a 'pushing' intellect. It was audacious, disrespectful, undiscriminating." * But whatever be the validity of Mr. Parker's claim to knowledge, he has, we think, a very slender one to wisdom. In our humble judgment the true way to a knowledge of what man really is, is that

* The Rev. J. Llewellen Davies, Rector of Christ's Church, Marylebone.

which common sense recommends, namely, the broad and beaten one of experience. To judge of his character we would therefore study him, mix much in all classes of society (only taking care to avoid a certain *sort* of experience which we would not bargain for, and therefore keeping at a respectful distance certain exceptionable characters who do not quite square with Mr. Parker's theory of the relative "*perfection* of human nature," and upon whom some Inspector A. 1. generally keeps "a sharp look out.") We would judge of what he *is* by what he says, what he does, and, as far as we can, by what it would appear that he thinks. We would endeavour to discover the motives by which he is actuated. We would carefully study his history, and thus accumulate *facts*. We would consult the experience of others as well as our own. We would pay no little attention to those truest interpreters of the human heart, the poets who have most faithfully "held the mirror up to nature," and above all we would try honestly to examine ourselves, scrutinize "the chambers of imagery" within us, and, anxious to ascertain the real truth, however painful, fearlessly interrogate conscience, that inward witness whose testimony when fully and fairly given is that of heaven. Then we would compare the result of this inquiry with, we need not say God's, but even man's standard of moral rectitude, and ask if that result be humiliating and painful to ourselves, whether it can indicate a more righteous nature in the judgment of Him whom it were blasphemy to accuse of one solitary imperfection? Such—supposing there were no revelation—

'l be *our* mode of proceeding. We consider our-

selves far better judges of man, and of human actions, passions, and propensities, than we can presume to call ourselves of the things which belong unto One who is "far above out of our sight." We prefer the evidence of what *we know to be* to that which we might conclude beforehand *ought to be.* We would rather suspect some error in our logic respecting the necessary consequences of *God's* nature than deny the facts which testify so intelligibly, so variously, so eloquently, so consistently, and so constantly to *our own.* While we acknowledge and adore His infinite power, wisdom, justice, and love, we are not quite so prompt in judging from our "inward light" alone, of the precise nature of the actings of these attributes, and what they must inevitably involve; and not so decided in pronouncing upon them as upon matters on which it is quite plain that we have faculties to adjudicate, and do, in fact, adjudicate every day of our lives. And if a system elaborated by a process diametrically opposite to this flatter moreover our natural pride and put us at peace with ourselves,—a system, therefore, which on the face of it should awaken our caution—be propounded by a man who, with all his great talents, and all his vast acquirements, and all his undeniable virtues, was yet one of the most self-sufficient of all human beings,—an utter stranger to anything like humility, our suspicions become confirmed. For a very inordinate endowment of *any* quality is not favourable to that truly philosophical judgment which forbids a dominating tendency to bias its decisions. And if this tendency happen to be self-esteem, we are the slower in yielding

which, even from the earliest times, credence has been given to theories which would ascribe it to our degeneracy from a purer and a happier than our present condition. Plato's well-known definition of man—"a biped without feathers"—was ridiculed by Diogenes, who, plucking the feathers from a cock, called it "Plato's man;" but of the real meaning of this definition the cynic was ignorant. The Platonists held that men had sinned, and had therefore been condemned to appear in their present bodies, and with souls reft of the wings wherewith they could once have ascended into the regions of light and happiness. Nor need we complain of Plato's statement if we regard it as a mere illustration. For man is verily like a featherless eagle which, had its pinions never been plucked, might be able with an "eye that never winks and a wing that never tires" to soar into the heavens and to gaze upon the sun. It was the opinion of Marcus Antonius that men were born slaves to their appetites and passions, while traces of a widely prevailing belief that our state at present is one of degradation through sin can be detected, not only, as we have seen, in the most primitive of all the known languages, but also in the oldest of all the surviving traditions of mankind. The best men have always been the most willing to acknowledge their own natural corruption, while of the few who have dared to deny *theirs* some have been among the very persons in whom the truth which they reject with their lips but attest by their lives has been most signally exemplified. There are many, too, who, while considering themselves as exceptional, readily admit the fact upon which we are insisting and

make it an excuse for their misanthropy. Nor have any class of men on the whole been more cordial in acknowledging, or more eloquent in describing it, than unbelievers of a past generation. The language of Voltaire on the subject is particularly striking, and painful: "In man there is more wretchedness than in all the other animals put together. He loves life, and yet he knows that he must die. If he enjoys a transient good he suffers various evils and is at last devoured by worms. This knowledge is his fatal prerogative: other animals have it not. He spends the transient moments of his existence in diffusing the miseries which he suffers; in cutting the throats of his fellow-creatures for pay; in cheating and being cheated; in robbing and being robbed; in serving that he may command, and in repenting of all he does. The bulk of mankind are nothing more than a crowd of wretches equally criminal and unfortunate; and the globe contains carcases rather than men. I tremble at the review of this dreadful picture, to find that it contains a complaint against Providence itself, and I wish I HAD NEVER BEEN BORN."* According, then, to this unhappy unbeliever's own showing, it is verily true that man by nature is "dead in trespasses and sins," that he is "born to sorrow," and that his heart is "desperately wicked." And on the strength of the same showing may we not ask whether it is likely that this state of anomaly and disease (for

* Mr. Jay draws a very striking contrast between this passage and the language of the excellent Hallyburton, "I shall shortly get a very different sight of God from what I have ever had, and shall be made meet to praise Him for ever and ever . . . What a

thing! Hundreds of great and wise men have wearied themselves with this problem, and have, Mr. Parker thinks, been merely pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp. It is altogether a mistake to suppose that evil has any existence!

"Such is the result of an endeavour to work out a philosophy in the drawing-rooms of Boston. The inquirer passes from one tea-party to another, from one admiring coterie to another, and finds life so pleasant, that he exclaims, 'Talk of sin and wickedness, and misery and wretchedness; I don't believe a word of it all. There are no wicked people. There are no miserable people. The idea is a "ghastly fiction."' *

"We never hear of this kind of language, whether in Boston or in London, without wishing that such dreamers could have their knowledge enlarged, and their views of human nature made more like fact and reality. We should be glad if Mr. Parker or any of his followers in England could be made to abide for a season in China, and to see a Mandarin ordering or superintending the execution of 7,000 prisoners, till the execution-ground on which they were massacred was turned into one large pool of human blood! or in Dahomey, to witness a similar scene, though on a smaller arena; or on the slave-trading coasts of Africa, to behold the tens of thousands of poor captives dragged down to the beach by men-stealers and traders in human flesh, who depopulate large tracts of sea-coast in many different parts of Africa to supply Cuba and Brazil with slaves. We might

* We think, however, that one cause of this denial was his unwillingness to believe in facts that contradicted his theory.

name many other parts of the world in which wholesale murder is as common as eating or sleeping."

The reviewer then cites from Pope's "Essay on Man" lines with which every reader of English literature is thoroughly familiar, and which in fact contain the whole "system" of Theodore Parker as far as the reviewer and we too can understand it; the similarity is so striking, that but for Mr. Parker's own statements, quoted already, it would be impossible to help suspecting that the "system was founded on the 'Essay.'". Of the latter, Johnson tells us that "the doctrine was derived from Bolingbroke, who 'ridiculed Pope as having adopted principles of which he did not know the consequences.'" Johnson himself remarks of Pope that "metaphysical morality was to him a new study; he was proud of his acquisitions, and, supposing himself master of great secrets, was in haste to teach what he had not learned. Having exalted himself into the chair of wisdom, he tells us much that every man knows, and much that he does not know himself: that we see but little, and that the order of the universe is beyond our comprehension—an opinion not very uncommon; and that there is a chain of subordinate beings, 'from infinite to nothing,' of which himself and his readers are equally ignorant. But he gives us one comfort, which, without his help, he supposes unattainable, in the position that 'though we are fools, yet God is wise.' Never were penury of knowledge and vulgarity of sentiment so happily disguised. The reader feels his mind full, though he learns nothing; and when he meets with it in its new array, no longer knows the talk of his mother and his nurse."

"Much of this is equally applicable to poor Parker, but there is this deeper criminality in his case, that he wrote not in the darkness of the time of Pope, but after Butler and Paley, Chalmers and O'Brien had arisen in England, and Jonathan Edwards, Dwight, and M'Ilvaine in America. It was between 1830 and 1860 that he 'discovered' and proclaimed as 'a system peculiar to himself,' the same series of blunders, half truths and whole falsehoods, which Alexander Pope wrapped up in his mellifluous rhymes in 1725." *(Ibid.)*

Parker's success as a preacher and his fame in his generation are very easily accounted for. His character was distinguished by some traits of genuine good feeling. He seems to have hated vice, and entertained the liveliest admiration of all that he believed to be true and good. His morals were pure, and there was about him a boldness, a frankness, and a self-reliance which are nowhere more highly valued than in America. Then, his reading, which Mr. Davies allows to have been enormous, and his indomitable energy, must have greatly increased his popularity. But the principal cause of his success was no doubt the very agreeable doctrine he inculcated. Nothing in the world could have been pleasanter to believe. "The infinite God generates blessedness, ever blessedness, and only blessedness." . . . . "The pain of sin is the pain of surgery, nay, the pain of growth. God provided for it all. Suppose I am the blackest of sinners; that, as Cain, I slew my brother, or, as Iscariot, I betrayed Him, and, blackened with such a sin, I come to die, still I am the child of God—of the infinite God. He foresaw the consequences of my faculties, of the

freedom He gave me, of the circumstances which girt me round; and do you think He knows not how to bring me back?" If this doctrine were true, every man's death, however atrocious his life, might be an euthanasia. Some of the best men that ever existed have bitterly reproached themselves for their sins, fools that they were! There is no sin; or if there be, it is only "the pain of surgery—nay, the pain of *growth!*" To quote again the reviewer, "Could any doctrine be more pleasing, more generally popular than this? Is it any wonder that, set forth by an able and energetic man, it attracted the largest congregation in Boston? The preacher, too, had a vast advantage over an ordinary Universalist; for the propagators of this doctrine ordinarily profess to draw their lessons from the Bible, and men cannot shut their eyes to the fact that the Bible does speak of everlasting punishment, &c. This source of perplexity Theodore Parker threw quite away. He started with the principle that though the Bible was a wonderful book, it was merely human and full of errors. All its pictures of a 'wrathful God' and of future punishment he cast aside as ugly dreams and nothing more. Nothing of the kind was to have a moment's credence. The God whom he professed to worship was a far higher and nobler Being than the God of the Bible. He was infinite; *i. e.*, there was no end or limit to His mercy or His power. He could find means of bringing to heaven the impenitent and unbelieving as well as the contrite and confiding; and as He was all love, and only love, it was certain that He would

do so . . . . He knows how to bring every sinner to heaven unchanged and unrepentant; why, then, should the greatest miscreant that ever lived give himself one moment's uneasiness?"

It is utterly impossible to account satisfactorily for the all but universal prevalence of the rite of sacrifice without supposing it to arise from distorted traditions of revealed truth, or else from an inward sense of guilt, a desire for expiation, and a dread of punishment. But Mr. Parker and his *consistent* followers must utterly reject both of these explanations. The former would look too like a confession that the Bible is after all an authority. The latter would argue something wholly at variance with Pope's "Essay on Man," amplified unconsciously into what Parker calls "*my* system;" mark, then, his gross inconsistency. The same thing which teaches him everything else that he believes, is by no means to be listened to when it tells him of what he chooses to call a "wrathful God." To that inward oracle which utters not only indistinct but disagreeing responses, and yet makes a revelation superfluous, he listens devoutly as long as he thinks he can gather from its mutterings anything that opposes the great truths of the Gospel; but the moment it gives utterance to almost the only idea that it ever yet plainly enunciated, namely, that man is a grievous sinner and deserves punishment, he stops its mouth, and cries, "Hush, hush! speak unto us smooth things, prophesy deceits;" or else, "This is contrary to my system, and I will not hear it." How much of that system as regards the infinite perfection of

God, and more especially His love, is taken from the very Bible which he repudiates we shall not stop to inquire. But we think that

> "Revealed religion first informed thy sight,
> And Reason saw not till Faith sprung the light,"

may be addressed with as much propriety to him as to many others who, rejecting Christianity, would fabricate a system of religion. "Besides many doctrines unknown to reason, Christianity republished authoritatively in a simple and accessible form, without any intermixture of error, those truths—discoverable indeed, and discovered by a few, but unknown generally—which before had a precarious existence in a scattered and dissipated condition, and were first reduced by the Gospel into one solid system of verity. Joined with each portion of the Revelation, old and new, is a truth of natural religion (so-called), which experimentalists are always cutting off, to see it writhe and twist, and mistake its merely nervous and muscular action for that vitality which it can only permanently have in connexion with the head . . . . . What, asks Rousseau, is the soul of religion but to worship God in spirit and in truth? What, indeed! It only needed about 4,000 years—the dispensation of the law, the teaching of the prophets, and the death of the Son of God—to establish this simple and obvious truth, simple and obvious as the 5th Proposition of Euclid is, *i.e., to those who have been taught it;* and when a reasoner against the necessity for a revelation parades this principle as an argument, he gives it life by transfusing into the withered veins of his natural religion

drops that have been drawn from the very heart's blood of the revelation which he depreciates." *

But why, it may be asked, dwell thus long on the character and writings of a single individual? We answer. 1. Because Mr. Parker's opinions have had, and still have, an extensive influence, and in various respects resemble those of many well-known writers in our own country "who could do little more than repeat 'what a single confident outspoken Deist had been preaching in the music-hall at Boston for some fifteen years before.'" Two distinct editions of his works, each a collection of 12 vols., have already been printed; one of them even stereotyped. And we wish to show the real authority of his opinions, as well as to *account for* his great popularity. That he had some virtues, virtues which we greatly admire, and sincerely wish we could pretend to ourselves, we cordially admit—and virtues which gave great weight to a particular kind of teaching, which, with a large class of persons, must always be very popular, even though not thus recommended. We admit, too, though obliged to qualify our opinion in deference to better judges, that his learning was vast. But we deny that with the mere materials with which wisdom builds they were by him wisely "smoothed and squared and fitted into place," and maintain that with a *great deal* of that which "is proud that it has learned so much," he had *very little indeed* of that which "is humble that it knows no more," and that he was, therefore, *ipso facto*, wholly unsafe as a moral teacher—a

* Modern Pantheism. Essay by Translator, pp. 220, 221.

teacher one of whose chief requisites for the duty he undertakes is humility; that although his mind was "replete with thoughts of other men," he was strangely ignorant of the fact that what he calls *his* system was little more than a reproduction of the long exposed and long exploded fallacies of Bolingbroke and Pope—that he reverses the process by which, as it seems to us, truths connected with man can be discovered without a revelation, and that he sets *facts* at defiance—that he refuses to hear his own oracle when it gives one of its very few intelligible responses, because it militates against his theory, or because it tells him unpalatable truth, or for both of these reasons together—that he borrows, perhaps unconsciously, some of his best ideas from "the Book" that he praises, but rejects—and that he may be numbered with many others also learned, and also possessed of signal virtues, who may yet be cited as instances of that darkness of delusion which forms the subject of a preceding chapter. This last observation is expressed still more strongly by one of the writers we have quoted, who tells us that "Mr. Parker concocted a creed which is neither that of Heathenism nor that of Christianity, and which having no root in any known fact, or in any natural consciousness, is the most utterly baseless and unsupported collection of ideas that is to be found among all the *dreams* of vain and presumptuous man."

But we have another reason for thus enlarging on the subject of Mr. Parker's system, and that is to show the straits to which a gifted man is driven in order to make out a religious system which wholly ignores the fall.

To deduce the relative perfection of man from the infinite perfection of God, he is obliged to deny that man is really wicked and sorrowful at all!!

We think, then, there is no occasion to consider Mr. Parker's authority as outweighing that of mankind in general, supported as it is by that of profound thinkers, both Heathen and Christian.

THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH, PREACHERS OF THE DARKNESS.

One sun by day; by night ten thousand shine
And light us deep into the Deity.
* * * * *
Stars teach as well as shine—
The prospect vast,—what is it? Weigh'd aright
'Tis Nature's system of divinity,
And every student of the night inspires.
'Tis elder Scripture writ by God's own hand.

In the preceding chapter we have tried to show that man's history presents us with a series of facts and phenomena of which some abnormal darkness affords an easy and an adequate explanation. One of them is a deep and general conviction on the part of mankind that our race is guilty before God, that it merits punishment, and that its present condition is one of degradation. But there are some writers who deny the conclusion which all this would seem to justify, and we have endeavoured to prove that of these one of the most influential found himself unable to fabricate a consistent system of theology that ignored the fall without virtually denying, despite of the most conclusive evidence, some of the best established of those facts and phenomena themselves.

If his system lead inevitably to the inference that after all there is no sin and no wretchedness in the world, most people, we suppose, will conclude that it refutes itself, and that his whole argument is a sort of "*reductio ad absurdum*." But the Scriptural doctrine that man is a fallen creature, denies, ignores, or evades nothing whatever that we require it to account for. In the language already quoted, "a fall of some kind or other is the fundamental postulate in the moral history of man: without it man is unintelligible; with it *every* phenomenon is explicable." As an hypothesis it will therefore stand until supplanted by another which has a better claim to validity. Whether such other can be suggested is a question to be considered hereafter. In the meantime we would call attention to a different sort of proof, and endeavour to show that an argument for the fall may be founded upon the suggestive scenery of that natural period by which we have shown that it can be illustrated. This evidence, taken by itself, may have little weight, but we think it has some, and on such a subject no argument unless it have none at all should be neglected. Even supposing that it can be fully answered, the very facts on which it is based are full of interest and importance. We argue, then, that the ornaments of natural night favour the supposition of a spiritual, and suggest for its occurrence some such cause as that which Scripture has assigned. It is not wonderful that that magnificent spectacle which on a clear and cloudless night beautifies the boundless firmament has called forth from the earliest ages expressions not only of wonder but of worship, and that the splendid objects which Eastern shepherds in their

nightly watchings beheld in the glorious canopy above them were among the first of all created things to which in the ignorance of their "natural religiousness" men became idolaters. "The heavens," says David, "declare the glory of the Lord, the firmament showeth his handy work." And after that minstrel king who caught his inspiration directly from the God of all, every poet down to the latest who has sung "the voices of the night," has only, when alluding to the same gorgeous prospect in the same religious connexion, thrown into his own language the devotional feelings, guided in the Christian by a light from heaven, that struggled for expression in the full heart of some primitive gazer as his widening eye wandered over that glowing vault that seems like heaven's flooring "paved with stars." But to the modern observer who has a soul for the proper contemplation of this imposing sight, and studies it with the aid of science, words must be wanting to express his admiration. There is a part of the heavens as seen through a powerful telescope, of which it has been said that no one perhaps ever saw it for the first time without uttering "a shout of wonder." But the true philosopher, as he beholds the grandeur and the glory of the nightly firmament, gazes on a spectacle far more inspiring than that of external splendour, for he reads in that register of God's almightiness, of which the letters are the stars, convincing and amazing proofs not only of the outward beauty, but also of the perfect order and the wonderful harmony which appear to pervade the whole material universe. Far as, with his best instruments, the eye of a practised astronomer can pierce the spreadings of

immensity, he sees the unmistakeable signs of law, order, symmetry, consistency, concord, and regularity. Who has not heard of the "music of the spheres," and of stars

"Singing as they shine,
The hand that made us is Divine"?

But to an ear attuned for the melodies of heaven, but stunned with the discords of earth, there is a sublimer, because a moral, harmony in the nice adjustment and regular movement, the reciprocal interaction and combined effect of the celestial bodies, than there could have been in the voices of the stars, if all had joined in chorus, to hymn in audible adoration a song of praise to their common Creator. In the multitudinous variety of orbs that meet our glances as we scan the wide expanse, there seems to be no collision, and no confusion. The little that some astronomers have supposed to be exceptional, such as the possible disruption of a planet between Mars and Jupiter, that retrograde movement of the satellites of Uranus which the author of "The Vestiges" ascribes to a *bouleversement!* the existence and possible consequences of an interplanetary ether, and the phenomenon of vanishing stars can scarcely be said to be sufficiently investigated to render the conclusions of such astronomers more at present than premature and conjectural.* To use the language of a

* Speaking of the newly appearing and vanishing stars, Sir Henry Holland remarks, "The fact long noted that a large proportion, if not all, of the new stars observed, have appeared in or near the Milky Way, has done more to excite than aid conjecture, and we must not stop to relate the speculations which have been

competent judge, "It may be asserted without any risk of contradiction, that nowhere within this wide knowable space do we discover even the semblance of chance, confusion, lawlessness, or oversight. Nay, it may be most confidently affirmed that no where within this extensive region, or in the long ages opened up to us by the time which light requires to travel from different stars, do we discover any traces of a chaos now existing, or ever having existed, or of worlds being formed by natural law, or of worlds only half formed, or in the course of formation, or of any object overlooked or *out of place*, or not *in harmony with all the rest.*"* Seeming deviations from the laws which regulate the

hazarded on the subject, as none of them have any higher sanction than that of possibility." We believe that the same may be said of most of the other speculations alluded to above. But the following statement with reference to the planet between Mars and Jupiter is founded upon evidence which may be considered as more satisfactory :—"We cannot forbear noticing again the wonderful group of small planets between Mars and Jupiter—the *sole instance* in our system, with the exception of comets, where it becomes probable that some sudden *catastrophe* has occurred, changing essentially the condition of a great body revolving round the sun. We venture to use this word *catastrophe* because we can hardly refuse belief to Olbers's conjecture of the disruption of a planet in this region."—"Essays on Scientific Subjects," by Sir H. Holland. Still, he says he treads here "on uncertain ground." But if such exceptional cases could be clearly established, the very fact that they *are* exceptional would strengthen rather than weaken our argument, for they would show that in the midst of innumerable proofs of order, harmony, stability, and regularity, there are yet occasional instances of convulsion, discord, and catastrophe.

* "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation," p. 400.

motions of the heavenly bodies have been found to be not only consistent with, but examples of their rigid uniformity. The very inequalities which were once supposed to endanger the stability of this universal frame were found to be not only caused, but compensated, by the very law which they once appeared to contradict, and to secure the continuance of what they seemed to imperil.* Inequality is balanced by inequality, and "perturbation" (so called) by perturbation again. All is conducted by a system of agencies which retard, accelerate, direct, sustain, or balance each other, causing in the midst of vast variety and much apparent complexity the most perfect harmony.

> "Yonder starry sphere
> Of planets and of fixed in all their wheels,
> Resembles nearest mazes intricate,
> Eccentric, intervolved, yet regular
> Then most when most irregular they seem."

Seeing, then, the admirable order and beautiful regularity of the material universe, we might expect, judging from analogy, to find a similar state of things in the moral. We might infer that each of our natural faculties, affections, and sentiments would regularly revolve in its own appointed orbit of obedience around that ruling sentiment of Godliness which itself would complete its commissioned circuit around that central "sun of righteousness," God Himself, to whom it was its tendency for ever and ever to be gravitating. We might suppose that they would operate in perfect harmony through that

* These remarks, however, must be qualified by those in page, *post.*

attracting principle of love which would draw them to Him who is love itself, and at the same time to each other, causing them thus, in one beautiful cluster, like sister planets round a common sun, to glorify together the common source of all their light and joy. The following passage in Scripture illustrates our meaning *: "Wherefore, giving all diligence, add † to your faith virtue ‡" (properly courage—say moral courage), "and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance" § (rather self-control), "and to temperance patience, ‖ and to patience GODLINESS, and to Godliness brotherly kindness" (rather love of the brethren) ¶ "and to brotherly kindness charity," or love at large.** Here is a brilliant assemblage of virtues which together express our obligations at once to self, to God, and to our fellow-creatures—in short, the whole duty of man.

* 2 Pet. i. 5, 6, 7.

† We may render this by our vernacular expression, "bringing to bear." (Webster and Wilkinson, *in loco.*)

‡ "The constancy and courage of manly vigour" (*ibid.*).

§ "Command over the appetites—self-mastery" (*ibid.*).

‖ "Submissiveness—the patience of humility" (*ibid.*).

¶ "Affection for the brotherhood—for the household of faith" (*ibid.*).

** "General and universal love to men as men. This passage is no less remarkable for philosophical justness of calculation than for prophetic truth. The Apostle displays a profound knowledge of human nature, and delivers a prospective caution against the yet undeveloped corruptions of Christianity in subsequent ages affording a *signal example of more than human skill and foresight*" (*ibid.*). See the whole note; which, however, is somewhat different in one respect from our own remarks; also "Saturday Evening,' by Isaac Taylor.

The centre of the system is Godliness, for God Himself is the common point of attraction. The quality that ought to accompany each is diligence, and this in the highest degree (hence the phrase *all* diligence); for each is exposed to extra-celestial forces which would cause it to wander out of the path of its proper motion in the spiritual heavens, and must therefore be energetically resisted. The particular collection that first attracts our notice as nearest to the observer's eye, is that which guides us in our conduct to ourselves, and begins with the star of faith, the first in order; for "without faith it is impossible to please God, and whatsoever is not of faith is sin," while it is faith that, working by love, draws us to Him, and points out the plane of the orbits which all its companions should be describing. To faith is added virtue or courage, for faith without courage is moral cowardice; "and to courage knowledge," otherwise its actings may produce blind, bigoted, and undiscriminating zeal; "and to knowledge temperance," or self-control, for without this the knowledge, instead of guiding the courage, would glorify self, or gratify self beyond measure, or too *directly*; "and to self-control patience," for every virtue requires time for its development; "and to patience Godliness," for this is the glorious centre of all; "and to Godliness love of the brethren," for the sentiment that causes love to God causes love to those who are specially His children; "and to love of the brethren charity," or love in general, for the love of the brethren is apt to degenerate into party spirit, and the proper corrective to this narrowing tendency is that expansive benevolence which includes

within the wide circumference of its cordial and comprehensive sympathies, the whole of the human family. What order is here! what harmony! what skilful adjustment, what guiding, controlling, correcting, and balancing! and what a character would be that in which we could witness all these in their proper combination! Verily its possessor would be a "burning and a shining light" to every generation. And can we suppose that a system of ethics thus consistent, compact, compendious, and complete, condensed as it is into a single sentence, was simply an unaided fabrication of the brain of a poor fisherman of Galilee? "Credat Judæus Apella." But to the point. Where do we actually witness a living illustration of this moral, intellectual, and spiritual harmony? What we do see is something lamentably different.* Some dominant propensity, some "besetting sin" lords it but too often over the whole mental

* This contrast between the physical order of the universe and the moral disorder on earth has perplexed many thoughtful minds in all ages, and is eloquently expressed by the poet Claudian :—

". . . . cum dispositi quæsissem fœdera mundi
Præscriptosque mari fines annisque meatus
Et lucis noctisque vias, tunc omnia rebar
Consilio firmata Dei, qui lege moveri
Sidera, qui fruges diverso tempore nasci,
Qui vanam Phœben alieno jusserit igne
Compleri, solemque suo ; provexerit undis
Littora ; tellurem medio libraverit axe.
Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
* * * * *
Adspicerem, * * *
* * rursus labefacta cadebat
Religio, * * * *"

economy, and keeps in subjection those higher principles of which it ought to be the minister. The different qualities of the mind, instead of acting and interacting so as to work in harmony, and according to the moral laws to which they should each of them be amenable, operate in the wildest confusion. Those which ought to be the most are often the least influential. God, instead of being "in all the thoughts" of man, is sometimes not in any. Propensities which can only be legitimately indulged when their action harmonizes with that of reason, and the moral sentiments, set their masters at defiance, and thus what might be cosmos becomes chaos. Then is it not natural to conclude that in some way or other "an enemy hath done this;" that a state of things thus apparently abnormal and exceptional cannot be the unmarred and original work of Him who made the sun, the planets, and the stars, and leaves the stamp of order, and symmetry, and adjustment in every region of the universe, so far as man can explore it, from the solar system to the farthest nebula, but arose from some such disturbance as Scripture ascribes to human apostasy? Thus the very harmonies of nature, especially when they "tune their nocturnal note," sing in a spiritual darkness just as did the sightless bard in a natural—

> "Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
> Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
> Brought death into the world and all our woe."

Let us now reflect upon that evidence of the same truth which is furnished by the globe that we inhabit. It has briefly been touched upon already, but deserves a fuller consideration. No reasonable man can resist the

convincing proofs which this our earth affords of the Creator's supreme benevolence. True it is now night, but is the natural period which is so called without its benefits, blessings, and enjoyments? To answer this question in the affirmative were to give the lie to universal experience. And so, as we have seen already, there are proofs in abundance of the mercy and goodness of that God our maker who, even in the deepest depths of the spiritual darkness, "giveth songs in the night." Paley's argument is well known; "that in a vast plurality of instances in which contrivance * is perceived, the design of the contrivance is "*beneficial*," and "that the Deity has superadded *pleasure* to animal sensations beyond what was necessary for any other purpose, or when the purpose, so far as it was necessary, might have been effected by the operation of pain." And qualifying the following remark of the same author with such of the preceding statements as prove that it requires to be modified, we enter cordially into the feeling which it expresses. "It is a happy world after all; the air, the earth, the water, teem with delighted existence. In a spring noon or a summer evening on whichever side I turn my eyes myriads of happy beings crowd upon my view. The insect youth are upon the wing; swarms of new-born *flies* are trying their pinions in the air; their sportive motions; their wanton mazes; their gratuitous activity; their continual change of place without use or purpose, testify their joy and the exultation which they

* For a defence of the argument from design, see "Typical Forms and Special Ends;" Translator's "Essay to Modern Pantheism;" "Indications of the Creator," by Professor Whewell.

feel in their newly-discovered faculties." And in speaking of a cloud of shrimps which he had often seen in the "act of bounding into the air from the shallow margin of the water or from the wet sand," he adds:— "If any motion of a mute animal could express delight it was this: if they had meant to make signs of their happiness they could not have done it more intelligibly. Suppose, then, what I have no doubt of, each individual of this number to be in a state of positive enjoyment, what a sum, collectively, of gratification and pleasure have we here before our view!" He also refers to the *young* of all animals as another instance, and to the different periods of life as well as to the diversified enjoyments of animal existence in general. But man is capable of higher and keener pleasures than is any inferior creature, and the more we contemplate, not exceptional cases, but distinguishing instances, the more the mind will be, or ought to be, impressed

> "With worthy thoughts of that unwearied love
> That planned, and built, and still upholds a world
> So clothed with beauty for *rebellious* man."

And we think that to the question why it is not clothed with greater beauty and made subservient to greater happiness, there is an answer which is satisfactory as far as it goes, in the fact that man *is* rebellious. But Professor Hitchcock has derived proofs of the Divine benevolence from the very quarter which of all others might at first appear the most unpromising, and shown that nine different arguments in favour of that benevolence ay be drawn from the science of geology. The seventh

appears to us particularly striking:—"If a created and intelligent being from some other sphere had alighted on this globe during the remote period when the vegetation now dug out of the coal formation covered the surface with its gigantic growth, he might have felt as if there was a waste of creative power. Vast forests of sigillariæ, lepidodendra, confervæ, cycladeæ, and tree ferns would have waved over his head with their imposing though sombre foliage, while the lesser tribes of calamites and equisetaceæ would have filled the intervening spaces; but no vertebral animal * would have been there to enjoy and enliven the almost universal solitude. Why, then, he must have inquired, is there such a profusion of vegetable forms, and such a colossal development? To what use can such vast forests be applied? But let ages roll by, and that same being revisit our world at the present time. Let him traverse the little island of Britain, and see there 15,000 steam engines moved by coal dug out of the earth and produced by these same ancient forests. Let him see these engines performing the work of two millions of men, and moving machinery which accomplishes what would require the unaided labours of three or four hundred millions of men, and he could not doubt but such a result was one of the objects of that rank vegetation which covered the earth ere it was fit for the residence of such natures as now dwell upon it. Let him go to the coal-fields of other countries, and especially those of the United States, stretching over one hundred and fifty thousand square

* We believe that subsequent discoveries would oblige the author to qualify this statement.

miles, containing a quantity absolutely inexhaustible, and already imparting comfort to millions of the inhabitants, and giving life and energy to every variety of manufacture through the almost entire length of this country (America), and destined to pour out their wealth through all coming time, long after the forests shall all have been levelled; and irresistible must be the conviction upon his mind that here is a beautiful example of prospective benevolence on the part of the Deity." (Geology of Religion, Lecture VI.) But this interesting writer well knew that Geology also furnished instances of agencies the operations of which it is hard to reconcile with our notions of simple benevolence, and therefore devotes a distinct chapter to the proofs of that kind of Divine benevolence which is exhibited in a *fallen world*. It is not to be denied that the globe which we inhabit is very far from being "*all* beauty to the eye and music to the ear," but that pestilence breathes its poison on the blast; hurricanes bestrew the ocean with wrecks; volcanoes spread their devastating lava over crowded cities; earthquakes engulph human habitations; and thunderstorms leave in ruin the homes of families, the seats of learning, the palaces of royalty, the fanes of religion, and the fortresses of war. How then are we to reconcile the action of these tremendous agencies with Divine benevolence? The author just quoted replies, "I maintain, first, that notwithstanding all this, benevolence *decidedly predominates* in the present system of the world; secondly, that the benevolence exhibited in the present system of nature is not *unmixed*, but modified by other perfections, adapted to restrain and amend a

wicked race; thirdly, that the same system of good and evil which now exists has always prevailed since the earth was inhabited; and from these propositions I deduce the following conclusions:—first, that the world is not in a state of retribution. As a general fact, virtue is to some extent rewarded, and vice to some extent punished. But it is not always so. Indeed the picture is sometimes reversed *apparently*, and the good are afflicted because they do good, and the wicked triumph because they do evil; evil abounds, but it is not so distributed as righteous retribution would award it; neither is good." We consider this as proof of a future existence; but he argues besides, "Since God's justice must be infinitely perfect, there must be some other object for the prevalence of good and evil in the world besides righteous retribution; secondly, that the world is *in a fallen condition;* thirdly, that man's condition is not hopeless; fourthly, that the world is in a state of probation, or trial; fifthly, that the subject shows us a reason why suffering and death prevailed in this world long before man's existence; and, finally, that the same subject harmonizes infinite and perfect benevolence in God with the existence of evil on earth." Now we freely confess that we cannot fully go along with the author in the last of these conclusions; and indeed he himself admits that "there is a question lying in the outskirts of metaphysical theology which still remains unanswered, and probably never can be settled in this world, because some of its elements are beyond our reach." It may be true, however, as he states, that the light which he throws upon the subject enables us to

"come nearer to its solution than we could by viewing it in another aspect;" and we think that he fully succeeds, not only in throwing back the real difficulty as far as possible, but also in proving that even though we cannot "solve the question in its abstract form, and as applied to the whole creation, it is sufficient for every practical purpose of religion to show (and we think he *has* shown) how the present system of the world *for a fallen being* illustrates instead of disproving the Divine benevolence." His fifth inference, namely, that there is a reason why "suffering and death prevailed in this world long before man's existence," is intended partly to account for a fact which is now considered as thoroughly established; which in this 3d Lecture he has himself reconciled with Scripture, and which all theologians of the present day agree, we believe, in admitting. But it seems at first to militate against both the Divine benevolence, and, as far as the brute creation are concerned, against the Divine justice. "But," he replies, "God foresaw (I will not say preordained, though He certainly permitted it) that man would transgress, and therefore He made a world adapted to a sinful, fallen being, rather than to one pure and holy. If He had adapted it to an unfallen being, and then changed it upon his apostacy, that change must have amounted to a new creation. For, as I have endeavoured to show in a previous Lecture (Lecture III.), the whole constitution of our world, and even its relation to other worlds, must have been altered to fit it for a being who had sinned. To have introduced such an one into a world fitted up for the perfectly holy, would have been a curse instead of

a blessing. It was benevolence on the part of God to allow evil to abound in a world which was to be the residence of a sinful creature; for the discipline of such a state was the only chance of his being rescued from the power of sin and restored to the Divine favour. It may be thought, however, inconsistent with Divine benevolence to place the inferior, irrational animals in a condition of suffering because man would transgress, and thus punish creatures incapable of sinning for his transgression. Animals do indeed suffer in such a world as ours, but not as a punishment for man's or their own sin. The only question is, Do they suffer so much that their existence is not a blessing? Surely experience will decide without inquiring as to their future existence,* that their enjoyments, as a general fact, vastly outweigh their sufferings, and hence their existence indicates benevolence. It should also be recollected that their natures are adapted to a world of sin and death, and they are doubtless more happy here than they would be in a different condition, which might be more favourable to unfallen, accountable beings." †

Now although it must be admitted that these observations do not entirely clear up all the difficulties of the subject, we think they afford a satisfactory answer to some; that others are utterly inseparable from *any* hypothesis that would reconcile the benevolence of God with the present condition of the earth; that

* A great number of intelligent and thoughtful Christians believe in the immortality of animals, and to them the problem is relieved of much of its perplexity.

† "Religion of Geology."

these last are less perplexing than they would be but for some such explanation; and that if there be still some residuary difficulties upon which it throws no light at all, or next to none, the same difficulties beset still more inextricably every mode of accounting for the facts that scepticism would suggest as a substitute, and that the very fact that such difficulties are now insoluble is only what might have been expected on the supposition that, as fallen creatures, we are groping in that "darkness of ignorance" of which the supposition itself appears to involve an admission. For though we have separated this class of evidences from the proofs adduced in the preceding chapters, in order to associate the heavens with the earth as preachers of the fall, yet it were easy to include such evidences in the physical department of the phenomena to be accounted for. In that case the hypothesis would still be, that man has departed from the source of spiritual light; and this hypothesis seems to involve the fact of darkness to *some* extent almost in its very terms. Enough, we think, has been said at all events to show that the benevolence of the Creator, as exhibited on this globe in the physical laws to which it is obedient, is a benevolence that is suited to a world that is fallen—a world like our own, and no other. It would be wholly unfit for manifestation in a scene of simple punishment, and to a race of hopeless and irreclaimable offenders, and equally so for manifestation in a world of unfallen creatures—creatures in a state of purity and innocence. It is a benevolence, too little qualified for the one, and too much so for the other; while, for a sphere of being, inhabited by fallen

creatures who can yet rise again, who make it their place of sojourn till death calls them home, and whom the discipline of sorrow and suffering is to qualify through grace for the enjoyments of a world where sorrow and suffering are unknown, it is precisely the sort of benevolence that is most suitable. It is a benevolence that permits of a partial retribution, but which purifies while it punishes, and makes the retribution subserve a restoration. In short, it is infinite benevolence acting in the only conceivable way in which it could act for the moral and spiritual improvement of an apostate, but free, immortal, and reclaimable race. But it is wholly unintelligible, except upon the supposition that that race have lapsed from a purer and a happier state than that in which they are now existing.

Nor is this the only sort of evidence which the earth suggests in favour of the fall. Another, in the way of analogy, as at least showing that human degradation is not incredible, has also been glanced at already. If there were no instance of degeneracy among the different plants that diversify earth's crowded scenery, or among the various animals which at various times have tenanted its homes of life and intelligence, it might be hard to believe that man stood entirely alone, the solitary exception to a law that obliged every living thing around him to be either quite stationary or advancing in a career of progressive improvement. But the fact that degraded types of being are found both in the vegetable kingdom and the animal is notorious; nor is there, we believe, any science that is richer in proofs of both kinds of degeneracy than geology. Where are the lofty equisetaceæ that

contributed to deepen the shade of the boundless woods that, in the carboniferous era, covered the earth with a tropical and luxuriant vegetation? See their diminutive representatives in the little plants called horsetails that fringe our ponds at present. Where are the gigantic lycopodiaceæ that, in the same era, composed a part of its magnificent flora?

"We have entered the coal measures," says Hugh Miller, in that exquisite chapter of his "Old Red Sandstone," in which he describes the richness of this wonderful vegetation and alludes to Columbus at last nearing the land." . . . The water is fast shallowing. Yonder passes a broken branch with the leaves still unwithered, and there floats a tuft of fern. Land from the mast-head! land! land!—a low shore thickly covered with vegetation. Huge trees of wonderful form stand out from the water. There seems no intervening beach. A thick hedge of reeds, tall as the masts of pinnaces, runs along the deeper bays, like water flags at the edge of a lake. A river of vast volume comes rolling from the interior, darkening the water for leagues with its slime and mud, and bearing with it to the opening sea, reeds and fern, and cones of the pine, and immense floats of leaves, and now and then some bulky tree undermined and uprooted by the current. We near the coast, and now enter the opening of the stream. A scarce penetrable phalanx of reeds that attain to the height, and well-nigh the bulk, of forest trees, is ranged on either hand. The bright and glossy stems seem rodded like Gothic columns; the pointed leaves stand out green at every point, tier above tier,

each tier resembling a coronal wreath, or an ancient crown with the rays turned outwards. And we see atop what may be either large spikes or catkins. What strange forms of vegetable life appear in the forest behind! Can that be a club moss that raises its slender height for more than fifty feet from the soil? or can these tall palm-like trees be actually ferns, and these spreading branches mere fronds? And then these gigantic reeds! Are they not mere varieties of the common horsetail of our bogs and morasses, magnified some sixty or a hundred times? Have we arrived at some such country as the continent visited by Gulliver, in which he found thickets of weeds and grass tall as woods of twenty years growth, and lost himself amidst a forest of corn fifty feet in height? The lesser vegetation of our country,—reeds, mosses, and ferns—seem as if viewed through a microscope: 'The dwarfs have sprung up into giants.'"

Passing from the flora to the fauna of preadamite times we meet with instances equally striking of this degeneracy. The existing iguana, a reptile which seldom exceeds the length of five feet, has its fossil prototype in a creature of enormous dimensions, whose thigh-bone exceeded in bulk that of the largest elephant! But of these and a multitude of similar examples it may be said the changes have all been physical and brought about by physical agencies, alterations in the earth's surface, climate, &c., &c. Well, then, let us turn to man himself, and the moral degradation of which we find occasional instances in his history. We believe that there is hardly an asylum in existence for the sick, or for the

touching objects of pity, who are either born without those intellectual faculties on which man is so apt to pride himself, or so scantily endowed with them as scarcely to be raised above the level of irrational animals, but affords some melancholy proof that in a few generations a grievous change can be effected either in the human body, or the human mind, or both of them together! Who knows but that an ancestor of some poor creature who is now gazing vacantly on the floor of his chamber in a refuge for idiots was a man of genius, who boasted in his day of the vastness of his learning, the keenness of his wit, and the grasp of his intellect? Of how many noble families which once flourished like forest oaks among their meaner brethren of the woods is the old stock now withered and gone, or represented only in some dwarfish offshoot? And is not the truth on which we are now insisting exemplified, not only in individuals and families, but in nations—and even whole races of mankind? "How are the mighty fallen!" The stream of time rolls on, carrying along with it in its turbid waters the detribus of wasted monarchies. Egypt is now among the basest of the kingdoms. It was once the Athens of the world. The might of the Assyrian is a story of the past—Babylon is no more. Persia, compared with what it was, is but a geographical name. Greece—the well-known words describe it—

> So coldly sweet, so deadly fair,
> We start, for soul is wanting there.

Was ever degeneracy more striking than that of Rome

in the days of her decline and ruin? Is the modern Arab or the modern Spaniard, the Celt in his mountains, or the American savage in his woods or his prairie a fair example of his ancestors? Why, in these days we hear so much of progress that one might suppose there never was degradation. Yet how eloquent is its language throughout extensive regions of the earth! * But the noticeable fact is this, that the cause of the change has generally been sin. An excessive addiction to the pleasures of sense and appetite;—habits of luxury and vice,—indolence and self-indulgence, have had a larger share, we suspect, than any other agencies in producing it; and it should never be forgotten that to outrage, even in the most innocent way, the laws of organization by excess of any kind, is to violate the laws of the God who has enacted them, and justly expose us to the natural but disastrous consequences which He has annexed to their infraction. The inordinate and unregulated indulgence, therefore, of *any* desire is a sin; and if the brain be overwrought by the ceaseless pursuit of gain, or the schemes of insatiable ambition, the cares of business, the bitterness of grief, or the toil of study, the mind reacting on the body may induce a premature debility in the general frame, and co-operate with other causes of deterioration. It may have had little or no influence upon races or

* Hugh Miller tells us that there is "a type of even physical degradation already manifesting itself in some of our large towns, especially among degraded females, which is scarcely less marked than that exhibited by the negro." ("My Schools and Schoolmasters," p. 351.) Instances of this degradation are notorious.

nations, but it is certainly not without effect upon individuals, and so far at least fortifies our position that sin of some kind or other is, generally speaking, the most active of the causes of human degradation.

And, though our earth, as a scene of discipline for the fallen, is often presenting sights of suffering, and echoing with sounds of woe, we can easily conceive that it might once have been the home of exalted happiness. We have no sympathy, nothing congenial, with the cold creature shaped like a human being who, in the midst of beautiful scenery, feels not within him the stirrings of some deep emotion at the contemplation of its loveliness; and it needs no wonderful effort of imagination to realize in thought as we gaze upon the combinations of beautiful form and splendid colouring around us, inhale the perfume of the flowers, breathe the pure air and listen to the music of the woods, a paradise in which a being without sin upon his conscience or sorrow in his heart might find even upon earth a congenial inheritance. Nor is it difficult to conceive that the same God whom we suppose to have made our planet in the beginning a temple for the pure devotions of its earliest rational and immortal inmate,—a fane that was floored with vegetation in its beauty, pillared with the mountains in their sublimity, and roofed with the firmament in its glory, can obliterate every mark of its profanation, and out of its purified materials re-erect a nobler edifice through whose glowing gates nothing that defileth is ever to enter, and upon whose golden altars no unhallowed fire is ever to be burning. We call the atmosphere around

us, and above us, as well as the varying and often beautiful scenery of morning and of evening cloud that diversifies the sky on which it is floating, "the heavens." These shall pass away, and a fiery lustration shall cleanse the earth beneath of all its pollutions. So far as human science alone can enable us to judge, nothing that is material can, at least in its present form, be decisively pronounced to be everlasting, and Philosophers are now speaking in language like the burning words of the Creator as they came from lips on which was laid a live coal from off the altar of the seraphim, "Lift up your eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath, for the heavens shall vanish away like smoke, and the earth shall wax old as doth a garment, and they that dwell therein shall die in like manner." But physical science has no immediate concern with the proofs of that sublime stability with which in the same verse this waste and fluctuation and death are contrasted: "but my salvation shall be for ever, and my righteousness shall not be abolished." It can only tell us that the philosophical calculations in the preceding generation respecting the perpetual stability of the solar system rested on assumptions which later science has shown not to be warranted.

"Within a finite period of time past, the earth must have been, and within a finite period of the time to come" (unless there be an action of laws which are not now known, or unknown operations of those which are) "it must again be, unfit for the habitation of man as at present constituted." *

* "Typical Forms and Special Ends."

Is it unreasonable, then, to "look for a new heavens and a new earth?" and if it be part of the great Creator's plan to be for ever from

> Seeming evil, still educing good,
> And better thence again and better still,
> In infinite progression,

can we hesitate to add "wherein dwelleth righteousness"? Or who can tell but that another change like those alterations which the earth has seemed to have already undergone may fit it for the joyous residence of a glorified and immortal creature?

Inspiring prospect! The full view shall break upon us as the morning of eternal day dissipates for ever the darkness of the night, its shadows, its dangers, and its dreams. In the meantime let us listen to its voices in the heavens and the earth as they mingle their music with that of the oracles of God in telling at once of an Omnipotent and universal Creator—of man's past apostacy through the sin that withdrew him from the centre of light and happiness, and of future glory for himself and for his dwelling-place, if he will only believe in the Kinsman who has ransomed both, and, with becoming repentance for all his transgressions, take to heart the words with which an Apostle closes his account of the coming destiny of heavens and earth together—words that may well be supposed to touch and stir every creature who can think—"Seeing then that all these things shall be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in all holy conversation and godliness?"

SCRIPTURE PREACHES THE DARKNESS.

"To the law and the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." (Isaiah viii. 20.)

THE preceding argument may perhaps be simplified by varying a little the mode of its expression. There are few, then, we would observe, who will venture to deny that an original apostacy of some kind in man from his Creator is *possible*. There is evidence, however little, that his primitive was superior to his present condition. This makes such an apostacy more than just possible, and renders it what, at the very least, may be called *supposable*. If we regard it, then, as a mere hypothesis, that hypothesis will account for all the phenomena it can be expected to explain, and, in the absence of a better, is therefore entitled to a provisional adoption. These phenomena may be classified under the different kinds of darkness which a withdrawment from God might be supposed to occasion. While, as far as we can judge of human opinion from languages, traditions, philosophies, and religious creeds, both the darkness itself and the cause to which Scripture ascribes it (or one essentially similar) have been, even from the

earliest ages, so generally and so cordially acknowledged, that we naturally attribute this remarkable unanimity of sentiment either to the moral instincts of our nature, or to the teaching, directly or indirectly, of some Divine revelation. It doubtless admits of other explanations, but of none so obvious and satisfactory; some of the profoundest thinkers that ever existed have carefully considered the subject, and deliberately endorsed this prevailing opinion. The fact that man is the victim of sin and sorrow has been confessed by none more freely, more frequently, and more forcibly than by unbelievers. One of the few exceptions is that of a modern writer, the exigencies of whose religious system, and, we think, of every similar one, involve, through ignoring the fall, this strange conclusion, that after all it is a vulgar error of the grossest kind to suppose that there is really evil in the world! Thus, what before was possible and supposable may be regarded as *credible*. The general harmony in the heavens, which seems to show that order is there the prevailing law; and that catastrophes, if real, are obviously exceptional, seems also to warrant the presumption that the moral confusion in our world may be likewise exceptional, and may have been occasioned by some abnormal cause analogous, though moral, to that, whatever it was, which produced such physical disorders. The condition of the earth, adapted as it is to a *fallen* creature, and the analogy of its plants and animals, but especially of its human inhabitants, amongst whom degeneracy is often, if not generally, traceable to some moral cause, would appear to show that man may have lapsed from a better than his present condition, and that sin of some

kind or other has been the cause of the degradation. Now all this corroborates a fact which in itself is possible, supposable, and credible, making it, we think, even *probable*. Whoever, therefore, believes in the Divine authority of Scripture, must at once admit that it may be revealed, and that, if revealed, it *is certain*. But there are many who wholly reject that authority, and in arguing with *these*, we have shown, unless greatly mistaken, this much at least, that there are no good grounds for rejecting Scripture simply because it tells us of *some* apostacy in man at an early period from his God. We even think that, admitting a Divine revelation to be probable, or even possible, a professed revelation has a claim upon our belief from the very fact that it records such an apostacy. But, be this as it may, it were well if the controversy were confined to this class of objectors alone. They are, we think, the only class of objectors who are thoroughly consistent. They disbelieve in the fall of man, but then they disbelieve, at the same time, in the Old and New Testament altogether. Other opponents of our faith, while they reject much that is properly historical in the Bible, and reduce it to mere allegory, profess to regard the sacred writings as verily the Word of God. Now it is to these last objectors that the following observations are principally addressed. We cannot well see how the Bible can be historically true in any sense or to any degree at all, and yet its account of man's first disobedience be merely allegorical. That account, it is doubtless conceivable, may be a myth; but every myth has a meaning, and if *this* myth do not mean that man has lapsed, it seems, at all events at first sight,

to contradict the whole volume of which it forms a part, unless that volume be so interpreted as to leave not a vestige of literal fact beneath a veil of universal allegory. In that case, what is the use of saying in one place, "which things are an allegory"? (Gal. iv. 24.) If the whole book be nothing but an allegory, why call attention to a particular part of it as an allegory? The *fact* (and we are not now considering the *story*) of the fall is inseparably interwoven with the whole tissue of revelation. It forms the thread that interlaces it with all the other Scriptural truths that are vitally important, and can be traced, more or less distinctly, almost all through, from Genesis to the close of the Apocalypse. To extract it were therefore to unravel the whole texture.

It is recorded, not in poetry, but in plain prose narrative—a narrative of apparently literal facts—a narrative in which we search in vain for a hint that its meaning is allegorical; a narrative literally interpreted, it would seem, by such of the subsequent writers of the volume to which it belongs as touch upon the subject at all, since they never once allude to any figurative signification; a narrative which is joined without any note of separation, but, on the contrary, with every appearance of continuity to statements which, beyond all reasonable doubt, are purely historical; and a narrative which, as recorded once for all, is not as often again referred to as might otherwise have been expected, but so recorded in the very beginning of the Scriptures on purpose, it would appear, to show its fundamental importance. Nor can we discover, as we proceed in the perusal of the sacred volume, the remotest

possible *allusion to any other mode of accounting for moral and physical* evil *than that which this narrative had already supplied.* On the contrary, what we do discover is, that the fall is more than once distinctly stated,* and very often inevitably implied. The types of Scripture involve it.† Its histories involve it.‡ Its prophecies involve it.§ Its doctrines involve it.‖ Its

* Ecclesiastes vii. 29; Rom. v. 12, to the end of the chapter. The instrument of the temptation is referred to in 2 Cor. xi. 3. The woman was the first transgressor, 1 Tim. ii. 14; see Wiesinger. The sentence on the woman is also here referred to. The curse upon the ground is referred to in Gen. v. 29, and Romans viii. 20, where the expression "subjected" points, "in a manner not to be mistaken, to an historical event; originally the creation was free, but it ceased to be so. That here the fall of man and the curse attaching to it is alluded to cannot be doubted."—Oldshausen. The primitive condition of man as one of innocence and joy is referred to in Ezekiel xxviii. 13. The following texts are quoted by Macdonald as doubtful or disputed: Isa. xliii. 27, Job xxxi. 33, Hosea vi. 7, Job xii. 16, Job xxvi. 13; but see his remarks taken from Bishop Sherlock on the last especially. Evil spirits—"*the* evil one," Satan. The serpent, the accuser, &c., &c., &c., are repeatedly spoken of in Scripture. The objections to some of these texts will be considered hereafter.

† See Lev. xxv. throughout. All the cases which required the interference of the Goel, or the kinsman Redeemer, if there had been shedding of blood, if there had been loss of liberty, or if there had been a forfeiture of inheritance, are, we think, plainly typical, and typical as plainly both of the fall and the recovery.

‡ See "Creation and Fall," by Rev. D. Macdonald, pp. 206-8.

§ *Ibid*, pp. 215-18.

‖ To get rid of the fall we must also get rid of the atonement; for it is hard, if not impossible, to conceive how, if there had not been a fall, there can be need of satisfaction; or how, if there be,

very words (some at least of the most significant and important, at all events as translated into English) involve it. The terms "*re*conciliation," "*re*ligion," redemption, "*res*titution," and "*re*generation" (as it occurs in Matthew xix. 28 *) imply it in their derivation. We read (Acts iii. 21), "Whom the heavens must receive until the times of the *restitution* of all things which God hath spoken of by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." Now whether the word "which" refers to the "times" or the "things" does not affect the point, which is, simply, that "restitution" means a return to or a restoration of something that once existed but exists no longer. The word for it in the original is αποκαταστασις. Of this the first meaning would seem to be restoration; and in this sense it must have been understood by our translators, while, in fact, the last chapter of the Bible describes, in language plainly taken from the scenery of the Adamic Paradise, that very "restitution." But how is it possible to restore that which has never been taken away? The fact of Adam's disobedience lies at the foundation of the reasonings of St. Paul. Christ is called the second Adam in evident allusion to the first, and we are taught to believe that what man has lost in the latter he can regain in the former. If we read of a temptation to Adam, we read of a corresponding temptation to Christ. If we read of a serpent-tempter successful at first, we

there can be such a provision for man's recovery as that in Rom. v., founded, as it evidently is, on the fall.

* See Parkhurst on παλιγγενεσια; also Webster and Wilkinson's G. Testament.

read of the same tempter defeated at last. If we read of a promised victor over him, in the beginning of the Bible, we are told at its close of that victor's final triumph. And if we read of a curse in the 3d chapter of the book, we read in the last "and there shall be no more curse." Intermediate parts of the same book link together its beginning and end with direct statements of the fall, or with indirect allusions to that event; with doctrines based upon it, with conclusions drawn from it; with parables implying it, or with admonitions suggested by it; and all, not only without a hint that it must be mythically interpreted, but found in a book much of which is professedly and indisputably historical, yet which contains no statement that tells where (if the fall be really a myth) we are to draw the line between the allegory and the *facts*, but sometimes blends them together so that they cannot be separated without extreme violence to both; and, what is stranger still, a book which in other cases than that of the fall makes the very distinction which is here so much needed, telling us that these things "are an allegory;" "the words that I speak unto you they are *spirit* and they are life." "*Declare* unto us the parable of the tares of the field. He answered and said unto them," &c., &c. Then if the fall be allegorical, how are we to know what it signifies? What rules are to be observed in its interpretation? What does Adam signify? What is meant by Eve? what by the serpent? what by the forbidden tree? what by eating? what by death? what by the tree of life? what by the tree of knowledge of good and evil? Were the other trees of the garden also

emblematical? was the garden itself symbolical? Is the narrative expressive of a fact which actually happened, or only of a state of mind? If of a *fact*, was that fact man's degeneracy from a primitive state of virtue and enjoyment? if of a state of mind, what is that state? Is it a conflict between the higher and lower principles of our nature, and if so, what are those higher and lower principles? Was this conflict always going on, and, if not, when did it begin? It is manifest that in answering these questions there is "ample room and verge enough" for the wildest imagination to run riot. We find, accordingly, that the strangest and most contradictory opinions have been held by figurative interpreters upon this portion of Scripture. Philo * thought that Paradise was the dominant character of the soul, which is as full of opinions as Eden was of trees; that the serpent was a symbol of pleasure, and was said to have uttered a human voice because pleasure employs innumerable champions and defenders. Some consider the 3d chapter of Genesis as "an historically-clothed philosopheme of a reflecting Israelite or some other orientalist on the origin of physical and moral evil." Others deny that in the chapter there is any allusion to a fall—the myth rather describing *the exaltation of man to the Godhead!* One writer says:—"The garden of Eden is the body of man represented by a garden as a covering for his spirit. The trees of the garden are not to be understood literally, but of the bodily sensations and appetites of man." Others

* "Creation and the Fall," p. 13.

consider the whole account a mere poetical mythos adapted to the senses and intellects of a rude unphilosophical people. One writer thinks it wholly mythical, another, historico-mythical. According to some, Eve may represent the affections, Adam the reason; while the general meaning of the fable is, that man is tempted through his affections. We are told by one author that the narrative (whatever its meaning) cannot be literal; it "cannot be *history*, it may be poetry." By another, that the first chapters of the Bible are an ideal description of the happiness designed for man on condition of our first parents successfully resisting temptation. By another still, that the serpent is the emblem of sensuality, and that his success in the garden symbolized the premature indulgence of natural appetites. Thus fancy has ever been the guide of mythical expositors, and must be such always if we abandon the plain and literal meaning of the inspired narrative; for in that case we embark without rudder, or compass, or light, or chart, or pilot, upon a fathomless sea of speculation and conjecture. As might have been expected, therefore, the historical interpretation is regaining its popularity in the very country where the mythical was most rife, and some of the ablest literalists of modern times are Germans. Yet, thoroughly to get rid of the fall, this vague, fanciful, unsatisfactory, and abandoned system of exegesis must be carried through, not only the third chapter of Genesis, but, as it seems to us, almost the whole Bible; and its only consistent expositors are Strauss and his followers, of whom it has justly been said that they find "no single spot of firm historical ground, scarcely any

mixture of ascertainable fact amid the legendary and mythical representations." We thoroughly agree with a writer already quoted, "that the truths contained in the first three chapters of the book of Genesis may be traced in their workings and counter-workings from Genesis to the last pages of the Apocalypse." If, then, this be true, we repeat that the only consistent disbelievers in the fall are either total infidels (professedly such), or such audacious interpreters as Strauss; and whether Strauss could properly be called a Christian is a question which has often been debated.* But if it be thought unfair to include such thoroughgoing allegorists as he

* Some, indeed, do not hesitate to say that "Strauss himself never believed those absurdities" (of his own system); and they say so in compassion to his understanding. They say that one really so acute, could not really believe such nonsense; or that if he did, he must be thought acute no more. But if they save his understanding it is at the expense of his honesty. It would prove that Dr. Strauss was not only hypercritical but hypocritical. It must be confessed, however, that the flagitious manner in which at the conclusion of his book he has discussed the question whether a man in his own predicament may not occupy the place of a Christian preacher and pastor to a congregation of ordinary Christians, taking care not to let them penetrate his disguise, gives too much reason for the imputation. ("Claims and Conflicts.") The old Deists made no scruple of declaring openly their utter hostility to Scripture, and pronounced it a collection of absurdities. But, modern *Christians!* Pantheists and Idealists speak of the "ethical beauty," moral sublimity, and so forth, of a book which convicts (according to them) its authors of gross dishonesty, in claiming power to work miracles, that is, "impossibilities"—which as the Word of God to mere fables, some of them very far- d and fantastical—fables which came to be credited as facts space of time incredibly short considering the lengthened

was, in the same category with avowed infidels, we may formally confine our remarks to the latter, leaving those who disagree with us in thinking them substantially applicable to the former also, to make for themselves the required exception. A denial of the *fact* (whether the *narrative* of that fact be explained away as mythical, or rejected as false) that man has ever fallen, brings, we think, the truth of Christianity at once to an issue. It amounts to a repudiation of its fundamental principle. Let us weigh, then, the evidence against the fall, with that in favour of Christianity, or what, as it seems to us, is virtually the same thing, of the fact on which it is founded. Are the proofs that man's moral state was always essentially as it is at present, differing only as the same tree differs from itself in the different stages of its growth, sufficient to outbalance the proofs that the Bible is true? He must be a bold man who will venture to answer this question affirmatively. "But," it may be said, "this is not putting the case fairly. We do not argue that the doctrine of man's apostacy from God is enough of itself to prove that Christianity was false; we only make the improbability of that apostacy one out of a great number of arguments which together prove the whole system of which it is a part to be unworthy of belief." Be it so. To this, then, we reply, first, that the force of that particular argument against Christianity which the *fact of some fall* (for we are not *now* defending the *Scriptural account* of that fact) is, if not wholly de-

period generally required for myths to be confounded with history—and fables of which the meaning was latent for 1800 years!

stroyed, at least greatly weakened by the preceding remarks, so that it must either be eliminated altogether from the general collection to which it belongs, or else regarded as infinitely precarious. And, secondly, that after this subtraction or abatement, the residue is lighter than vanity itself when weighed against the ponderous evidence which substantiates the truth of the Scriptures. The arguments of infidels, in modern times especially, are for the most part of an *a priori* character. "A miracle," we are told, "is *not possible*." "It is *impossible* that God can act in the way in which Christianity describes Him as acting." An "authoritative book revelation of moral and religious truth is *not possible*." "If it were, and the revelation were actually made, it *would have been* made at once in all its fulness, and been published to all mankind without exception, nor *would there* be a doubt about its interpretation," &c., &c., &c. Now, if there be any value at all in our preceding remarks when treating of the darkness of ignorance, they apply in all their force to this class of objections especially. We suspect that if the sort of reasoning which has caused them, were employed upon nature, its course and constitution, and what has been called "natural providence," it would lead to some very strange conclusions. It would show that a number of certain, acknowledged, undoubted, and undeniable *facts* are yet *impossibilities!* Those who advance such objections might say, for example, it is *impossible* that God could leave us to act, and act decisively, in many cases of the utmost possible importance connected with the business of ordinary life, on

very low and very doubtful evidence, evidence immensely inferior to that of Christianity, and sometimes on what can scarcely be called evidence at all, and yet enable us to reach the strongest of all possible proof, in short actual demonstration of some truths (in astronomy for example) which, to the great mass of mankind, are, as far as we can judge, of no practical use whatsoever. Yet the impossibility would be a *fact* notwithstanding. To use Mr. Rogers's illustration, such objectors are like the lawyer, who said to a man in the stocks, "They cannot put you there for that," and who received the short reply, "But I *am* here." The overweening confidence with which some persons express themselves on what the supreme being can do, or not do, ought to do, and ought not to do, is almost as great as that of the philosopher who said, or is reported to have said, "If *I* had been near the Creator when He was making the world I could have shown Him how to make a much better world than this is." "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread," and we have read somewhere an ancient oracle, "There came in a wise man and a fool. The wise man heard—investigated—decided; *the fool decided.*" Verily it *is* now night, and if proof were wanted it might be supplied by the presumptuous talk of some *very* young men in the present day, who have learned long ago to set aside such books as those of Butler and Paley as beneath their notice, for they remind us of a pigmy in the moonlight who, admiring the long shadow of his own little body, fancies that his stature is gigantic. But surely none of this class of objections, even when urged with becoming modesty, are to be much relied upon. If, indeed,

they established a clear *contradiction* the case would be different. But when, at most, they only prove that, in the present state of our knowledge, there are certain scriptural difficulties which might be got over if we knew more than we now know, but which at present are insoluble, they must be outbalanced by proofs which derive their force, not from our *ignorance*, but from our *knowledge*. We do not deny that there is *some* weight in *a priori* reasoning, and believe that it has been usefully employed in defence of Christianity, but we maintain that it ought to be used with great caution, and be assigned a place of very subordinate importance in any collection of proofs. Nor do we deny that in the infidel argument there are other kinds of reasoning which are more satisfactory, but we repeat that in modern times it is the staple of the evidence on which many unbelievers appear to place dependence. Let that evidence, however, be taken collectively, and estimated at its utmost; then, let it be put against the aggregate of proofs on which, as Christians, we rely for a proof of the truth of our religion. An unbeliever, to prove that Christianity is false, must succeed in demonstrating that a miracle really *is* impossible,—that it implies a contradiction or an absurdity—such an absurdity as that two and two make five, or five hundred.* Failing in this, he must show that a miracle, though not impossible, is yet very highly improbable. Should he not succeed in demonstrating that *no* evidence can establish its truth, he must at least convince all reasonable and impartial men that the par-

* The difficulties of proving a miracle impossible are absolutely insuperable to all who believe in a personal God.

ticular evidence to which we appeal for a proof of the *Scriptural* miracles is not sufficient. In that case he must account for facts which appear, without a satisfactory explanation, to tax our faith as much as any miracle. Supposing him, however, to fail in the attempt (and fail he must, if we are to judge from what we consider as the utter failure of all similar efforts as yet) he must prove that no miracle, or set of miracles, even if real, could authenticate, or help to authenticate a Divine commission. Should he succeed, as we think he may,* in showing that the mere performance of a miracle is no proof *ipso facto* that its human agent is divinely sent to publish truth to mankind, he must demonstrate that such performance does not entitle him to a *hearing*. In showing this, moreover, he must bring it to bear, not only on what are generally called the miracles of Scripture, but also on its prophecies, for these too, if really such, are miraculous, and he must prove (which we venture to say he never can) that neither miracles nor prophecies, nor both, invest a teacher who professes to be sent from God with an authority which he could *not* have without them. Then supposing our Saviour and His Apostles, as workers of miracles, to have a special claim to be heard, the objector must convince us that their doctrine thus *so far* worthy of consideration is yet false—that there is no warrant for believing it, either on account of its simplicity, its originality, its purity, its sublimity, its utter freedom from all that resembles either imposture or enthusiasm, or on account of its wonderful adaptation to

* See Trench, on "the Miracles."

the spiritual wants and weaknesses of mankind. He must explain how a system which has called forth the warmest expressions of admiration from those who are generally considered as the very best judges of its ethical and general merits, and even elicited enthusiastic eulogy from some of his own predecessors, is yet not only a human fabrication, but a fabrication of ignorant peasants and illiterate fishermen. He must assign, too, some satisfactory reason for the fact that the same men contrived not only to construct that system so ingeniously as to impose both upon their own generation, and afterwards upon thinkers like Leibnitz, and Pascal, and Locke, and Bacon, and Newton, and Butler, but to do so in ways which of all others were least likely to be successful. He must tell how it came to pass that such persons as the Evangelists and Apostles wrote four biographies of Christ, history, travels, and familiar letters, abounding with allusions to times, places, and facts,—thus, on the supposition that their statements were not true, multiplying incalculably the chances of detection—and yet that the minutest, the most severe, and the most searching criticism has only brought to light just enough of glaring, though unimportant, variation in their accounts to render the hypothesis of conspiracy or concert simply ridiculous; and yet such a multitude of latent, recondite, and obviously undesigned agreements, congruities, harmonies, and coincidences, as would seem to be utterly inexplicable on the supposition of falsehood. Further, he must throw some clear light (much clearer than that of Gibbon's celebrated chapter) on the mystery of the propagation of this system by such agents as these

Apostles and their successors, ignorant fanatics, not from Greece or Rome, but Judæa, without money, without arms, and without a worldly motive; who went about preaching, to the proud, humility; to the violent, meekness; to the lawless, order; to the selfish, charity; to the profligate, purity; to infidels, godliness; uncompromising honesty to magistrates the most corrupt; and unaccommodating morality in an age the most licentious. He must show how it was that these unarmed, unlettered, untitled, unpatronized, and unhonoured champions of a faith that was everywhere unpopular, and that struggled with all existing idolatry, warred against all fashionable error, often provoked all imperial power, and ever grappled with all prevailing iniquity, succeeded, notwithstanding, against Councils and Synagogues, Governors and Kings; Jews, with their bigotry; Grecks, with their philosophy; Romans, with their authority; and Barbarians, with their ferocity,—succeeded against wit, eloquence, hatred, calumny, scorn, exile, chains, stripes, and martyrdom; succeeded, too, not merely for a time, but, as far as *we* can judge, permanently. And in *what* did they succeed? Was it not both in bringing about a revolution to which there is no real parallel in all the world's history, and in establishing a religion, of which it may be said with truth, that no other has ever *at once* survived so long, prevailed so widely, flourished among such different races, acted so effectively, resisted so successfully, and wrought so beneficially? Now, if Christianity be merely a certain stage in the natural progress of mankind, and have been propagated without any but ordinary natural agency, or without any special

providence of God, there is something in all this which it is certainly not easy to understand. Then, in the case of the miracles, supposing them not real, how is it that these spurious miracles were not only numerous, but wrought in open day, before *enemies*, and enemies deeply interested in the exposure of the frauds, yet believed by those enemies to be real, but ascribed to diabolical agency?—diabolical agency in support of exalted morality! Yet this is not all, for the miracles are supported by prophecies, and these, too, are numerous, so that the accomplishment of at least the vast majority must be disproved or naturally accounted for, before we can reasonably attribute that of the rest either to the effect of natural sagacity, to fortuitous coincidence, or to fraudulent fulfilment. Indeed, one single well-established case of such prescience as is not human is itself miraculous. What, then, if there be a number of such cases? Here, therefore, looking at the whole case, we have consistency where it would seem there must be contradiction, charity where we would look for bigotry, sublimity where we might seek for vulgarity, wisdom where it would be natural to find foolishness, originality where we might suppose there could only be imitation, splendid success where we could hardly hope for anything but ignominious failure, and a continuance that seems to promise immortality under circumstances that threatened an immediate or, at all events, a speedy extinction! Nor is this all, for we have also martyrdom where we might have anticipated compromise, or else sobriety where we might have fancied there must be extravagance, openness where success must have mainly depended on secrecy, and the

disinterested admission of determined enemies, where we might have confidently anticipated denial, disproof, and exposure! We challenge our adversaries to ransack every existing record of human actions for such a singular combination of improbable contingencies. We fearlessly assert that the facts of the case are just as we have stated them, and ask our opponents to account for them —if they can—upon the principles which are generally supposed either to foster the vagaries of honest enthusiasm or to quicken the currency of religious fraud. All this has been said, and far more ably, many times before —yet we have waited in vain for its refutation. But there is an argument which, although too obvious to be original, we do not remember to have heard or read, and which can hardly have been insisted upon with the force and frequency that its importance would appear to deserve. It is the thorough consistency of the operation of a remarkable principle which pervades the facts, the doctrines, and the history of Scripture. This principle is clearly expressed by St. Paul in his second Epistle to the Corinthians: "We have this treasure in *earthen vessels*, that—or in order that—the excellency of the power may *be of God*, and not of *us*." It is *natural* agency, weak almost to impotence in itself, but made effective in a marvellous degree through *super*natural influence. Nothing is more conceivable to all who acknowledge the possibility of miracles than that God as omnipotent *could* accomplish His ends without any human, or natural, instrumentality. In the case of the nobleman, whose son was sick at Capernaum, our Lord answered in this way the father's prayer. He simply

said, "Go thy way, thy son liveth." But this was not His *usual* mode of proceeding. He employed almost always an instrumentality of *some kind* in effecting His miracles; it was clay, or a touch, or an ablution, or a fisherman's net, or a hook that was cast into the sea, but an instrumentality which, of itself or through any influence that was not Divine, was utterly inadequate to the accomplishment of the purpose with which it was associated. The prevailing character of His miracles was the attainment of ends the most stupendous in connexion with means apparently the most contemptible, and this, and a similar mode of acting, namely, the attainment of vast results from very small beginnings, will be found, we think, to distinguish with remarkable uniformity all the Divine proceedings as recorded both in the Scriptures and in history. Now, for all this we think we can see some very sufficient reasons, while there may be others, and many, which we do not see. Among the former was the necessity of associating by some sensible and obvious connexion, in the case of our Saviour's miracles, *them* with Himself, as their author; while another was, perhaps, to show indirectly and emblematically that means of some kind must be resorted to by us, and that we are never to sit down and wait with folded hands for a miraculous blessing upon idleness; but then, in spiritual matters, means which in themselves are inadequate, and therefore not to be *trusted* to, but *means* notwithstanding; means, too, to be very often chosen out of those which God has appointed, according to the best of our natural judgment, which should never be dispensed with—means, and not slothfulness;

means, and not magical formularies, or acts which in themselves are efficacious, and resemble charms, spells, or incantations. But we can imagine another and perhaps a more satisfactory reason. The symbolical character of much of our Saviour's teaching is unquestionable; and we can easily suppose, that by using means insufficient in themselves, He meant us to see that though our sins and sinful propensities were ever so formidable, and our own strength—even with all the prescribed means at our disposal to overcome them—ever so contemptible, we ought not to despair, but to remember that God's strength is perfected in human weakness, take courage and persevere. But what we would *here* notice is not the beneficial tendencies and designs of the principle itself, so much as the singular consistency with which it pervades the Bible from first to last, as if upon *a settled plan*. A statement of the principle as it bore upon the Apostles has been quoted already from St. Paul. But we find it again and again adverted to—for example: "I was with you in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling, and my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the spirit and with power, that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of man, but in the power of God." "When I am weak then am I strong." "But God hath *chosen* the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath *chosen* the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty, and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God *chosen*, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are." We turn for exemplifications of this

principle to the Old Testament, and find that Palestine, not Egypt, or Assyria, or Persia, was the chosen depositary of the great first truths of religion. Moses felt himself so inadequate to the fulfilment of his mission, that he implored the Lord to provide a substitute, and accomplished his miracles, not without means, but with such means as only God could make effectual. The capture of Jericho by a shout and the sound of trumpets, is another example; so is the story of Gideon's victory over the Midianites by means of 300 soldiers armed with trumpets and empty pitchers! We meet with a further instance in the victory of David the stripling with a stone over the giant in his armour. Such are a few illustrations from the Old Testament. We pass on to the New, and find the most remarkable of all in the case of the Saviour's nativity. Who was Jesus considered only in His humanity? "Is not this the carpenter's son?" Where was He born? At Athens, or at Rome? No, but at "Bethlehem of Judæa." And what were the circumstances under which He appeared? Eternal, He existed with the Father, when the space now occupied by our sun and stars, uninhabited by a solitary form of life, and uninspired by a single breathing of the Spirit, was one tremendous solitude, yea, and will be when that space (it may be) is a solitude again! Omnipotent, His will was universal law! He had but to "speak and it was done, to command and it stood fast." Omniscient, to Him were unbosomed all the mysteries of eternity, and all the secrets of the universe! Infinite in holiness, not a shadow of pollution had ever passed for a moment over that all-hallowed Spirit. Infinite

in happiness, life with Him was supreme, sublime, and never interrupted enjoyment. Yet He—yes *He* it was who deigned to appear upon earth. Then, as the heavenly portals were opened before Him, did all the celestial inhabitants accompany Him, and in their richest choruses and sublimest songs cry out, "Arise ye nations all, and bid Him welcome; scatter crowns and sceptres, stars and distinctions at his feet. Levy of earth from all thy provinces a tribute of homage to this august and glorious visitor. Tenants of illuminated palaces, prostrate kings, greeting multitudes, rejoicing citizens, and adoring worshippers, blend, oh! blend with ours your many voices, that all human languages and all angelic harmonies may join in one inspiring burst of universal song to hail the great Creator!" What saith the Scripture? "*And Mary brought forth her first-born son, and wrapped him in swaddling clothes and laid him in a manger*"!! Could He not at once have regenerated our race by the miraculous enlightenment of our consciences and the miraculous purification of our affections? Or, if His incarnation were indispensable, could He not have rendered it so imposing and so convincing, that all scepticism must immediately have been silenced and put to shame? No doubt He could. But though, in presuming to conjecture the reasons which may have induced the Deity to act or not to act in any particular way we touch on tender as well as sacred ground, and ought to treat it with a cautious and a reverent humility, yet we can say with confidence that such an appearance of God in human form would have been utterly incompatible, to all human seeming, with the very purposes which His

humanity, as we are taught by His own religion to believe, was specially intended to subserve. For it tells us that Christ was the "*Lamb* of God, that taketh away the sins of the world;" that He was set forth to be a *propitiation* through faith in His *blood;* that He bore our sins in His *own body on the tree*, &c., &c., &c. All this implies voluntary degradation and voluntary suffering, and is quite in keeping with what we are told of His deep humiliation, that "being in the form of God, He thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and being found in fashion as a man, he *humbled* himself (that is still more) and became obedient unto death, *even* (a depth of degradation deeper still) the death of the cross." And if such an appearing had been inconsistent with His expiation, equally so must it have been with the purposes of His example, and with the dignity, nay, the sacredness which His incarnation was evidently intended to impart to all the social and domestic relations which He assumed. For He assumed them *as such*, and therefore as common to all, even the very lowest of our race. He became an example of all righteousness, and an example *to all men*, while by inhabiting, as it were, the temple of our humanity, He breathed upon it a consecration which gave a character of peculiar heinousness, because a character of profanation and of sacrilege, to all the sinful and all the unholy purposes to which it might afterwards be perverted. Nor is this all, for a less humble form of humanity than that which He actually took upon Him would have been a less eloquent appeal

to the *heart*, and the very essence of His religion is *love* —love reciprocated as well as exhibited — than that which, as the despised Nazarene, He has addressed to all His disciples. Nor is it difficult to conceive that there may have been many other reasons which we cannot discover. But what we now insist upon is this, that any imposing manifestation of humanity would have been utterly out of harmony with all that Scripture has taught us to consider as a part of the Divine plan, and a distinguishing feature of the Divine proceedings in relation to the religious education of mankind. As it was, on the contrary, all the circumstances of His advent corresponded exactly with that characteristic design, and even in the minutest particulars. His birth was announced to a king by human beings; to wisè men from the East by a stranger heraldry—a star in the heavens; to humble shepherds by an *angel*. We find Him acting on this principle in the choice of His disciples. They were "earthen vessels"—persons whose antecedents unfitted them (humanly speaking) altogether for the stupendous task they were chosen to accomplish. Saint Matthew was a publican, one whose very occupation must have made him unpopular, and even, perhaps, in that age, exposed his very honesty to suspicion. The rest were plain, humble, and unlearned men, whose natural characters, though adapted, no doubt, to the peculiar departments for which they were respectively designed, were yet frail and fallible; nor have we any reason whatever for supposing that before their conversion they were (with the exception, perhaps, of St. James) much more moral, more amiable, or more pious than the

majority of that wicked and adulterous generation. All we *know* is, that they had certain salient points of character, certain clearly defined and distinguishing qualities which the Spirit of God, without overriding, or even perhaps diminishing, consecrated. It is plain, for example, and has often been noticed before, that St. Paul was naturally a zealous believer, who accordingly became the Apostle of faith; that St. Peter was naturally a sanguine man, and may be styled the Apostle of hope; that James, "the *just*," was naturally conscientious, and became the Apostle of duty; that St. John was naturally affectionate, and has been called the Apostle of love. But this does not prove that they were not earthen. Who is without faith—though it be not the faith that justifies—but faith of some kind? Hope is the universal attribute of human beings. A man wholly without conscience were a moral monster. And we may say as much of one altogether without natural affections. These are earthly materials, and, in the case of the Apostles, their moral failings proved distinctly that the agency "that made them holy left them human." It is remarkable, too, as has often been observed, how frequently they, though inspired, were left, just as we are, to the free use of their natural faculties, and allowed, even in the discharge of duty, to feel their weakness, and to err. St. Paul and his companions *intended* to preach the Word in *Asia*, but were forbidden of the Holy Ghost; and after they came to Asia they *essayed* to go into Bithynia; but the Spirit suffered them not, and it was only at last from a dream that St. Paul gathered assuredly that the Lord had called him into Macedonia. All this proves that,

though occasionally allowed to follow their own judgment, that judgment was sometimes overruled; that they were *earthen*, though *inspired*, and that when left to themselves they occasionally, but plainly, betrayed their earthiness. Again, it is remarkable how forcibly they were made to feel that earthiness in matters not connected with their mission, but with themselves. They were to show that God works by means even in an age of miracles, and were not to expect any supernatural supply to their natural wants. St. Paul was obliged to continue a tent-maker. They could cure the sick, and even raise the dead; but this did not prevent them from feeling hunger or thirst, and, strange as it may seem, it may yet have been true, "that they who could work miracles might have often been in want of a meal." In all this we think we can see a very obvious design to depreciate the human instrument in order to exalt the Divine agency; and it is very observable in the case of St. Paul. His natural character would seem to have been one of self-confidence, as appears, we think, from the very earnestness with which he struggles against it. But He knew that it would have been fatal to the success of his ministry; and, though better qualified, on human principles, than any of the other apostles to carry on his arduous work, he is the very one who has taken the greatest care to draw the broad contrast we allude to, between the earthly instrument and the heavenly power that gave it effectiveness. We find that the same principle thus exemplified in the birth of Christ and in the choice of His Apostles was also exemplified, both in His teaching, and in the classes of persons to whom it was ad-

dressed. We think we can see it in the parables of the grain of mustard-seed and the leaven in the meal. At all events it was characteristic of "Him that was to come," for, in proof of the fact, He told the disciples of John to tell their master, not only that miracles were performed, but that "the *poor* had the gospel preached unto them." It was evidently in His own mind when He said, "Father, I thank thee that thou hast *hid* these things from the wise and prudent, and *revealed* them unto *babes*, even so Father, for *so it seemed good in thy sight;*" that is, as we understand the words, it accords with a Divine and predetermined plan. We find, accordingly, that His converts were not generally among the most distinguished and influential classes of society, persons who might be supposed to advance His cause, but among the poor and despised, whose example might be imagined to be of little consequence. This is true also of the converts of the Apostles, "not many wise, not many mighty were chosen," while the doctrines taught, both by the Saviour and His Apostles, partook of the same character that distinguished everything else that related to their ministry. Naaman the Syrian was angry at receiving so simple a prescription, and one so little likely to be useful, as that of Elisha, namely, to wash in the Jordan; and to this day there are multitudes who can see no connexion whatever between acting on the simple words, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," and the rest of the sentence, "thou shalt be saved." Something more complex and elaborate, and something which seems to promise, according to man's judgment, a more immediate and a more striking result than simple faith is, and produces, has accordingly been in fact

almost always added to faith, in the various corruptions of Christianity. Again, the leaders of the distinguishing heresies in the Church have generally endeavoured to mix up with the doctrines of Christ, some such prevailing philosophy as would give them favour and popularity in the age for which the adulteration was intended to adapt them; and all this shows that the *unlikelihood* (judging from natural principles) of success in preaching the simple Gospel has always been felt by one or another of those who have busied themselves most in the affairs of the Church. The spread of Christianity in the earlier ages of its history by the agency of persons utterly inadequate, in themselves, to the task of its propagation is another illustration of the truth on which we are insisting. And for another still, we appeal to a contrast between the effect produced by a memorable sermon preached by St. Paul, and that produced by one, almost equally memorable, preached by St. Peter. The former of these discourses is recorded in the 17th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. The text, the place, the preacher, the topics discussed, and the mode in which they were treated, all tended to make it, on human principles, the most effective sermon that ever yet was delivered. No words were more likely to attract attention, as the text of a religious address, than those which St. Paul selected for his—"The unknown God." It was to this mysterious being that the altar which the Apostle beheld at Athens was inscribed. The very darkness that overhangs the subject of Deity—especially to those who have no revelation—must in itself have given to the inquisitive Greeks an

interest in the speaker and his subject; and this was, doubtless, increased by the remarkable circumstance which is said to have caused the dedication.

The altar was a memorial, it is thought, of an awful plague which some unascertained power had stayed, after a fruitless supplication to all the Gods of the Pantheon. What more could an orator desire to ensure for him a listening auditory? The place on which the Apostle stood was itself inspiring. "Whose blood would not grow warmer on the plains of Marathon?" But a deeper feeling than that suggested by Marathon might be awakened by the Areopagus, and it was there that St. Paul addressed the Athenians. He was himself a scholar and an orator, and could therefore appreciate to the utmost all the suggestiveness of the scenery. He was, moreover, a Christian, and as such (were it only in name) we can easily understand that, under an influence far less animating than that which moves a special ambassador of Christ, his spirit might have been stirred within him when, in passing through the city, he saw that its people were "wholly given to idolatry." His hearers were ever desirous to "hear and to see some new thing," and there stood before them an illustrious stranger, one of those who were then "turning the world upside down," one of whom they must often have heard, and one who must have excited that curiosity for which they were remarkable. Nor were these advantages to the speaker in any way neutralized by a want of skill upon his own part in turning them to account. He was fully equal both to himself and the occasion. His subject, and the incidental topics upon

which he touched, in its discussion, were deeply interesting, and must have had a peculiar charm for the people he addressed, while his own remarks were admirably adapted to the various disciples of the different philosophies which his hearers had embraced. His discourse has come down to us, of course, in a very abbreviated form, but enough has been recorded to convince us that, as actually delivered, it must have been a masterpiece. Its effect, then, under all the circumstances, must, we might naturally suppose, have been prodigious—but what was the fact? "Some mocked, and others said, We will hear thee again of this matter. *So Paul departed from among them.*" The success, then, of this remarkable sermon was inconsiderable, and this appears further from the words which immediately follow: "Howbeit, (that is notwithstanding, or to set off against, this failure,) certain men clave unto him and believed." So that the effect produced was simply this, that some mocked, some procrastinated, and some (these last being it would seem but a small minority) believed—an effect not greater than is often produced by a faithful preacher through the delivery of a single discourse to a modern congregation. Thus, when the natural means were most effective, the result was least remarkable. When the "vessel was least earthen," the "power" was least availing.

Let us now contrast with this, the sermon preached by St. Peter after the effusion of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles on the day of Pentecost. This Apostle was by no means the equal of St. Paul, either in learning, in eloquence, or in energy. If the circumstances under which he addressed his countrymen were awakening

"when there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they" (the Apostles) "were sitting, and they spoke with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance," it is certain that, while some were amazed, and said, "What meaneth this?" "others mocking said, These men are full of new wine." And if, again, there was something impressive in the application which St. Peter made of the prophecy of Joel to the solemn occasion of which it predicted, who was Peter that he especially should command the attention of the auditory he addressed? Was not this the Galilean fisherman? Had he not recently denied three several times the very master whom he was then preaching, and had he not proved himself a cowardly boaster, whose spirit quailed within him at the voice of a servant maid? Was this, humanly speaking, the sort of man to arrest the attention of his hearers? Was this the person to presume to rebuke them with language like the following? "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, *ye* have taken, and by *wicked hands have crucified and slain.*" Can we suppose, judging from natural principles, that the very people who had so lately cried out "Crucify him, his blood be upon us and our children"—who hated the very name of Jesus—and who, or some of whom, perhaps, imprisoned shortly afterwards this Apostle himself for preaching, through Jesus, the resurrection of the dead, would patiently bear to be charged by the same Apostle with deliberate murder? Orators generally begin with endeavouring to ingratiate themselves into the favour of the assembly they address,—

but allusions to "blood, and fire, and vapour, of smoke," and charges of murder against that assembly itself, are not likely to produce a favourable impression upon the audience. How different was this from the exordium of St. Paul: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious;" δεισδαιμονεστερους,* a word here improperly rendered, and one of which, the true meaning, so far from being offensive, was complimentary. All the commentators tell us that St. Paul's address displays consummate art and power. But we look in vain for proofs of oratorical skill in that of St. Peter. It is idle to say that *his* hearers were awed by what they deemed to be the supernatural, and were, therefore, the more susceptible of impression. That some of them were not affected in this way is evident from the fact already noticed, that they treated the matter with ridicule. Besides, our very point is, that supernatural influence, or that sort of supernatural influence which was then in operation, makes signally effective that which naturally has no effectiveness at all, in order that by the use of inadequate means it may magnify more the agency that gives them success. It is true that in this case there were certain visible and audible accompaniments which in themselves alone might be supposed to have some of this natural effectiveness, since by inspiring alarm they might have given an adventitious interest to the language of the speaker. But the *permanent* effect of any such dread could hardly have been

* "In excessive awe of invisible things." Webster and Wilkinson, *in loco*. Some suppose it might be rendered by "distinguished by a more than usual religiousness."

great, if we are to judge from the multitudes who witnessed the prodigies that attended the crucifixion, yet were as obstinate as ever in rejecting the Messiah; and if there was a feeling of awe at the supernatural in Peter's hearers, there was one of interest in the supernatural in St. Paul's, for the very subject of which he treated was itself the supernatural—"the unknown God," and this in connexion with an inscription which is generally ascribed to gratitude for the supernatural cessation of a very grievous calamity. But even if the advantage in this respect were on the side of St. Peter it would go but a little way in accounting, on natural principles, for the enormous disparity between the effects of the two contrasted discourses. Nor is there much force in the argument that, since after the crucifixion "all the people" who had come "together to that sight" and beheld "the things which were done, smote their breasts and returned;" some who had witnessed it might have heard the sermon of St. Peter, and under a feeling of sorrow or remorse at the remembrance of the dreadful tragedy which had thus deeply moved them been the more disposed to obey his call to repentance. For, all such merely natural emotion in a popular assembly is notoriously of very short duration, and there is not the slightest evidence in the narrative to negative the natural conclusion that in the fifty days which had then elapsed the impression in this case had utterly died away. In short, if we separate the natural from the supernatural in all that we read of this discourse and its accompaniments, we can hardly fail to perceive, that in point of natural likelihood to effect its object, it will bear

no kind of comparison with that of St. Paul. Yet how much more important was it in result? "Now when they heard these things they were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and the rest of the Apostles, Men and brethren, what shall we do?" Again, and in the *same day*, there were added to them about 3,000 souls!

Nor are the instances which may be adduced of the general principle which these remarks exemplify confined either to Scripture or to antiquity. They have occurred again and again in all the ages of the Church. Christian writers of great ability have served, it is true, and greatly served, by their learning, their genius, and their eloquence, the cause of their heavenly Master. There is no sort of reason for supposing that *because* a zealous Christian has great gifts, he is not to have corresponding graces, or be blessed with corresponding success. It is to a *trust* in natural endowments and natural attainments, and not to their legitimate use, that the preceding observations apply. The favoured few who have profited the world most by the sanctified use of these advantages have been among the first to acknowledge that, "though Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, it is God alone that giveth the increase." And granting cordially that eloquent and scholarly divines whose "praise is in all the churches" have benefited mankind greatly by their valuable labours, and been especially serviceable to educated unbelievers, it may yet be gravely doubted whether they are the sort of instrumentality which God generally employs, and which, on the whole, has been most successful. They have a sphere of their own, but it is neither the widest nor the most important. We venture

to say that if even modern converts to true Christianity could be taken in the mass and asked to trace, it they could, the great change which has made them what they are, to its instrumental cause, they would tell us that that cause was not the study of some profound work on theology, or the wonderful eloquence of some extraordinary preacher, but the simple reading of the Bible, or the plain language of an earnest village preacher, or the utterance in their hearing of some text of Scripture often unheeded before, or some remarkable word, such as eternity or repent, or some part of a preacher's discourse which he himself might have struck out of his sermon, had he revised it for the press, as wholly superfluous, or to some other means just as little likely, it might appear, to prove effectual, but which the blessing of God had made useful when others far more promising had been abortive.

"But what," it may be asked, "has all this to do with the truth of Christianity?" Much, we reply, and in various ways. In the first place it argues such a thorough consistency between different authors writing at different times, for different purposes, and to different men, under circumstances which made co-operation or concert impossible; and such a consistency, not only with each other, but with the facts which they record; with the spirit of the religion which they inculcate; with the history of its successes for many generations; and with a mode of Divine procedure which they tell us has been acted upon from the very beginning, as even the infidel, great as is his credulity, can hardly believe was accidental. In the next place, it is very hard to

reconcile all this with the theory of fraud and imposture on the part of the sacred writers. It involves, as its very foundation, an acknowledgment of their own insignificance, their worthlessness, their impotence, their nothingness. Is this a confession likely to come from a succession of designing impostors? We are apt to imagine that if such impostors could gain no pecuniary advantage by their frauds, they would be at least desirous of worldly reputation, and seek in some way or other to glorify themselves. However consistent, then, the actual facts of the case may be with the hypothesis of enthusiasm, they seem to be fatal altogether to that of imposture. Yet, even on the supposition of enthusiasm, there appears in this conduct of the persons to whom it might be ascribed, a cool, consistent, and steady adherence *to a certain rule* that seems, to say the least of it, not common with enthusiasts. For the most part, if not always, they are irregular, impulsive, impetuous, excursive, and impatient of restraint, rule, and fixed principle. Again, there is evidence of the truth of Christianity in the fact, already noticed, that a religion like that of the Bible, which owes its successes entirely to influences, and agencies, and powers which are *not of this world*, of human might, or of natural laws in their natural operation, must have its origin in the mind of Him whose strength is perfected in our weakness, whose power is omnipotent, and whose wisdom is infinite. What a contrast in this respect is the religion of Christ to that of Mahomet!

And, finally, it enables us to give such an answer to some common objections against Christianity as its advo-

cates perhaps have not sufficiently appreciated. Unbelievers often speak in contemptuous terms of the sort of instrumentality with which we are made acquainted with the principles of the Christian religion. They sneer at the Bible as an "old Hebrew book," to which are added biographies, letters, &c., in faulty Greek, and they tell us that the whole volume is not, as its warmest admirers confess, without errors of transcription and translation, while its meaning is perplexed by various readings, and open to various interpretations. "Can," it is asked, "a book at all, or if any, such a book as this, be the instrument which God has chosen for the religious enlightenment of mankind?" To all this there are two answers. The first is, that it has often been by instruments just as unlikely to answer their purpose that the same God has brought about the most stupendous results; the second, that the analogy of nature is corroborated in this respect by that of the book *itself*. It reveals, over and over again, and in the plainest of all possible terms, a certain Divine procedure upon a certain fixed plan, and one that leads us almost inevitably to conclude that the language of the book would be like its contents; exhibit the same plan with similar distinctness; be as inadequate of itself alone as an instrument as were all the other instruments which it tells us that its author has employed—resemble the Apostles in being *earthen*, though *inspired*, and exposed to the same objections as those to which *they* were exposed. Instead, therefore, of doubting the truth of the Bible because of those grounds of cavilling, we look for them, and should be more strongly tempted to scepticism by not

finding them at all, than by discovering them in abundance. For suppose that the sacred volume had been written but in one language, and that in classical purity. Suppose it had been composed with all the systematic exactness of a philosophical treatise, regularly divided and subdivided into numbered chapters, sections, and paragraphs. Suppose it had contained no obscurities of style, and stated nothing or little that was "hard to understand." Suppose that its language were throughout as eloquent and beautiful as certain parts of it are allowed to be; that its author had taken care to avoid every expression that might be thought too harsh, or too gross, or too concise, or too often repeated; that its arguments were couched in syllogisms, or made so simple and so convincing that all could comprehend their meaning, and all must acknowledge their conclusiveness; and suppose that it had come down to us in a state of uncorrupted preservation, so perfect that not a line, a word, a jot or a tittle had been added to, omitted, or varied. In that case its enemies might have said, "All this gives the book a certain *human* aspect and character, which at once suggest the idea of forgery. It is too artificial and too elaborate to be like the works of that God of nature to whom its admirers ascribe its authorship. There is about it no evidence of "that easy, artless, unencumbered plan," which so eminently distinguishes the Divine from all human operations. It betrays on the part of the writer, or the writers, a study of "*effect*," and a skilful accommodation to the tastes and desires of the reader which remind us more of the art with which a practised advocate can bolster up a bad case, than of

such an indifference to any result but that of honest conviction, as hides nothing, mystifies nothing, embellishes nothing, exaggerates nothing, takes, in stating a fact, no needless and no *suspicious* care to fortify its evidence; despises everything like artifice, and relies, not, like an impostor who feels that his own testimony is too questionable to warrant him in dispensing *with any* circumstantial corroboration, upon all the accompaniments that can make it plausible; but, like an honest witness, upon that thorough consciousness of veracity which can afford to let a story tell its own tale in its own way, even though that way might seem to damage its chances of success, and upon that *faith* in the witness himself which he has a right to expect, as well as on the independent credibility of his announcements in themselves. This is enough for that well-founded, impartial, and unbiassed belief which is all that he cares for insuring. And if, in the case supposed, objections such as these should be thought hypercritical, we are sure that they are quite as reasonable as many of those which are often relied upon in the case as it is.

But our principal point is this: that if the Bible had been transmitted to us in the way imagined, it might have led to a belief that, if not in fact a forgery, it was inspired in a sense in which its very authors were not inspired. It would have been utterly inconsistent with itself. It would have contained a heavenly treasure in a heavenly vessel. It would have wanted that earthiness which itself had all through and most emphatically insisted upon as a distinguishing characteristic of all the Divine instrumentality for our moral and spiritual im-

provement. We could have seen at once its natural effectiveness, and might have ascribed to this the success that attended its employment. The very book of which one of the main purposes was to show that "the excellency of the power" which attends upon the use of divinely-appointed means might be seen by their very earthiness to be, not in themselves, but in God, might itself, although amongst the most important of them all, have been a perplexing exception, and contributed to counteract the end it was intended to accomplish. The brilliancy of the casket in which the pearl of great price had been deposited might either have been confounded with that of the treasure it contained, or have led us to suppose that the native lustre of the enclosed material required to be "set off" with artistic surroundings. But no such character belongs to the Bible. We find it, on the contrary, to be a striking example of the truth which, as we have seen already, itself so often enforces. It comes before us with hardly anything that is extrinsic to recommend it; of all the books that ever yet was written, it is the very one of which it might be said with the greatest truth that it owes its successes to the simple power of the mind that composed it. No book is so little indebted for the effect it has produced, either to the graces of the language in which it was written, or the character of the agents who gave it publicity. No book is less artificial. No book is open to more obvious objections from shallow criticism. Its language is that of authors who seem wholly indifferent to their own reputation, or to any result but that of God's blessing upon the simple words in which the fulness of their hearts

found expression. If sometimes so sublimely eloquent that the very grandeur of its diction argues an inspiration to which no lips but those which Heaven's own fire had hallowed could give such brilliant and such burning utterance, it is again so plain, so unpretending, and almost so homely, that its enemies have called it puerile. The same volume which tells us, without any attempt at disguise, reserve, or palliation, of the worst sins, however grievous, of the very characters whom, on the whole, it urges us to admire and imitate, manifests the same transparent honesty in the style of its composition. Sin is described in words as plain as the crimes which they reprobate, and not the least effort is made to soften down the right expression so as to accommodate the fastidiousness, or the refinement, or the tastes, or the usages of an advancing civilization. There are passages in the Bible which render the supposition that it could have been the work at least of any comparatively modern impostor an absurdity, and one scarcely less glaring to imagine that an exhibition of its earthiness as well as its inspiration was not to be among the ends of its composition. Again, no book can possibly be more unsystematic. It reveals, at all events, the outlines—some say the details—of what is doubtless the most perfect system, but in such a way as perhaps to leave upon superficial readers the impression that it reveals no system at all. It tells us of a plan, of the complete unity of which some of its advocates have given us conclusive evidence, and yet evidence of which the force can only be appreciated by a careful comparison of apparently disconnected writings. It is written in different

languages, embarrassed with various readings, and clouded with some obscurities—is often capable of different meanings, and possibly disfigured with some interpolations. Interesting to some from the historical facts which it records, and to others from the sublime poetry which it contains, it has yet few charms for readers in general, is certainly not read by a large portion even of those who profess to make it their rule of faith, and considered by many of those who do not, yet are recognised Christians, to be dry and repulsive as well as mischievous. We admit, then, the truth of much of all that unbelievers have said in its disparagement, and allow them to make the most that they can of the concession. Yet this is the book which of all others has had the widest circulation and the greatest success. This is the book which has not only been translated into almost every tongue under heaven, but preserves, perhaps, more than any other in the world, its original meaning and effective power, whatever the language into which it is rendered. Above all, this is the book which has touched more hearts, awakened more consciences, soothed more sorrows, and reformed more lives, than any that ever yet has been published. No volume has provoked and baffled such inveterate, such varied, such ingenious, such prolonged hostility. No book has been read with such avidity, and by such different men. It has its place in the scholar's library, the rich man's cabinet, and the poor man's hut. Children lisp its language in the nursery, and old men quote it in their dying words. The christian philosopher studies it in his closet, and the savage idolater hears it in his woods. Other books have

lost their popularity through changes of taste, or alterations of time; but this is now, upon the whole, more widely, more attentively, and more devoutly studied than ever it was before. Other books, of which the immediate object was to enlighten and to civilize mankind, have failed to accomplish their object, while this has effected it, and that so often and signally, that the Bible is now the recognised instrument of human civilization. The missionary succeeds where the schoolmaster fails; and it is found by extensive experience that the most effectual way to civilize is to evangelize. A new era dawned upon mankind when "the fulness of the time was come," and "the story of peace"—no longer whispered in the closet—was proclaimed upon the housetops. It was an important epoch in the civilization of the world. The first great step was then taken in that progress which has since become so rapid and remarkable. The new religion was as favourable to knowledge as it was to morality. It removed, in exact proportion as its true principles were understood, some of the principal barriers which had long impeded man's intellectual advancement; and it is to the distinctively *Christian* doctrine that man is man's brother over all the earth that we are indebted for the removal of prejudices fatal to some of the most interesting branches of all human inquiry.

The Bible, too, is the charter of man's liberties. It is hostile to every slavery, and the publication of its principles has tended as well to political as to moral and intellectual emancipation. It is the "sword of the spirit," and He, like the diademed warrior, of whom we read in the Apocalypse, armed with this ethereal weapon,

has gone forth "conquering and to conquer." It has struck down the heathen in the house of his God, and the idolater at the altar of his superstition; the man of this world who had never a thought, it would seem, of the next; the philosopher in the midst of his speculations, the monarch on his throne, the voluptuary in his midnight revels, and the prodigal son in his mad extravagance. It has made, for nearly two thousand years, every country whereon the rider has trodden, a theatre for its achievements, and every year an anniversary of its victories. It has changed, under God, the hearts of men who, in their generation, appeared to be hopeless profligates, while it has formed the characters and guided the lives of some of the brightest ornaments of all human society. It has given, and is still imparting, over wide regions of the globe, at once knowledge to the ignorant, counsel to the perplexed, comfort to the mourning, hope to the despairing, and joy to the dying. Thus, the same book which tells us that the weapons of our warfare, though not carnal—and just because they are not carnal—are mighty, *through God*, to the pulling down strongholds, casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing every thought into captivity to the "obedience of Christ," is itself one of the most striking of all the illustrations of the fact. It is not carnal—for it is the last kind of weapon which we can ever suppose to be of carnal manufacture, or successful in carnal hands; and yet its mightiness, *through God*, the Church's history, for more than eighteen centuries, has been attesting. We can admit that its victories have

been promoted by causes with which its origin from God has no *obvious* and *immediate* connexion; but the very combination of numerous circumstances, all conspiring to give it a success which, in its own strength, it could never have obtained, must be regarded by all who do not believe everything connected with earth and with men to be entirely fortuitous, as signally providential. But all this is here intended not so much for a proof of truth as for an answer to objections—and when the unbeliever, in the midst of his libellous accusations, charges the Bible with certain marks of utter unfitness for a Divine revelation, we can show him that those very marks are evidence of its thorough consistency, not only with itself, but with its history and its concomitants; and such consistency, as it is almost impossible to conceive could have been either fraudulent or accidental. But even if this argument be valueless, it may be safely withdrawn from the collection of which it forms a part, for enough will remain in the mass of evidence from which it is subtracted to outbalance altogether the objections of unbelievers. The residue will be a vast aggregate of proofs, internal, external, experimental, and miscellaneous, each of which may be divided and subdivided into numerous branches, while against all this there may be set off only some plausible objections of which many that are most relied upon are of an *a priori* character, either fully answered or greatly weakened by the analogy of nature—some, scientific or critical, and in a fair way of removal by a growing acquaintance both with Scripture and the subjects which occasion them; and some which, although unanswerable in the present

state of our knowledge, are to be expected in a condition of apostacy, and therefore of darkness.

We argue, then, that there is no consistent course between wholly rejecting the Bible and admitting the fact that for some cause and in some way or other man is a fallen creature. But there is evidence sufficient to satisfy every reasonable mind that the Scriptures are true.

THE STORY OF THE DARKNESS.

"What sudden turns!
What strange vicissitudes in the first leaf
Of man's sad history! To day most happy,
And, ere to-morrow's sun has set, most abject!"

HAVING hitherto confined ourselves to the *fact* of human degradation, we would now consider its *story*. The one is preliminary to the other; for it were useless to try to prove that man has apostatized from God in the way that Moses has described, if it could be shown that he has not apostatized at all; while the evidence that tends to establish the truth of the general proposition that ours is a fallen race tends also, and proportionately, to establish the historical credibility of the scriptural narrative in which its fall is recorded. With these remarks let us resume the tale of darkness that constitutes man's moral and religious history. We have seen that, from the very constitution of his nature, as God's image, he was likely to be open to the temptation of supposing himself to be, like God, independent, and that he was placed under a law, in order that, by voluntary obedience, he might show and confess that he was *not*. He was to remember that, though an image, he was *only* an image

of his Maker, and to acknowledge his obligations for all that he had, and owed to the common Author alike of himself and his inheritance—to work out the resemblance between himself and his Creator into a closer and closer similitude to that great Original—to live with Him, by Him, and in Him continually—to feel that departure would be death—and to yield the free homage of his heart's affections to that one, only, and gratefully acknowledged source of all his rich enjoyments. And was this, it may be asked, an unreasonable requirement? Did not the boundless beneficence of God render this tribute of love, loyalty, and obedience, but a small return for services at once so vast and so numberless? Verily, we have no sort of sympathy with the cold and withered spirit of one who could say that this commandment was grievous. But the same authority which tells us it was given, tells us, also, that it was broken, and acquaints us with the circumstances which attended its infraction. Those circumstances are described in Scripture as supernatural. It tells us of an evil spirit who succeeded by miraculous means in causing the first of all human transgressions. Now, the doctrine of spiritual agency for evil, as well as for good, is one which it would be impossible here fully to discuss; suffice it to say, that it can present no real difficulty, except to the actual materialist. For if it be granted that man is a spiritual being, as well as a corporeal, there can be but little difficulty in believing that in the universe there may be other spiritual beings, who are not corporeal, or corporeal in any such sense as would enable us to ascertain their existence through the medium of our senses. And if,

again, there are *evil* spiritual beings who are *men*, what forbids us to suppose that there may also be *evil* spiritual beings who are *not* men? But all must allow that we are *tempted* by the former. Why, then, is it incredible that we should also be tempted by the latter? Nor can it be reasonably denied, that among such evil spiritual beings who can tempt, there may be one in particular more evil, and also more powerful, than the rest. Yet this is all that is necessary in order to a belief in the existence of Satan, and in the part which, according to Scripture, he has taken to seduce our first parents into the earliest act of all human disobedience. The instrument he employed, as we are told, was that of a serpent. But it is no more incredible that evil spirits should make use of instrumentalities, than it is that men should do the same. The serpent, however, is described as using articulate speech, and addressing himself to Eve. But is it not presumptuous, in the highest degree, to conclude that this was impossible? There are persons, and unhappily not a few, who consider the mere fact that an account is supernatural—no matter how attested, or under what circumstances and for what purpose it may have been recorded—enough to convince them that it must be fabulous. This wild incredulity has led the modern rationalist to eliminate from Scripture the miraculous element altogether, and to explain away whole chapters of the Bible—indeed, almost all Scripture—by a purely mythical interpretation. Of course, then, the story of Eve and the serpent has not escaped the fate from which not even the miracles of our Lord Himself have been exempted; and while the story has been

allowed to have an important, though allegorical meaning, its truth has been utterly denied.

But waiving any regular discussion on the subject of miracles, as wholly unsuitable to a work like the present, it is enough to refer the general reader to such publications as "The Bible and Modern Thought," the first essay in "Aids to Faith," "The Eclipse of Faith," "Trench on the Miracles," &c., &c., for a clear and thoroughly conclusive answer to the objection of rationalists that a miracle is *impossible*. But there is one reply which, as addressed to common sense and common honesty, can hardly fail to have weight with the English mind in general, and show that we must either, like the older deists, reject the Scriptures altogether, as a gross and impudent forgery, or else receive them as true in despite of the supernatural accounts which they contain; since it is utterly impossible to disbelieve those accounts, and yet be consistent in professing, like some modern rationalists, any reverence for Scripture at all. The reply in question affects, and vitally affects, the *moral character* of the sacred writers, and even that of the Saviour Himself.* If no miracles such as those which the Bible relates have ever been performed, then our Lord and His Apostles were not only not inspired, but not even honest; for they distinctly assert that the power which on certain occasions they employed was miraculous, and appeal to that power as a proof that they were Divinely commissioned. Now, it is utterly impossible that Christ can be our *Example*, and yet

* This argument is very ably put, both by Dr. Maunsell and Mr. Cook, in "Aids to Faith."

have ever been guilty of any kind of *untruthfulness*. He is, in every sense, "the Truth." On His veracity, the truth of His religion must stand or fall; for we are certain of nothing if not of this, that there is no deceitfulness of any kind whatsoever in God. The supposition that Christ wrought natural works, the secret of which may one day be discovered, and yet *supposed* that they were miraculous, is a strange hypothesis; but even if such a monstrous explanation could be received, it would only save His *sincerity* at the expense of His judgment, and deprive Him of all effective authority as a "teacher come from God."

It is manifest, then, that by rejecting all miracles, we reject also all Scripture as a Divine revelation to mankind. The attempt to save it, even in the character of a mythical representation of moral truths, must be a mockery; and the rationalistic notion, that after we deprive it of the miraculous element it is still a rule of faith and practice, must be at once abandoned; for in that case it has lost the first claim to our belief as in any sense from God; for it states as true that which in reality was false.

Another proof of the utter futility of all attempts thus to rid the Scriptures of the supernatural, and yet retain them as worthy of devout or even of serious attention, is furnished by the history of all such attempts up to the present moment. The miracles of our Lord have been attacked by no less than seven different kinds of assault.* The Jews ascribed them to Beelzebub.

* For an account of these see Trench on the Miracles.

The Pagans admitted their truth, but denied the necessity of the conclusions which they were said to establish. Pantheists denied that they were *possible*. Sceptics of the school of Hume denied that they were *credible*. All these unbelievers were perfectly consistent in denying the truth of the Scriptures, and dismissing them from their minds as utterly unworthy of any credit considered as guides of religious belief. But these opponents were followed by others who attempted to save the Christian idea of God, and reconcile Christianity with philosophy. The coarse ribaldry of many of their predecessors was, in general, carefully avoided. The language of Scripture, and the forms of Christian worship were to be retained. But then something must be done to banish from the Bible this obstinate element—that is, the *supernatural*. And the first attempt thus to harmonize Scripture with the philosophy of the day, was that of those German writers who maintained that the miracles were only RELATIVELY miraculous—relatively, that is, to the person for or in regard to whom they were first performed, just as to a savage an eclipse of the sun would be miraculous. But it was obvious that this contrivance involved, just as did its successors, a moral charge against the workers of these wonders, who, in that case, must have *passed them off* as genuine miracles when, in fact, they were spurious.

The next attempt was that of the naturalistic rationalists. This was another effort to escape from the dilemma of rejecting miraculous testimony, and yet retaining a real respect for the volume in which it is recorded. And this school of infidelity endeavoured to extricate them-

selves from the difficulty by boldly denying that in fact any such testimony could be found in the Bible. They maintained that Christ never professed to perform miracles; that the sacred narratives contained no account of anything which the writers themselves agreed to be miraculous, and that it was only the lovers of the marvellous who could find there aught that was really supernatural. Their theory was, that all the miracles were unusual, but still natural events, which the heated fancies of the witnesses had magnified into miraculous occurrences. Our Saviour, in Cana of Galilee, did not turn water into wine; no true interpreter of Scripture could imagine that St. John intended his readers to come to any such unphilosophical conclusion; our Lord simply supplied the guests with additional wine when that of the house was exhausted. He cured defective sight, just as would a skilful oculist. He walked on the shore, when the wonder-loving spectators imagined that he was walking on the sea! He raised Lazarus from a swoon; but here, again, the deluded witnesses strangely supposed that he raised him from the dead! He told Peter to catch as many fish as he could sell for a stater; but so greedy are people in general for the marvellous, that it came to be really believed that He told the apostle he would find a piece of money in the fish's mouth! In this way it was supposed that the honesty of the sacred writers could be successfully vindicated, and Christ Himself regarded as a truthful Teacher, a disinterested Benefactor, and an eminent Example. This naturalistic theory saved, also, the credit of the New Testament as entirely historic,

and only maintained that it recorded ordinary events. But the obvious absurdity of such a clumsy contrivance soon brought it into utter disgrace, and it fell beneath the weight of ridicule it provoked.

Still, the effort to save the favourite "*a priori*" assumption that "a miracle is impossible," and yet save also the veracity of Christ and the Evangelists, was not to be abandoned; and the naturalistic theory was accordingly supplanted, for a time, by the mythical. This resolved all miraculous interpositions into myths, historical, philosophical, or poetical, which, modified by the prevailing opinions of the age in which they were written, and the people to whom they were addressed, conveyed, under a legendary form, eternal ideas—universal and permanent truths. The preceding theory saved the Bible as a record of historical facts, and only divested them of any miraculous character; but this went further, and reduced nearly the whole of the Scriptures to mere fable and allegory. The life of our Saviour was no longer a body of plain and tangible realities, but became a naked skeleton of occurrences which legend and myth had covered over with what seemed to be the flesh and blood, as it were, of actual history. But to this theory, there were two fatal objections. The first was, that it was utterly impossible to separate the sacred narratives into the two parts of which it supposes them to be composed—that is, the mythical or miraculous, and the real. They related a multitude of plainly historical events, known and allowed to be such; and these were intimately interwoven with the miracles into one tissue of statement and doctrine,

which utterly defied the required disintegration. The second, was the hopelessness of any attempt to account for the growth of the legends in the short period which must have elapsed between the occurrence of the facts, and the time in which they were developed into fables. The supposition, for example, that in an age so nearly contemporaneous with Christ's as that of St. Luke, (whom Strauss himself acknowledges to have been the author of the Gospel that bears his name, and to have also been the companion of St. Paul,) the true history of our Saviour should have passed into a fabulous legend, was felt to be altogether incredible.* This historico-critical system, then, as it is called by Dr. Trench, shared the fate of its predecessors, and has all but completely expired in the land of its nativity.

Every attempt to rid the Scriptures of the supernatural has thus been hitherto abortive; and it would now appear that all the possible modes of rejecting the miracles, yet saving the Bible as worthy in any sense of real reverence, have been exhausted; at all events, it is difficult to imagine how there can be any remaining. Vain, then, is the use of Scriptural language—the reference to Scriptural authority for any purpose either moral or religious—or the profession of respect for the sacred volume in general—if we are bound to maintain the philosophical fancy that all miraculous intervention, and all supernatural agency, are impossible. In thus plainly

* The *origin* of Christianity, its *progress*, and the fact that for 1,800 years the true interpretation of Scripture must (if the mythical hypothesis be correct) have been unknown, are equally fatal to that hypothesis. See "Eclipse of Faith."

stating the gross inconsistency of many modern rationalists, we may be accused of removing the only ground upon which their orthodoxy, such as it is, can find a footing, and of driving them at once into the deepest and darkest abysses of utter infidelity. But, as Mr. Cook has well observed, "This consideration would, undoubtedly, have great weight, if the question only regarded the speculative inquirer. But when a man propounds his opinions publicly, and commends them by all the graces and artifices of rhetoric, his object is evidently not so much to satisfy his own mind, as to influence the minds of others; and for their sake it is necessary to ascertain his meaning, and to show clearly the principles upon which his system rests, and the consequences which it involves. Above all, is this our duty when those principles are introduced rather by insinuation than by direct assertion, and are directly connected with the recommendation of disingenuous acts by which the safeguards of religion are undermined."* The author then goes on to give a clear and deeply-interesting account of the consequences to which the principles he is exposing have LOGICALLY led, and shows that, "consistently carried out by writers of very different feelings, they leave man without a Church, without a Saviour, without a living soul—teach us that man himself is the only proper object for the reverence and worship which has hitherto been directed to the idea of a God—that sacraments are to disappear—that the true eucharist will be found in wholesome meals, and baptism in the healthy

* "Aids to Faith," page 147.

use of cold baths! Atheism stood out first in its bareness and barrenness, and then in its utter hatefulness. A host of writers sprung up who rejected with contempt all such delusions as the virtues of unselfishness, courage, and truth. The dogmas of socialism and communism were preached with the wildest fanaticism. Poets, politicians, socialists, and natural philosophers, came forward to demand the extirpation of all faith—to denounce the belief in the *invisible*, as the root of all human weakness and misery—to proclaim the sacred law of egotism—the religion of the flesh. And for a time they seemed to have succeeded. It was felt that the religion preached by the professors of all schools tainted by rationalism, or by ideology, was a farce, a delusion, a fraud. The materialists carried the day, took the lead in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and suddenly, to their own amazement, found themselves triumphant amidst the ruins of Church and State." *

The notion itself that miracles are impossible, would go to prove that a revelation is impossible; for a revelation must, from its very nature, be miraculous.† The same notion is inconsistent with the belief in a personal God; for the statement of Paley, "once believe that there is a God, [that is, a personal God,] and miracles are not incredible," never has been, and, we are persuaded, never can be answered. We find, accordingly, that in fact the dogma in question is held in connexion

* Abridged from "Aids to Faith," pages 160, 161.

† Butler's Analogy.

with some metaphysical pantheism—a connexion which common consistency makes inevitable. But the history of Pantheism in Germany shows us clearly its natural and logical developments—atheism, socialism, communism, materialism—an utter rejection of all the higher virtues of our nature, and a substitution of thorough selfishness in their place. All this led, of course, to a strong reaction, and the system has all but utterly died out in the country where it flourished at first; in so much, that the land of its birth, it may almost be said, now "knows it no more."* Such is Pan-

* The mythical mode of ridding the Scriptures of miracles and history together was perfected by Strauss; but something like it was invented long before his time. The germ of the whole system may be traced, perhaps, to a perverted use of the writings of Origen. But in the beginning of the last century, Woolston, an English Deist, published six "Letters on the Miracles," in which he adopted an allegorical system, similar to that of Strauss; and the history of these letters is a curious example of the failure of deistical writings to leave upon the public mind any permanent impression, as well as a proof of the needlessness of any alarm either at the prevalence in this our day of infidel tendencies, or at the sensation caused by the Essays and Reviews, and Colenso on the Pentateuch. The very name of Woolston will probably be quite new to many of the readers of these pages; and as for the letters on miracles, they can only be found perhaps in the dusty shelves of some scholar's library. Yet those letters, at the time of their publication, caused a complete *furor*. They called forth no less than sixty answers, and had an immense circulation. Hence the lines of Swift—

Here's Woolston's tracts, editionthe twelfth
'Tis read by every politician;
The country members when in town,

theism; and it is well to warn the unwary of the tendencies of "modern thought," in that direction.

It is not consistent with the purposes of this volume to enter fully into the argument for the possibility of supernatural interposition; but there are certain postulates which, if once admitted, involve that possibility; and fortunately they are such as the common sense and natural instincts of plain people will at once admit. They are—The reality of the external world; the existence of a personal God; and the facts that the universe is governed not only by physical but by moral laws, and that the latter are higher than the former. These, if taken in connexion with the fact that this condition has undergone a change corresponding to night, will supply materials abundantly sufficient for the necessary proof, and may be employed by the reader for himself.*

> To all their boroughs send them down.
> You never met a thing so smart,
> The courtiers have them all by heart, &c., &c.

And the writings of Strauss, which once awakened so much attention, are now sharing the same fate as that which befel those of his English predecessor. (See Trench on the Miracles, pages 81—89.)

* Havernick has well remarked, that "whoever should be disposed to doubt that the character of positive fact belongs to the historical account of the first sin because it contains something miraculous, would show his ignorance of the fact itself; whoever should desire that the first sin should come about in a natural manner, would have the first sin itself regarded as a natural thing, while, on the contrary, it was just that kind of thing which is unnatural, and which has only become natural."—*Einleitung* l. ii. p. 252.

But it may be said, The possibility of a *divinely* supernatural agency is not the question here. You are now treating of a *diabolical* agency—a supernatural agency for *evil*—as employed in the first temptation; and the point in dispute is whether *this* is possible. To this it may be answered, in the first place, that a step has been taken in the right direction, if we have opened, or helped in any degree to open, the way to a proof that any supernatural agency is possible. Then, it may be observed, in the next, that there is a complete answer to all objections against such supernatural agency for evil, in our utter ignorance respecting the origin of evil *at all*. The fact that evil exists is not to be denied; and we must surely suppose that, therefore, there was some sufficient *cause* for its existence. There must have been some expediency or some necessity for its permission; but of that expediency or that necessity we are utterly ignorant. If we were to frame a world from our own imaginations, it would, doubtless, be free from all evil. But for reasons beyond our present comprehension—but, no doubt, for *some* reasons—it is certain that there is much evil in the universe. Now, if we are altogether incapable beforehand of seeing the need for evil *at all*, we must be equally incapable of seeing for how much or how little there was need, the quarters from which it should originate, or the extent to which it should operate. It is manifest, that until we know why there was any evil whatever, we can never know why it should not prevail in other worlds as well as on earth—among extra-terrestrial beings, as well as ourselves—and in connexion with invisible as well as with visible powers, why

it should not be permitted to operate supernaturally as well as naturally, or why it should not prevail to a great extent, as well as to a little. Let us suppose that the rain which falls from heaven were always what it is sometimes, and that is, a positive evil in some way or other; then let us suppose, that a person who was utterly ignorant of agriculture, who had never seen a sod of earth turned up in his life, and who had never known that rain fertilized the soil, were given a large tract of uncultivated land: would he not be utterly unqualified to judge whether or not it required ANY irrigation, and, therefore, equally unqualified to judge, whether, if it did, the requisite moisture should come at once, or by degrees —at one season, rather than at another—be communicated naturally or artificially—continue for a long time, or only for a short—and descend in a deluge, or only in a shower? Now this ignorance of agriculture would not be greater than our own, respecting the causes which produced or permitted evil in the universe; and until it is enlightened by a knowledge of which we are now incapable, there can be no force in any objection to the permitted power (whatever it may be) of Satanic agency. In this utter darkness of our present faculties on the subject of evil at all, it is no more incredible beforehand, that there should be an evil spirit, than it is that there should be an evil man; or that the power of the former should be *superhuman*, than it is that the latter should be only human; and, no more incredible that an evil spirit should be able, for the purpose of temptation, to make a serpent seem to speak, than it is that an evil man might employ mesmerism

or ventriloquism with a similar intention. And this, we think, is a complete answer to the whole objection.*

"And he (the serpent) said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?" &c. Now, it is no disparagement, either to the authenticity or the inspiration of Scripture, to suppose that the narrative, of which these words are part, records only a part of the dialogue that took place on the occasion. There is not the slightest necessity for supposing that the whole transaction, here narrated, was simply allegorical. But, while believing the story of the temptation to be perfectly possible and perfectly real, we may yet suppose that it is fragmentary, and not complete; otherwise it is hard to conceive how the adversary could have succeeded. Judging from the very short account in Genesis, we might conclude that Satan effected his object at once, and without an effort. But this is hardly probable, considering the moral constitution of man, in the beginning, as already explained. Many divines, accordingly, have supposed, with Milton, that the first verses of the third chapter of Genesis sketch but an outline of the first temptation. We may fancy, then, that in an evil hour, when the mother of all mankind was alone, off her guard, and therefore under circumstances favourable to the tempter—for moments of idleness and loneliness ever have been and

* There are persons, strange to say, who devoutly believe in clairvoyance and "spiritual manifestations," yet reject as incredible the story of Eve's temptation.

ever must be, moments of danger—an hour when Satan had said within himself—

> "Let me not let pass
> Occasion which now smiles. Behold, alone
> The woman, opportune to all attempts;
> Her husband, for I view far round, not nigh,
> Whose higher intellectual more I shun,
> And strength"—

let us suppose that in such an hour, a voice, sweet, perhaps, insidious, musical, and strange withal, as issuing from what seemed to be a serpent, came whispering through the solitudes of Paradise. Admiration, perhaps, mixed with curiosity and with wonder, attracted her attention to this unwonted speaker. "Yea, (or indeed,) hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?" It was thus, that with well dissembled surprise, the fallen spirit instilled the first insidious doubt, followed immediately by the first audacious lie, "Ye shall not surely die: for God doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." As if he had said—"Now ye are gods, only as those trees when seen upon the clear waters of that sparkling river —that is, images, mere images. Eat, and ye shall be really as gods. Here is a tree of knowledge; and what is knowledge but divinity? Eat of the fruit, and ye too shall be divine. You have now dominion, it is true; but it is delegated. What are you but ruled rulers after all? Eat, and dominion shall be yours directly—yours supremely. It is a tree to make one wise; and shall

God's image be prohibited that very wisdom which, because you are His image, you must long for? It is a tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Eat, and learn good to gain it—evil, to avoid it."

Something like this, we may suppose, without irreverence to the sacred Volume, may have been the language, in full, of the enemy of souls; and if so, it would be touching that point in the nature of his victim, which, of necessity, was most vulnerable—

"Men would be angels, angels would be gods!"—

and it was natural to suppose that God's image might be tempted to aspire at becoming, in all respects, as God Himself, and, therefore, *self-sustaining* and *self-sufficing:* the very error which lies at the bottom of the human heart to this day — which shows itself in the self-righteousness and the pharisaism of mankind over all the earth—which makes the doctrine of human merit so widely and so cordially acceptable—and which Christ became incarnate, preached, wept, suffered, bled, and died to extinguish. For salvation, not by merit, but by grace—not through self, but through Christ—is the essence of Christianity. The same language was also employing, with a consummate knowledge of human nature, that triple snare which Scripture calls the "world," and with which the world has always been most easily and most fatally entrapped—namely, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life. She saw that the tree was good for food; that it was pleasant to the eyes; and a tree to be desired to make one wise. The same snare (and this is one of the

many proofs of the harmony of Scripture) which the same tempter, emboldened by its success on the first man, tried again with the second—"Command that these stones be made bread;" "All these kingdoms," showing them, "and the GLORY of them, will I give thee."

But to return to the subject before us. Eve, at this critical period in her own, and therefore in all human history, uttered not, we must suppose, a solitary prayer for help from Heaven. The very nature of the temptation to which she yielded predisposed her against it. "Ye shall be as GODS," was the language of the adversary, implying, "therefore, ye want no help." Prayer is an expression of the wants and weaknesses of a dependent creature, and can only proceed from one who acknowledges the superior power of Him whose sovereignty it confesses, and whose agency it implores. But in this case, a dream of independence was the work of the wizard who beguiled her; and to pray, were to prove that his witchery was charmless, his magic at fault, his spell resisted. No such talisman, then, as one humble petition, arrested his power, and on moved his infatuated victim, proud, and, therefore, we conclude, prayerless, at the beck of the enchanter. Her curiosity, her pride, her vanity, her ambition would then be on fire, while her fears were lulled, and her faith was asleep—her conscience drugged, and her reason stupefied. But if ever sorrow was self-inflicted, it was hers—if ever sin was voluntary, it was the first. From the very beginning she had lent herself to the sorcerer—she had yielded her *will*, and as a free creature, without supernatural assist-

ance. When *this* was gone, all was gone; for, instead of meeting him at the outset with the firm determination of one who, while "free to fall," was yet resolved to stand, she listened, when to listen was to yield, and parleyed, when to parley was to die.

There is truth, after all, in the dream of Zoroaster.* It was the waking thought, distorted by the sleeper's own benighted fancy, of one to whom tradition whispered tidings of the fall. A kingdom of light opposed

* One of the rationalistic objections to the Jewish doctrine of the fall through the agency of an evil spirit is, that it is derived from the system of the Parsees, and an importation into Jewish theology of the Zoroastrian notions of Ormuzd and Ahriman. But the similarity in some respects between the Persian doctrines and the Jewish can, we think, be easily accounted for, without supposing that the latter were borrowed from the former. Both express ideas and modes of thought which are eminently natural, and may have prevailed in different countries at the same time. The fact of a conflict between good and evil is matter of experience and of consciousness, and the human mind must have been occupied from the earliest times in attempting to account for it, while no explanation could be more obvious, however false, than that of Zoroaster, and no figures more natural than that of light to express the good, and darkness the evil principle. A legend of the fall acting upon these ideas and modes of thought might have originated the system of the Parsees. *It is not true* that the doctrine or the details of the fall, as now understood, are not alluded to in any Old Testament writings except those composed during or after the Captivity. (See "Creation and Fall," by Macdonald, p. 141-6.) And if there be some resemblances between Christianity and the Persian doctrines, there are many striking differences; and every reader of Church history knows how widely the teachings of the Gnostics and Manicheans, which reflect those doctrines, diverge from the Bible.

by a kingdom of darkness, is our only clue to unravel the mystery of that antagonism between good and evil which the history of man exemplifies; and it was the temptation in Paradise that, on earth at least, first brought the powers of these different empires into collision. The contest has continued to this hour, and will last till death and hell are cast into the lake of fire, and there is curse no more. But if ever there was a critical period in all this world-wide and long protracted battle, it must have been just before that fatal act which first mantled with a covering of night and darkness a world which till then was glowing in the light of its Maker and God. The tempter triumphed, and ever since, as Christianity teaches us to believe, man, over all the earth, has rued the direful consequences. Adam was tempted by the woman; and though we thoroughly disagree with the purely mythical interpreter in supposing that this, any more than any other part of the story of the fall, is allegorical, we may yet agree with him in thinking that it has a moral, and teaches us how easily we may be tempted through the affections.

But, besides this, the fact that Eve was the instrument employed in the temptation of Adam, led to consequences of which none who have any acquaintance with human nature at this day can be ignorant, but of which the fall is the natural, if not the only explanation. How is it, we ask, that that nearest approach perhaps on earth to heaven, the institute of marriage as it first existed—"one soul," as it were, "in two bodies"—man and (if we may use the expression) his supplement, or that which was needed to form a combination of all

the feminine with all the masculine qualities in close, hallowed, and life-long alliance, representing humanity as a whole in all its perfection—is never completely, never but most imperfectly realized? How is it that in that institute, as it now exists, we have only a mere, though a beautiful, ideal, and one that is too often contrasted in a sort of mournful mockery with the sad reality, in which, if we see it at all, it is only across the tears on which it is refracted, like a rainbow on a cloud? Is it not manifest that the same qualities which made it, as we contend, a thorough reality once, would, if sufficiently sanctified, make it always a thorough reality again? And do we not know that in proportion as those qualities are sanctified, and the marriage tie is formed on Christian principles, so much nearer does the union approach to a state of perfect happiness, and the more vividly represent the mystical union of Christ and His Church? But who can doubt that now those qualities are often the elements, not of one of life's purest joys, but of its bitterest sorrows; and that if there is a hell on earth, it is the home of hating hearts compelled to be together, or the gloomy circle of a godless household where nearest kinsmen pine in want and woe, and wish, it may be, that they never were born? To all this, the Christian's answer is, "The Fall."

Oh! there is a solemn meaning felt often in the bitterness of a mourning mother's heart, when the union which she longed for as a blessing has proved to be a curse; when the companion for whose affections she has given her all, requites with brutal cruelty the generous surrender; and when what might have been her life's

consolation, children (the heritage of the Lord), are begotten in the squalid wretchedness of unbefriended penury or unrelieved disease; verily there is to her a real eloquence in the words which, while they acquaint her with the original cause of her sufferings, acquaint her also with an appointment of heaven, and therefore with the grounds for resignation:—"Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception. In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children, and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." And is not this latter portion of the curse, "he shall rule over thee," realized most, we ask, where our nature is, so to speak, the most fallen—that is, where it is nearest to the state in which, according to the Scripture doctrine, that curse has left it—the state, that is, of savage life, where man makes woman his slave, or that worse than savage condition where, in a Christianized land, sin has degraded man into a merciless tyrant over weakness and dependence? Now, what is true of marriage is true also of almost all our other sources of enjoyment. Our cup is full of bitterness; and yet the very ingredients of which it is composed might have crystallized into elements of sweetness such as medicate the waters of life and joy in the paradise of God. No doubt all this is *capable* of explanation, without supposing that our nature has undergone any such disastrous change as that which, according to the Bible, it has experienced; but we hope to prove hereafter that no hypothesis can afford a solution of the mystery, at once so obvious and so satisfactory as that which supposes a misapplication and perversion of qualities which

might have given us exalted happiness, but which sin, through the fall, has converted into materials for mourning and for woe. And how, except by regarding it as a primitive appointment, can we reconcile with the justice of God the lot, at once so notorious and so melancholy, of woman in every age of the world—a lot so clearly expressed in the words, "I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children"? Her case, on any other supposition, is an anomaly in the creation. No other mother under heaven is subjected to so much suffering from conception and parturition. But why is this? Why is it that the same Almighty Being who has so constituted all other animals that they propagate their offspring with comparatively little pain or peril, should have connected the parturition of woman with pangs expressive of the severest of all possible anguish? Why is it that the noblest of the races should be the very one of which the continuance should be associated with the greatest amount of fear, of danger, and of suffering? It may be said, indeed, that the appointment in question may have been intended in some degree to compensate the lower animals for their inferiority to man. But, upon the infidel hypothesis, it may be doubted whether (everything considered) they are not more than compensated. For, if man have not fallen, Scripture, as we think we have shown already, is not true, and therefore there is no revelation. Consequently the immortality of the soul is still a matter of doubt and uncertainty. But with keener physical sufferings, in one respect at least, than those which lower creatures than man endure—

with more numerous wants than theirs, and wants which are harder to supply—with doubts, toils, fears, distresses and disappointments to which they must be strangers—with "more wretchedness," according to Voltaire, than can be found "in all the other animals put together," but, at all events, a wretchedness which many suppose surpasses theirs, what is our strongest consolation? Is it not the lively hope, nay, the firm conviction of a future and a happier existence? If, then, this conviction were reduced to a mere "peradventure," might it not be gravely questioned whether, after all, the brutes had not, so to speak, "the best of the bargain"? But, be this as it may, why, we ask, should the compensation, or an important part of it, be in its nature, such in particular as that to which we are specially alluding, unless woman's exceptional sufferings were the consequences of woman's transgression? The argument has, we think, been put with much clearness by a modern writer, who asks, "why should woman, a partaker with man of a rational soul, fitted to be both his companion and his peer, endowed with all that distinguishes humanity from the brutes, and fits mankind to enjoy a supremacy over everything that is on the earth—be thus subjected to pangs and perils which no other living creature suffers? . . . The noblest and highest nature of all (the human) would appear to be unequally treated if this had been an original and not a superinduced condition. The facts themselves must be ascribed either to the primitive and arbitrary arrangement of the sovereign power—and would then appear to want equity and benevolence—or they must be

admitted to have a punitive character and a moral cause, and so to comport harmoniously with the Mosaic narrative, and add greatly to its probability."*

To Adam it was said, "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." It is true that in this curse there was hidden a blessing, for a certain amount of exertion is conducive to health and enjoyment. But a beneficial may be also a punitive employment. Very great advantages have arisen from the vigorous industry by which the millions of our race obtain the means of subsistence. But with this good there has been mixed a large amount of evil, and we may reasonably consider such excessive and exhausting toil as that which wrings from the earth a supply to the earliest and most urgent of all human wants as a proof of the Divine indignation against human transgression. Other animals subsist upon the spontaneous produce of the soil. "They toil not, neither do they spin." But, with a few exceptions, more apparent, perhaps, than real, and quite consistent with the statements of Scripture, man over all the earth eats bread in the sweat of his brow or the labour of his brain, and after painful and protracted exertion. Now it is easy to conceive that the benefits which this oppressive diligence has occasioned might have been subserved by a less wearisome process; and therefore it is natural to conclude that the toils of our race, as well as its tears and its mortality, bear witness to the inheritance of a punishment upon human disobedience. All, it is true, *can* be accounted for without confessing that they resulted

* Redford, "Holy Scripture Verified." 1853. P. 67.

from a Divine, punitive, and corrective visitation. But, looking at the claims of the Bible to be a Divine revelation, and being under no necessity to explain as figurative any part of it which, like the account before us, may in its literal sense be possibly true,* we receive that account in its *primâ facie* meaning, since it is not contradicted by other scriptures, and since it gives us an obvious and an adequate though humiliating explanation of the mystery.

But if compelled to admit that certain portions of the narrative cannot be literally interpreted, must we make the same concession respecting the rest? By giving a mythical, symbolic, allegorical, or fictitious form to the whole we would sanction a principle as dangerous as it is vague, and one which in this instance would not only unsettle the established belief of thousands upon thousands of Christians without providing them with a substitute which could be open to no dispute, and admit of no conflicting interpretations, but take from the story almost all its impressiveness. We could no longer appeal to it as a solemn fact, and as such an expressive warning. We should be obliged to consider it as a fiction or an emblem,—such, it is true, with an instructive meaning,

* We may defy physiologists to *prove* that man could not have been made at first capable of immortality; and though geologists may think it very improbable that at any part of the human period the earth was more fertile than it is at present, we think we might safely challenge them to demonstrate that it *certainly* was not. The fact that there were thorns and thistles in the earliest portion of that period of which they can find any traces is certainly no sufficient proof.

but still only such, and therefore without any of that peculiar and eloquent significance that belongs to historical reality: no longer could we teach our children the awakening and most profitable fact that one act of disobedience produced a mournful change, from which man for thousands of years has been suffering. They must not be deceived into a belief that a spiritual enemy, a real being seduced our first parents, and that his success in that "mortal sin original" shows the necessity for guarding with constant care and watchfulness against his insidious agency. We must forbear from referring to that daring falsehood with which he imposed upon his victim as a real and a melancholy instance of the working of this "father of lies." The task of the spiritual teacher would be, not to apply facts, but explain symbols; and how cold and uninfluential is a lesson thus imparted in comparison with one that is founded on solid history and spirit-stirring fact! Notwithstanding its imaging tendencies and its love of the ideal and the fanciful, the human mind is so constituted, after all, that it is practically influenced far more by the real than by the fictitious. A true story, or even a story founded on fact, at once commands attention, and fastens itself on the memory, when one that is purely imaginative—just because it is so—is read with little comparative interest, and less comparative effect, by all but those who have little concern with the actual business of life, and are dreamers rather than thinkers and doers. Hence the best writers of fiction, and especially of fiction with an important moral, are allowed to be those who not only never outrage probability, but add to the creations of

their own imagination some well-known facts, in order to throw over the whole an air of historical reality. It is true that the Bible abounds with examples of instruction by parable, and type, and symbol, but its general character is historical; and were it really wanting altogether in this matter-of-fact claim to our acceptance it would resemble the doctrines of that early sect of heretics who held that Christ was born in a manger, wept, bled, and was crucified, all only in appearance, thus reducing some of the most striking occurrences which Scripture has recorded to a sort of hollow and theatrical make-believe.

Much has lately been made of some real difficulties connected with an historical interpretation of the curse upon the serpent. These difficulties are not now brought into notice for the first time, but were felt and acknowledged long before the discoveries of modern science had led to the belief that some of them were insuperable. It was well known that serpents do not eat dust, and if geologists have proved that they never went otherwise than on the belly, they have only corroborated the interpretation which various commentators had put already on the passage in Genesis which records the doom and degradation of our spiritual adversary. We can readily acknowledge that ophidian reptiles found in the tertiary London clay prove that, thousands of years before the human period, all this class of animals moved as they do at present, and therefore that the words "on thy belly shalt *thou* go," &c., apply not to a race, but an individual—not to the literal, but the spiritual serpent, and must be taken, not literally, but figuratively,

and figuratively altogether. Satan is called the serpent in other parts of Scripture; "eating dust" is obviously a figurative expression, and, along with the words "on thy belly shalt thou go," denotes debasement. The enmity between the seed of the woman, and the seed of the serpent, although partially true in a literal sense, has evidently an ulterior and far sublimer meaning in its reference to a spiritual warfare between Satan and man. Again: "It shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel" has always been taken as the first prophecy of redemption, while the literal meaning of the passage has been rejected as puerile.* Explaining Scripture by Scripture, we have the clearest authority for supposing that the whole passage relates to a prolonged hostility between the Saviour, the Church collectively, and individual believers on one side, and the great enemy of souls on the other, but an hostility to be terminated by a triumphant victory to the woman-born Redeemer. Thus, in the spiritual gloom that first invaded Paradise, when night was falling on its once happy possessors, there was a "cloud with a silver lining," for a light from heaven was behind it—the light of prophecy and promise, to cheer and to guide the exiles in the darkness of their future pilgrimage.

But, though admitting that this portion of the narrative is not to be interpreted literally, we see no good

* If we suppose that when our Lord "turned and said unto *Peter* 'Get thee behind me, *Satan*'" He meant by Satan the Devil, thus overlooking the *instrument* in rebuking the *agent*, we have a case exactly similar to that now before us, in which the insignificant serpent was lost sight of in punishing the formidable foe it symbolized.

reason for supposing that neither is any other. We maintain, on the contrary, that the account is, on the whole, historical; that Adam and Eve were real persons; that Eden was a real locality; that the Paradisaical state was not an imaginary but a real condition; that Satan was a real being; that the instrument which he employed in the temptation was a real serpent; that the temptation was a real occurrence; that the Fall was a real event; that it arose from the voluntary infraction of a real commandment; that this disobedience was visited with a real punishment; and that the general incidents of the Fall must be considered as literally true. But we can easily suppose that, along with this reality, there was also figure and symbolism. Satan may have chosen the serpent for his instrument, and yet Scripture have employed it to represent not only the subtlety, the insidiousness, the venom, and the fascination of Satan himself and of sin, but the very *degradation* that sin was to produce. All the other resemblances between the emblem and what it signifies are comparatively obvious. But we can hardly say as much of this. Yet it was certainly, we think, the principal one. For the sin was pride; the pride of independence, the pride of aiming to be as God;* and the appropriate punishment of *pride* is *debasement*. But the pertinence or the full pertinence of a serpent as an emblem of this in particular could not have been known to any uninspired author at the time in which the Book of Genesis was written. He must have been ignorant of the fact, since ascertained, that no

* And it is fair to presume that the sin which degraded Satan, to whom this part of the passage refers, was also pride.

other animal in the whole creation could have illustrated more aptly than the serpent the degeneracy it was intended to signify; and the following quotation from "The Testimony of the Rocks," by Hugh Miller, is so much in point, that we give it in full.

"Now in the times of the oolite it was the reptilian class that possessed itself of all the elements. Its gigantic enaliosaurs, huge reptilian whales mounted on paddles, were the tyrants of the ocean, and must have reigned supreme over the already reduced class of fishes. Its pterodactyles—dragons as strange as were ever feigned by the romancer of the middle ages, and that to the jaws and the teeth of a crocodile added the wings of a bat, and the body and the tail of an ordinary mammal—had 'the power of the air,' and pursuing the fleetest insects in their flight, captured and bore them down. Its lakes and rivers abounded in crocodiles and fresh-water tortoises of ancient type and fashion; and its woods and plains were the haunts of a strange reptilian fauna of what has well been termed 'fearfully great lizards,' some of which, such as the iguanodon, rivalled the largest elephant in height, and greatly more than rivalled them in length and bulk. Judging from what remains, it seems not improbable thnt the reptilians of this oolite period were quite as numerous, and consisted of well nigh as many genera and species as all the mammals of the present time. In the cretaceous ages the class, though still the dominant one, is visibly reduced in its standing. It had reached its culminating point in the oolite, and then began to decline; and with the first dawn of the tertiary division we find it occupying, as

now, a very subordinate place in creation. Curiously enough, it is not until its times of humiliation and decay that one of the most remarkable of its order appears, an order itself illustrative of extreme degradation, and which figures largely in every scheme of mythology that borrowed through traditional channels from Divine revelation as a meet representative of man's great enemy, the evil one; I of course refer to the ophidian, or serpent family. The earliest ophidian remains known to the Palæontologist occur in the ancient deposit of the tertiary division known as the London clay, and must have belonged to serpents, some of them allied to the pythons, some to the sea snakes, which, judging from the corresponding parts of the recent species, must have been from 14 to 23 feet in length. And here let us again pause for a moment to remark how strangely these irascible, repulsive creatures—creatures lengthened out far beyond the proportions of the other members of their class by mere vegetative repetitions of the vertebræ—condemned to derive, worm-like, their ability of progressive motion from the ring-like scutes of the abdomen—venomous in many of their species—formidable in others to even the noblest animals from their fascinating powers and their great craft; without fore or hinder limbs, without thoracic or pelvic arches—*the very types and exemplars* (our highest naturalists being the judges) *of the extreme of animal degradation.*"

It is true that the degradation referred to in the passage from Genesis relates to Satan, and that *his* debasement is there the subject of the prophecy, but the whole scenery was one of degradation, and thus was man

reminded of his own. The same aptness of illustration can be traced in the words "thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee," though in this case it can be more naturally accounted for. It appears that "when a bud is *imperfectly* developed it sometimes becomes a short branch, very hard and sharp at the extremity, and is then called a thorn."* "That thorns," says Professor Balfour, "are in reality *undeveloped* branches is shown by the fact that they are connected with the centre of the stem, that they bear leaves in other circumstances, and that under cultivation they become true branches" . . . "May we not see in the production of injurious thorns an arrest of the fiat of the Almighty in the formation of branches, and thus a *blight passed upon this part of creation;*" and in speaking of thistles the same writer observes, "The calyx is not developed, as in other plants, but is *abortive,* blighted as it were, and changed into hairs, which, as already shown, indicate degeneration." †

Thus our first parents, themselves degraded, were surrounded with examples and symbols of degradation, and we think we can see a sufficient reason for this symbolic teaching in the fact that the posterity of the first human sinners must often and often have seen in the familiar scenery of nature some of these illustrations of the fatal consequences of disobedience to that God who "resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble"—illustrations which might not be intelligible

* Professor Henslow.

† Balfour, "Phyto-Theology." Edinburgh, 1851, pp. 110, 111, 145, 147.

to all, but which, to those who understood them, might in fact be eloquent of humiliated pride, and this as long as the earth in its present form shall endure, and up to the last of all human generations. It is possible that almost everything in nature may have a meaning to the devout believer, according to the exquisite poetry of Wordsworth—

> I have seen
> A curious child who dwelt upon a tract
> Of inland ground applying to his ear
> The convolutions of a smooth-lipped shell,
> To which, in silence hushed, his very soul
> Listened intensely, and his countenance soon
> Brightened with joy; for murmurings from within
> Were heard,—sonorous cadences! whereby
> To his belief, the Monitor expressed
> Mysterious union with his native sea:
> Even such a shell *the Universe itself*
> *Is to the ear of Faith.*

It may be difficult to separate those portions of the narrative which are wholly or partly symbolical from those which are not. But this is no reason for interpreting the whole either as poetry, or a myth, or a philosophical attempt to account for natural phenomena. No doubt a uniform interpretation would meet our notions of correct writing and remove much perplexity. Nor need we hesitate in concluding that in such passages as contain some statements which are undeniably literal the rest, though apparently figurative, may also be literal. But in thus making the literal meaning determine, in some cases, what seems to be the figurative, we lend no countenance to a system which would make

the figurative determine the literal. This were to place more dependence on the less than on the more trustworthy of two different guides, and make the former overrule the latter. On the whole, then, we adhere to the well-known canon that "when the literal meaning will stand, the farthest from the literal is generally the worst," and are guided *generally* in the exposition of a passage by the superior authority of the guiding rule. But in cases where the literal meaning certainly will *not* stand, that is, where well sustained and universally acknowledged facts, or the irresistible deductions of *true science* clearly prove that the literal is untenable, we adopt another, even though the context prove that on the whole the writer is referring to real events and using literal expressions. To this course it is easy to make objections. It is certainly not so short, simple, and consistent as might be thought desirable. But the love of brevity, simplicity, and uniformity have often, we are persuaded, interfered materially with the discovery of truth, by originating theories of which the real merit was not their philosophical value but their popular attractiveness. There are complex phenomena, both in nature and religion, which can only be explained by some more or less complex hypothesis. A simple key with only one ward will not open an intricate lock, and the simplest and shortest exegesis is not always the most satisfactory. It is easier to cut a knot than to untie it, but there may be purposes for which when cut it would be useless; and it is easy to rid a scriptural narrative of all perplexity by calling it an "allegory," but by such a course we may deprive it of half its effectiveness.

There may be a short path to a given locality, but by pursuing it the traveller may encounter more perils and pitfalls than he could ever have met with on the beaten highway, and thus be longer in fact on his journey. And so there may be what seems to be a brief and royal road to scriptural truth, but in following it we may stumble upon greater obstacles and run into greater dangers to our faith as Christians and our happiness as men than we could have encountered by adhering to the worn pathway, though it appeared to be circuitous.

We have dwelt already on the fact that both in nature and religion, but especially in religion, it often pleases God to accomplish His ends by means which may seem to us imperfect, inadequate, or even contemptible; and have tried to prove that such a mode of proceeding is exemplified in the Bible itself as His appointed instrument for the communication of spiritual truth. Since then the scriptural narrative of the Fall is plainly a very brief account, more may have been said and done on that occasion than has been actually recorded; and were the omission supplied it might enable us to draw a clearer line than we can at present between the parts that have a mystical and those that have a literal meaning. Or again, since the language in which the narrative is written is far, as yet, from being thoroughly understood, it may contain words which as now translated convey a meaning which cannot literally be true but which certainly might be so if correctly rendered.*

* There are several instances of mistranslation in the earliest chapters of Genesis. Thus the words "They sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons" have led to the flippant

It could be proved that in other portions of Scripture, one part of an author's language must be taken literally, and another figuratively. Nor would it be at all unreasonable to look for some such mixture of meanings in a narrative like that of the Fall, which we consider as symbolico-historical, but essentially and on the whole historical, and in a book, like the Bible, which for reasons mentioned in the preceding chapter might, although inspired, and fully * inspired, be open to all that class of objections to which such a mode of writing would be liable. And whatever may be the force of such objections we maintain that they are far less formidable than those which beset a purely mystical or poetical interpretation, for this would make the Scriptures like heathen oracles and fables; deprive them of all the effectiveness of historical reality; convert their exposition into something like a solving of riddles, and render the Word of God capable of meaning almost anything or everything that agreed with the fancy of an expositor.

The style of the narrative has been often but vainly appealed to to prove that its language is that not of history but poetry. If, indeed, it could be shown that the scriptural account of the creation and the primitive innocence of man was merely poetical, we might perhaps conclude that such also was that of the Fall. But the

objection, "Where, then, did they obtain the needles and thread?" Whereas the word in the original for sewed means fastened or connected. For other examples see the 5th Essay in "Aids to Faith," by Dr. M'Caul; also his other writings.

* While denying the verbal, we are thorough believers in the plenary inspiration of Scripture.

best judges assure us that in the first chapter of Genesis there are none of the peculiarities of Hebrew poetry.

"Though the style is full of dignity it is that of pure prose narrative. There is no mention of prophetic vision. No prophetic formula employed. It is not said 'the vision which Moses saw,' nor 'I lifted up my eyes and behold.' The prophet, or historian, is kept entirely out of sight, and the narrative begins at once without any preface, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' and then goes on to the account of Paradise, the birth of Cain and Abel, &c., without any break or note of transition from vision to history. The book of Genesis is history. It is the historical introduction to the four following books of the Pentateuch, or rather to all the following revelation, and the first chapter as the inseparable beginning of the whole must be historical also. When the Lord recapitulates its contents in the Fourth Commandment, and makes it the basis of the ordinance of the Sabbath, He stamps it as a real history. To suppose a moral, or even a ceremonial command based upon a poetic picture, or a vision, or an ideal narrative, would be absurd. The Lord also treats the first chapters of Genesis as real and authoritative history when He makes Genesis i. 27 and ii. 23, 24 the foundation of His doctrine concerning marriage and divorce." *

Nor are these the only reasons for assigning to the

* "Aids to Faith:" Essay on the Mosaic record of creation, which contains, we think, a most satisfactory answer to those geological difficulties which are supposed to necessitate a figurative interpretation of the two first chapters of Genesis.

narrative a character essentially historical. Not only is it noticed in the New Testament, when noticed at all, as though it described real events, but confirmed as such by a multitude of heathen traditions. Every incident of the Fall is reproduced, though often under a very distorted form, in the Gentile mythologies. Of these, some, it is true, are not in every particular accordant with the Scriptural account. But the difference, while thoroughly consistent with the common origin of both in some real occurrences, shows how incomparably superior the Divine revelation is to the human additions with which it is corrupted. Traditions of the Fall linger in the legends of Persia, of Assyria, of India, of Egypt, of China, of Greece, of Rome—nay, even of Scandinavia; and we argue that they cannot be so satisfactorily accounted for by any hypothesis as by that which supposes them to be founded, not only upon some real fact or facts, but the very facts which Scripture has recorded.

To begin with the traditions of the West. According to Hesiod, one of the earliest of the Greek poets, men at first were, like the gods, exempted from toil, from care, and from sorrow, while the earth yielded spontaneously its fruits to a happy population. Ovid's account agrees with that of Hesiod—

> "Aurea prima sata est ætas, quæ vindice nullo
> Sponte sua, sine lege fidem rectumque colebat," &c., &c.
> —METAM. i. 89.

The same state is described by Macrobius as "Simplicitas mali nescia et adhuc astutiæ inexperta." (Somn. Scipionis, ii. 10.)

In the Grecian mythology Jupiter is represented as

having punished Prometheus for stealing fire from heaven, by ordering Vulcan to form a woman of clay whom the gods endow with grace and beauty, but whose heart was evil. She marries Epimetheus, and from thenceforth the lot of man becomes disastrous. Here the same thirst for forbidden knowledge which in Scripture is represented by eating the fruit of a tree, is set forth by the theft of fire; and, as in Scripture, the instrument through whom the evil was effected is the woman.* Again, Apollo is described as having, out of love to mankind, destroyed the serpent Python. Again, we are told that in the garden of the Hesperides were certain apples which hung on a mysterious tree, and which a Son of God would at a certain time remove. Hercules accordingly gained access to the garden, and, having destroyed the serpent-guardian, carried off the apples. "In this legend," says Dr. Kitto, "the idea seems to be, that access to the tree of life is impossible till the Son of God opens the way, and overcomes the serpent by whom that access is prevented. The word python is used in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts xvi. 16),

* We have before us the whole history of this transaction in an engraving from an ancient bas-relief; and, what is most remarkable, there are two groups at each extremity of the tablet, offering, as it were, a Biblical key to the whole scene. On the one hand are a man and a woman standing naked under a tree, the woman in a drooping and disconsolate posture, the man with one hand raised to the tree, and the other directed towards the woman. It is such a picture that a child would at once say, "That is Adam and Eve." At the other extremity is a sedate and august figure ·d upon a rock and strangling the serpent.—"Daily Bible rations," by Dr. Kitto, Vol. i., p. 63.

where the damsel at Philippi is described as possessed by a spirit of divination (πυθωνος). It means to over-persuade and to deceive; the heathen python, then, may mean "that old serpent called the devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world." There are various gems and ancient remains, in which this python the serpent is represented as wreathed around a fruit-laden tree, "exactly as modern painters represent him in their pictures of Eve's temptation."

"Still more of Hercules. At Cadiz, which was originally a Phœnician colony, there was a pleasant garden consecrated by mystic rites and ceremonies to idolatrous worship. In the midst of it were two remarkable trees which grew out of the tomb of another of the monsters (Geryon), whom Hercules overthrew. One of these was of a mixed nature, and it was affirmed of it that it distilled drops of blood. This seems to point to the living tree—the tree of life; near this, upon an islet in a small lake was a temple in which Hercules was worshipped under the name of *Soter*, or the Saviour. From this sacred enclosure all women were driven away, as their sex was looked upon as the source of all calamity and mischief. The whole temple, moreover, was guarded by lions, and a flaming fire which turned every way to forbid the approach of the unholy and profane."

Now Hercules was the son of the supreme God (Jupiter), and his worship, as well as the traditions respecting him, are allowedly derived from the East.

In the same mythology Bacchus is represented as the first horticulturist. He is painted as drawn by leopards and lions, to signify, doubtless, the pristine peace and

security of mankind, while, in the rites of his worship, serpents were carried and waved with shouts of "Eva! Eva!" and the name of Eve is pronounced in the East as if it consisted of two syllables.

The legends of Scandinavia represent Thor as the first-born of the principal Deity, and as a mediator between God and man. He is said to have bruised the head of the great serpent with his mace, and at last beaten and slain him, but at the expense of his life, having been suffocated with the venom of the monster he destroyed.

On turning to the traditions of the East, we find a corresponding similarity. From those of China it appears that the primitive state of man was one of peace, purity, and enjoyment; but he fell, and from causes similar to those of which we read in Scripture—that is to say, according to one authority, an inordinate desire for knowledge; according to others, flattery, or the temptation of the woman. The doctrine of the Buddhists is, that man is a degenerate creature. In the Hindu mythology the chief of the evil assoors, or demons, is styled "the king of the serpents." His name is Naga, and he is the sovereign of the Nagis, or Nacigs, while the Hebrew word for the serpent is Nachash. According to the Vishnu Purana, human nature was at first upright, but afterwards became corrupted through sin. One of the favourite subjects of Hindoo paintings is the triumph of Krishna over the mighty serpent, whose heads they represent him as crushing with his feet.

Among the Persians there are two legends which, together, make up an account very similar to the Mosaic.

According to the former, the world was created in five periods. Man appeared in the sixth, and was at first holy and happy. But Ahriman, the evil one, deceived them, and after some time presented them with fruit, of which they ate. From that moment almost all the excellences for which they had been distinguished departed from them, and sorrow and sickness and death attended their career. They advanced in knowledge, but became more degenerate in moral character, more and more enslaved to Ahriman. According to the second, this Ahriman, having first visited heaven, came to earth; and, appearing to man in the form of a serpent, killed him with the poison of his venom. The world became disordered, and the evil one mixed himself up with everything that was human. The parents of our race made themselves clothes of skin, and built houses, but they forgot to thank the Author of life. "Almost all the nations of Asia," says Von Buhlen, "assume the serpent to be a wicked being who has brought evil into the world;" and Havernick, after quoting this statement, adds, "What a similarity is observable between the traditional tales of Egypt, India, Persia, and even of the northern nations, and the old Hebrew narrative!" Serpent-worship formed part of the idolatry of different nations of antiquity. Horus is represented in the Egyptian monuments as standing in a boat, and piercing with a spear the head of the serpent as he rises above the water; and, in the language of Hugh Miller, "the old mythologies are as full of the serpent as are the runic obelisks."

Nor is the remark of a German writer, that the Mosaic account of the Creation and Fall is distinguished from the heathen mythologies by the hope of a restoration, to be taken without much qualification. For, without attaching importance to the expectations of a large part of the Roman world at about the time of the Saviour's appearing, of a coming deliverer, or to the celebrated lines of Virgil, we might refer to many legendary myths of antiquity regarding the future emancipation and final happiness of mankind through the victories of a great deliverer. Some of these are contained in the preceding statements respecting Apollo, Thor, Horus, &c. In Bohn's edition of Mallet's "Northern Antiquities," a part of the doctrine of the early Persians is thus explained:—

"The strife between the two principles continues, and will continue to the end of the predestined term. During the last 3,000 years of the period Ahriman is predominant. The world now hastens to its doom; religion and virtue are nowhere to be found; mankind are plunged in sin and misery; but Sosiosh is born of a virgin, and redeems them, subdues the Devs, awakes the dead, and holds the last judgment. A comet sets the world in flames. The genii of light combat against the genii of darkness, and cast them into Duzakh, where Ahriman, and the Devs, and the souls of the wicked are thoroughly cleansed and purified by fire. Ahriman then submits to Ormuzd; evil is absorbed into goodness; the unrighteous, thoroughly purified, are united with the righteous; and a new heaven and a new earth arise, free

from all evil, where peace and innocence shall for ever dwell." *

Now it can hardly be contended, either that these numerous resemblances are purely accidental, or that they arose from agreement in opinion between different thinkers who had arrived independently of each other, and by their own reasoning, at similar conclusions. It might be argued, indeed, that the myths of one country may have been borrowed from those of another, and that the earliest may have arisen from the vanity which would ascribe to our race some exalted origin. But though this might account for a belief in the doctrine that man was originally virtuous and happy, it will not account for the belief in his subsequent degradation. For our vanity is just as likely to be mortified by the thought of our present degeneracy as it is to be elated by that of its original dignity. Again, it might be said that Moses founded his own narrative on these traditions. But even in that case it would be natural to conclude that they were based upon a foundation of actual facts. Some of them may possibly have existed before and long before the era of the Hebrew legislator, but it does not follow either, that they originated in the speculations of some early philosopher, or that Moses, without the guiding inspiration of God, formed out of them the account which he has given us in the opening chapters of Genesis. The sounder conclusion is, surely, that, whether aware or ignorant of these different legends, he was in-

* There is also a striking similarity between all this and the philosophy of Zeno and the stoics, as well as to the doctrine of the Prose Edda.

spired by the Deity Himself to communicate truth to mankind. If ignorant, he was taught that truth directly from heaven. If aware, he was guided by heavenly wisdom in the choice and use of his materials; and such an explanation accords, it is well known, with orthodox views of Divine inspiration. Or again, he might have been versed in all these traditions, yet overruled to ignore them for the time, and to state facts which agreed with them just because they also were founded upon facts.

It would appear, then, that on the supposition of a fall, it would be reasonable to conclude that the state which human apostacy induced was one of darkness, the darkness of ignorance, as well as of delusion, sorrow, and sin; and next, that if in such a state a revelation were vouchsafed, it would not at once and completely remove that darkness, but suffer so much of it to remain as would be necessary for the moral and spiritual discipline of a fallen creature capable of regaining, under Divine grace, the happiness he has lost: and further, that we might reasonably conclude beforehand, that if such a revelation were made, it would contain difficulties, and be open to seeming objections—difficulties and objections of which we ought not to feel surprised if some were in the present state of our faculties extremely perplexing.

For proof of the reasonableness of such of these suppositions as relate to the probability of a Divine revelation at all, we reserve our remarks for a chapter on light in the darkness; and for proof of the reasonableness of the supposition that man has fallen we refer to the pre-

ceding observations, which go, we hope, to prove that it is neither impossible nor incredible in itself—that it accounts for all the facts of human history and human consciousness, and that it is supported by numberless analogies in every department of nature, as well as by the judgment of the profoundest thinkers, and the general consent of mankind. The fact of *some* fall, entitles to a candid hearing the scriptural *story* of that fall, and this, we maintain, is a true history.

But one of the preceding arguments, namely, that the fall, regarded as a mere hypothesis, accounts for all the facts and phenomena we require it to explain, must be fortified by proof that no other is as adequate and as reasonable. But of such other hypotheses there is only one, we think, that deserves any serious attention.* This shall be the subject of the following chapter; and we shall give it fairly and fully, according to our own convictions of its real meaning, and not in that mutilated, incomplete, and inconsistent form in which it is held by many who shrink from adopting what at all events would *seem* to be its logical consequences.

* The supposition either of imitation or of a universally depraved education is surely not worth considering. *Whence* this tendency or this education?

ANOTHER STORY OF THE DARKNESS.*

Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise and rudely great,
With too much knowledge for the sceptic's side,
With too much greatness for the stoic's pride,
He hangs between in doubt to act or rest,
In doubt to deem himself a god or beast.

At a period in comparison with whose vast antiquity the dust of Egyptian monuments is but of yesterday, certain apes, an unknown species, were evolved, developed, transmuted, or otherwise metamorphosed into human beings. It was then that Deity (if there be such a being)† "arrived at consciousness" —that in the language of one eminent philosopher ‡

* For an answer to charges against this mode of treating the subject see concluding remarks.

† It would be the grossest injustice to charge with atheism or pantheism some of the distinguished writers who hold the doctrine of development. But some modern authors who adopt it certainly are Pantheists. Pantheism and development naturally go together; some, indeed, suppose that either involves the other, and beyond a doubt each has a tendency to lead to the other.

‡ Hegel.

"the idea was out of itself," and that in that of another "0 became +."*

Ridicule has ever been the favourite weapon of ignorance, prejudice, and bigotry. Before the true form of the earth was thoroughly known there were persons who laughed at the idea of places where the inhabitants walked with their heads downwards, and where it rained and snowed upwards, whilst a modern wit has called apes "our poor relations," and the

* See ante page 80. These opinions are wittily noticed by Mr. Mansell in the following lines—

"The land that produced one Kant with a K,
And many Cants with a C,
Where Hegel taught to his profit and fame
That something and nothing are one and the same
Where reared by Oken's plastic hands,
The eternal nothing of nature stands.
And Theology sat on her throne of pride
As Arithmetic personified,
Where Fuerbach showed how religion began,
From the deified feelings and wants of man;
And the Deity owned by the mind reflective
Is human consciousness made objective."

Phronisterion. Scenes from an unfinished drama, pp. 13, 14.—*We* only quote. There are many who profess clearly to *understand.* But to warrant confidently such a profession they must have carefully studied Spinoza and Kant, and Schelling, and Hegel, and Fuerbach, and Oken, and perhaps many other metaphysical writers. A book has lately been published with this significant title, "The *secret* of Hegel," who himself is said to have lamented that there was only one person in existence who understood him and that *he didn't.* Thus, fortunately for the Christian cause, the *light* which in this darkness of ignorance some would substitute for Christianity, or Christianity as now received, is of such a nature that only one in a million can *see* it.

answer of Topsy to the question, Who made you? How did you come into existence? "I 'spect I growed," has been employed to illustrate and ridicule the doctrine of progressive development. But truth triumphs at last, and the popular jest of one generation often becomes the sober philosophy of the next. No educated person now disbelieves in the Antipodes, and Topsy's theory was right after all, for the human race has grown ultimately out of an oyster, a cockle, or perhaps a sea weed. Of the precise period in which our Simian ancestors emerged from baboonhood into humanity there is no exact registry in the great "rock-book of nature," or none that has yet been deciphered, although the progress of discovery has led us to consider man as older and older still as the light of science has gradually broken in upon the darkness of pre-historic antiquity. We only know that he was certainly among the last of the living creatures by whom the earth was successively inhabited. But the first being who could well be called human was the great (many times repeated) grandson of a reptile which again was the lineal descendant of a fish, which further was among the posterity of a limpet or a barnacle, which was the son of ocean, which was the son of earth, which was the son of a ring, which was the son of Nebula, which was the son of ——. Here (except that in some way or other all were the children of law) the pedigree becomes too obscure to be any longer traceable. Philosophy is no flatterer, and in assigning to our race its real origin, only illustrates the general truths, that great results proceed from small beginnings, and that whatever is destined for a high place in creation must arrive at maturity by slow and

scarcely perceptible steps under a lengthened process of gradual development. The Deity, granting His or its existence, has never, unless perhaps when originally imparting laws to the universe, acted by special interposition. The hackneyed quotation—

> Nec Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus
> Inciderit—

may express a truth. But no nodus from the beginning of the world to this hour, not even the birth and destiny of His noblest creature on earth required His special interference; and the first human being was left to the operation of the same laws as those which govern the rest of the living creation, to "take his chance in the general *melée*," * and perish like the weaker races who had sunk in "the great struggle for existence," or be preserved from extinction by the law of might, and the principle of "natural selection." † The saying of the great monarch, that "Providence favours the strong battalions" illustrates a philosophical truth, and man, in consequence, has survived perils which, in the infancy of his being, must have seriously endangered his existence. Considering his physical inferiority to other animals, —some of them his mortal foes,—his comparatively unprotected condition by nature, the noxious agencies with which he was surrounded, and the present delicacy of his organization, there are many who suppose that he could not have existed for even a few days without some Divine intervention. But this is an error, and arises

* "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation."

† "Darwin on the Origin of Species."

from a false estimate, both of his physical constitution and his intellectual capacities.

"When animals first crept forth from the newly-formed earth, a dumb and filthy herd, they fought for acorns and lurking-places with their nails and fists, then with clubs, and at last with arms, which, taught by experience, they had forged. They then invented names for things, and words to express their thoughts, after which they began to desist from war, to fortify cities and enact laws." (Horace, Sat. lib. i. 99.) Such was Horace's theory of the original state of our race; and though rejected by almost all eminent philosophers in the earlier portion of the present century, it has lately been revived, and is now endorsed by the illustrious author of the "Antiquity of Man." * *We* have no concern with the question why Horace should be considered a higher authority than Moses. It is certain that "the picture of transmutation given by the Roman poet, however severe and contemptuous the strictures lavishly bestowed upon it by Christian commentators, accords exactly with the train of thought which the modern doctrine of development has encouraged." †

Man has been called the only tool-using animal; but monkeys sometimes crack nuts with a stone; we may suppose, therefore, that it was in the exercise of an inherited instinct that the first article of human manufacture was fabricated. The most convenient instrument must have been a stone; and as weapons additional to those which nature had provided were

* P. 379. † Ibid.

necessary to secure the safety and meet the wants of the earliest generations of men, we may conclude that the earliest specimen of their mechanical skill was a very rude flint hatchet, such as we now find, both among the lowest savages, and in those caves which contain flint implements of human workmanship mixed with the bones of extinct animals. This was the age of stone, and it must have lasted a considerable time, probably for thousands of years. Could that first hatchet be now discovered, and placed in the next London exhibition of the industry of all nations, among the numberless articles of exquisite manufacture there deposited, some idea might be formed of the vast antiquity of our race, and its capability of almost unlimited progress.

Passing from the consideration of the hand to that of the tongue, we may argue that the first language of mankind was onometapœic. This hypothesis, under the name of the "bow wow" theory, has been ridiculed by no less a philologist than Max Müller. But it is the most natural and reasonable, perhaps, of any that can be suggested. "The sound" was made "an echo to the sense," and men expressed their ideas by utterances which, like the word "cuckoo," that bears a resemblance to the note of the bird of that name, were supposed to be similar to some characteristic of the object intended to be described; and these, along with pantomimic gestures, were sufficient to make intelligible to each other the few ideas that men at that time had any occasion to communicate. The earliest occupations of mankind were war and hunting, the next were pastoral and agricultural. The rude, primitive implements of stone were

succeeded by others of better workmanship and higher finish, and these again by instruments of bronze. One great advance had now been made in civilization, and the period in which the change began was the commencement of what archæologists call "the age of bronze." To this succeeded the age of iron. With the manufacture of this metal a new era set in, and the progress of mankind has since, though sometimes interrupted and retarded, been vast and wonderful. The vulgar notion that man has fallen from a happier state than his present one must be for ever abandoned. He has emerged out of the darkness of a primitive barbarism into the light of knowledge and civilization,* a light that will become brighter and brighter till man, as some

* "When, above all our philosophy, there remains an infinite void or an infinite unknown, we doubt, and speculate, and wonder in obscurity. But when revelation opens out the highest truths that involves our race, and teaches what we must do to be *saved*, all other knowledge ranges itself lower down in the scale, and assumes a definite position, instead of floating loosely amidst the vague mysteries of imagination. Philosophy, however clear, is but the deceitful moonlight that mocks with its illusions; and, though much may be seen and known, even by the moonlight, the calm and steady rays of *day* are requisite before the spell of the fancy is dissolved, and before the form and colour can be seen in their reality." (Dove's "Theory of Human Progression.") This writer maintains that the first great condition of knowledge is the Bible. How it can be doubted that Christianity has in fact promoted civilization is to us extraordinary. True Christian principles are eminently favourable to knowledge; and for a proof of this in the case of one science in particular, we refer the reader to a statement respecting universal brotherhood by Max Müller "On the Science of Language," 1st Series.

philosophers have taught, feels himself to be Divine, and all religious worship merges into that of himself.

The animal propensities and lower intellectual powers of our race were called into active operation at an earlier period than were the moral sentiments. But these, too, have been subject to the great law of development. Honesty, benevolence, justice, and honour have been gradually ripening into effective principles of action, and will doubtless exert, at last, a vast and universal influence over the great human family. True, it may require—say some fifty thousand years (such is the low state of morals and morality in large portions of the earth at present) to bring these high qualities to their full maturity. But the law that regulates their prevalence and power is one which, though of slow, is yet of real progressiveness, and we may confidently look forward to a happy period in which, through the discoveries of science, the spread of knowledge, the action of sanitary laws, the effect of enlightened government, and the disappearance of all those mischievous superstitions which are called religions, the dream of the millenarian, though in a way widely different from that of which *he* is thinking, shall be fully and gloriously realized. The philosophers who flourished just before and during the first French Revolution started grand thoughts, but the period was not ripe enough to permit of their practical adoption; and though the "age of reason" was an age of horrors, yet all thinking men must now acknowledge that the "reign of terror" is a bugbear employed to frighten the timid from embracing enlightened views of civilization.*

* The language of Robert Hall is worth quoting here. "It

Nor is the salutary influence of these views likely to be damaged by right notions of what theologians call "sin." It is merely "imperfect development." The most atrocious murderer that ever outraged the laws of God and man differs from the most amiable of all the men that ever adorned society with their virtues, just as the buds of a tree differ from its foliage, its blossom, and its fruits. The *vulgar* may imagine, that this is a dangerous doctrine, since by representing wickedness as only defective growth, it may lesson our horror at even the most abominable guilt, and lead to the notion that the vilest criminal has no more reason for feeling unhappy at his low moral state than has a dwarf at not equalling the average stature of mankind. And the reasoning of

had been the constant boast of infidels that their system, more liberal and generous than Christianity, needed but to be tried to produce an immense accession of human happiness; and Christian nations, careless and supine, retaining little of religion but the profession, and disgusted with its restraints, lent a favourable ear to these pretensions. God permitted the trial to be made. In one country, and that the centre of Christendom, revelation underwent a total eclipse, while atheism, performing on a darkened theatre its strange and fearful tragedy, confounded the first elements of society, blended every age, rank, and sex in indiscriminate proscription and massacre, and convulsed all Europe to its centre, that the imperishable memorial of these events might teach the last generations of mankind to consider Religion as the pillar of society, the safeguard of nations, the parent of social order, which alone has power to curb the fury of the passions, and secure to every one his rights; to the laborious the reward of their industry, to the rich the enjoyment of their wealth, to nobles the preservation of their honours, and to princes the stability of their thrones." ("Sermon on Modern Infidelity.")

such persons would gain in plausibility if taken in connexion with modern statistics, for then they might say, "If, indeed, the human will were free there might be some excuse for the self reproaches with which repenting profligates have made themselves miserable. But the more the 'law of averages' is studied, the more evident it becomes that we have no free volition. The modern science of statistics proves that communities, taken collectively, act as if they had agreed together to pursue a prescribed course of conduct. Their acts conform to laws scarcely less rigorous than that of gravitation. This uniformity extends even to matters of taste, caprice, inclination, memory, and forgetfulness. We find for example that in the same country in a series of successive years the same average number of marriages are contracted; that the same number of men of 30 choose wives of 50; that the same number of illegitimate children in comparison with children born in lawful wedlock come into existence; that the same number of crimes of the same description are annually committed; and, strange as it may seem, that the same proportion of persons charged with offences are acquitted every year, and the same number of letters without an address left at the Post Office! Thus all the actions of men, whether arising from temperament, temptation, whim, impulse, or inclination, including those which seem to be the most purely voluntary, are subject to laws as rigorous as those which regulate the motions of the planets. It appears, therefore, that free will and free agency are mere fancies, and that man is the victim of fate, or inexorable law."*

*. The statement that sin is not an "evil and a bitter thing" is

The principal religions of mankind, including Christianity, may be considered as "Phases of Civilization," and the same progressiveness may be discovered in them also. The earliest worship was fetechism; this was succeeded by polytheism, and this by monotheism. There seems to be in man a religious instinct, that prompts him to make known his wants to some invisible superior by whom, as he supposes, those wants can be supplied. But the petitioner vainly imagines that in answer to his prayer, be it ever so sincere, ever so importunate, or ever so suitable, he can gain the object for which he supplicates. Law is deaf to the most eloquent entreaties that the bitterest sorrow has ever put into

so monstrously false, and so flatly contradicted by the conscience, common sense, and experience of mankind, that it needs no refutation. Its absurdity neutralizes its mischievous tendency. But the remarks with which it is coupled respecting free-will demand an answer. The *true* inference to be drawn from these facts is thus stated by Dr. Lardner: "The conclusion at which we arrive, then, is that the great principle by which the author of nature carries out his purposes by the operation of general laws is not, as it would at first appear, incompatible with the freedom of human agency, and therefore with man's moral responsibility. The same character of generality attaches to the laws which govern the moral and intellectual phenomena of human actions, considered collectively, as those which attach to mere physical phenomena. But these laws not being applicable to human actions considered *individually* leave free-will and moral responsibility inviolate." "Museum of Science and Art," No. 92. "General Laws," p. 96. See also Note in "Essay on Miracles," "Aids to Faith." Conclusions such as the above, contradicting the plainest instincts of our moral nature, prove that there *must* be an error in the reasoning which leads to them, and in this case the error arises from confounding *individuals* with communities.

words for any boon that must be granted by a special interference of the Supreme Cause, and is utterly useless except in improving the character of the petitioner himself. Thus the instincts of our nature are ever setting us astray on the most important of all possible subjects, and the law by which they operate seems to have no object but deception. It cheats us into pleasing and, in some respects, serviceable delusions, but still delusions. We have air for the lungs, food for the appetites, objects for the senses, gratifications for the social and for the animal desires, but for the instinct that prompts us to pray there is nothing to correspond and to gratify. The enlightened Christian who prays for what after due consideration he conceives to be agreeable to the will of God, and in the humblest, the purest, and most believing spirit, is on a par in this respect with the savage idolater who implores a "dumb stone" to grant him a request that could not be acceded to except by the most stupendous miracle.

The darkness—intellectual, moral, and spiritual—of which theologians say so much is simply owing to our imperfect growth as yet in the knowledge of which we are capable, and to which we shall yet attain. We have not fallen into our present state from a higher one of knowledge, and virtue, and happiness, but have only as yet acquired a capacity for receiving a portion of the light which we shall one day perceive in all the fulness of its brilliancy.

"Men naturally began by questioning their *imagination* on the causes of the Universe. This was the epoch of *religions*. At a later period, in proportion to

the advancing cultivation of the *intellect*, poetic symbols were replaced by metaphysical hypotheses and abstract conceptions. This was the age *of philosophical systems*. Finally, in our own times, men, having learned to read the universe and themselves, have nothing more to do with the deceptive dreams of the imagination, nor with the arbitrary combinations of pure reason: they turn to *experience*, and ask of it only what it is able to give, facts and *laws*, and thus we enter upon the era of *Positive Science*." *

"Hitherto no rival hypothesis has been proposed as a substitute for the doctrine of transmutation; for 'independent creation,' as it is often termed, or the

* "Modern Pantheism." Introduction, p. 17. "This generalization is praised by Mr. Mill with unusual warmth. Speculation he conceives to have three successive stages. In the first it tends to explain the phenomena by supernatural agencies; in the second by metaphysical abstractions, and in the third, or final state, confines itself to ascertaining their laws of succession and similitude. This generalization appears to him to have that high degree of scientific evidence which is derived from the concurrence of the inductions of history with the probabilities derived from the constitution of the human mind. Nor could it be easily conceived what a flood of light it lets in upon the whole course of human history." "Logic," vol. ii., p. 616. "It is curious that the first and third of these stages should have been exactly signalized by Plutarch. The ancients, he tells us, looked exclusively to the divine in phenomena, the moderns exclusively to natural causes. Is Plutarch less philosophical than Compte when he asserts that both views are partial and defective simply because they are *exclusive?* The one forgets the originating source, the other the intermediaries. Eliminate neither of the two elements, but learn their true relation . . . . See 'Neander,' vol. i., p. 31. 'Church History,' Clark's Translation." Note upon the above passage by

direct intervention of the Supreme Cause, must simply be considered as an avowal that we deem the question to lie beyond the domain of science." *

It appears that a belief in the immortality of the soul must have distinguished even the earliest of the creeds of

the translator. "Positive philosophy," adds M. Saisset, "does not go so far as to conclude 'that there is absolutely nothing beyond invisible things;' but in 'concentrating science and human life upon finite objects, and in leaving the ideal and divine in a state of complete indetermination, it joins with the Pantheistic and sceptical schools, and conspires to the same result.'" And no doubt there are many believers in transmutation among the disciples of this Positive school.

* "Antiquity of Man," p. 421. The frequent use by Sir Charles Lyell of such words as the "Supreme Cause," "the author of nature," &c., &c., together with his approval of the opinion of Dr. Asa Gray that there is nothing in the doctrine of variation and natural selection to weaken the foundations of natural theology, prove that it would be doing him a great injustice to suppose that he holds any of the Atheistic or Pantheistic views of certain extreme Progressionists. He never speaks irreverently of Scripture. He only (but we think very unphilosophically) *ignores* it. "Independent creation" may be "out of the domain of science" and yet be true. Believing as we do most firmly in the possibility of miracles, we can believe that in the creation of man there was something special and exceptional, therefore something which science cannot reach. We can acknowledge that he bears a close anatomical resemblance to an ape, and yet conceive that the organic structure fixed upon for man may have been one into which God breathed the breath of life, making him in the image of Himself. Sir Charles himself says that men who maintain that the origin of an individual as well as the origin of a species or a genus can be explained only by the direct action of the creative cause, may retain their favourite theory compatibly with the doctrine of transmutation.

mankind. "If the fossil memorials have been properly interpreted; if we have before us at the northern base of the Pyrenees a sepulchral vault with skeletons of human beings consigned by friends and relatives to their last resting-place; if we have also at the portal of the tomb the relics of funeral feasts, and within it indications of viands destined for the use of the departed on their way to the land of spirits; while among the funeral gifts * are weapons wherewith, in other fields, to chase the gigantic deer, the cave lion, the cave bear, and woolly rhinoceros, we have at last succeeded in tracing back the sacred rites of burial, and, more interesting still, a belief in a future

* "Here bring the last gifts, and with these
The last lament he said;
Let all that pleased, and yet may please,
Be buried with the dead.

"Beneath his head the hatchet hide
That he so stoutly swung,
And place the bear's fat haunch beside—
The journey is so long!

"And let the knife new sharpened be
That on the battle-day
Shore with quick strokes—he took but three—
The foemen's scalp away!

"The paints that warriors love to use
Place here within his hand,
That he may shine with ruddy hues
Amidst the spirit-land."

NADOWESSISCHE TODTENKLAGE.

(Translated by Sir E. L. Bulwer.)

state, to times long anterior to those of history and tradition."* But there is no such evidence as thoroughly satisfies a philosophic mind that this belief is not a delusion. Mankind is indeed in one sense immortal, for every successive generation fills up the place of its departed predecessor, "like a tree which is *figuratively* styled perennial, while the apparently permanent green with which it is invested is made up of successive generations of leaves."† With the prospect, then, of this sort of immortality, and of the glorious future for the human race when its wonderful capabilities shall have reached their maturity, we must console ourselves under the sorrows of our present condition, and the uncertainty that hangs over the hope of individual men for another and a happier.

Remarks upon the Preceding Story.

"Such is development developed"!—such the end to which modern thought has a tendency! And is it this that we are to substitute for Christianity? Yet we see not how, by rejecting the doctrine of the Fall, and therefore Christianity, we can escape from the gloomy alternative of embracing opinions more or less

* "Antiquity of Man." Burial rites of post-pliocene period, p. 193.

† "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. pp. 36, 7. Note on the consistency of Hegelianism with Christianity, by the translator, who adds, "But in the immortality which Scripture reveals, each leaf upon the tree is immortal and imperishable." (Cf. August. de civit. Dei xx. 1.)

similar to those which the foregoing statement embodies. It is not intended for a fair account of the sentiments of those who hold, in a modified form, the doctrine of progressive development by natural laws. It represents extreme views, and may be called by some a caricature; but extreme views often exhibit the dangerous tendency of the principles which they push to excess; and a caricature is after all a *likeness*. The system above noticed would, perhaps, in its integrity, be at once and indignantly repudiated by many of those who yet embrace it partially. But it does not, we believe, contain a single important remark that has not been held or sanctioned by one or other of the different advocates of either the development or of the transmutation hypothesis. And though a caricature is always an exaggeration at the time in which it is drawn, it may yet, at some future period, be a faithful portrait. According to physiognomists, the expression of the countenance is affected by the peculiar passion in which we indulge; and if so, that expression may become more and more marked as the victim of an influencing desire gives way to its importunities; so that what at first was little better than a gross burlesque, may be at last a real resemblance. Thus it is possible to embrace, at first partially, and in ignorance of their real tendency, a set of dangerous notions, which might ultimately warrant such an account of their character as would now be exaggerated. We have joined with the doctrine of certain Progressionists the dreams of Pantheism, and we cannot see that the association is unwarrantable. For though some of the writers whom we have quoted appear

clearly to be Theists, and even Christians, yet it is difficult to separate clearly the trains of thought which are entertained by some ultra-progressionists from those which are held by Pantheists. It must be admitted, however, that Sir Charles Lyell distinctly states that, consistently with the derivative hypothesis of species, we may hold any of the popular views respecting the manner in which the changes in the natural world are brought about. We may imagine that "events and operations in general go on in virtue, simply, of forces communicated at the first, and without any subsequent interference, or we may hold that now and then, and only now and then, there is a *direct interposition of the Deity;* or, lastly, we may suppose that all the changes are carried on by the immediate, orderly, and constant, however infinitely diversified, action of the intelligent efficient cause." And again: "The whole course of nature may be the material embodiment of a preconcerted arrangement; and if the succession of events be explained by transmutation, the perpetual adaptation of the organic world to new conditions leaves the argument in favour of design, and therefore of a designer, as valid as ever; for to do any work by an instrument must require, and therefore presuppose, the exertion of more rather than of less power than to do it directly." These remarks are thoroughly satisfactory as far as they prove the possibility of holding the views of a transmutationist, and yet adhering to the primary doctrines of natural theology. But the question is, whether transmutation and development (at all events without much qualification) can be reconciled with revelation. Sir Charles

Lyell seems to think that it need not disturb his conclusions, for he repudiates the notion of human degeneracy, and considers the "first Olympiad the earliest date on which we can rely in the past annals of mankind." It is therefore the duty of the Christian advocate to examine carefully the evidence in favour of certain theories of the school to which Sir Charles belongs, and to ascertain whether, even if irresistible, it obliges us to deny that Scripture is verily inspired. It may be said that in the preceding statement we have not only mixed them up with others with which they have no *necessary* connexion, but travestied the opinions of some of the most illustrious writers of modern times, and evaded by ridicule arguments which cannot be met by reasoning. But we have admitted that such a connexion, though neither unnatural, nor even, perhaps, uncommon, is not inevitable; and as for placing in a ludicrous light the views of very gifted *savans*, we can only say that it was scarcely possible otherwise to show how incredible such theories appear "*à priori*." Preconceived notions, no doubt, may be utterly false, and many truths are now admitted which seemed at first to be in the highest degree improbable. But when we are called upon to believe in statements which not only appear in themselves, and prior to the consideration of their proofs, to be highly unreasonable, but outrage the convictions at which thinking men have arrived after the careful study of evidence, we have a right to demand that such statements shall be verified by proof to which there can be no valid objection; and if there be any value at all in *à priori* reasoning, we are warranted in

assigning to it, in a matter of the utmost moment, all the importance it deserves. The views which certain Progressionists would oblige us to entertain of the Supreme Creator are painfully repugnant to all ordinary notions of His character; and we are justified in asking for the clearest possible proof of the truth of the doctrines which involve them before we can ever be reasonably expected to give them our approval. Has any such proof as yet been adduced? There are difficulties, no doubt, in the scriptural account of man's creation and fall; but they admit of what has been called "a proximate solution;" for the Bible informs us that man has fallen in consequence of his own voluntary transgression, and that it is still in his power, through Divine grace, to regain, and with additions, all that he has lost. But, according to these theorists, he was created *what he is*, only in a rudimentary condition, and therefore doomed, through no fault at any time of his own, to be gradually advanced through the infant stage of frightful barbarism and hideous idolatry, with all the terrible suffering, all the horrible superstitions, and all the abominable crimes attendant upon such a state, into maturity, after, it may be, a million of years; unsupported, during this long minority, by one act of special intervention on the part of his infinitely good Creator; one warning voice from heaven, except to his own dull and darkened conscience; one supernatural intimation of encouragement when he obeyed, one direct reproof when he rebelled, one immediate consolation in his sorrow, or one revealed counsel in his perplexity! And what is the nature of the evidence on which all this is expected to be credited? Is

it of such overwhelming force as not only to overthrow these obvious and beforehand difficulties, but also the entire phalanx of proof by which Christianity is defended? Assuredly not; nor even to imperil the faith of any but most "unstable believers." It rests upon little more than plausible speculations, ingenious theories, disputed hypotheses, open questions, and doubtful conjectures! The system which we have tried to explain is based upon the nebular *hypothesis*, upon a very controverted *theory* of a certain kind of progressive advancement in the forms of organization; upon another, little better established, respecting the great antiquity of the human race; and upon another still (and that, as it was thought, an exploded one), respecting human civilization. Most of the sciences—although undoubtedly entitled to be called such—on which it is founded are yet in their infancy. Some of them have undergone considerable changes, and led to the subversion of opinions which they almost appeared at one time to necessitate.* Among geologists there have been Neptunists, Vulcanists, Catastrophists, and Uniformitarians; nor have their controversies as yet, we believe, been entirely set at rest.†

* One of these opinions, we believe, is that there *must* have been a *universal* deluge within the last 5,000 or 6,000 years. Faber, in his "Difficulties of Infidelity," states, and quotes those who were in his day very high authorities to prove, that "no circumstance is more *thoroughly established* in geology than that the *crust of our globe* has been subjected to a great and sudden revolution by the agency of water," and that this revolution occurred at a comparatively recent period. No geologist, we believe, now thinks that the Mosaic deluge was universal.

† We do not think that the Uniformitarian hypothesis is univer-

The Development theory has been opposed by some of the most scientific men of the age; and one has only to read the defences of that theory by Sir Charles Lyell, to see how strong are the objections which he undertakes to refute. To some of them, indeed, his only answer is very unsatisfactory—namely, that there are blanks in the geological record, and that these may yet be filled up. Mr. Darwin confesses that his theory *at present* receives no support from geology. "Geology," he says, "does not reveal any such finely-graduated scale" (that is, as his views would seem to require), "and this perhaps," he adds, "is the most obvious and the gravest objection to my theory." While that theory itself has undergone an important modification since it was first propounded by Lamarck, the various and very able answers which the work of Mr. Darwin on the Origin of Species, and that of Sir Charles Lyell on the Antiquity of Man, have called forth, prove that, even in its latest forms, the same theory has not been accepted by many writers apparently of very high scientific attainments. Sir Charles Lyell, with an openness to conviction worthy of his high reputation, has retracted the opinions which he once held on the age of mankind, and on "independent creation;" and it is possible that, from his characteristic love of truth, and after further inquiry, he may embrace them again. As for the antiquity of man, although the arguments in its favour, derived as they are from various sources, appear at present to be

sally received by continental geologists. (See article on geology in Dr. Lardner's "Museum of Science and Art.")

strong, yet the unscientific world may, in perfect consistency with a sincere and cordial admiration on their part of the talents and learning of its advocates, be excused for suspending their judgment. We may admit and admire the great attainments of archæologists and geologists, yet doubt their infallibility, especially when we consider the fate of the controversies on the Zodiac of Deudera and the book of Nabathean agriculture, the want of unanimity among Egyptologers, the futility, according to Max Müller, of that linguistic argument by which the antiquity of our race has been supported, and also the argument founded on Mr. Leonard Horner's piece of Egyptian pottery, an argument which, it has well been said, has been as effectually disposed of by the "Quarterly Review" as "Mr. Monkbarn's Roman Inscription was by Edic, Ochiltree."

But it may be as well to show, if possible, that besides these general grounds for hesitation, if not scepticism, there are some strong reasons for doubting the validity of the conclusions of these eminent men respecting both the theory of development and that of the age of mankind.* Prior, however, to the statement of these reasons, we may advert to the fact that the writers alluded to never consider the Bible as of any use *at all* in the controversy. They do not, it is true, revile it, but they pass it by as apparently beneath the notice of a philosopher, and so Scripture is quietly shelved as an authority. Let us endeavour to illustrate the un-

* These topics have been touched upon in the first part of this work, but it is thought advisable to advert to them more fully again.

fairness of such a proceeding as regards human antiquity. Suppose that in a court of justice a case is tried of which the result hangs chiefly on the age of a given individual. All the possible means, except one, of ascertaining how old he really is are exhausted. His hair, his face, his walk, his sight, his hearing, his mental faculties and his bodily vigour, the testimony of his acquaintances as far as their knowledge of him extends, and all similar kinds of evidence are carefully considered. But when one of the advocates comes forward with a record which is *said to be* almost tantamount to an actual registry of the disputed birth, he is told that such a record is not evidence. No cause is assigned for rejecting it; no proof is listened to of the value of the document itself; and of course no question is raised about the mode in which it ought to be interpreted. It is simply set aside without authority, without hesitation, and without inquiry!

But without enlarging at present on the force of the adverse evidence thus passed over, the proofs themselves of the great antiquity of the human race are not, we contend, resistless. Some of the objections to these proofs have been noticed already. Let us glance at a few more.

The degree of dependence to be placed on geological calculations of time when expressed in numbers, may be estimated from the following facts. According to Professor W. Thompson the gradual cooling of the earth's crust from a state of fusion must have occupied about 98 millions of years. Professor Haughton thinks that in a shorter *geological* period than that referred to by

Professor Thompson, the cooling must have continued 2,298 millions of years.* The recession of the falls of Niagara from the opening above Queenstown to its present site is supposed by Mr. Bakewell to have required 9,856 years, by Sir Charles Lyell 35,000. And yet both calculations were made upon the spot; and as for the age of mankind, it is estimated variously at from 50 or 60 to 6 or 7 thousand years. Is there, we ask, a sufficient approximation to each other in these numbers to warrant an implicit confidence in geological calculations? †

Again, every argument advanced by Sir Charles Lyell in favour of the antiquity of man has been combated with much plausibility; and all the phenomena which his theory explains have been accounted for more or less satisfactorily by hypotheses consistent with the comparatively modern origin of man.‡

One of the strongest reasons for a great extension of our present chronology is founded on the fact that flint implements of human workmanship have been found in gravels supposed to be of vast antiquity, and sometimes in immediate connexion with the bones of extinct animals. But the age of these gravels is still, we believe, a matter of dispute, and Mr. Prestwich concludes that

* These are vast numbers, but what are we to think of Mr. Darwin's calculation, that the denudation of the weald alone required 306,662,400 years!

† The foregoing statements are taken along with others which follow from a very able and interesting letter addressed to Professor Phillips by Mr. Wood, F.G.S.

‡ In addition to the works already noticed on this subject, the reader may be referred to a work by the Rev. Mr. Brodie.

"the evidence seems as much to necessitate the bringing forward of extinct animals towards our own time as the carrying back of man in geological time." To the same effect is the language of Principal Forbes, who says that "the tendency of the whole investigation is as much to reduce the interval which separates us from that epoch as to draw back the creation of man into the depths of the abyss of geological time," and that "it is impossible to assign with the least degree of certainty the number of centuries or thousands of years to allow of the disappearance of any widely spread species."* Alluding to the burial cave of Aurignac, he tells us that "it seems very improbable that such a tomb transcends in antiquity the limits usually assigned to historic records." In speaking of deltas his words are, "It must be confessed, however, that the advance of science and the accumulation of relative facts have by no means conduced to unanimity as to the age of the alluvial deposits." "Another geological chronometer," he tells us, "has been sought in the gradual elevation of continents from the bed of the ocean leaving its trace in those terraces or ancient beaches which fringe the coast of Scotland and other countries," and adds, "But there is not a vestige of proof that such elevations are universal, or that their amount is the same in different countries, or even in one country at different times." The same writer is of opinion that "of all the attempts to estimate geological duration by ordinary chronology the most deceptive, perhaps, is that which is made to depend upon the variations of climate indicated by the organic remains of

* Essay on the Antiquity of Man in "Good Words."

the strata." Nor does he speak more favourably of the arguments in favour of man's antiquity which are founded on archæology. "These archæological periods," he thinks, "are very nearly as vague as those of geology." He states that "the three ages of the prehistoric man (stone, bronze, and iron) do not afford absolute universal chronology, but at most are applicable to the progress of civilization in the particular region where such relics are found." These ages may have been contemporary with each other, taking the comparative civilization of different countries into account: "The stone period is the existing one for the Esquimaux and Australians as the bronze age was for the Mexicans in the time of Columbus. And the 'Kitchen middens' or shell mounds of ancient Denmark, as Admiral Fitzroy pointed out some time ago in a letter to the 'Times,' are accurately reproduced by the modern Fuegians." *

These are the remarks of an eminent geologist, and they are followed by a postscript in which he makes the following very judicious remark, that "when such generalizations become popular there is a danger of *going too fast*, the triumphant propagators of new doctrines being as *much disposed to carry their inferences to success* as their predecessors were inclined to contract their fair application."

All this is surely sufficient to justify the public in general in withholding their judgment upon the great age of mankind until those who are best qualified to judge of the value of the evidence, for believing it, pronounce that evidence to be quite satisfactory.†

* *Ibid.*

† The following questions must all be settled satisfactorily

The oldest date that can be assigned to any human building is about B.C. 2400. Historical records do not reach higher than the 28th century B.C., and there is no

before the extreme antiquity of man can be established:—"1. Is the hypothesis of uniformity reasonable when applied to the whole range and series of geological changes, from first to last? 2. Is it a safe guide to the chronologist, even within the much narrower limit of the quaternary period? 3. Does the evidence prove more than the comparatively modern date of a considerable number of animal species now extinct? 4. Can no explanation be offered of the glacial drift, as least as plausible as that which the Uniformitarians propose? 5. Do not the scientific uncertainties of the problems of geology, even in its most recent periods, justify a refusal to prefer its independent queries as to events from four to six thousand years distant to direct evidence on the subject which dates more than 3,000 years ago? 6. Are there no direct presumptions for the recency of the human race which greatly outweigh the supposed argument from geology for its immense antiquity?"* But each of them, to say the least, is extremely debateable.

All the evidence that can be collected of the age of man may perhaps be arranged under the following heads:—

I. *Scripture.* Variation to the extent of 1,500 years among chronologists.

II. *History.* This, as far as it goes, tends to prove the recency of the origin of man.

III. *Geology.* The proofs furnished by this science may be arranged thus:—The time to be allowed—

1. For the growth of forests and trees.
2. For the growth of peat.
3. For the elevation of raised beaches.
4. For the extinction of species.
5. For the change of climate.
6. For the deposition and removal of gravel beds.
7. For the effects of rivers and torrents.
8. For the duration of the glacial period.

* "Scientific Theories on the Origin of Man."—*Record.*

memorial of man or his works that can be traced with anything like positive certainty farther back than the last 5,000 years. It is true that an answer may be furnished to these facts by the doctrine of development, which implies that man must have existed long prior to the earliest of these dates in a state of such extreme and savage barbarism that he has left nothing behind him to denote that he existed at all. But before reverting to that doctrine it may be useful to remark, that the scriptural account of the fall and its consequences is consistent with almost any amount of degradation in the earliest ages of mankind; and there-

It has been argued that *not one* of all these chronometers can be depended upon.

IV. *Philology.*—Argument from the growth and variety of languages. Answered by Mr. Rawlinson in "Aids to Faith."

V. *Archæology.*—Ancient monuments and buildings; traditions of Eastern nations—Egypt, China, India; early articles of human workmanship; human remains and relics found in caves, &c., &c. None of these *conclusive.*

VI. *Physiology.*—On the supposition that man originated from a single pair, it is supposed that a much longer period than 6,000 years must have elapsed to bring about such physical differences as exist between the negro and the Caucasian, especially since Egyptian monuments prove that the features of the negro were the same 3,000 years ago as they are at present. For an answer to this see letter to Professor Phillips by Mr. Wood. The questions are, 1st, Are these proofs conclusive of a greater antiquity than the variations among orthodox chronologists allow of? 2. If not, is Scripture consistent with the doctrine of pre-Adamic races? This doctrine is ably supported by Dr. M'Causland, in his work, "Adam and the Adamite." For our own parts, we should not suffer our faith to be disturbed if, as some geologists suppose, relics of man shall be found in the pliocene, and even think that the fact would help to explain Scripture.

fore that there is very little weight in the argument of Sir Charles Lyell against the doctrine of human degeneracy. "Had," he says, "the original stock of mankind been really endowed with such superior intellectual powers, and with inspired knowledge; and had they possessed the same improveable nature as their posterity, the point of advancement which they would have reached ere this would have been immeasurably higher." *

We cannot see the necessity for this conclusion. Nothing can be more conceivable than that the descendants of a very gifted stock may rapidly degenerate. Nor is it possible to estimate the degree of debasement to which they may sink. If, therefore, the "original stock of mankind" were, as the Bible teaches us to believe, very highly endowed, their posterity might in a short time have lost almost all traces of the dignity of their origin, and been as much debased as, according to the Bible, were the antediluvian races. In this state the progress of mankind may have been very slow indeed for many generations. Sir Charles himself says, "We see in our own times that the rate of progress proceeds in a geometrical ratio as knowledge increases; and so, when we carry back our retrospect into the past, we must be prepared to find the signs of retardation augmenting in a like geometrical ratio; so that the progress of a thousand years at a remote period may correspond to that of a century in modern times, and in ages still more remote man would more and more resemble the brutes in that attribute which causes one generation

* "Antiquity of Man."

exactly to imitate in all its ways the generation which preceded it." Let us then suppose that a race has degenerated from a primitive state of civilization into the lowest of those above referred to, and we have all the conditions required in order to account for the progress not having been greater than it has been, and is at this moment.* But the eminent geologist whom we have quoted will not, perhaps, admit the hypothesis of degradation, yet it is justified by the clearest evidence.†

* If the advocate of progression by development argues that the comparative recency of all the now existing memorials of man is no proof of his modern origin, since he might have existed for a long time in such a state of barbarism as to leave no traces of himself or his works, we have a right to assume that if he could have *degenerated* into equal barbarism the same result would follow.

† "But are there not races of men still existing which are scarcely distinguishable from the brutes? Well, and what then? Are those men undoubted examples of what all men once were? Let us see, Mr. Development-theory holder, whether there is not a more reasonable account of them to be given. Go and take your stand on the mud-heaps of Mujelibé and Nimroud; ask the wandering Arab to calculate for you the courses of the planets and the period of their return; demand of him canons of architecture, and painting, and sculpture, and cunning work in gold and silver; and when you find that in all these points he is scarcely removed from the veriest savage that exists on earth, will you tell me that Nineveh, and Babylon, and Chaldean sages and Assyrian art are therefore all a lie? Or go, again, to the miserable beings who haunt the ruins of the world-famed temples of Egypt; tell them you come, like Herodotus, more than 2,000 years ago, to gain additions to your stores of human knowledge; and when you find that none can help you, that they do not even understand what you mean, will you say that the wisdom of Egypt is a fable also?" (Letter to Professor Phillips, pp. 21, 22.) The same letter also

We venture, then, to assert, that although the scientific arguments for the vast antiquity of man are numerous and imposing, they leave it, in the present state of the controversy, an "open question;" and we think we have shown, in the first part of this work, that, if thoroughly established, it ought not to weaken in the least degree our faith in the Bible as a Divine revelation.

Closely connected with the doctrine of man's antiquity is that theory of civilization which supposes his natural and original condition to be that of a savage. Such, it has been said, was his state

> Ere the base laws of servitude began,
> When wild in woods the noble savage ran;

while the progress to which some of our race have attained in knowlege and civilization arose, it is contended, from the unaided exercise of their own natural faculties. This theory had till lately been well-nigh abandoned as utterly untenable; but the support which it gives to the kindred theories of development and human antiquity has revived its popularity. The limits of this work oblige us to treat it very briefly, and we must refer the reader for full evidence of its futility to a work by the late Dr. Cook Taylor on "The Natural History of Society," and to a pamphlet by the late Archbishop of Dublin, on the "Origin of Civilization."

refers to striking modern instances, and shows that mere rudeness of implements or mode of life is no test of antiquity, and no proof that it cannot co-exist with the highest civilization elsewhere, by quoting a very pertinent passage from my "Schools and Schoolmasters," by Hugh Miller.

"The savage, then," says Dr. Whately, "is only so far in (comparatively) a state of nature that the acts which he learns and transmits to his children are very few and very rude, and yet it is remarkable that savage life is decidedly more artificial—more anti-natural, than the civilized. The most elaborately dressed fine lady or gentleman has departed far less from nature than a savage of most of the rudest tribes we know of. Most of these not only paint their skins with a variety of fantastic colours, but tattoo them, or decorate their bodies (which is the New Hollander's practice) with rows of artificial scars. The marriage ceremony among some of these tribes is marked, not by putting a ring on the woman's finger, but by cutting off one of the joints of it; and in these same tribes every male, when approaching man's estate, is formally admitted as coming of age by the ceremony of having one of his front teeth knocked out. Some of them wear a long ornament of bone through the middle cartilage of the nose, so as to make the speech indistinct. Other tribes cut a slit in the under lip, so as to make a sort of artificial second mouth in which they fix some kind of fantastic ornament. And some tribes, again, artificially flatten by pressure the forehead of their infants, so as to bring the head even nearer than nature has formed it to a resemblance to that of a brute.

"And their customs are not less artificial than their decorations. To take only one instance out of many, marriage among the most civilized nations of Europe usually takes place between persons who, living in the same society, and becoming well acquainted, contract a

mutual liking for each other; and surely this is the most *natural* course: but among the Australian savages such a marriage is unheard of, and would be counted an abomination; a wife must always be taken by force from another—generally a hostile tribe; and the intended bride must be dragged away with brutal violence and most unmerciful blows." * "Such is man in what is called a state of nature!"

Most people, we suspect, would argue from these facts that man is a fallen being; that these facts prove the civilized man to be more *natural* than the savage, and that, just as human beings advance in knowledge and goodness, do they *return* to the *truly* natural condition from which our race has degenerated.

Mr. Rogers has suggested as a curious commentary on the asserted *unity* and *sufficiency* of "internal revelation" an addition to the Great Exhibition of the *Industry* of all nations in another Great Exhibition of the *Idolatry* of all nations. In this might be exhibited gods of all sorts, and in all stages of manufacture, from the bits of wood or stone which Fetichism has worshipped, up to a Phidian-Jupiter; and all the ugly deities and consecrated monsters of idolatrous superstition, as well in ancient as in modern times, and in all the countries of the world; and we think that as a commentary on the *naturalness* of savage life, the same exhibition might represent every species of skin-painting, and tattooing; of lip-jewels, and nose-rings; of flattened foreheads, distorted crania, artificial mouths, scarred faces, and

* "Origin of Civilization," pp. 8, 9.

Chinese feet,—while it might also exhibit a marriage ceremony, such as the Archbishop describes; and represent along with amputated fingers, and broken teeth, the Australian and highly natural mode of wooing through the gentle solicitation of cuffs and cudgels.

The weakness of this theory may be estimated from the fact that there is not a single instance in all the world's history of a self-civilized people. Of degeneracy from a prior condition there are many examples, but of civilization except "ab extra" there are none. All experience goes to prove that men left in the lowest barbarism never did and never could elevate themselves into a higher condition—all history and all tradition point to this conclusion; and it has been argued with much force that without some Divine instruction *at the beginning* to advance man into the state in which his powers of progressive improvement became available we might have been savages at this day.*

But if vast and various difficulties beset both the theory of man's antiquity and that of his originally savage condition, greater and more numerous still are those which involve that of development. There is no hypothesis, however preposterous, that with clever management may not be made plausible. But no very profound acquaintance with geology and the connected sciences is necessary, we think, to warrant, even on physical grounds, the gravest doubts of the validity of this in particular. It *assumes* that the acknowledged blanks

* See "Origin of Civilization," in which the writer argues that the first beginnings of civilization must have come from a *superhuman* intruder.

in the geological record (and they are very numerous) may yet be filled up, but the probability that they ever will has been denied, and until they are, we have a right to attach their full force to the admission of Mr. Darwin that geology affords no support to his theory, and that this is an obvious and a grave objection to his doctrine. It has been argued, indeed, that the progress of discovery, so far from confirming, appears to contradict the hypothesis, and that the classes of the animal kingdom were not, as the theory, to give it harmony or even consistency, would seem to imply, successive, but to a considerable extent synchronous; that species are not only not found where, according to the development doctrine, they ought to be, but *are* found where they ought *not* to be—that the fertility of a few hybrids makes against rather than in favour of the hypothesis, since such races, instead of exhibiting a tendency to perpetuate the new type, exhibit on the contrary a tendency to revert to the old—that the analogies furnished by vegetable life are not conclusive since we are too ignorant to be sure that such life must be identical in character with that of animals—that mere varieties may be mistaken for transmuted species—that the classes of animals who have successively tenanted the earth were not at first, as the exigences of the theory would seem to require, low, diminutive, or half-developed creatures, but, as far as we can discover, of the highest type, and in a state of perfection from which they afterwards degenerated; * and

* This fact was strongly insisted upon by the late Professor Sedgwick, and, however it may have been replied to, there is another fact which militates against the theory, and to which we

that the supposed law of development has acted, and yet ceases to act, in a way that opposes our notions of law altogether.†

But these are not the only grounds on which we object to the theory. The reasoning on which it is founded strongly favours a system of pantheistic materialism which is just as repugnant to right reason and common sense as it is fatal to all religion. Sir Charles

cannot see that the imperfection of the geological record is an answer. That theory seems to imply that in every living organism there is a tendency to improvement. "How is it, then, that there exist these very low forms of life which are still found in nature? How is it that the tendency was so unequally developed, especially in those very early ages when the struggle for existence was at a minimum? How is it that the monad has never had the opportunity of developing into an oyster—much less, like some of his more fortunate brethren, into a man? nay, that the protophyte at the dawn of the creation is a protophyte still?" (Letter to Professor Phillips.) "Suppose that during each of the four periods —silurian, carboniferous, oolitic, and cretaceous—a single monad only got a fair chance of being improved into higher form—and surely this is a very modest supposition—we should then have four series of ascending developments, of which it is not even pretended that any traces have ever been discovered. And the more Mr. Darwin extends his period in order to account for the extreme imperfection of the geological record, the more unintelligible does it become that we should fail to find many such series. And if it were argued, as some might argue, that lower forms, because they are capable generally of wider variations than more complex ones, would be more easily improved than others, it would increase the chances against the present existence of simple forms of life so immensely, that their existence would be incredible." (*Ibid.*, Appendix, Note C.)

† See *ibid.*, pp. 7, 8.

Lyell it is true maintains that the views of Mr. Darwin are logically consistent with theism; but others entertain a different opinion, and if they judge correctly we have no alternative left us but to infer that there must be a grievous mistake *somewhere* in the reasoning that would lead to such monstrous conclusions.*

But with reference to man in particular. Granting that his anatomical resemblance to an ape is as close as some (but only some) anatomists suppose, we have still to account for the wide gulph of separation that divides the human race, intellectually, morally, and spiritually, from all the rest of the living creation. †

In this case at least the axiom "natura non agit saltatim" is not verified. Geologists have not yet dis-

* In connexion with the immortality of the soul the development theory involves this dilemma, either all living things have immortal souls, or man has by some special exception. If *all* living things have such souls we must form a strange notion of the future world. If man, on the other, hand is exceptional, the doctrine that the Creator *never* interferes must be abandoned. See *ibid.*, pp. 15, 18. If, again, He does sometimes interfere, at what point did this interference occur? In what stage of the development did an anthropoid creature acquire a soul?

† "I feel so sure," said the late Sydney Smith, "that the blue ape without a tail will never rival us in poetry, painting, and music, that I see no reason whatever why justice may not be done to the few fragments of soul and tatters of understanding which they may really possess. I have sometimes felt a little uneasy at Exeter Change from contrasting the monkeys with the prentice boys who are teasing them; but a few pages of Locke, or a few lines of Milton, have always restored me to tranquillity, and convinced me that the superiority of man had nothing to fear."

covered such a class of highly intelligent anthropomorphous apes prior to man as would preserve the continuity of the "finely graduated chain" that links, it is supposed, the lowest order of living creatures with the highest. It is no sufficient answer to our objection either to say that such apes *may* yet be discovered, or to say that if not there are analogous difficulties in the constitution of the world around us. The first reply proves no more than that we ought to suspend our judgment. The second, that since it applies to a certain system of philosophy, it may also apply to Christianity, and therefore that there is real weight in the arguments of Bishop Butler in favour of revealed religion. The same argument which is available to the scientific naturalist must also, in common fairness, be available to the Christian divine; and if in the hands of the latter it shows the credibility of the whole Christian scheme, and that scheme be fortified, as we contend it is, by other arguments of various kinds, forming a chain of evidence much stronger than that which supports the development theory, then, when the scientific hypothesis cannot be reconciled with the Divine announcements, we are bound, in reason, to prefer the Word of God to the speculations of man. "Yea, let God be true, but every man a liar." We think, then, that the only hypothesis which can account for the present condition and past history of man, without supposing him to be a fallen creature, is untenable, and therefore that the argument contained in the preceding chapters in favour of the scriptural doctrine of human degradation from the fact

that it accounts for all that we require it to explain is satisfactory.*

* In addition to the different replies which have been here quoted to the scientific arguments in favour of the high antiquity of man, the reader may consult some valuable papers in "Good Words" on the subject.

And it ought to be remembered that there are arguments for the *recency* of our race arising from—

1. The actual number of the world's population at present, which, according to a calculation of the probable rate of increase, would be reached in about 4,000 or 5,000 years.

2. The low date of all authentic history.

3. The comparatively modern date of arts, sciences, and inventions.

4. The moral reasoning which forbids the supposition of so vast a period of extreme gloom and barbarism as the opposite theory demands. (See "Scientific Theories," &c., pp. 81, 87.)

LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS.

Most wondrous book! bright candle of the Lord!
Star of eternity! the only star
By which the bark of man could navigate
The sea of life, and gain the coast of bliss
Securely;—only star which rose on Time,
And on its dark and troubled billows still,
As generation, drifting swiftly by,
Succeeded generation, threw a ray
Of Heaven's own light, and to the hills of God—
The everlasting hills—pointed the sinner's eye.
This book—this glorious book—on every line
Marked with the seal of high divinity;
On every leaf bedewed with drops of love
Divine; and with the eternal heraldry
And signature of God Almighty stampt,
From first to last this ray of sacred light—
This lamp from off the everlasting throne—
Mercy took down; and, in the night of time,
Stood casting on the dark her gracious bow,
And evermore beseeching man with tears
And earnest sighs, to read, believe, and live.

If there be any value at all in the preceding remarks on the darkness of mankind, they justify Paley in saying, "I deem it unnecessary to prove that mankind stood in need of a revelation because I have met with no

serious person who thinks that, even under the Christian revelation, we have too much light, or any degree of assurance that is superfluous." He concluded that since it is now night no rational being could gravely maintain that there was no occasion for enlightenment. But if he were at present alive he would find not only that many persons, apparently quite serious, deny that a revelation is requisite, but that a living writer holds a revelation, at least an "authoritative *book* revelation of moral and spiritual truth to be *impossible!*" But his own book treats of moral and spiritual truth, and if it be worth anything *ought* to have authority. It appears, then, either that his own volume is of no use to mankind, or that, if it be, it is impossible for God to do that which the writer has himself accomplished! Now, we suspect that most people are under the impression, that what that writer has done God can do—and even do better; nor can we conceive how any explanation, addition, or qualification, can rescue from this very obvious retort the startling proposition that "an authoritative book revelation of moral and spiritual truth is *impossible!*" * Another writer tells us that a revelation like the Bible must be actually mischievous. "This theory," he says, "makes inspiration a very rare miracle, confined to one nation and to some score of men † in that nation

* For an admirable illustration on this point, see "a dialogue showing that that may be possible with man which is impossible with God" in the "Eclipse of Faith;" also a "Defence of the Eclipse of Faith."

† For an answer to the arguments of this writer, see "The Bible and Modern Thought," by the Rev. T. R. Birks, chap. ii.,

who stand between us and God. We cannot pray in our own name, but in that of the Mediator who makes

p. 20. He divides them into three heads. The first, he says, is made to lie against the notion that a supernatural revelation is needful, or even desirable; and this he answers, 1, by an appeal "from dreams to facts," proving that, according to his opponent's own showing, "men have been groping for thousands of years in blindness, but that they must be held on *à priori* grounds to have lived all the time in clear daylight, rather than sceptics will own that there could be any need for a supernatural revelation;" and, 2, by general reasoning. The second argument, he says, is that a miraculous revelation would be positively hurtful, because it disparages and sets aside natural religion, and confines inspiration to a few persons only in a remote age of the world's history. This he answers by showing—what is surely plain enough—that "the gift of revelation withdraws from mankind nothing which they really possessed before, but, on the contrary, makes the lessons of God's natural works plainer than ever, and that the only sacrifice it involves is that of mischievous delusions by which men indulge in vain fancies of light and knowledge while they are really sunk in gross darkness." The reader may also refer to "Butler's Analogy," part ii., chap. 2, where he shows the importance of Christianity, first, because it is a REPUBLICATION and external institution of natural or essential religion adapted to the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to *promote* natural piety and virtue; and, second, as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason," &c. Mr. Birks answers the charge that Christianity is confined to a few individuals, and that it restricts the presence of God to particular times, places, and persons, by showing that it has "no other ground than a palpable abuse of terms," pp. 24, 25. He shows that there is a natural, a moral, and a prophetic inspiration: that the natural belongs to all mankind; that the moral is the privilege of holy and regenerate souls; and that the prophetical is claimed for prophets and Evangelists—an inspiration which, instead of being made universal by the sceptic, is denied altogether—while

intercession for us. It exalts miraculous persons and degrades men. Our duty is *not to inquire into the truth of their word.* Reason is no judge of that. We must put faith in all that all of them tell us. It sacrifices reason, conscience, and love to the words of the miraculous men, and this makes its mediator a tyrant who rules *over* the soul by external authority, not a brother who acts *in* the soul by awakening its dormant powers" (yet this is one of the very ways in which, according to Christianity, the Spirit of God really does act). "It says the canon of Revelation is closed. God will no longer act on man as heretofore. We are come to the end of the feast, are born in the latter days and dotage of mankind, and can only get light by raking among the ashes of the past. The religion of supernaturalism* is worn out and second-handed. Its vice is to restrict the Divine presence and action to towns, places, and

the sort of inspiration "claimed by the sceptic himself is not denied by the Christian but only freed from absurd and mischievous exaggeration." See also "Butler's Analogy," part ii., chap. 5, on the "want of a universality in religion." The third argument that Mr. Birks refers to in the writer above cited, is that Divine revelation lays a yoke upon the reason and conscience that is tyrannical, &c. If the claims of a supposed revelation be false, the admission of its Divine authority will impose a heavy burden upon all whom it has deceived. But if God has really made known His will to mankind, His gift, as a God of wisdom and truth, can never be felt as an oppressive yoke by any but the proud, the self-willed, and the profane.

* We take the whole passage and comment upon it, though some of it is not quite relevant to the immediate subject in hand; because we can thus meet some common objections to Christianity, as well as to any revelation.

persons. It overlooks the fact that if religious truth be necessary for all, then it must have been provided and put within the reach of all,—or else there is a fault in the Divine plan." "Discourse of Religion," pp. 156, 158. Now, we shall be excused, we hope, until clear proof is given to the contrary, for believing that there is a fault, not in the Divine plan, but in the author's reasoning. But in addition to the answers referred to in the preceding note, it may be useful to make upon that passage a few general observations. It tells us that our duty as Christians is not to inquire "into the truth of the word" of inspired men. If this mean that having once convinced ourselves that they *are* inspired, we are not to doubt their word; the statement is true, but we have yet to learn how it can be unreasonable in an *erring* creature to submit his own reason to the reason of his *un*erring Creator, since that Creator speaks (according to the supposition) through the men whom He has inspired. But if it mean that we are not to inquire into the validity of their claims to the needful inspiration, that reason is no judge of *them*, and that we are to believe all that all so-called inspired men tell us, without troubling ourselves to consider whether they are inspired or not, we utterly deny the existence of any such obligation. Where is it said in Scripture, 'believe everything you hear, take all men always exactly at their word. If a man calls himself a prophet, follow him,—teach what he may?' What it *does* say is, "believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be of God." "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good." It speaks of the "*signs*" of an

apostle, and "the *infallible proofs*" of the resurrection. It inculcates faith as a virtue and condemns unbelief; but then the only faith which it enjoins is that which substantiates things hoped for, and realizes things *unseen*, not things *untrue*; while the only unbelief that it condemns is that which is avoidable and wilful. "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin; but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father. If I had not come and spoken unto them they had not had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin. If I do not the works of my Father believe me not; but if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may *know and believe* that the Father is in me and I in him." (John x. 37, 38.) If, again, the expression of the author in question—"We are not to inquire into the truth of the word of these inspired men. Reason is no judge of that"—mean that we are to attach no weight *at all* to whatever, after impartial and careful study and reflection, *appears to us* very improbable in their statements, so that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their doctrine, prior to the proof of it from external considerations, is not to be any part whatever of the evidence of the truth or the falsehood of those statements—statements which we are to believe or reject on *other grounds*—we deny this also. The apparent *à priori* improbability that some of them can be perfectly true in all respects is a fair ground of objection as *far as it goes*, but in justice there should be weighed against it the opposing evidence; for it is thus, and thus only, that we can ever ascertain on which side the balance of

probability preponderates. But that it goes a very little way indeed, if any at all, will be evident to those who will carefully consider the arguments of Bishop Butler. He tells us (see "Analogy," Part II., chap. iii. in full) that his design in that part of the work is to observe in general with respect to this whole way of arguing, that upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree, and that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great objections, in case we judge of it otherwise than by the analogy of nature. And therefore, though objections against the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet objections against Christianity itself are in a great measure frivolous—almost all objections against it, excepting those which are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God. "I express myself," he says, "with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason, which is, indeed, the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even revelation itself; or be misunderstood to assert that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false from internal character . . . . Yet still the observation is, I think, true beyond doubt that objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous." He then goes on to accomplish this design; and as the present work is one of reference to proof, rather than of proof itself, it is enough in this place to direct the reader's attention to the whole chapter. The same prelate anticipates the objection against a mediator and intercessor. ("Analogy," Part II., chap. vi.) As for the statement

that the canon of Revelation is closed; that God will no longer act upon man as heretofore, and that we are come to the end of the feast, &c., we may quote the Bishop again:—"And as it is owned that the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so if it ever comes to be understood before the *restitution of all things*, and without miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way that natural knowledge is come at —by the continuance and progress of learning and of liberty, and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing intimations scattered up and down in it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all improvements are made, by thoughtful men tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seemed to come into our minds by chance; nor is it at all incredible that a book which has been so long in possession of mankind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered, for all the same phenomena and the same faculties of investigation from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age were equally in the possession of mankind several thousand years before. And possibly it might be intended that events as they come to pass should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture." ("Analogy," Part II., chap. iii.) Since the above passage was written, "the progress of learning and of liberty" has silenced objections which once appeared unanswerable. Take, as an example, the memorable discrepancy between Daniel and Berosus, the Chaldean historian. The former tells us that Belshazzar, the

latter that Nabonidus was the last king of Babylon. Daniel informs us that at the capture of the city this last king was there slain, Berosus that he *left* it to attack the approaching invader, and that though defeated, he was *not* slain, but retired into Carmania, where he died. It appears, however, that in the ruins of the ancient city of Ur, of the Chaldeans, certain inscriptions have been found upon cylinders of clay, from which it turns out that Belshazzar was the eldest son of Nabonidus, and that he reigned conjointly with his father. Thus there were two last kings of Babylon. Nothing, then, is simpler than the explanation. One king—the father—left the city to encounter the enemy, was defeated, but not slain, and permitted to retire into Carmania, where he died; the other king, Belshazzar the son, remained at Babylon and was killed; and the more closely the account in Daniel is examined, the more complete does this reconciliation appear. "Particular persons attending to, comparing and pursuing intimations scattered up and down" in Scripture which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world has led to the great work of Paley, the celebrated "Horæ Paulinæ," one of the most convincing books in its way that has ever yet been written, while it has also led to a less-known, but still a very able, book by Mr. Blunt on the undesigned coincidences of the Old Testament. Again, the progress of learning has confirmed Scripture by showing the correspondence in many striking particulars between sacred history and the inscriptions at Nineveh, as also between the statements of Scripture and those of

classical authors respecting historical facts. Modern research has brought to light so many, such minute, and such diversified points of agreement between the sacred writers and ancient authors regarding, not only occurrences but times, places, and persons, as stamp the seal of unmistakeable historical, geographical, and general accuracy upon the inspired narratives. (See "The Bible and Modern Thought," chapters v. and vi.) The same progress of learning has brought a better knowledge of Hebrew, than once prevailed among biblical scholars, to the aid of Christianity, and has conclusively demonstrated that certain objections to the book of Genesis are unfounded. (See Dr. M'Caul's Essay on Geology and Scripture, in "Aids to Faith;" also "Moses or the Zulu," by the Rev. W. Wickes.)*

M'Causland and many other writers have shown that on the whole the correspondency between Geological facts and the Mosaic cosmogony is such as proves that Moses must have derived his information from sources which were supernatural.

"We are astonished," says Dr. M'Caul, "to see how the Hebrew prophet in his brief and rapid outline, sketched 3,000 years ago, has anticipated some of the most wonderful of recent discoveries, and can ascribe the accuracy of his statements and language to nothing but inspiration. Moses relates how God created the heavens and the earth at an indefinitely remote period before the earth was the habitation of man. Geology

* Also an interesting book by the Rev. William Hoare on the veracity of Genesis.

has lately discovered the existence of a long prehuman period. A comparison with other Scriptures shows that 'the heavens' of Moses include the abode of angels and the place of the fixed stars which existed before the earth. Astronomy points out remote worlds where light began its journey long before the existence of man. Moses declares that the earth was, or became, covered with water and was desolate and empty. Geology has proved by its investigation that the primitive globe was covered by an uniform ocean and that there was a long azoic period during which neither plant nor animal could live. Moses states that there was a time when the earth was not dependent on the sun for light or heat, when, therefore, there could be no climatic differences. Geology has lately verified this statement by finding that tropical plants and animals were scattered over all parts of the earth. Moses asserts that the earth existed before the sun was given as a luminary. Modern science proposes a theory which explains how this was possible. Moses asserts that there is an expanse extending from the earth to distant heights in which the heavenly bodies are placed. Recent discoveries lead to the supposition of some subtle fluid medium in which they move. Moses describes the progress of Creation as gradual, and mentions the order in which living things appeared—plants, fishes, fowls, land animals, man. By the study of nature geology has arrived independently at the same conclusion. Where did Moses get all this knowledge? How was it that he led this rapid sketch with such scientific accuracy. in his day possessed the knowledge which genius

and science have only recently attained, that knowledge is superhuman. If he did not possess the knowledge, then his pen must have been guided by superhuman wisdom." ("Aids to Faith," pp. 232, 233.) What is true of science is true also of criticism, for after carefully distinguishing between the *guesses* of a few individuals and the well established results of sober critical investigation it will be found, we doubt not, that the labours of the learned will remove most, if not all, of those remaining difficulties which perplex the interpretation of the Scriptures. The past leads us to anticipate to a certain extent the future, and, in the words of the author last cited—

"The history of the last 100 years, since modern criticism took its rise, is sufficient to quiet the reader's mind as to the ultimate result. It tells of theory after theory propounded by the critics of the day, first applauded, then controverted, then rejected, just like the philosophic systems of the same period, and yet a gradual advance from antichristian hostility to an effort after scientific impartiality, and a large amount of positive gain for the right interpretation of Scripture, and the confirmation of the old Christian belief." (*Ibid*, p. 234.) It appears, then, that even if we *have* come to "the end of the feast," we have neither exhausted the good things with which it is provided, nor had the fullest proof that it is only a false and perverted taste that cannot appreciate their excellence. The longer and the more carefully this heavenly food is examined and tested, the more nourishing it is found. In proportion as new and more correct modes of analysis are adopted,

the more clearly will adulteration be detected (if any there be); the more conclusive will be the proofs that what those who would not themselves accept of the invitation, "Come taste and see," pronounced to be noxious was nutritious, and the truer will seem the words of inspiration, "And in this mountain shall the Lord of Hosts make unto all people a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the lees, of fat things full of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined." But we must finish the quotation, for until the prediction it contains is accomplished, there will always be murmurers against the manna. "And he will destroy in this mountain the face of the covering cast over all people, and the veil that is spread over all nations." (Isaiah xxv. 6, 7, 8.)

"The religion of supernaturalism," we are told, "is worn out and second-handed." Yet it is astonishing how often and how confidently all this has been said centuries ago. Somehow or other, it is very hard to put this effete system to death. It has contrived to outlive all the predictions of its downfall, as well as all the assaults of its opponents. It certainly possesses a very obstinate vitality. Again and again has it been "given over, and again and again has it revived." Every possible weapon, both mental and material, that could be forged in the armouries of scepticism, has been wielded for its overthrow, but in vain; and, "worn out" though it be, it has a surprising grasp upon a very large proportion of even the strongest, the most intellectual, and the most enlightened minds of the present generation. In fact, a religion of supernaturalism can never be worn out until the human race

is worn out; for if there be one sentiment of which, more decisively than of another, we can say that it is innate and universal, that sentiment is a tendency to believe in *something* supernatural. We can trace its operation among the memorials which Sir Charles Lyell thinks he can recognise in "man the mighty hunter, when, long before tradition left behind him one proof of his achievements in the field, he chased the cave-lion and the woolly rhinoceros over ground which for ages have known them no more." And whoever has read some of the many works on modern "spiritual manifestations" must admit that it is far as yet from being extinct, even among those who think they are not *superstitious* enough to believe in the Scriptures.

Now, if a belief in the supernatural is thus a sort of instinct of our nature, there must be *something* supernatural to meet it, for our instincts are not mockeries. A religion, then (if such were possible), which was not supernatural would not be accommodated to the human character, and would therefore be *un*-natural. It would not address itself to a fundamental element of man's moral constitution. It would supply, as it were, no drink for thirst, and no food for appetite. The very idea of religion implies the supernatural. A God and a future existence cannot be included in any category of being and of fact but one, which comprehends more than agrees with our every-day experience. Spirit, pure spirit, in this sense, is supernatural. Hence all stories of spectral apparitions are called tales of the supernatural. There is, indeed, another sense of the word in which it means, or is taken to mean, some

interference with the laws of nature. Thus understood it includes all that is said to be miraculous. But the objection to a religion proved by miracles is, after all, an objection founded on a want of conformity between the event alleged to be miraculous and the general experience of mankind. Now all the principal objects of religious belief are also unconformable to this general experience. No one pretends to have seen either heaven or hell, or God or a spirit, or, if he does, he is supposed to be insane. Yet these, or some of them, are the subjects of all religious belief; and without that belief there could be no religion whatever. Never, then, till religion is worn out and man is worn out can a supernatural religion be worn out; and since it must have *some* supernatural verity to suit it, unless our moral being is one vast lie, what supernatural verity is more probable than a Divine revelation? Hence the readiness with which, in all ages, spurious revelations have been accepted. They ministered to a universal want. They addressed a principle to which every bosom gave an echo. Men were in darkness, and hailed instinctively whatever professed to be the light—the light that was lost and longed for. They were ignorant often of the loss, but the desire was not to be mistaken; and we can no more believe that God has given a desire which is *never* to be gratified, than we can believe that He has given eyes and yet not supplied the fluid, if such it be, that is requisite for vision. Thus the case is truly stated by Bishop Butler:—"A revelation is miraculous, and miracles are the proof of it." It is something which agrees not with the general experience of man; and

while a miracle once granted to be real silences for ever the argument that *all* miracles are impossible, it is not more or much more improbable that miracles should prove a miracle than it is that the miracle requiring that proof should have been accomplished.

"Its vice," the vice, that is, of this worn-out supernaturalism, "is to restrict the Divine presence and action to towns, places, and persons. It overlooks the fact that if religious truth be necessary for all, then it must either have been provided and put within the reach of all, or else there is a fault in the Divine plan. If the two main points (a knowledge of the existence of God and of the duty we owe to Him) be within the reach of man's natural powers, how is a miracle, or the tradition of a miracle, needed to reveal the minor involved in the universal truth? Where, then, is the use of miraculous interposition?" Now we had imagined (weakly perhaps) that Bishop Butler had long ago disposed of all this class of objections. But be this as it may, we are certain that the best way of proving them to be unanswerable, and the best way of making the "absolute religion" which excludes them universal, would be to write a systematic reply to that Bishop's celebrated "Analogy." We who still cling to the worn-out supernaturalism are wont to consider him as one of the profoundest thinkers that ever was born. His great work was the result, we are told, of some thirty years' thought, and we are apt to suppose that the thirty years' thought of such a mind must be worth something, especially since now, after a lapse of about 130 years, no one that we know of has yet attempted its refutation.

But possibly some professor of modern "insight" might make short work of it; until, however, some such reply is forthcoming, we shall prefer the light of Moses, Isaiah, Saint Peter and St. Paul, both to our own "insight" and that of a school which teaches an absolute and universal religion, but whose disciples disagree, notwithstanding, on the *somewhat* important point of the soul's immortality. We shall believe in the fact of a Divine revelation, although a teacher of that school tells us in what (if good and true) is virtually *his own* "authoritative book revelation of moral and spiritual truth" that such a revelation *from God* is *impossible;* and we shall think that, after all, Bishop Butler is a sufficient authority to justify the following quotation from his "Analogy." "Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation as in its very notion incredible, and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain no revelation would have been given had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense as to render one not wanting and useless. But no man in seriousness and simplicity of mind can possibly think it so who considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation, and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light from it, particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men concerning things of the utmost importance as well as the natural inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system which we call natural religion in its genuine simplicity clear of superstition; but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the

generality could; if they could, there is no sort of probability that they would. Admitting there were, they would highly want a standing admonition to remind them of it and inculcate it upon them. And, further still, were they as much disposed to attend to religion as the better sort of men are, yet even upon this supposition there would be various occasions for supernatural instruction and assistance, and the greatest advantages might be afforded by them; so that to say revelation is a thing superfluous, what there is no need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at random."

From the very data which our opponents have supplied to prove that a revelation is either impossible or improbable we deduce a totally opposite conclusion. They contend that all men, even the "man whose hands are smeared all over with the blood of human sacrifice," have within them an internal oracle whose responses anticipate and supersede any external revelation. Now we admit that all men have a certain natural religious sentiment—a certain vague tendency to worship *something* that is invisible, and a capacity for learning religious truth; for all this a divine revelation presupposes. But the whole analogy of the human faculties and sentiments makes it presumable that this "vague potentiality" should require something external to itself for its proper development. It is only the animal instincts and the senses which of themselves, and without any external instruction or education, suggest immediately the requisite material, and furnish at once the specific intelligence—hunger may be left to itself with-

out the least danger of mistaking water for meat, and it requires no oculist to teach us to see. But the higher our faculties and sentiments the more need there is for something outside of themselves to bring them to perfection. The highest, perhaps, of our intellectual powers is the reasoning faculty, yet it is only by careful discipline, intellectual conflict with the same faculty in *other* minds than our own, and in some cases a regular system of logic deliberately learned from without, that this faculty is brought into steady, useful, and trustworthy operation. It is the same with imagination. No doubt there are intuitions of creative genius, which cause the real poet to throw untaught, "thoughts that breathe" "into words that burn." But the sort of imagination which so often aids the philosopher in his discoveries, is one that must never run wild. There are rules from without which check its wanderings, and curb its extravagance. In general our intellectual faculties are made into safe guides and developed to their full extent only by something exterior to themselves, and this fact is implied in the two words "instruction"—that is a pouring into—and "education," or a leading out from. For it is only from without that we can pour in, and only from without that that which lies latent can be brought forth. It is the same with the moral sentiments. Benevolence without any external guide or director is often blindly impulsive and almost as frequently mischievous as it is useful. This guide is not always the reason of the person whose benevolent sympathies are to be properly governed, for it is often another individual who acts in giving them a right direc-

tion, but in any case they are not left to themselves. Justice, unrestrained by laws, often becomes "the *wild* justice of revenge." What is true of benevolence and justice is equally true of what we generally understand by conscience. Of all the principles which ought to regulate our conduct it is, next to religion, perhaps the highest and most important; but men, for conscience sake, have committed awful crimes, and how repeatedly we are obliged to ask counsel from others in order to exercise this principle aright! The science of ethics stands to the moral feelings in a relation somewhat similar to that in which the art of logic stands to the faculty of reasoning. It is a system for developing and directing certain internal tendencies and capacities which require its teaching to bring them to perfection. It is the wisdom of other minds applied to the improvement of our own. It is a process from without to produce the desired result from within. The same law which regulates the lower and the higher elements of the nature of man appears to pervade the whole animal creation. The lower animals are very soon independent. The spawn of the fish are deposited in a suitable locality, and left there. Reptiles lay their eggs in the sand or some fitting situation and desert them—but in both cases the young creatures come forth and with little if any parental care soon do for themselves. Birds on the contrary require for a time a tender exercise of that care. Mammals need it still more urgently, while man without it would utterly perish in his infancy, and depends upon others longer and more helplessly than any other animal in existence. The instincts of animals are un-

erring—"no bee makes a mistake in his geometry." The reason of man on the contrary is often at fault, and requires a gradual and careful education furnished externally to itself, in various ways before it reaches its maturity. If, then, the whole analogy of nature shows that it is only the lower forms of life and the lower manifestations of mind that can be trusted to act spontaneously and independently, and that the higher we ascend in the scale the more pressing is the need for outward aids, and for dependence upon extrinsic agency, it is natural to conclude that when we reached the highest of all human sentiments—the sentiment that makes man most Godlike—that is the religious, this necessity would be more than ever imperative. In all the other cases the need is supplied from nature and from man, but in this case the very elevation, the crowning dignity of the sentiment itself, which brings as it were the creature into contact with his Creator, would seem to demand an adventitious agency that was higher than natural, as well as more constant and complete—in short a Divine revelation. Thus, it would appear that the very last case in which, judging from analogy, it would be reasonable to expect a sufficient guide in mere *intuition*, is that of religion. Hence it is on the very data from which our opponents deduce an argument against a revelation that we build an argument for its necessity. There seems to be a vagueness and dependency in the principles of our nature proportioned to their dignity; and accordingly this vagueness is proved from experience to be greatest of all in the highest. Yet this vagueness is the religion that need not be supple-

mented with a Divine revelation! Surely the whole analogy of nature goes to prove that this indefinite feeling was meant to be assisted and illuminated by something beyond itself, but the light of other human minds than our own is not exempted from the feebleness from which ours are suffering, and to depend upon their enlightenment is like asking darkness to irradiate darkness. This external aid, then, must come from a source that is higher than human—it must be divine; but since it has pleased God that almost all the knowledge which man can acquire, especially on the higher subjects of thought, should be communicated by books, we conclude from the very constitution of our mental and moral nature that nothing is more probable than that which some of our opponents pronounce impossible, namely, a Divine "book revelation of moral and spiritual truth."

Another argument of our adversaries is founded on the fixity, uniformity, and catholicity of natural laws. A revelation such as *we* contend for is in its nature miraculous. It implies a special interposition of the Divine Intelligence. But such an interference, they tell us, is contrary to experience (it would be more proper to say *not conformable* to *general* experience); and if God were indeed so to interpose, it would be by some such obvious and universal agency as would resemble the ordinary laws of the Creation. In the language of one of this school, "In the moral as in the physical world, it is ever on a great scale and by simple means that Deity operates." The universality, the perpetuity, and the uniformity of natural laws are thus employed to negative the notion of a revelation, and

especially such a revelation as the Christian. But here again we deduce from the datum of our adversary's argument the very conclusion he would employ it to falsify. We admit that the laws of nature *are* uniform, and argue that for this very reason something *unusual* is necessary to remind us of the *legislator*. It is this unbroken uniformity that has caused in many minds a tendency not only to speculative, but also and especially to practical Atheism. As long as the harmonies of nature appear not to be interrupted, and natural processes to be carried on without disturbance, we are apt to forget that there exists a universal Ruler, who, if He pleases, can throw this order into confusion. The tendency in question is that of those scoffers in the last days, of whom we read in Scripture, and who, "walking after their own lusts, shall say, "Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep all things are as they were from the beginning of the Creation." It is a strange but undeniable fact, that the very perfection of His laws has caused the Legislator to be forgotten. They operate with a regularity which shows that they proceed from one "who spake, and it was done; who commanded, and it stood fast." But this sublime uniformity, instead of impressing us with a deeper reverence for that infinite Creator who has thus ordered into unswerving obedience the whole material universe, and made it eloquent with the praises of His power, often lulls us into a forgetfulness of His agency if not of His very existence, just as the monotony of the same murmuring stream, which at first delights the listener with its music, may cheat him at last into slumber as it rolls

hour after hour thus evenly along. But let there be something apparently exceptional in the workings of some established law, and then shall men in general bethink themselves of Him whose voice, unheard as it whispered in the ordinary breeze, becomes startling in the hurricane and the thunderstorm.

"The hand," says a modern writer, "that God has constructed so wondrously can write 'There is no God,' but let it be smitten with sudden paralysis, and the notion of an intervening avenger will arise; nay, let us at any time behold some strange unique in any of the departments of experience, and it startles our habitual slumber. That is to say, as long as the work is *perfect*, we recognise no worker; but the moment it becomes deficient (the very thing which ought logically to produce the doubt), we begin to conceive and admit its reality. The more apparently capricious the works of nature, the more they resemble man's, and the more they remind us of direct agency analogous to the human. Now if this be so, could it be expected that to produce an acknowledgment of His being and attributes, the Deity would continue to employ the same medium of regular and ordinary laws, the same vast and uniform processes in the physical and moral world which in all ages have tended (such is the miserable subjection of man to an unreasoning imagination) to render His agency suspected by some, and practically forgotten by the many. To make Himself felt, He must *disturb* His laws; in other words, He must perform or permit 'miracles.' But then He must likewise exhibited them *sparingly*, as if they continued to appear on assignable principles of stated

recurrence and in definite cycles—nay, if they appeared *frequently* though unfixedly, they would enter into the procession of the laws of nature, and thus lose their proper use and character. What follows? It follows that miracles cannot be presented to every successive age, far less to each individual person; they must then be presented only to *some particular age or ages*, and to some particular personal witnesses. But we have seen that they ought to be publicly and continually *known*, therefore (there being but one way of transmitting past events to present times) revealed religion and the knowledge of God, which we have seen is only thus to be practically and influentially attained, must be made dependent upon human *testimony*. There is no step of this deduction which might not be made by a man who had never heard of any actual revelation having been given to man; it is purposely built upon the simplest principles of our common nature. But to the believer in the Gospel message, how powerfully do the hundred voices of history echo the truth of these views! History proclaims (and the sound of her testimony shatters in an instant the airy structures of mere speculation) that, in point of fact, God never *has* been in any form acknowledged by the mass of mankind except under the supposition of a direct interposition, whether true or false, that He never has been rightly or decorously worshipped by the same mass of men until a true revelation, handed down by and believed on testimony, did that for the world which the 'natural laws,' the 'simple means,' the harmony of the world, and the glorious spectacle of the starry heavens never effected in a single nation of the

earth—never thoroughly and constantly effected perhaps in a single mind since the fall of Adam! We are accused of evading arguments from reason; this seems to me to amount to something like *demonstration* that a traditional revelation, built on testimony transmitted from man to man, that is, of a Bible and sermon religion, far from being improbable (as the impugners of an 'historical creed' so eloquently insist), is actually the form of religion imperatively demanded by the *very structure of human nature.*" ("Sermons, Doctrinal and Practical," by Dr. Archer Butler. First Series. Sermon XXII., pp. 314—16.)

Now, we think the above extract a sufficient answer, not only to the objection that the Christian revelation is miraculous and supported by miracles, but to all the class of objections with which it is generally associated. This distinguished writer has shown that the very uniformity and universality of natural laws, when taken in connexion with *the acknowledged nature of man*, prove that after all the "worn-out and second-handed supernaturalism" is the necessary character of a true revelation. He has also shown that, since miraculous agency of some sort is required, that agency must be occasional only, and confined to particular ages and particular witnesses, otherwise it would defeat its own object, thus answering the objection, "Its vice is to restrict the Divine presence and action," &c., &c.; while the same writer has further shown that since the miracles must be *known*, yet can be known only by the way in which the knowledge of past occurrences is conveyed to present generations, that is, by human testimony, a book

revelation recording that testimony is the very revelation that might have been naturally and reasonably expected.

Mr. Faber considers most justly a disbelief in either the possibility or the probability of a revelation among the "difficulties of infidelity." "A careful father," he says, "is anxious to give every information to his child which may qualify him to play a useful and respectable part in society; and should any parent *systematically* withhold such knowledge from his son, we should deem his plan an extraordinary mark of extreme folly. But the Deist, on his own principles, is obliged to believe that what we deem the very perfection of folly in man is precisely the line of conduct adopted by a God of confessedly surpassing wisdom in regard to the whole intelligent human species. This wonderfully wise Being created man, and placed him as a sovereign in our nether world. But He left him in a state of profound ignorance, both as to the unity or plurality of his Creator; both as to the moral attributes of the Deity and his own consequent moral obligation. Not the slightest lesson did He give him; not the least care did He take that he should well answer any supposable end of his creation. On the contrary, He industriously withheld from him all knowledge of his most intimate concerns and interests. Nor did He merely refrain from giving him the requisite information . . . . The knowledge was at once systematically denied to him, and the means of acquiring that knowledge by any possible exertion of industry were studiously withheld. Man was never taught that there is one God only; and he is utterly unable to attain to any certainty respecting the unity of the Godhead.

Man was never taught that God is good and just and merciful; and he is utterly unable to demonstrate that the moral attributes of God are justice and goodness and mercy. Man was never taught what actions are pleasing to God; and he is utterly unable to prove that virtue is more pleasing to Him than vice. Much of this knowledge need not to have been revealed to him had man been placed in a world differently constituted from the present; because if virtue were uniformly followed by reward, and vice by punishment; if pain and misery and sickness were unknown, except as the evident and unfailing penalty of injustice; if no instance of suffering or trouble in the case of a good man were ever known to occur; and if a removal from the present state of existence were never attended with horror and agony save in the case of a bad man, the character and will of God might then be as unerringly ascertained as if He had formally declared them. But the truth is, that the world in which man is actually placed is a complete enigma, a tissue of jarring contradictions. Perplexed and distracted, he can arrive at no certainty; labour as he may, he is of necessity tossed on endless doubtings. Yet in such a world the Deist supposes man to be placed, not by babbling folly, careless whether an end be attained or not, but by consummate wisdom, which in every other instance carefully and effectually adapts the means to the end." *

In short, whether we consider the darkness of mankind; the confessions of the ablest of heathen philosophers

* Faber's "Difficulties of Infidelity," Chap. XX., Lecture II., pp. 39, 40.

that they stood in need of Divine illumination; the eagerness with which all spurious revelations have been received in all ages; the analogy of all our superior faculties which require something beyond themselves for their development; the innate and universal tendency in man to believe in the supernatural, and the consequent probability that such a tendency would be met by a supernatural communication from that "unknown God" whom men were ignorantly worshipping; the uniformity of the laws of nature, which without some such communication would cause men to forget the legislator, or the character of God as a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness, a belief in the improbability of a divine revelation is among the strangest of the many strange "*credulities* of scepticism."

But, admitting the necessity for this light in the darkness, let us consider next the object or purpose of any such divine revelation as would be most likely to secure in the best way the performance of man's duty to his Creator, for we shall thus be able to appreciate, under God's blessing, the full force of the arguments which prove the authenticity of the revelation which we believe to have been actually provided. "God is love." This is the first article of true Christianity, and must be connected with another, namely, that, in order to some adequate manifestation of this glorious attribute, a being at once divine and human was to act it out on a suitable theatre for its effective exhibition. Keeping this before us, we shall discover a unity of design in the works at once of creation, providence, and redemption. It is the key-note of the harmony that in heaven is to thrill for

ever the throng of enchanted listeners. It was struck in the solitudes of eternity before the world was, and the first response came from infant nature's earliest voices as they lisped of approaching man, that immortal creature who, it seems,* was the constant theme of their long predictive and gradually deepening song. Angels as they heard it might have known that it prophesied ultimately of Him who, in the purposes of God, slain lamb-like before the foundations of the world, would one day in human form make the prophecy a fact, and become an incarnate Redeemer. Man himself then caught up the strain; and, while his words made musical the new-born world with human speech, his very nature was a sort of prophet's harp strung to foretell of that coming God-man, in whose image he was created. Thus the grand overture began. Every tongue was attuned, and every voice kept time. But strange and jarring sounds broke in, and it seemed as if some demon of discord had changed seraphic music into a Babel multitude of wild and wailing cries. But "known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world," and for the permission of all this there was some sufficient cause, which for the present appears to be among the unfathomed secrets of infinity. Certain it is, however, that since the theme was infinite love, we could hardly have *felt* it to be infinite without a corresponding exhibition of its magnitude. But such an exhibition implied forgiveness, and forgiveness implied a wrong to be forgiven. It may be, too, that just as the Prince of Peace, when He walked upon the storm-wave,

* See *ante* pp. 8—10.

knew that when He had hushed the angry waters into silence adoring wonderers would exclaim, "What manner of man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey him," so the great Ruler of the melody knew that His skill would be felt to be all the more divine when, at His own will and in His own time, He had made these discords to cease. Or it may be, again, that He permitted them to be thrown in in order to cause them, like similar sounds even in the musical creations of man, to give in the end a sublimer effect to the general harmony. But these conjectures are hazarded in the perfect consciousness that even if worth anything at all, they throw no real light upon the depth of this inscrutable mystery. It is wiser, then, to leave it as we find it, sleeping in the unbroken repose of that bosom which hides in the "majesty of darkness," "judgments unsearchable," and "ways past finding out." Yet it is gratifying to know (as already stated) that what even revelation has not explained is rendered more than ever perplexing by those far wilder conjectures than any of the preceding with which infidelity has attempted the solution of this appalling problem. It is also gratifying to indulge in the glorious hope that when "the mystery of *godliness*" is fully solved, "the mystery of *iniquity*" shall also be solved, and that then the rapturous anthem of the saints in day, as "beyond measure astonished" they contemplate the wonderful consummation, shall be, "He hath done all things well." In the meantime the night song goes on, and above the din of conflict and the clash of hosts a listening ear can catch the melodies, which prove that the great key-note is after all faithfully remembered. We

have seen that as there were prophets who sung of the first man; so the first man, in his turn, was a minstrel who swept his harpstrings in honour of the second. Time rolled on. The voices of inspiration became louder and louder, more and more distinct. The seers' lips were touched with a live coal from off the altar of the seraphim, and their chant was ever of Him who should be born of a woman, though "His goings forth had been of old from everlasting." At last "the fulness of the time," though not of the times, arrived, and we know that then an angel announced to the shepherds of Bethlehem "the glad tidings of great joy," while the multitude of the heavenly host sung glory to God in the highest, "on earth peace, good will to men." Then could be seen proof upon proof of God's great love wherewith He loved us, and of the depths of the humiliation to which Deity *could* stoop to render its manifestation affecting. Putting for a time all the glories of the godhead into abeyance, Christ became man. His cradle was a manger; His home was the shore, or the desert, or the mountain; as man He taught, suffered, wept. His tears at the grave of Lazarus showed how He loved His friend. His tears at the sight of Jerusalem how He loved His country. His strong crying and tears at Gethsemane how He loved mankind. His words upon the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,' how He loved His enemies. Despised and rejected of men it was to man's good that His whole life was devoted, and never before or since has that world that loves and lives for little or nothing but its own, beheld a living example of God-like unselfish-

ness. Then the horrid hell-cry, "Crucify him, crucify him," broke from the burning lips of His infuriated murderers. He died upon the cross with the vilest malefactors, and if ever dirge was sung in heaven it must have been when bowing His head "He gave up the ghost." Yet this infernal discord only made more touching that "still small voice" that breathed a strain of heaven's richest music in the pauses of the thunder-storm. "Father, forgive them," then waxed into a louder cry, "It is finished," that is, the martyrdom of love is finished when He bowed His head and gave up the ghost. The worst was over. The crowd dispersed. The cross was taken down, and silence reigned over that scene of death. But He who died and was buried rose and ascended into heaven, there to intercede for his own believing people, and carry on the same ministry of love till the last of the saved "(a multitude which no man can number) is gathered in, and the vast assemblage out of every nation and kindred and people and tongue, irradiated all, with the beautiful light of heaven's eternal morning, join with ten thousand times ten thousand and thousands of thousands of angels, and with every creature which is in heaven and on the earth and under the earth, and in the sea," in pouring through heaven's whole cathedral one inspiring and universal chorus of "Worthy the Lamb, and blessing and honour and glory and power unto Him that sitteth on the throne and unto the Lamb for ever and ever."

Now we ask, "which is the more likely to *touch the heart*—a belief that all this is a sublime reality, or a belief that it is only a mere *myth?* The modern meta-

physical pantheist tells us that it means—what? God merged in the soul of the universe!—Christ in the *ideal* of humanity!—The INCARNATION in the union of the higher and lower principles of human nature! and the ATONEMENT in the reconciliation of those principles through struggle and suffering." Such is the misty abstraction into which, under the chemistry of rationalism, the heart-stirring story of human redemption evaporates. A frigid speculation thus takes the place of a truth, which, as a simple matter of fact, moves to the very bottom the soul of a believer. Now it is a mistake to suppose that truth has no other judge than the mere understanding. In the language of Pascal, "the heart has its reasons which the reason cannot always understand," but which may often be perfectly valid notwithstanding. In this case they are equally clear and satisfactory. Yet there are persons who cannot comprehend them, because such persons are deficient in those emotional tendencies which give power or even meaning to the argument. We would not refer to asbestos for a proof of the efficacy of *fire*, and so it is not to the love-proof spirit of a *mere* thinker that we would appeal for evidence, that through the felt power of the burning love of God a sinner's heart can be *melted*. But we can ask of all who are capable of grateful affection whether they cannot obey more cordially when won than when awed; when drawn than when driven; when warmly moved than when coldly convinced. We ask, whether there is not an eloquence far more thrilling and far more effective in that amazing demonstration of heaven's love, which the life of Jesus, as a literal biography,

supplies, than there could have been if that life had been merely the nucleus around which legend and fable incrusted the fictions of incarnation and atonement. We ask the whole rational world whether the one great duty of creature to creator is not obedience, and then we ask of all who have hearts and of those who have not, but have witnessed *the heart's power* over conduct in others, whether the truest, the steadiest, the most constant, and the most enduring, as well as the purest, the most disinterested, and the most exalted obedience is not that of conscience-guided *affection?* Now true Christianity assists us as no other system possibly can in the great conflict with sin by bringing the affections to the aid of the conscience, and making the performance of duty the result neither of eye-service alone nor lip-service alone, nor that of the mere form or the mere letter, nor yet that of mere terror or mere self-interest, but of the life, the spirit, and the heart. It takes for granted that the appeal to obedience is founded on a soul-inspiring reality, and therefore throws a meaning, to which nothing but the dedication of all that we have to the service of the glorious benefactor can give expression, into the touching words, "If ye *love* me keep my commandments." How utterly spiritless in comparison with this is the notion that the whole history of the Saviour as recorded in the Gospels is to be sublimated into the unsubstantial dreams of an airy idealism!

We utterly deny that any one part of our nature is always to be at irreconcileable variance with any other. The true system of ethics is that which teaches us how they can act together in harmonious combination. In

such a system then the affections must have their place. They can co-operate with a sense of duty, and whenever they do the result is, that moral harmony which ought to pervade the whole mental economy.

But it may be said "You bring about one union at the expense of another; your alliance is accompanied with a divorce; it reconciles conscience and the affections; but it separates reason and duty; it puts the understanding into exile and disgrace in order to put the heart at peace with the moral principles. The literal interpretation of the Gospel history does violence to the reasoning faculty, and that faculty is quite as much an element of our nature as any of those by which it is supplanted. The account of the Saviour as given in the letter of the writing, is incredible." But why, we ask, is it incredible?* It is only because to some minds absolute and unlimited goodness is incredible; just as infinity might be supposed to be incredible to the tenant of a water-drop. Take a culprit from the deep darkness of the prison-cell into the blaze of a burning sun, and, "blind with excessive light," he will not see that sun at all; and so it is the very magnificence of God's own manifestation of His own distinguishing attribute that to many makes that manifestation incredible; "as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are God's thoughts higher than our thoughts, and His ways than our ways;" and it is just because they are, that little presumptuous man pronounces them incredible. If the Divine attributes be infinite, why should not their manifestation be

* That is, the manifestation alluded to.

made to *prove* that they are infinite? and how could this proof be rendered so convincing as by the actions, the humiliation, the suffering, the agony, which it entailed. Suppose that God had merely *said*, that He was love, would human hearts have sent forth the same response as that of the penetrated spirit of an orthodox believer, who, on the strength of Scripture as a statement of actual facts, sees and feels that He is? Suppose He had left us to contemplate His character merely in the works of Creation. Alas! as we have said before, the astronomer has left his observatory, the chemist his laboratory, and the anatomist his dissecting-room, unconvinced even of God's existence. Suppose He had sent (as Scripture tells us He has) messenger after messenger with tongues of thunder and hearts of fire to preach His being and His attributes. The fate of many distinguished teachers shows us that Scripture may be credited, when it tells us of those messengers, that some were mocked, some were beaten, and some were martyred. Suppose that He had even singled out of all the cherubim and seraphim the purest and loftiest archangel; suppose that this rapt seraph, who adored and burned, had winged his way in glory to the earth; that the scene of his apparition were illuminated with the dazzling beauty of His radiant form, while the music of his utterances, and the power of his eloquence, arrested and riveted attention. What could he more, after all, than *preach*, not *show*, not visibly demonstrate the wonderful love of that mighty God who had made him His ambassador? or suppose that Christ Himself had taken on Him the nature of angels, and with an aspect lovelier

than pencil has ever pictured, chisel has ever sculptured, or fancy has ever imaged; nay suppose that retaining all the insignia of His own Divinity, and escorted by all the hosts that worshipped Him, He had taken up His abode in the grandest of all earthly palaces imparadised to receive Him. What then? why it might be acknowledged indeed that His visit was an act of wondrous condescension, but would it have equalled, or even approached in demonstrativeness, that astounding proof that He felt and profoundly felt for our miserable condition, which, by assuming our nature and dying—dying too on the cross, He actually exhibited? Grant then that God is verily love—grant that, of all kinds of obedience, that founded on love is the purest and most abiding—grant that such obedience can only be elicited by a manifestation of love to the creature whose obedience is demanded—grant that man is a *fallen* creature, and so fallen that unless this manifestation were obvious, startling, and stupendous, it might have been in vain—grant that the greater it was the more likely would it be to be effective,—and grant, lastly, that nothing ever was, is, or can be, *too* great for God! and the facts that God became incarnate, a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief, and was denied, betrayed, and forsaken, bound, beaten, mocked, buffeted, scorned, spat upon, and crucified, are not incredible. Let it be granted that all this was no hollow and theatrical pageant, but a *reality*, and a rational man may wonder and adore, he may cry with the witnesses of the Saviour's tears over the grave of Lazarus, "Behold how he loved"! He may ask his own heart whether anything could move him, if this has been

ineffective; he may be prostrate with self-abasement at the contrast between his own insignificance and God's omnipotence; he may interrogate Creation wherever in all its spreadings there is a spot that is likely to be vocal with responses to the goodness of its glorious architect, whether it can tell him that out of Christ there is anywhere a love like this; but he cannot say it is *impossible;* he cannot say it involves a contradiction; he cannot say it is too vast for omnipotence, too Godlike for God Himself, too sublime to be real, or too good to be true.

Now we do not deny that there may be other and even weightier reasons for the incarnation and atonement than the effect to be produced by mere manifestation. There is doubtless some necessary connexion between the facts themselves, and the ends which they subserved. The objects to be accomplished must in the nature of things have required the means employed as well as the exhibition of those means.* Nor would we for a moment be misunderstood to intimate that the history of Christ was intended *only* for a demonstration of the single attribute of love. It was also designed for a proof of His justice, His wisdom, His power, and His holiness. Still less would we limit the manifestation, were it only such, to the tenantry of earth. Who can tell but that it was meant for other worlds besides our own? Who can pre-

* We have never seen a satisfactory answer to the argument that, since a "God all mercy were a God unjust," He must manifest His justice as well as love; but how justice and mercy can be reconciled but in the way which Scripture explains we cannot conceive.

sume to say that it was intended only for those immortal but guilty creatures who inhabit the theatre of its exhibition? May it not deepen the devotion even of angels, for these are the things which they desire to look into? May it not act in deterring other creatures than man in various departments of the universe from the sins that would be their ruin? All that we contend for is that to act upon such a creature as man, as we actually find him, and to act upon him in the best way, that is, by fortifying his conscience through his affections, and making his obedience what it ought to be, that is, cordial, constant, and enduring; no mode but that of manifestation could have answered the end in view.

Here again, then, is an evidence for the necessity of a revelation. How could such a manifestation have been continuous? How could it have lasted till it survived the latest of mankind? Is it credible that Christ was to suffer visibly, and be visibly crucified not once, but always? Or can we imagine that the same story was to be acted out, then acted out again, and so on till all men had been in the situation of the Jews to whom He preached? The supposition, monstrous in itself, is the more so from the fact that the desired end could be answered by the simple process of *recording* what the Saviour once actually suffered. An authoritative book revelation of moral and spiritual truth is, therefore, not only possible and probable, but indispensable.

Now "whatever makes manifest is light." If then a revelation make manifest the love of God, it is light indeed. But we have seen that the love of God is exemplified most of all in the work of human redemption,

and, therefore, in the wonderful history of Him by whose life and suffering it has been accomplished. Our answer then to the question what is this "light in the darkness?" is obvious, and we reply, it is simply "*the revelation of Jesus Christ.*" It is not intended either to supersede or to disparage, but only to intensify the light of nature, and supplement that light with another which discloses far more than nature alone could ever have enabled us to discover. It was designed to shine progressively, and to culminate when, in the fulness not of time, but of times, "that blessed hope, even the appearing of the glory of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ,"* shall be realized, and the Sun of righteousness in the horizon of a long-benighted world shall prove that it is day. For the city (as St. John saw it in the prophetic visions of the Apocalypse) "had no need of the sun, neither of the moon (that is of merely natural luminaries) to shine in it, for the glory of God did lighten it, and the *Lamb* is the light thereof."

The light then is that which reveals the Saviour. Whatever doth manifest is light. Scripture manifests Christ, and Christ's love, God's great love to mankind. "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

This revelation was first traditional, then written, then incarnate, then spiritual, then uncovered, and at the last shall be what may be called apocalyptical. Like the natural light which may be refracted into all the prismatic colours, and yet always and only be light, it may

* This is the correct translation.

be separated into different manifestations of the Deity, and yet be always a manifestation of love, while, like the natural light again, which appears gradually, and would overpower us with its glare, were it to break upon us with all its splendours at once, it dawned in Paradise; grew clearer in the old dispensation; assumed a yet brighter aspect when Christ became incarnate; was more fully realized after the pentecostal effusion of the Spirit of light; emerged from a long eclipse at the time of the Reformation, and will irradiate the blessed ones who throng the golden streets of the New Jerusalem, as with the morning songs of heaven it ends the night for ever. At present it shines in the written words of Divine inspiration, and though powerless in itself, it is yet through faith, and under the teaching of the Spirit, "quick and powerful," a "discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart," and "mighty through God," as thousands of instances can testify. Its earliest ray appeared when the parents of our race involved themselves in spiritual darkness, and fell upon them while yet they lingered in that scenery of joy from which they were doomed to be banished. It was to enlighten them when—

> The world was all before them, where to choose
> Their place of rest, and Providence their guide.

It was to comfort them during their own life-long exile, and also to illuminate their immediate descendants. This ray was the promise that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head, and, as other rays were added, the light grew brighter and brighter. It was

placed upon a hallowed altar within a human sanctuary, and shone like a lamp in a temple, when Christ, consecrating mortal flesh, took our nature upon Him, making His body a sanctuary, and lit up its shrines with the glory of the Lord. It was symbolized to the Gentiles by the star that guided the Magi to the manger of Bethlehem. It kindled the fire-tongues whose radiance was glowing wherever the Apostles and their immediate successors preached Jesus and the resurrection. It entered the poor man's hut, and cheered him in the darkness of his sorrow. It fell upon the profligate in the midst of his revels, and guided the penitent prodigal heavenwards and homewards to a father's arms. It penetrated the palaces of the Cæsars, and showed a monarch's household "the Prince of the Kings of the Earth." It found its way into the temples of Paganism, and expelled with its lustre, idols, who, like the bats and the owls, their ignoble kindred, inhabited the gloom. It glittered on the Roman standards, and gave light to the legions where Christian soldiers battled with their spiritual foes. It stole into the fanes of superstition, and broke up the trance of the priestess, whose ravings were confounded with the voice of a God. It broke upon the amphitheatre, and ended its brutal sports. It guided the generous philanthropist to the homes of human wretchedness, and, kindling his sympathies at the sight, caused him to build asylums for the sick and sorrowful and destitute. It beamed upon the path of all human progress, and became the grand element of man's advancement in everything

> That exalts, embellishes, and renders
> Life delightful.

The storms of persecution but fanned it into greater brilliancy. The cataracts of blood by which its foes endeavoured to extinguish it but acted like oil upon the flames. It battled with the darkness again and again, but came out of every contest victorious. Other lights have long died out, into the gloom of the night they failed to illuminate. But this continues. It shines in many a region whose inhabitants were once asleep; in the valley of the shadow of death, and in many "dark places which were full of the habitations of cruelty"; yea, and will shine through all the live-long hours of night, gleaming and glowing through the gloom, like the radiant seraph on his way to heaven, "unshaken, unseduced, unterrified," who

> Long way through hostile scorn, which he sustained
> Superior, nor of violence feared aught,

and of whom we are told that

> All night the dreadless angel unpursued
> Through heaven's wide champaign held his way, till morn,
> Waked by the circling hours, with rosy hand
> Unbarred the gates of light.

THE NIGHT WATCHES.

"I will stand upon my watch, and set me upon the tower, and will WATCH to see what He will say unto me, and what I shall answer when I am reproved" (margin, "*argued with*.") "And the Lord answered me and said, Write the vision," (that is, when it comes), "and make it plain upon tables, that he may run that readeth it. For the vision is yet for an appointed time, but at the end it shall speak, and not lie; though it tarry, WAIT for it; because it will surely come, it will not tarry. Behold, his soul which is lifted up, is not upright in him: but the just shall live by his FAITH," Habakkuk ii. 1, 4. (See note in part I, p. 53, of this work); also Heb. x. 37. "When I * * * meditate on thee in the night watches," Ps. 63, 6. "For yourselves know perfectly that the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night," 1 Thes. v. 2. "What I say unto you, I say unto all, *Watch*," Matt. xiii. 37. "Let your loins be girded about, and your lights burning, and ye yourselves like unto men that *wait* for their Lord," Luke xii. 35; "and be not faithless, but *believing*," John xx. 27.

A PORTION of our present subject has been anticipated by the concluding remarks of the preceding chapter. But enough, and more than enough of it remains for separate consideration.

If the duration of man's past existence on earth, from the Fall until now, be a difficult problem, that of his future, from henceforward, is a profound mystery. For

this reason, the days of the years of his whole pilgrimage are measurable by no human chronology. Just then as an unknown quantity cannot be broken up into equal parts, this undetermined period cannot be divided into equal intervals. Yet, for the sake both of consistency with our illustration and the useful reflections of which it is obviously suggestive, this long lapse of time may be looked upon as included in "watches." It was into four measures of this name that the Jews in the time of our Lord marked out the period between sunset and morning; and if we divide man's right history into corresponding epochs, we shall find that the Church in each, according to the text above cited from the prophet Habakkuk, has been watching, waiting, and believing; watching the providence of God, and the signs of the times, waiting for further light either at the first or second appearing of the Lord, and believing that God's promises, however unlikely according to human judgment to be realized, are yet all "yea and Amen." There was need for this vigilance, patience, and faith in the times that are past, and they are perhaps more than ever necessary in the present.

The distinguishing characteristic of the first watch was degradation, that of the second preparation, that of the third alternation, and that of the fourth transition; and these we shall explain and consider as we proceed.

The sun had set in Paradise when its once happy possessors "from Eden took their solitary way," and the world's history ever since has been like a long succession of dissolving-views of night, in which gleams from heaven reflected from the "lesser lights" that "ruled," in the

absence of the orb of day, relieved or lighted up the darkness of the scenery.

The first of these watches begins. The spectre Death, of whom our first parents had heard ere their exile commenced, has made his first apparition, and the moonlight falls on the corpse of a murdered man! a brother has shed a brother's blood! Such is the first instance of human mortality, and what an appalling proof it affords of the rapidity with which the darkness has been increasing! It deepens as time draws on, "all flesh has corrupted his way upon the earth," and "every imagination of the thought of man's heart is only evil continually." Thus the spiritual firmament is growing blacker and blacker. Meanwhile, one watchful sentinel, supernaturally enlightened, sees the threatening aspect of the sky, and knows that the mass of wickedness which is now fermenting on the earth, will ascend in a copious evaporation, which is soon to be condensed in the cold night hours that are passing away, and then break and burst in a desolating flood on the thoughtless children of ungodliness. The rain-clouds now begin to gather in the natural firmament, and descend not as since in drops, but spouts, streams, and torrents; and the closing picture is that of an overpowering deluge.

But we shall not continue a mode of writing which can hardly be preserved with consistency. It is a solemn fact, and one that is told in Scripture in language which that of no human tongue can equal, as well as with a vividness which no human painting can impart, that this first watch (as we have called t), beginning with murder and ending with a flood,

was one that was characterized by increasing degradation, and closed with an appalling judgment. With that portion of the story of man which is thus included between these two remarkable events, every reader of Scripture is familiar, and notwithstanding all the attempts which from time to time have been made to disprove it, disparage it, or explain it away, we maintain that there is evidence enough to satisfy every impartial mind that it is literally true. We cannot enter here into the question whether the deluge was partial or universal. The language of Scripture seems at first to discountenance the idea that it could have been confined to particular localities; but judging from the *acknowledged* meaning of the *same* language in other portions of the Bible, we cannot reasonably doubt that it is capable of such a signification as would reasonably accord with the conclusions of geology as now understood, and which seems to prove that the Noachian deluge could not have extended over the whole of the globe. But of *some* deluge at a very early period of our history there is all the evidence that the oldest and widest, and most diversified, yet on the whole most accordant, traditions can supply; while of *such* a deluge, competent geologists have, we think, very clearly proved the perfect possibility.* The traditions in question, some of them orally transmitted, some committed to writing, are traceable in Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Assyria, India, China, Phœnicia, Greece, Scandinavia, Britain, and

* See "Testimony of the Rocks," where the whole subject is very fully considered.

America. They are traced in names, buildings, ceremonies, drawings, coins, sculptures, and medals; and so striking is the family resemblance between them all, that there can hardly be a doubt of their common parentage.* The difficulties connected with the longevity of the Patriarchs are not insurmountable,† and for that longevity very satisfactory *reasons* can be assigned. Neither on the supposition that the deluge was not universal are the difficulties connected with the ark and its inhabitants insuperable. There is nothing at all incredible or even improbable in the scriptural account of the wickedness of the age, and we can trace it to causes which abundantly account for it.‡ And if we put all these traditions together, they will be found to corroborate more or less forcibly all the following facts as recorded in scripture:—1. The prevalence, at a very early period, of the rite of sacrifice. 2. The longevity of the primitive races of men. 3. The great wickedness of the world at this era. 4. The existence then of persons who, either from their great stature and physical strength, or other causes, acquired much influence and power. 5. The existence of one righteous man in this ungodly generation. 6. The fact of some signal and disastrous deluge. 7. The pre-

* See "Kitto's Daily Bible Readings."

† See "Rawlinson's Essay on the Pentateuch" in "Aids to Faith." One of the reasons for this longevity, we must suppose, was that the traditions of the Creation and Fall might not be corrupted materially in passing from father to son. Thus between Adam and Noah there were only eight generations.

‡ See sermon of Robert Hall on the wickedness of man before the deluge.

servation of this righteous man and his family by means of an ark or ship. 8. The preservation, in the same way, of animals in pairs. 9. That there were persons whose names were Shem, Ham, and Japhet, the sons of Noah. 10. The resting of the ark on a mountain. 11. The sending out of a bird or birds.*

Geologists may tell us that the deluge was the result of physical agencies; but they can never demonstrate that it was not the work of a moral Governor. They may explain to us the natural laws by which it was occasioned, but they will still have to prove that the legislator has not employed them to punish iniquity. They may argue that it was not a miracle, but they will fail to convince us that it was not a warning. And though the mythical interpreter may endeavour more or less plausibly to explain away some of the different events by which the catastrophe was preceded, he may try in vain to resolve into fable the catastrophe itself. The lesson which it eloquently inculcates is one of which modern science and criticism have neither neutralized nor weakened the practical application. It is not the moral of an allegory, but the teaching of a fact. It is drawn from no dream of a fabulist, who would cheat us into virtue with vivid descriptions of fancied sin and visionary warning, but is founded on one of the most intensely real of all the occurrences that ever distinguished the history of the earth. And the same character belongs to all that makes it useful as a monitor. We

* See, for evidence of all this, "Kitto's Daily Bible Readings," "The Testimony of the Rocks," and the numerous authors to whom these writers refer.

speak but of *facts* when we say that at the time to which we refer, there had been in operation certain specific causes of iniquity which aggravated the wickedness of a nature which the fall had corrupted, and ripened it for the judgment of a righteous God; that public worship was then generally abandoned, that unsanctified, unsuitable, and ungodly marriages had contributed to extend and make hereditary the prevailing abominations; and that with the pride of a power which, whether physical or intellectual, or both, was gigantic, "the mighty men" and the "men of renown" in that day were intoxicated. We speak but of facts when we say that the same causes which were then, are still in operation, and that now there is, as then there was, a God, who visits iniquity with punishment. It may not come in the rushings of the hurricane and the flood, but come it will, unless averted through timely repentance. Similar causes will produce similar consequences, and man must rue his unrepented and unexpiated sins, it may be in this world, it may be in the next, or it may be in both, by the action of laws just as certain and just as inevitable as those which brought on the deluge.

Let us muse for a moment over the monotonous, yet expressive scenery of this conclusion of the earliest night watch. The cries of the drowning are hushed for ever, and the voiceless dead are wrapped in the same liquid winding-sheet. The storm fiend hisses not now in the hollow blast, and the dirge-like winds have ceased their moaning. The last sounds of all that once had life have died away, and silence sleeps upon the gloomy waters. Yet there is a sense in which the whole catastrophe speaks with thrill-

ing eloquence. Its language, translated it would seem into the traditions of almost all the principal nations under heaven, whispers warning to every generation. It is heard at this day by every child who, in a Christian land, can lisp its parents' creed, and cannot be mistaken by any creature who has an understanding and a conscience. Unforgotten when the last man has met his God, it will live in the everlasting recollections of the lost as one of heaven's neglected voices, conveying always and everywhere the same expressive meaning, "Though hand join hand, yet shall not the wicked go unpunished.

THE SECOND WATCH.

The waters have begun to subside, the clouds are passing away, the dove has returned with an olive branch to her resting-place, the inhabitants of the ark have disembarked, a token is visible in the heavens, and it may be considered physically as an instance of the natural laws of reflection and refraction, federally as a sign of God's covenant with Noah, and evangelically as an emblem of the Saviour who, shining on the drops of human sorrow, arches his light over the weeping clouds, and promises that to such mourners as believe in Him, those drops "can never be a deluge."

In this way might we describe the commencement of that period which may be called the second watch of this our spiritual night. It was a period emphatically of preparation. It was to end with the appearance of that true light of which Scripture was but a reflection, the light that was to lighten the Gentiles, and be the glory

of God's people Israel—"the light that was to be shining in darkness," while "the darkness comprehended it not." Its beams in all their real brilliancy were to be subdued and softened down in passing through the only medium through which men on earth could behold it properly in the darkness. It would have broken too suddenly on the beings whose sight was exercised only in straining through the obscurity that surrounded them, and have "made them blind with excessive light," had it not been shaded by that humanity in which it was enclosed. But it was "the desire of all nations," and the whole of the dispensation may be regarded as a series of preparations for its appearing. It became the subject of type and prophecy and song for many generations. Abraham saw it afar off, and was glad. It was symbolized in the ritual of the Jews, and the furniture of their temple. It was the subject of a monarch's psalmody, and the favourite theme of the "seers," who anticipated its shinings and described it in the glowing language of inspiration. Prior to its appearing there was a beacon city in the darkness, "and out of Zion the perfection of beauty God had shined;" but it was there only in emblem. The radiance which was therein concentrated was only that of the preceding lights, which were to illuminate till then the nations that were walking in darkness. But it was so situated that it spread widely through the surrounding gloom, and caused among the Gentiles a lively hope of some supernatural light from the East.* During this period the nations descended

* For some interesting remarks on the history of Zion, especially the southern point, or Mount Moriah, as the site of the

from Shem, Ham, and Japhet, arose, and began the fulfilment of that remarkable prophecy which foretold the distinguishing features of their future history. In fact the "germs of *all* future history are contained in the book of Genesis."* The dream of Nebuchadnezzar was

threshing floor of Auranah the Jebusite, where the plague was stayed, where David placed the ark and the tabernacle, whereon, in the following reign, the great temple was erected, and where, long before, Abraham had experienced delivering mercy when about to offer up Isaac; and for an account of the geographical position of Zion and its peculiar suitability as a city set upon a hill to diffuse the light widely through the ancient world, see "Sturtevant's Preacher's Manual," 1 vol. p. 466-8; also "Faber on the Prophecies." It is believed by many interpreters of prophecy, that the Jews, when converted and restored, are to be the chosen instruments of God for enlightening mankind; that they are themselves the best adapted of all people to be a missionary nation, and that Jerusalem is the most suitable of all cities to be a great missionary metropolis. Hence (it is supposed) the great importance attached in Scripture to the mere land of Judæa; see also "Horsley's Sermons," vol. II., p. 311, "Dissertation on the Prophecies of the Messiah dispersed among the Heathen." It is certain that "the expectation of some extraordinary person who should arise in *Judæa*, and be the instrument of great improvement in the condition of mankind, was almost, if not altogether, universal at the time of the Saviour's birth, and had been gradually spreading and getting strength for some time before it." *Ibid.* The natural conclusion is, that this expectation was founded on the prophecies of Scripture, and was part of that system of *preparation* to which we allude.

* In addition to the well-known works of Bishop Newton and Dr. Keith, we may refer the reader to an able work by the Rev. W. Hoare on the "Veracity of Genesis," chap. iv. Modern research has led to the discovery of so many historical, geographical, and philological confirmations of the historical portions of the Old Testament, that their authenticity cannot be disputed. See "Rawlinson on the Five Great Monarchies."

receiving its fulfilment in the growth and succession of what have been called the four universal monarchies, and we think it could be proved that He who was really "the Prince of the Kings of the Earth" had been employing them during the whole of the interval which we are now considering either in verifying His predictions, in executing His judgments, in propagating the hope of His advent, or in removing the obstacles to His appearing. At length the heraldry of the true light was seen in the star that guided the magi to the manger of Bethlehem, while angelic voices proclaimed "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth, peace, good-will to men." Then came the last act of this preparatory process in the preaching of John the Baptist, "I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, *Prepare* ye the way of the Lord." The same came for a witness to bear witness of the light. "He was not that light, but was sent to bear witness of that light." Thus "the fulness of the time had come," and we think that a valid argument for the truth of Christianity might be founded on the fact that such fulness had then actually arrived, whether we consider the period in question with reference to* the pro-

* I. To the prophecies, because we think it can be shown that our Saviour was born (1) at, or nearly at, the predicted *time*, that is, after the expiration of Daniel's seventy weeks, and during the last of the four universal monarchies, during the existence of the second temple, and before the sceptre had departed from Judah; (2) in the predicted *place*, Bethlehem of Judæa; and (3) under the predicted *circumstances*, a precursor in the person of John the Baptist, the pre-eminence of the tribe of Judah, the meanness of the Saviour's appearance, His birth and lineage, &c. &c. II. To the Jews, because the Mosaic economy had answered sufficiently

phecies, the Jews, or the world at large. The long course of preparation, by prophecy, by type, by the progress of knowledge, by the work of kings and empires, by heraldry in the heavens, and by heraldry on earth, was now completed, and the hope of the Church from sunset in Paradise till the era of the incarnation, that hope for which believers had been watching and waiting, and which, despite of long delays, had been the subject of their faith throughout, was at last accomplished. This watch was now drawing to a close. The gloom was deepening most over the land of Jerusalem, and when at its worst a horrible tragedy was perpetrated. There was a night cry of agony that started the very dead from their sepulchres, a deluded multitude thought the light a false one, and united in an effort to extinguish it for ever. This was *their* "hour and the power of darkness." Their cry was heard above the magistrate's voice for forbearance. The vessel that held "the light of the world"

the ends of its institution, and because the cup of their iniquity was all but completely full. III. To the world at large, because the period was peculiarly suitable for the advent of a Divine teacher, and the establishment of a new religion. The temple of Janus was shut, and there was universal peace. The two languages, Greek and Latin, were spoken almost everywhere throughout the empire. The empire itself comprised a large portion of the then known world, and placed it virtually under one Government. The wickedness of the world was great. That world by wisdom knew not God, and there was a general expectation throughout the world of the speedy appearance of some extraordinary deliverer from Judæa. For proof of the first, see Daniel ix. 24, Haggai ii. 7, Gen. xlix. 10. For proofs of the second, see Micah v. 2, compared with Matt. ii. 5, 6; and for those of the third, any uninspired history of the time. See also sermon on this text by Robert Hall.

was broken. The light itself had *apparently* ceased its shinings, and a mantle of local, but symbolic and most expressive, darkness covered from the third hour to the ninth all "the land." "The heavens in mourning stood," and if ever there was midnight on this earth, it was then.

THE THIRD WATCH.

"It is finished." Such were the memorable words of the Saviour ere he "bowed His head and gave up the ghost." He had come into the world to make atonement for its sins, and now that great work for which the principal events of some 3,000 years had been preparing, was accomplished, "He came, too, to give light to them that were walking in darkness," and the state of mankind in general at the period of His death affords a convincing proof of the need there was for Divine illumination. There are persons who, rather than believe in the necessity for a supernatural light, persuade themselves that the accounts which historians have given us of the depravity of this age are either utterly false or greatly exaggerated. But the facts which these historians have recorded are placed beyond all reasonable controversy. Let us look at the state of Rome, and Rome in that age was the world. There were Emperors; but after Augustus, the first four, of whom not one came to a natural end, were monsters rather than men. There were nobles, men of enormous wealth, and of whom one possessed an estate so vast that "navigable rivers as large as the Thames performed their whole course from their fountain-head to the sea without leaving his domain."

But they squandered their riches in the purchase of every voluptuous pleasure that could be bought in the world's metropolis. They could spend a thousand pounds upon a supper, and we know that one of them cast the fattest of his slaves into a fish-pond to feed his lampreys. There was a Senate (that is, in name); but the senators were puppets of which the strings were in the hands of the imperial despot, who moved them at his will. There were women of rank—"Rome's proud dames, whose garments swept the earth," and some of these would act upon the stage in lascivious dresses, or fight in the amphitheatre, and stain the sand with their life-blood for the public amusement. There was a populace that was awed into submission by the legions, or bribed into quietness by gifts and by shows. There were poets, and these reflect but too plainly the manners and the morals of the times. There were philosophers; but they "condescended to take a part in the theatre of superstition, and disguised the sentiments of an Atheist under sacerdotal robes." There were priests; but "all religions were considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful," while gladiators, slaves, actors, buffoons, and strangers, made up the rest of the population. From these and many similar facts we may judge of the prevailing character of the age. All this time there were a few men in an eastern province of the empire who were "turning the world upside down." But this calls our attention from the state of the world to that of the Church.

We saw that the second of the four periods into

which this portion of our story has been divided ended with an event of which no tongue or pen can exaggerate the importance. The third began with another which was at once one of the most extraordinary, and one of the best established * in all the world's annals. He that was crucified, and of whose death and burial there could not be a doubt, rose from the grave, and gave to his disciples a commandment to evangelize the world. Then came the era of the tongues—cloven tongues as of fire—to settle upon the assembled apostles and equip them for the glorious work of "Turning men from darkness to light and the power of Satan unto God." After a few years appeared an additional emissary of the faith. He was on his way to Damascus as yet a bigoted Pharisee, breathing out threatenings and slaughter, and charged with a commission to bring all the disciples of Jesus whom he might encounter, bound to Jerusalem, when, He that was verily Himself the light, threw the glory of His presence upon the traveller, and for a time blinded him with its splendour. An immediate change took place in the character and conduct of this extraordinary man.† But it is needless, and would be im-

* The Saviour's resurrection is capable of such convincing proof that some divines have not hesitated to stake the truth of Christianity on that fact alone. See four discourses by Bishop Horsley on the nature of the Evidence by which the fact of our Lord's resurrection is established. "Sermons," vol. ii.

† How the evidences for the truth of Christianity multiply upon us as we proceed! The conversion of St. Paul, first noticed we believe by Lord Lyttelton as a proof of the truth of Scripture, has often since been appealed to with great power and conclusiveness.

possible here, to enlarge upon his life and labours. It is enough to say that he was a chosen vessel to the Gentiles, and carried the "light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" along the whole path of his extensive and most eventful wanderings. But we must not omit to mention another Apostle who also saw the light Himself when "his countenance was as the sun shineth in his strength."

It is now more than seventeen centuries since, on a certain Lord's day, an old man was, it is thought, in a deep trance on a little and lonely island in the Ægæan sea, opposite to seven Asiatic churches, which were arched as it were in a sort of semicircle around him. He belonged to a certain religious sect who in those days were called by themselves "Christians," and by the world in general variously, Christians, Jews, Nazarenes, and the followers of "one Jesus," as they called Him who was crucified. These people were charged with all manner of crimes, but perhaps it is not too much to say that all that could be clearly proved against them was this, that they kept much to themselves, and assembled once a week, generally in some obscure retreat, where they partook of a frugal repast which had a certain religious meaning; bound themselves to abstain from all vicious practices, prayed, sung hymns, and departed.* But, without a temple, and using no pic-

* We are free to acknowledge that there may have been, and perhaps still is, a tendency to exaggerate the virtues of the early Christians. They were certainly men, not angels, and men in a very corrupt age—an age from whose faults they could hardly have been human, and yet been wholly exempted. But we contend,

tures, statues, or images, they were accused of Atheism; while their religion, though breathing the largest and the heartiest love, was unaccommodating and uncompromising. It allowed of no amalgamation whatever with Heathenism. It grappled unflinchingly with all the then prevailing wickedness, and it set itself in deadly antagonism against all the then prevailing idolatry, while its followers, steadily refusing to worship the gods, were called obstinate and impracticable. Hence the hatred with which they were everywhere regarded, and the persecution which they everywhere endured. Of this sect the Apostle John had long been a zealous supporter, and, therefore, to this island prison, among the rocks of Patmos, the reigning Emperor ordered him to be banished. But in this sequestered spot the future history of the Church and the world passed in mystic panorama before the aged seer's inward eye, on through a period of more than a thousand years, and on, still on, through all the dim and distant ages thence and still to come, till every buried generation of Adam's race have started from their sepulchres, and every purpose of God to man on this creation has been accomplished! *

that, though far from "harmless and blameless in a perverse nation," they were yet "lights in the world holding forth the Word of Life." At all events it can hardly be denied that the Christians described in the first chapter of the Acts of the Apostles contrasted most favourably with the world in general at the time. Even Gibbon admits the "pure and austere morals of the early Christians."

* Such is our view of the visions of the Apocalypse, and let those who in this generation despise "prophesyings" read "The Book of the Age," as it has, we think, most justly been called,

These and the other Apostles went about everywhere preaching "Jesus and the resurrection," and adding to the Church daily such as should be saved. The story of redemption reached the prisoner in his dungeon, the mourner in his house of sorrow, the poor in their humble habitations; and making converts at last among the rich and lordly produced the greatest revolution that the world had ever witnessed. Meanwhile the light was still lingering in the Apocalyptic Churches, illuminated as they were by the great source of light Himself, though in some it had lost its earlier lustre, and was about to be extinguished so as to verify in their succeeding darkness the predictions of Him who threatened them (unless they repented) with the loss of their golden candlesticks.*

Then came a siege of which the horrors are not more memorable than the consequences. Jerusalem was taken. The Temple and walls were levelled with the ground —not one stone was left upon another, and

> Cæsar's ploughshare o'er the ruins driven,
> Fulfilled at last the tardy doom of heaven.

---

the "Horæ Apocalypticæ" of Mr. Elliott. There are many students of prophecy who do not agree with him. But in our humble judgment, he has shown that the History of Europe for many centuries has been predicted in the Book of Revelation. Mr. Elliott's work is considered by some of the best judges to contain more profound learning, and close reasoning combined, than any production of this century.

* Who can read the account of these Churches in Revelation ii. and iii., and contrast it with the present state of the lands in which they flourished, without perceiving how signally their predicted doom has been accomplished.

All this was foretold, and with its accomplishment there began that strange paradox, the darkness that gives light. The Jews rejecting their promised Messiah, and groping in the search of one who had come and gone, became themselves the most eloquent, though the most unwilling of witnesses, to prove throughout the various regions in which they were scattered, and for generation after generation, the truth of the very religion which they rejected, the divinely imparted foreknowledge of the prophets who had predicted with such wonderful correctness their singular destiny, and the heavenly origin of that light which they unconsciously reflected on others, though they obstinately refused to behold it themselves. Light fell upon the blind and clung to them, so that they carried it along with them into the nations amongst whom they were a byword and a proverb and astonishment, and they remain to this day one of the most perplexing of all the many perplexing problems of infidelity.

We have said that the most remarkable characteristic of this watch was alternation, and for a proof let us now refer again to the state of the world. In the hideous catalogue of Emperors who, after Augustus, wore and disgraced the imperial purple, we meet with the name of Domitian, and after the death of this tyrant the golden age of Heathenism began. Of his ten predecessors there were only two—Vespasian and Titus, (and these were the best of them) who came to a natural death. Domitian was also murdered, and after him the world had breathing time and repose for eighty years. Five remarkable sovereigns occupied successively the throne

of the Cæsars, and under Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius the world was governed by rulers of wisdom and virtue. On reverting to the state of the Church we find a change there also. The light which was kindled within it had been spreading far and wide. It was scattering the darkness of Heathenism and bringing life and immortality to *light* out of the obscurity in which for ages they had been concealed. Its enemies were trying to quench it with the blood of the martyrs, but this only acted like oil upon fire, and made brighter than before the flame it was intended to extinguish. Thus it was gradually diffusing itself in every direction, and the time was approaching in which it was to be concentrated under Constantine in the heart of the mightiest Empire that human ambition had ever erected. But the earthly agents by whom it was conveyed were becoming more and more unworthy of their office, and the light itself assumed a false hue in passing through the discolouring media through which it had to penetrate. In most of the seven Asiatic Churches the glow of their golden lamps was becoming dim. There was a decay in the godliness that distinguished the earliest Christians, and already the clouds were gathering that were to darken and deepen into the gloom that in a few more centuries was to overspread all Christendom.* Nor need the reader of ecclesiastical history be reminded of the

* Speaking of this period, Milner says, "though it be more common to represent the most sensible decay of Godliness as commencing a century later, to me it seems already begun."

numerous heresies with which the Church was speedily distracted.

Another instance of alternation presents itself in the wonderful change that occurred between the last and severest persecution of the Christians, and the accession of Constantine as sole Emperor of Rome. That persecution began A.D. 303, and in the short space of ten years afterwards Constantine entered Rome in triumph proclaiming toleration to the Christians, and himself professing that religion. Whether the miraculous story of the flaming cross with the motto, "Hoc signo vinces," which he is said to have seen in one of the *literal* "night watches" before the great battle with Maxentius, be worthy of credit or not, it is certain that from this time the labarum or special standard of the Romans was adorned with the monogram of the name of Christ to commemorate a victory which he ascribed to the Saviour's intervention, and that he wrought a change in the outward state of the Church which is generally considered as one of the most memorable and wonderful of all the facts of history.*

* Dr. Adam Clarke observes that the final destruction of Jerusalem, and the Revolution which took place in the Roman Empire under Constantine, were the greatest events that have ever taken place in the world from the flood to the 18th century of the Christian era. "Of course," says Mr. Elliott, quoting this passage, "he means of a *politico-religious* nature, and if he had only added the Reformation as a third of the list, it seems to me that his estimate of their unparalleled importance must have approved itself to every one's considerate judgment." This triumph of Christianity was considered by contemporary writers as most astonishing. When Maxentius went forth to battle he went

Passing in this rapid survey to the time of the Emperor Julian, we find a Sovereign who appears to have used unsparingly his vast resources and acknowledged abilities in a vain attempt to resuscitate the fallen Paganism. We are not *obliged* to suppose that he was miraculously prevented from rebuilding Jerusalem, and thus, as he supposed, invalidating the prophecies of Scripture, any more than we are to believe that Constantine saw a miraculous cross; but we *are* obliged to suppose (for the facts are undeniable), that what the latter accomplished for Christianity the former utterly failed to accomplish for Paganism. How is it that though we should admit that natural causes account both for the success and the failure,* so many causes were then in operation to terminate the worship of the gods, and substitute in its place the worship of the Saviour? Can they have all been accidental?

Here was alternation again. Less than forty years had elapsed since Constantine pronounced the sentence of banishment upon the Heathen Deities, when Julian endeavoured to restore them, and persecuted, though

fortified by heathen oracles and relying on the heathen gods—the champion of heathenism against the champion of Christianity; and though Constantine's victory should be clearly accounted for by natural causes, yet this is only one of those many instances of persons and facts, which were continually *turning up* in favour of Christianity, and illustrate what Dr. Trench calls *providential* miracles.

* But may it not be gravely questioned whether the natural means and opportunities were not more favourable to Julian than to Constantine?

not at first, with fire and sword the Church which Constantine had established.

In general the conquerors of a country impose their own religion upon the vanquished; but the barbarians who overran the Roman Empire, embracing for the most part the creed of the conquered, conveyed it to their countrymen at home and thus contributed to disseminate the principles of Christianity.

But while the *conquering* Goths assisted in spreading the light, throughout Europe at least, a very different result might have been produced had the *defeated* Huns and Saracens been victorious. Herbert, quoted by Creasy, in his "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," speaks of the "discomfiture of the mighty attempt of Attila, the Hun, to found a *new Antichristian dynasty* upon the wreck of the temporal power of Rome at the end of the term of 1,200 years, to which its duration had been limited by the forebodings of the Heathen," while Gibbon says that if the Saracen conquests had not been checked, "perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet." Surely, in all these successes and failures, defeats and victories, prophecies fulfilled and prophecies falsified, it is not unreasonable to say we recognise the finger of God. If there were nothing providential or extraordinary in the spread of Christianity in these times, how is it that our modern missionaries though provided amply with all the means and materials for

christianizing idolatrous nations make comparatively so slow a progress?

But along with this increasing progress of Christian opinions nominally adopted, the light was shining on the whole with a diminished lustre. There was much heresy in the Church and it was distracted by bitter controversies. The darkness was becoming more and more profound, while false lights from the East in the gleam of flashing scimitars and the glare of soldiers' watch-fires were held out to deceive the nightly voyagers. And there was a long and disastrous occultation of the Gospel during that gloomy period which is generally, and notwithstanding all that has been said by some modern writers in its favour, we think justly, called "the dark ages." This was the era of spiritual despotism and of epidemic war-dreams of glory to God from the victories of the cross over the crescent—an era of blind credulity, and sanguinary fanaticism, of the wildest delusions, and the most flagitious crimes.

But God has never left Himself without a witness. Even in the gloomiest portion of this dark period, there is reason to believe that a succession of so-called "Heretics," who were most numerous in the valleys of Piedmont, and therefore called Vallenses, afterwards Waldenses, formed the connecting link between the primitive Christians and the Churches of the Reformation. They held the distinguishing doctrines of Christianity in much comparative purity; and the emblem of the Waldensian Church, a candlestick enclosed in a circle within which was inscribed the motto, "Lux

lucet in tenebris," deserves to be mentioned in this story of light and darkness.

At last the long obstructed radiance from heaven, which during these ages was intercepted by the densest vapours of superstition, broke out with unwonted lustre, and revealed again those hidden truths over which for centuries a haze had been gathering. The Reformation was just a recovered revelation of the Saviour. He had been concealed by a multitude of legends, and by the intervention of numberless images, relics, and objects of idolatrous veneration. But now these obstructions were about to be removed, and the light of the world was to shine once more directly upon that mirror of inspiration from which it was intended from the first to be reflected. The darkness through which it pierced was like that of a sepulchre, for "a heap of unmeaning ceremonies adapted to fascinate the imagination and engage the senses—implicit faith in human authority combined with an utter neglect of divine—ignorance the most profound joined to dogmatism the most presumptuous—a vigilant exclusion of biblical knowledge, together with a total extinction of free inquiry, present the spectacle of religion lying in state surrounded with the silent pomp of death," * and such had been the gloom that hung over the gorgeous ritual of a creed from which all real life had departed. But with returning light came a resurrection. The first printed book is supposed to have been a bible; and the press, already at work, became a reflecting surface from which en-

* Robert Hall.

lightenment was widely radiated; then human thought, cheered with the illumination of every kind which the new vehicle of all light was imparting, started afresh and with augmented vigour in its onward march to truth and victory. But the day was not to be yet. The conflict between light and darkness, which began ere the first of our race had parted from Paradise, was to last for ages on the scenery of his exile, and every successive night watch was to be marked by its fluctuations. Darkness had its victories. Quickly again dreams of fanatical enthusiasm followed, and partly even accompanied, the healthy exercise of waking intelligence,* while the world's history ever since tells us again and again of some nightmare on the nations. It required many centuries to banish the spectres of superstition with which an affrighted imagination had peopled the darkness; and when these had disappeared their places were too often supplied by another and a ghastlier creature of the night, the phantom of infidelity. Men whose names are now almost forgotten, the Deists of our own country, fabricated the rude weapons which German philosophers have since furbished up, giving them a brighter surface and a keener edge than they had at first.† But though the enemies of the truth were

* Every Protestant must blush at some of the excesses that disgraced the age of the Reformation.

† For abundant references to the proofs of this fact see preface to "Veracity of Genesis," note p. x. "It is necessary to remember this in order to obviate an advantage which the very vagueness of much modern opposition to Christianity would obtain from the notion that some prodigious arguments have been discovered which the intellect of a Pascal or a Butler was not com-

then defeated and their armour broken they appeared again under new leaders and with altered tactics on the battle-field. There were stars in the spiritual firmament, burning and shining lights in their day, but they were often occulted, and after reaching the point of culmination, set to rise no more, but to be followed by others which, in their turn, were to shine, set, and disappear. And if there were periods when some persons were casting off the works of darkness and putting on the armour of light, there were also periods in which the masses were rioting in the voluptuous pleasures of nocturnal revelry, and "disinherited of day" seemed to "forget there ever was a sun."

Thus with alternations of deep darkness and comparative light the hours of this third night watch, as we have called it, were passing away; and they came to a close at one of the most remarkable periods in human history. There arose a class of men who might well be called "the rulers of the darkness of this world," at the time, great leaders of the thought of the age, men of literary reputation and scientific renown. "There were giants in those days," and unhappily, like the giants before the flood, they filled, or helped to fill, the earth with violence. Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, Raynal, are names known to all the readers of modern history, and names with which we associate the great French Revolution; for though it would be most unjust to charge these writers and philosophers exclusively, or

prehensive enough to anticipate, and which no Clarke or Paley would have been logician enough to refute." Rogers—"Reason and Faith," p. 238.

even chiefly, with bringing on that terrible catastrophe, it was a consummation which they had no inconsiderable share in producing. They prepared the minds of their countrymen for that substitution of philosophy for religion which led to the adoration of a profligate woman under the title of the "Goddess of Reason," to the definition of death as an "eternal sleep," to the overthrow of all that was once held sacred in the land, and, indirectly, to the reign of terror with all its horrors and atrocities. Political causes of change had no doubt been long in operation before the voice of an infidel generation had been raised to banish, if possible, God from the earth. But when Atheism had set in, and the multitude were left to redress, in their own way, their own and their fathers' wrongs, there was no religious feeling to restrain the burning lust for revenge. *Infidelity* never whispered, forgive, "love thine enemies, do good to them that hate you and persecute you." The passions of an exasperated people were left to themselves, and Atheism rioted in blood. Who can doubt that then, at least, it was night? and who can doubt that, if ever a nation was dreaming, it was France before this awful visitation? Her youth, her patriots, her philosophers, her citizens, fancied that a golden age of reason, of liberty, and of love, was approaching. The human mind had shaken off, it was thought, its unnatural lethargy, and awakened from a nightmare to enter with a joyous activity upon the business of a hopeful morning! The idea of a millennium is not confined to the students of prophecy. Philosophers were looking at this time for an Apocalypse of reason, and seemed to anticipate almost

as bright a future as any of which the prospect animates a Christian, as he meditates on the glorious appearing of his Redeemer. The contagion of this delusive hope spread far and wide. It deceived many and many an ardent and ingenuous mind throughout Europe, and men whose hearts would have sickened at the thought of the coming atrocities, hailed with enthusiastic joy the state of feeling and opinion which proved to be their harbinger.* It would seem as if multitudes were everywhere under the same delusion, and many there were who had to rue the dreadful reality to which they at last awakened.†

But, as in each of the preceding watches, so in this, some in the midst of the darkness, like sentinels at their post, were on the look-out. Christians were here and there, and now and again watching, waiting, and believing, like Habakkuk on his tower. There were men who observed the signs of the times, saw in them proofs of the providence of God, quietly waited, though without success, for the Saviour's appearing, and preserved their faith unto the end, notwithstanding the trials to which it

* Mr. Burke has particularized Dr. Price, a Dissenting minister, who exclaimed in a sermon with reference to it, "Lord, now lettest thou Thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen Thy salvation." Mr. Fox, who spoke of it as "the most stupendous and glorious edifice of liberty which had been erected on the foundation of human integrity in any time or country." Note in vol. iii. of "Horæ Apocalypticæ," p. 1060, first edition. Mr. Elliott also instances Mr. Bicheno and Bishop Watson.

† "I know it," said Le Roi, in September, 1789, when some one attributed the impending disaster of France to the new philosophy, "and I shall die of grief and remorse."

was exposed. The second coming of the Lord was often the subject of Christian contemplation during this long interval, and *then*, as in the days of Malachi, when the Church was expecting His first, many were saying, "It is vain to serve God." Then, too, as in the same days, when the words of many were stout against the Lord, Christians had their trials of faith just as we have ours, and they that feared Him, "spake often one to another."

The ages of infidelity and indifferentism in England, and of Atheism in France, drew to a close, and thus ended the third night watch.

Then came a new outburst of light in the "era of Evangelical Missions," and from this we date

THE FOURTH WATCH.

It was to this period that, according to some of the best expositors of prophecy, there is a reference in that striking passage of the Apocalypse, "And I saw another angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach unto them that dwell on the earth, and to every nation and kindred, and tongue and people, saying with a loud voice, Fear God, and give glory to him." (Rev. xiv. 6, 7.) Certain it is that, just about the time in which unbelievers were endeavouring to extinguish the light for ever, it began to shine with unusual brilliancy. It was then that Mr. Wilberforce's practical view of Christianity caused in our own country a profound sensation, then that Newton, Scott, Milner, Cecil, Robinson, Simeon, shone in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, like lights in the world, and then, above all, that there arose some of the most remarkable

of those philanthropic and religious associations which have since been illuminating the distant provinces of idolatry and heathenism.

The Baptist Society, the London, the Wesleyan, the Church Missionary appeared one after another in quick succession, "like the Swiss Alpine peaks at day dawn, catching and reflecting on a benighted world the rays of heavenly light." Then came the British and Foreign Bible Society; "and meanwhile, the ever advancing maritime and colonial ascendancy of Britain, whereby every sea and land was opened to its ships, together with the consolidation of its vast Indian Empire, the increase of British commercial wealth, and the progress of science concurred to facilitate the great work of evangelization." Thus commenced the fourth, and, as we conceive, the last watch of the night; and if the prevailing character of the first may be denoted by the word degradation, and that of the second by the word preparation, while that of the third may be called alternation, we think that the characteristic feature of the last may be styled transition.

"Almost every age," says Sir Henry Holland, "has either given to itself, or received from posterity, some epithet, marking, whether truly or fancifully, its distinctive place in the records of the world. It would be easy to find and to apply many such epithets to the remarkable period in which our own lot is cast, abounding as it does in characteristics which distinguish it from any that has ever gone before. One, which we cannot doubt our own posterity will adopt, inasmuch as it affirms a fact equally obvious and certain, is, that we

are living in an *age of transition;* a period when changes deeply and permanently affecting the whole condition of mankind are occurring more rapidly as well as extensively than at any prior time in human history." "The philosopher," he tells us, "takes note of what is the great agent in these changes—that wonderful progress in physical philosophy which has placed new powers in the hands of man—powers transcending in their strangeness and grandeur the wildest fables and dreams of antiquity, and the effects of which are already felt in every part of the habitable earth. He sees the march of discovery continually going on; new paths opened; new instruments and methods of research brought into action; and new laws evolved, giving connexion and combination to the facts and phenomena which unceasingly accumulate around us."* To the same effect writes Mrs. Sommerville: "The period is come for one of those important changes in the minds of men which occur from time to time, and form great epochs in the history of the human race." The whole of the civilized world could not have been roused to the enthusiasm which led them to embark in the crusades by the preaching of Peter the Hermit unless the people had been prepared for it; and men were ready for the Reformation before the impulse was given by Luther. These are the barometric storms of the human mind."

"The present state of *transition* has been imperceptibly in progress aided by many concurring circumstances, among which the increasing intelligence of the

* "Lectures on Scientific and other Subjects: Progress and Spirit of Physical Science."

lower orders and steam travelling have been among the most efficient." ("Physical Geography," by Mrs. Sommerville, vol. ii., Concluding Remarks.)

Nor is the opinion of statesmen very different from that of philosophers; and the late Sir Robert Peel while fully acknowledging the tendency of men in every age to exaggerate the importance of their own, maintained that at no period were the elements of change so numerous and so remarkable as they were at the time in which he was living himself. But by no class of writers has this transitional and portentous character of the present generation been noticed so often and earnestly as by the theological. Expositors of prophecy have eloquently called our attention to the evidences of the speedy coming of our Lord, and all who believe and reverence the authority which tells us of that "word of prophecy whereunto we do well to take heed as unto a light *shining in a dark place*," will pause long and ponder carefully before they conclude that such a coming is improbable.

The portion of our story on which we are now touching brings us to times so modern that we cannot well continue it without adverting to the controverted questions of the day; and these we are anxious to avoid. One of the most imperative of all Christian duties at present is to unite in a common effort to defend the common faith. Alas! our numerous divisions prove but too clearly that it is now night. The great object of our spiritual adversary is to prevent us from profiting by the light that we have, and this he endeavours to accomplish by delusion, division, and diversion or distraction. He

deludes us by holding out the illusory lights of false doctrines and heresy. He divides not only by causing us to overlook the points of agreement, and exaggerate the points of discord between us, but by concentrating our vision on ourselves and our adversaries, and thus inducing us to forget the one great and common source of all spiritual enlightenment; while he diverts by distracting our observation away from all the more important objects which the light reveals, on to the comparative trifles of form, ceremony, badge, dress, posture, and outward observance. There was a time when divisions were more useful than mischievous. They caused opposing religionists to be a check upon each other, and by preventing any from altering the Scriptures, they helped to preserve in its integrity and purity the common standard of truth. They also contributed to awaken mankind from that religious indifferentism in which they were wont to be slumbering, and they have left behind them a memorial of exploded heresies which, from their pernicious tendency, are not likely, we may hope, to be revived; just as, at the battle of Aboukir, the stranded "Culloden" contributed to the victory by warning her companion vessels from following in her wake. And all this should be remembered when we are "argued with" by the enemies of Christianity who would use these divisions and discords in time past to prove that the religion out of which they arose cannot be of God. Nor need we be shaken in our faith if, in a modified form, they are permitted to continue. They may keep alive, as they have done before, that earnest feeling which is the only proof of

spiritual vitality. They may disturb, but commotion is better than apathy, just as the hurricane that purifies though it destroys is better after all than the treacherous and the deadly calm that sleeps upon a stagnant and a poisoned lake.

But the time has now arrived that would seem to demand concession without compromise, and zealous co-operation against a common enemy. If the sentinels are quarrelling among themselves, how can they guard the citadel? There is enough to show the absolute necessity for watchfulness on all sides without entering into the discussion of subjects upon which the most orthodox are disagreed. Leaving, then, such points as those which divide Pre from Post millennarians, and the High Church from the Low, let us reflect upon the duties which devolve at present upon every real Christian. Are they not, as they always have been, to watch, to wait, and to believe? Are not the signs of the times enough to waken our vigilance? The progress of infidelity and rationalism in this our generation is surely sufficient to warn us against sleeping at our post. Let us, then, stand upon our towers and "watch what the Lord will say unto us when we are argued with." The vision will surely come. It has come hitherto; for difficulties which, as stated already, once appeared insuperable, have since been overcome. The very sciences which have furnished our adversaries with the weapons of their warfare will furnish ourselves with armour of defence. We dread not their assaults. We court inquiry of every kind. Our struggle is for light, and we bid it welcome provided it be real, from whence-

soever it may come. It is the watchman's office to be always on the look-out, and take note of *every* light that is visible. It may be an "ignis fatuus," or it may be a guiding star; but whatever it is, let it be carefully observed. Forbid, O gracious Lord, forbid that thy rebuke to thy slumbering disciples should be applicable to all their successors! "Could you not watch with me one hour?" Who knows but that just one hour may bring on the morning? Or again, "Sleep on now and take your rest;" that is to say, the opportunity is now past and gone. I want you not *now* to be watchful. You have slept all through your portion of the night without once mounting guard; and now it is too late, for death has called you from this temporary scene of darkness and light to another of eternal darkness or eternal light, where watching can be needed no more.

But careful watching must be accompanied with patient waiting. It is good both to hope and quietly wait for the "salvation of God." There is a patience of faith as well as a patience of hope. The vision will surely come—it will not tarry; and *though* it tarry, "*wait* for it." Should there be objections to the Scriptures of truth which we cannot now answer to our own satisfaction, or even answer at all, let us not be premature in pronouncing them insurmountable. Might not the objections to Abraham's having a son, and his posterity having an inheritance in a country in which Abraham had no possession, have seemed to *him* insuperable? Who could have thought that because a Persian monarch was passing a sleepless night, the Jews would be delivered from destruction, or that because a

Roman emperor ordained a general taxation, the Saviour would be born in the city which Micah had foretold would be the place of His nativity? Was anything more unlikely, in the days of the prophets, than the doom which has since been accomplished on some of the populous and prosperous cities whose destiny they foretold? Even in matters of science, facts which were once considered fatal to some now established theories are at present appealed to as proofs of their validity; and with these and many more instances of the same kind before us, to show that what seemed impossible was found at last to be perfectly true, ought we not to pause and wait till the Lord in due time answers us, as He answered the prophet Habakkuk with a vision to be made plain upon tables, so that "he may run that readeth it"?* But above all it is our duty to remember the language of our Lord to Thomas, "Be not faithless, but believing."

The Church, as we have seen, has had in every age its trials of faith, and supposing that, as almost all students

* Herodotus seems to have doubted the truth of the account of the expedition ordered by Necho for the very reason which is now assigned for its truth. (See "Translation of Herodotus," by Isaac Taylor, note on p. 284.) Some objections to the theories both of Copernicus and Newton have shared a similar fate. It has been stated already that modern discoveries have reconciled the apparently conflicting statements of Daniel and Berosus. In adducing some striking instances of the minute accuracy of Luke, only revealed by obscure collateral evidence (historic or numismatic) discovered since, Tholuck remarks, "What an outcry would have been made had not the specious appearance of error been thus obviated?" Luke calls *Gallio* proconsul of Achaia. We should

of prophecy believe, this is the last watch of the night we ought not to wonder if such trials were likely to be soon more than usually numerous. For though "the vision *will* come," though at "even time there shall be light," though the "wise shall understand" when "none of the wicked" shall, yet the darkest hour may be just before the morning, and then the faith as well as the love of many may "wax cold." It is said, "when the Lord cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?"

But as there always has been, so there always will be, light abundantly sufficient for all the purposes of salvation. The "vision" of saving truth is already so plain that "he may run that readeth it."

Human language will not admit of such an answer to the question, "What shall I do to be saved?" or

not have expected it, since, though Achaia was originally a senatorial province, Tiberias had changed it into an imperial one, and the title of its sovereign was therefore procurator; now, a passage in Suetonius informs us that Claudius had *restored* the province to the Senate. The same Evangelist calls Servius Paulus governor of Cyprus, yet we might have expected to find only a prætor, since Cyprus was an *imperial* province. "In this case, again," says Tholuck, "the correctness of the historian has been remarkably attested. Coins and, later still, a passage in Dion Cassius have been found, giving proof that Augustus restored the province to the Senate; and, as if to vindicate the Evangelist, the Roman historian adds, 'These proconsuls began to be sent into that island also.'" (Translation from Tholuck, pp. 21, 22.) In the same manner coins have been found, proving he is correct in some other once-disputed instances. Is it not fair to suppose that many apparent discrepancies of the same order may be eventually removed by similar evidence?" ("Claims and Conflicts." Essays from "Edinburgh Review," Vol. II., pp. 324, 325, note.)

perhaps to any other of great importance in words that cannot be tortured into a subject for controversy. But we are at a loss to conceive how an unprejudiced person, if left to himself, and comparing Scripture with Scripture, could mistake the meaning of passages such as these, or mistake them so as to fall into material error—"By grace are ye saved through faith." "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ." "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." "He that believeth on the Son of God hath everlasting life." "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood."

This, the last watch, may, for aught we know, be rapidly drawing to a close. Then shall come the glorious Apocalypse of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and then indeed shall there be day. To the question, "Watchman, what of the night?" we answer "The night is far spent, the day is at hand." It was near in the days of St. Paul, and therefore it must be so now; but, in the chronology of heaven, "one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." Our notions of time, founded as they are upon the infinitesimal measures of duration by which we mark out the little intervals that divide one from another the most momentous eras of our history, are narrow and contracted, like our own limited perceptions, and therefore to us a thousand years may appear a considerable period, but to one, could such a one be found out of heaven, who could grasp the idea of eternity, there would seem to be but a span between the song of the morning stars

at this creation's birth and the Saviour's appearing to judge both the quick and the dead; nay, when even we, poor mortals though we are, compare the interval that must elapse between the time that is now passing away and the morning of eternity with that eternity itself, what is it but a span?

For these reasons it may be said with truth that there never yet has been a period in which the day of the Lord has been distant. The apostles describe it as even in their days, at hand, even at the doors, then what must it be in ours? Who can doubt that every Christian ought to act upon the text "Gird up the loins of your mind; be sober (temperate, that is, in every sense—temperate in expectation, conduct, and opinion, as well as in the more carnal sense of the word—temperate, therefore, on this very subject, one upon which so many have been extravagant, and one which is here, doubtless for this reason, connected with the duty of sobriety), "and hope unto the end for the grace that shall be brought unto you at the revelation of Jesus Christ." Yes, the day *is* at hand—at hand to every true Christian because his death is at hand, and death is the day to *him*, and at hand *perhaps* (we presume not to dogmatize) in another and sublimer sense; at hand to all, be they quick or dead, at the Saviour's appearing. There would seem to be, as it were, a dim streak of light in the distant horizon; and if we are right, soon, full soon, it will be brighter, so bright that, to those who are really watching, it cannot be mistaken. It must be, yes, it must be a gleam of our Redeemer's apocalypse! the border of a beautiful cloud that blushes already with

the gold and the purple of morning. And what magnificent ideas crowd upon the mind and struggle for expression at the thought of that joyous, that wonderful hour! Then shall many thousands of thousands of voices exclaim, "Lo, this is our God; we have waited for Him, and He will save us. This is the Lord; we have waited for Him, we will be glad and rejoice in His salvation." Then, too, shall be fulfilled, in all the grandeur of their *ultimate* and most glorious meaning, the promises of removal from His patient and faithful followers of all that makes to them the present dispensation night; all mist from their eyes—"He will destroy the face of the covering cast over all people, and the vail that is spread over all nations;" all want from their being—"The Lord of Hosts will make a feast of fat things: a feast of wine on the lees, well refined;" all mortality from their bodies—"He will swallow up death in victory;" all reproach from their characters—"The reproach of his people shall he take away from off all the earth;" and all sorrow from their hearts—"And the Lord God will wipe away tears from off all faces." Marvellous consummation! This, surely, this is worth waiting for. Yes, sooner or later, there shall come a time when the darkness of ignorance shall be dispersed by the light that, irradiating all the faculties of the understanding, shall enable the called and chosen and faithful to see as they are seen, and to know as they are known. Then, too, shall be dispersed for ever and ever the darkness of delusion. There can be nothing to deceive, nothing to mislead, nothing to blind, nothing to infatuate in that

eternal day that shall be bright with the glory of the God of light, of truth, and of heaven—"The light of the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb for ever." And then, too, shall be ended the darkness both of sin and sorrow. Into the heavenly city "there shall in no wise enter anything that defileth or worketh abomination" any more than aught "that maketh a lie." And as for sorrow: how can a solitary tear ever bedim eyes from which the last has been wiped away? —eyes that are to beam and brighten with joy unutterable and full of glory, on and on throughout eternity? And in that day shall be accomplished the blessed promise, "Thy sun shall no more go down, neither shall thy moon withdraw itself, for the Lord thy God shall be thine everlasting light, and the days of thy mourning shall be ended."

Thus our chapter of light was followed by a chapter of darkness, but this again should be succeeded by a chapter of light *and* darkness—light to the saved and darkness to the lost for ever! But if eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man the good things which God hath reserved for them that love Him—things which only God's Spirit revealeth, what volume could describe them but that of the Spirit's own composing interpreted by the Spirit's own enlightenment? that book of which the concluding pages tell us in words of sublimer eloquence than that to which any tongue but an apostle's could give utterance, of the City of Light, and the people of light, and the blessing of light, and the God of light—that city which hath no need of the sun, neither of the moon to shine

in it, for "there is no night there,"—"the Lord God giveth them light, and they shall reign for ever and ever."

The failure of the greatest poets that ever existed to represent in language sufficiently vivid the sublime enjoyments of heaven proves the utter futility of any human attempt to describe them. We can only venture to surmise the evils which they exclude and the sources from which they originate. Those evils are death, sickness, pain, sorrow, and, of course, sin, the cause to which they are ultimately traceable; while those sources are the glorified elements of human character under conditions which allow of their fullest, their freest, and their noblest operation. There must surely be a heaven, though it be the lowest, first of all in the magnificence of that celestial scenery, where eye and ear in the midst of beauty and harmony for ever minister to the mind within their appropriate enjoyments. There must, we may suppose, be another in the purified affections of a social creature as he mingles when he regains the lost image of His God with congenial spirits in joyous, unrestrained, and everlasting companionship. We may anticipate, too, an intellectual paradise in the discovery of inspiring truth, the solution of perplexing mystery, and the contemplation of never-ending wonders. We know that there shall be occupation to suit a nature that was made for action, as well as rest for one that was once sighing for repose. Nor can we doubt that all the higher sentiments of our moral being shall be met in a way exactly adapted to their capability of imparting the highest and the purest happiness; that benevolence shall be gratified with participated joy, as

multitudes surpassing all human calculation give utterance to their deep emotions of gratitude and gladness in song and praise and worship for ever—that justice shall furnish a dignified delight arising from the equity of an administration seen to be righteous everywhere throughout the universe—that gratitude shall be fed with all that can intensify its rapture in the contrast of present light with preceding darkness, and present joy with preceding sorrow; in the memory of dangers escaped, and the consciousness of blessing bestowed—above all that the devotional sentiment shall find its object in a world where God is everything, and everything, as it were, is God—the glorious centre of light without darkness—the great "I am" who is there all in all, ruling, enlightening, animating, inspiring, and, so to speak, *actuating* all things. But vague as is this general idea of that which in its fulness no earthly tongue can express and no uninspired imagination has ever conceived, it may answer, notwithstanding, one practical and most important purpose. It may teach us that since grace is an education for glory, we not only have the elements of all the moral part of this happiness within us at this moment, but, if real Christians, have brought them more or less effectively into actual operation. Death is a passage, not a plunge. It removes but it does not regenerate. It scatters no new seed, and only transplants the existing produce to another and more congenial soil. But as in natural so in spiritual vegetation like produces like, the tare can never ripen into the wheat, nor the wheat into the tare; neither can the harvest of the flesh be anything but "corruption," nor the fruit of the Spirit

be anything but "life everlasting." Thus our heaven or our hell is substantially begun upon earth. We pass to our eternal home, as death finds us, that is, with the same spirit, only in a new sphere and under new conditions. It is written "he that is unjust let him be unjust still, and he that is filthy let him be filthy still, and he that is righteous let him be righteous still, and he that is holy let him be holy still." How solemn then is the truth that if our hearts are unchanged by the Spirit of God we are making this moment that which, unless altered through repentance, must be our character for eternity. Often as we hear it said of a person who is utterly careless about spiritual things that "he lives for this world alone," the statement taken strictly is false. As well might we say that daylight dawns only for the morning, that the rose-tree buds only for its foliage, that the caterpillar crawls upon the weed only for its then existing condition, and not to prepare it for its last and loveliest transformation; that the life of the lordly oak is not lingering in the fallen acorn; or that the child who grasps with his tiny hand, watches with his widening eye, or gambols in his thoughtless sports, is not unconsciously developing the physical powers that shall ultimately fit him for the busy occupations of his after life. Nor is this all. It is not merely by strides, but by little and little, that we may be advancing into a state which the judgment shall make perpetual. It is not exclusively, though doubtless it is chiefly, by significant actions, good through the operations of Divine grace, or evil through natural corruption, that our character, and with it our doom, shall be de-

termined for eternity, but by every decision of the will, by every change of inclination, by every yearning of the heart, by every sally of thought, and by every dream of imagination; for each of those contributes its quotum towards the general result. Vague then as must be our notions of heaven's happiness, they are not so vague as to warrant us in making our incapacity to understand it an excuse for not endeavouring to obtain it. We know enough to be sure that it consists chiefly in a character that is to fit us for the enjoyment of its peculiar pleasures; that we have the elements of that character within us, and that, under grace, they can be exercised so as to produce a meetness for that inheritance of which our Redeemer has been the purchaser. Hence the unspeakable importance of the question, What are our present pursuits, pleasures, dispositions, and inclinations? And here is a test which can hardly be deceitful. We may be easily mistaken about our pardon, and flatter ourselves with the notion of a forgiveness which we have never experienced, but we can hardly deceive ourselves into a belief, that we are loving, and living for that of which, when properly explained, we are not, strictly speaking, even desirous. We can hardly believe against our own consciousness, and consciousness can make no mistake about the nature of our habitual wishes and desires. We are to aim at the attainment of an intelligible result, and one to which the evidence of an *existing tendency*, if there be one, is equally intelligible. It is indicated by the prevailing current of our affections, and this can be determined not only by the more remarkable actions of our lives, but by all the

little routine of our ordinary existence, just as the straws and bubbles that float upon a river serve to show in what direction the stream must be flowing, as well as those uprooted trees that are hurried by its impetuous waters onwards to the ocean. There is a sense then in which Christians may be said to be "*partakers* of the glory *to be* revealed." They taste in drops of that which they shall yet find to be an ocean. But over that fathomless sea there is now a mist: still the light that we have gives us a glimpse of its shores, and shows us the way to its scenery. Let us then walk by the light. "I am come," says the Saviour, "a light into the world, that whosoever believeth on me should not *abide* in darkness." "This is the condemnation that light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light because their deeds were evil. For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved" or discovered. "But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest *that they are wrought in God.*" Hail then all real light that can illuminate the darkness of our pilgrimage. It comes from Him who "is the brightness of His Father's glory, and the express image of His person." Rejoice in that holy light, all ye that make it now your guide. It will cheer you though every gleam of other joy be quenched in sorrow. It will irradiate your parting spirit when in death you see it full *before* you, and, therefore, cannot see the shadows—mere shadows all—that fall *behind* you on the landscape you are leaving for ever. It will come with an exchange of night for morning, of light for darkness, of sorrow for joy,

of watching for reposing, of waiting for enjoying, of seeing for believing. It will survive your mortal agonies, and mitigate your parting pangs; it will outlive your lips' last language, as they mutter forth a fond farewell to friends, and a final prayer to heaven, the tears that shall be shed upon your grave, the tomb that shall enshrine your ashes, and the monument, if any, that shall record your departure. Yes, hail now with all your hearts this blessed light. It shall be shining when that of your own earthly being has faded into darkness away; when that of the Saviour's Apocalypse has lit up the scenery of judgment; when that of the earth is the flame of a burning ruin, and, when it may be, that of the very sun and stars is extinguished,—shining, still shining, on and on for ever, for it is the light of immortality, of day, of joy, of heaven, of glory, and of God!

THE END.

WILLIAM MACINTOSH,

24, PATERNOSTER-ROW, LONDON.